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 Introduction 
 In the summer of 1866, Prussia and Austria went to war to determine 
who would be dominant in Germany; one battle, on July 3 at Könnig-
grätz, was suffi cient to resolve the issue, and the war ended less than two 
months after it started. In the summer of 1914, Austria again went to war, 
this time to establish dominance over the South Slavs; this confl ict lasted 
more than four years, with deaths in the millions rather than the thou-
sands. The contrast between these two confl icts—wars that appeared 
quite similar at the outset but differed dramatically in their eventual du-
ration and destructiveness—is hardly unique. To cite another example, 
in 1929, the Soviet Union invaded China, which was riven by internal 
confl ict, to secure its hold on the Russian Manchurian Railway; this con-
fl ict ended quickly and at low cost. In contrast, Saddam Hussein’s effort 
in 1980 to take advantage of Iran’s temporary weakness following the 
revolution in 1979 to advance territorial claims along the Iran-Iraq bor-
der dragged his country into what turned out to be an eight-year war in 
which hundreds of thousands of people died. 
 With the benefi t of hindsight, the relative severity and length of these 
wars may seem intuitive, yet for contemporaries there were good reasons 
to expect quite different outcomes. The outcome that occurred in 1914—
expansion of a localized dispute into a general European war—was pos-
sible in 1866: Bismarck’s policies were heavily infl uenced by the possibility 
that France or Russia might intervene on the side of Austria. 1 On the other 
hand, the conventional view of World War I has been that the initial par-
ticipants expected the war to end quickly and decisively; from this per-
spective, the trench warfare that developed was a complete surprise. 2 In 
the Sino-Soviet case, Stalin apparently considered using the confl ict over 
the Manchurian railway as a pretext to launch a broader war with the aim 
of replacing the Nationalist government in China with a communist one; 
Iran in fact (unsuccessfully) used the confl ict with Iraq as an opportunity 

























ultimately diverged dramatically, with some ending quickly and at low 
cost while others dragged on for year after painful year. 
 Indeed, the extremely destructive confl icts like World War I or the 
Iran-Iraq War are remarkably unrepresentative, as fi gure I.1 demon-
strates. This fi gure differentiates between long and short wars, where 
long wars last over a year, and between low- and high-intensity confl icts, 
where intensity references the  rate at which deaths accumulate. 4 Most 
wars are short, lasting less than a year; indeed, median war duration is 
about four months. Very few are both long and intense, as was the case 
in the World Wars and the Iran-Iraq confl ict. Yet these few wars are re-
sponsible for a disproportionate amount of human suffering: the 10 per-
cent of wars that are both long and intense are responsible for 86 percent 
of all deaths in battle over the past two centuries. 
 What separates the few unusually destructive wars from the many that 
are limited, either in duration or in intensity? The primary goal of this 
book is to answer this question. 
 The Argument Writ Short 
 My answer to this question relies on the observation that there are 
multiple logics of war. In the jargon of academia, war is characterized by 
equifi nality—there exist multiple independent causal pathways that can 
lead to war. 5 We can think of all of these paths as containing individual 
causes of war, with each cause being a reason why the adversaries in the 
confl ict would rather fi ght than accept peace on the opponent’s terms. 6
Figure 1.1 The frequency and destructiveness of interstate wars
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Each of these causes thus is individually suffi cient to bring about fi ght-
ing, although multiple causes may be at work in any real-world case. 
When we move from the question of why war begins to examining varia-
tion in its destructiveness, however, not all causes of war are equal. Some 
are relatively easily dealt with, as leaders or publics come to realize that 
the war that they expected is not the one that they are going to get. Oth-
ers push leaders toward increased war aims and a higher tolerance for 
the costs of war, with the result that it may take many battles and much 
suffering before settlement can be achieved. In rare cases, one side in a 
war takes settlement entirely off the table, guaranteeing that war will 
continue until one side subjugates the other militarily. 
 Thus I argue that unraveling the logic of different causes of war allows 
us to explain the variation in war duration and severity. In developing 
this argument, I work from the bargaining model of war, which I discuss 
in greater detail in the next chapter. In particular, I examine three causal 
mechanisms that are believed to be particularly important in bringing 
about violent confl ict: divergent expectations and mutual overoptimism, 
principal-agent problems in domestic politics, and commitment prob-
lems that generate an inability to trust one’s opponent to live up to a 
political agreement. None of these causes are new—it would be highly 
disconcerting if in the more than two millennia that war has been studied 
major causes had eluded our attention. That said, our understanding of 
the implications of these causes of war for war’s duration and deadliness 
remains imperfect. As it turns out, each is associated with a unique path 
from peace to war and back to peace, with the result that the wars that 
they bring about look dramatically different. 
 In particular, I argue, and fi nd, that commitment problems produce 
unusually long and deadly wars. Most explanations for commitment 
problems focus on shifting power: a country that anticipates relative de-
cline in the future must fear that its opponent’s rise will eventually allow 
that opponent to impose painful political concessions, as once the oppo-
nent’s rise is complete the now-weaker declining power will be more 
reluctant to fi ght. If the rising opponent is unable to allay those fears—a 
diffi cult proposition given the incentive for even hostile rising powers to 
claim that their intentions are benign while the rise is occurring—then 
war to prevent the rise from occurring may be an attractive option. The 
problem, however, is that if fear of decline is a cause of war, then war will 
continue until that fear is addressed, which will typically require either 
that the decline be prevented or that it come into being. Short of prevent-
ing the decline from occurring, a militarily undefeated declining power 
will typically prefer to continue to fi ght rather than settle. Moreover, pre-
venting a decline from occurring will typically require an unusually 
large victory, meaning that the declining power’s aims in these wars will 
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be unusually high. As a result, these wars can endure for a long time, 
even when fi ghting is quite intense. 
 Moreover, I identify a different type of commitment problem, which I 
refer to as the “dispositional commitment problem,” in which the belief 
that no agreement is credible exists not because of shifting power (a situ-
ational commitment problem) but because leaders conclude that their 
opponent simply is not deterred by the costs of war. An opponent that is 
by nature aggressive presents tremendous problems for war termination, 
however, as she can be expected to break any agreement as soon as it is 
convenient for her to do so. Thus leaders who sincerely believe that war 
is a consequence of an opponent’s character will resist settlement on any 
terms that do not permit the replacement of the opposing leadership 
and, frequently, the remaking of the opposing society. This dynamic is 
thus associated with demands for unconditional surrender, which, al-
though rare, are a feature of some of the worst wars in history. 
 I argue that the dispositional commitment problem—and hence a 
categorical refusal to negotiate with the existing regime—arises in a 
consistent fashion across cases. First, leaders who fear relative decline 
launch a conventional preventive war out of a belief that the target of 
their attack would otherwise attack them or impose unpalatable conces-
sions in the future. In these cases, the belief in the opponent’s hostile in-
tentions, while often understandable, turns out to be inaccurate. Attacked 
by an aggressive opponent who claims that her aggression is justifi ed by 
intentions that do not in fact exist, the target of the attack concludes that 
the stated justifi cations are simply rhetorical cover for a preference for 
naked aggression. Thus what starts as an aggressive war—given the 
initiator’s preventive motivations—becomes a war to the death. 
 That commitment problems, either situational or dispositional, have 
the potential to produce unusually destructive wars is the central argu-
ment in this book. That said, a convincing account of the variation in in-
terstate war destructiveness must also explain why noncommitment 
problem confl icts tend to be limited. I thus examine two additional 
mechanisms, which I argue are the most salient alternative logics of war. 
Both provide theoretically coherent explanations for costly confl ict, but I 
argue that the wars that they produce inevitably will be limited in either 
duration or intensity. In the informational mechanism, fi ghting arises be-
cause the two sides have differing expectations about how the war will 
go: for example, because they disagree about relative strength or resolve, 
and hence are unwilling to agree to each other’s demands. Once war 
begins, however, these expectations are put to the test, and at least one 
side inevitably must be disappointed by events on the battlefi eld or in 
the diplomatic arena. This disappointment forces leaders to revise expec-
tations, and hence demands, bringing them closer until settlement is 
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reached. Fighting thus inevitably leads toward settlement, more quickly 
when fi ghting is intense. 
 Wars driven by domestic politics—in which leaders resort to war to 
pursue policies that the public would not have chosen in their stead—
are similarly limited. The most prominent example of this sort of behav-
ior is diversionary war, in which leaders attempt to use external confl ict 
to distract attention from internal problems and thus improve the 
leader’s hold on power, but this logic also covers situations in which 
leaders pursue policies that represent a defi nite minority interest in soci-
ety more generally. While leaders can start wars that are not in the gen-
eral interest, their ability to continue them depends on whether they can 
hold onto power and avoid being forced into a settlement that would, 
after all, be in the interests of the leader’s constituents. A leader’s ability 
to sustain this kind of war thus depends critically on her informational 
advantage over her citizens: if she can claim convincingly that continued 
war is in the general interest, then fi ghting will be unlikely to end. As in 
the informational mechanism, however, the revelation of information as 
the war continues limits the degree to which the leader can plausibly 
claim that further fi ghting is in the general interest; beyond a certain 
point, orders to continue fi ghting will be ignored or overridden, or the 
leader will be replaced by someone more willing to negotiate. Once 
again, this process will happen more quickly when fi ghting is more sa-
lient, implying that wars driven by this mechanism can be either long or 
intense, but not both. 
 The Contributions of This Study, 
or Why Another Book About War? 
 Given the number of books that have been written about war, what 
can another one add to what we already know? I argue that this book 
makes a number of signifi cant contributions to our understanding of 
war. Most important, it addresses a question for which the fi eld does not 
yet have an established answer. Political scientists and historians have 
long been interested in determining the causes of big wars: the events of 
July 1914 or the Munich Crisis in 1938 have been minutely dissected and 
reinterpreted. They have shown by contrast less interest in relatively 
minor wars, given their more limited consequences. Yet by focusing 
primarily on the big wars, they have, ironically, limited their ability to 
determine what it is that makes those wars so destructive. Similarly, be-
cause it focuses more on the onset of war than its conduct or termination, 
existing work is poorly positioned to explain why it is that particularly 
deadly wars were so hard to resolve. 
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 This point becomes clear if we think about how existing work would 
lead us to answer this question. Clausewitz notes that left to its devices 
war tends to the extreme, but he provides little insight into why some 
wars become more extreme than others. 7 The Realist focus on systemic 
wars leads to a standard assumption that great power wars are unusu-
ally destructive, while non–great power wars are not. 8 To a certain extent 
this observation is true, of course, simply because the great powers have 
tended to have larger populations and thus be able to infl ict and suffer 
greater numbers of deaths. Yet not every major power war is particularly 
destructive: France and Austria fought a war in the nineteenth century 
that lasted less than three months and brought about “only” twenty 
thousand deaths, while the Soviet Union and Japan fought two border 
wars in 1938 and 1939 that have been all but forgotten by history. 9 More-
over, some non–great power wars have been horrifi c: Paraguay most 
likely lost over half its population in a six-year war against Argentina 
and Brazil in the 1860s, and Iran and Iraq fought an incredibly destruc-
tive war in the 1980s. 10
 More recently, a statistical literature has emerged that directly con-
trasts wars of differing duration and severity, but it has done so at the 
expense of compelling theory. 11 Thus, for example, Bennett and Stam 
fi nd that realist variables have the greatest infl uence over interstate war 
duration, while domestic political variables play a secondary, but still 
important, role. 12 With respect to war size, Cederman builds on an earlier 
fi nding that deaths in war follow a power law distribution to argue that 
war size is essentially random. 13 While empirically quite interesting, 
both these studies, and several others like them, do not address the cen-
tral question of why leaders sometimes decide to settle wars and some-
times decide to continue fi ghting: for Bennett and Stam, the central 
question is how long it takes one side to triumph militarily, while for 
Cederman there seem to be no political decisions whatsoever. 14
 Yet the question of why some wars end quickly while others drag on 
for years is extraordinarily important. A tremendous amount of work 
has been put into understanding how policymakers might prevent wars 
from occurring or promote peace in ongoing confl icts, yet without an 
understanding of why it is that wars differ in their duration and severity 
we are limited in our ability to develop defi nitive recommendations for 
how to promote peace most effectively. This point is especially important 
given the observation that war is characterized by equifi nality: a strategy 
that works quite well for dealing with one cause of war may be ineffec-
tive or even counterproductive for another. Similarly, a better under-
standing of the implications of different causes of war for war duration 
and severity may allow for better advice when it comes to the use of 
force. If we know, for example, that a given logic of war tends to produce 
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confl icts that are particularly bloody, we may be more willing to seek 
peaceful alternatives when that logic drives us to consider going to war. 
 At a far more prosaic, if still important, level, this study helps to fi ll a 
gap in the scholarly study of war more generally. In the past fi fteen years, 
theorists have developed an impressive structure of theoretical work 
based on the bargaining model of war; it is largely because of the attrac-
tiveness of this theoretical logic that this model has become so prevalent 
in the academic study of violent confl ict. That said, empirical applica-
tions and tests of bargaining model predictions have not kept up with 
the theoretical advancements. 15 As a result, we have not resolved dis-
agreements among different theorists, as with the question—discussed 
in the next chapter—of how long a war driven by divergent expectations 
should last. Moreover, an increase in the range of studies that test key 
claims from the bargaining model empirically will generate greater con-
fi dence that the entire theoretical framework is useful. From this per-
spective, then, positive fi ndings in this study can help to increase 
confi dence in a whole range of fi ndings that are similarly grounded in 
the bargaining model of war. 
 Clarifying T erminology 
 There is a signifi cant potential for terminological confusion in this 
project, so it makes sense to defi ne some of the key terms. With respect to 
theory, I discuss four different causal mechanisms, all of which bring to-
gether a number of related concepts. The situational commitment prob-
lem, which I also refer to as the preventive war mechanism, involves 
declining powers starting wars to forestall the undesirable implications 
of decline. The dispositional commitment problem, also referred to as the 
unconditional surrender mechanism, involves actors refusing to negoti-
ate because they believe their opponent is by nature predisposed to ag-
gression. In the informational mechanism, overoptimistic actors fi ght 
because of their divergent expectations about how the war will go. Fi-
nally, in the principal-agent mechanism, misbehaving leaders make use 
of their advantages in domestic politics to pursue wars that serve their 
interests rather than those of their constituents; this mechanism includes 
diversionary wars, but also other confl icts (which I refer to as “policy 
wars”) in which the leader pursues an interest other than improving her 
hold on power. 
 On the empirical side, I use the term  destructiveness to refer to all forms 
of suffering and devastation imposed by war. The most obvious indica-
tor of destructiveness is total deaths (which I treat as synonymous to war 
severity), but I also examine war duration and the economic cost of 
fi ghting. 16 The argument that certain mechanisms are logically limited 
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focuses on both duration and intensity, where intense wars are character-
ized by frequent signifi cant military clashes, or in other words by higher 
death totals  per unit of time . This concept is thus distinct from war sever-
ity (deaths for the war as a whole): a war could be intense but not par-
ticularly severe, as for example in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War, if the 
period of fi ghting is relatively brief. Finally, I distinguish between lim-
ited and unlimited wars, where wars can be limited either because they 
are fought at a relatively low level of intensity (e.g. the Vietnam War) or 
because they are relatively short, while unlimited wars are both intense 
and long. 
 Chapter Outlin e 
 The remainder of this book consists of three broad sections: theoretical 
arguments about the determinants of war duration and severity, quanti-
tative statistical tests of hypotheses drawn from those arguments, and 
case study tests of both those hypotheses and further inferences that are 
not amenable to statistical tests. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical argu-
ment, starting with a summary of the bargaining model of war and then 
advancing my explanations for both unlimited and limited wars. I begin 
with preventive wars driven by the situational commitment problem, 
explaining why these wars will tend to be diffi cult to resolve once they 
have begun. I then turn to the dispositional commitment problem, which 
leads to sincere demands for unconditional surrender. I fi rst explain why 
this behavior is a logical consequence of the belief that one’s opponent is 
dispositionally aggressive—in short, that the opponent enjoys war—and 
then provide a novel explanation for this belief, grounded in the way 
that the targets of preventive war interpret their opponents’ attacks. The 
fi nal section of this chapter examines the other two mechanisms, in each 
case explaining both the logic of the decision to fi ght and the reason why 
wars driven by the mechanism will be limited in duration, intensity, or 
both. In addition to advancing general predictions about whether wars 
driven by the different mechanisms will be limited, I also derive specifi c 
hypotheses for each mechanism that allow for more convincing empiri-
cal tests. 
 Chapter 2 presents the quantitative analysis. This chapter begins with 
a discussion of the appropriate research strategy for testing the hypoth-
eses developed in chapter 1, focusing in particular on the decision to 
combine quantitative and qualitative analysis. I then introduce the data-
set used in the quantitative analysis, which combines standard interna-
tional relations data with information collected specifi cally for this 
project. The main section of this chapter presents the statistical tests. I 
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start by examining variation in war destructiveness, measured in three 
different ways (duration, battle deaths, and total spending), and then 
turn to more specifi c tests that examine the speed of settlement or con-
quest, the choice of military strategy, and the nature of war termination. 
The most important fi nding is that larger prewar shifts in relative capa-
bilities, which I argue are proxies for anticipated future shifts, are associ-
ated with unusually destructive wars, in particular because these wars 
are unusually diffi cult to settle. Other results suggest that noncommit-
ment problem wars will tend to be either intense or long, but not both. 
 The remaining chapters present my case studies. Chapter 3 examines 
the understudied Paraguayan War of the nineteenth century, in which 
Paraguay—a buffer state between regional powers Brazil and Argen-
tina—launched an aggressive war against both of its neighbors that 
ultimately killed over half the Paraguayan population and that has puz-
zled historians ever since. I fi nd that this aggressive and risky policy fol-
lowed from a fear of decline created by its neighbors’ economic and 
military rise and by their incipient alliance. The case is particularly use-
ful for the analysis of dispositional commitment problems, as Brazil, but 
not Argentina, refused to consider negotiation with Paraguay; consistent 
with my predictions, the historical record demonstrates that Paraguayan 
fears of Argentina were well founded, but that those of Brazil were, if not 
unfounded, in fact inaccurate. 
 The next chapter examines World War II in Europe. The fi rst section 
focuses on the sources of German expansion, which I argue arose from 
the belief, grounded in Nazi ideology, that Germany faced irreversible 
decline absent the acquisition of most of Eastern Europe. Moreover, by 
the late 1930s, Germany’s rearmament and Stalin’s purge of the Red 
Army offi cer corps created a situation in which Germany would never 
have a better opportunity to address Hitler’s fears. Consistent with the 
commitment problem argument, Hitler had expansive war aims that he 
pursued through risky strategies and refused to abandon even in the face 
of military defeats. The second half of the chapter analyzes the Allied 
refusal to negotiate with Germany once the war was underway, focusing 
on the British decision not to negotiate after the fall of France in the sum-
mer of 1940 and the Allied decision to demand Germany’s unconditional 
surrender. Again, the dispositional commitment problem provides a 
compelling explanation, as the Allies, who obviously did not share Hit-
ler’s ideological theories of international politics, did not understand the 
threat that he believed Germany faced and certainly did not intend to do 
what he expected. Given this disconnect, they concluded that the Ger-
mans were fundamentally aggressive, and hence that only a thoroughgo-
ing reform of the German social and political system after Germany’s 
unconditional surrender would produce sustained peace. 
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 Chapter 5 presents shorter case studies of additional major wars, in-
cluding the Crimean War, the Pacifi c War in World War II, and the Iran-
Iraq War. These cases, although presented in substantially less detail 
than the Paraguayan and European World War II cases, provide an ad-
ditional opportunity to see the commitment problem arguments in ac-
tion. In the Crimean case, the British had strong preventive motivations 
for war that arose out of the fear that Russia was on the verge of acquir-
ing Constantinople; their aggressive war aims and reluctance to settle 
followed from this fear. The Russians, however, understood the British 
concerns and thus remained open to negotiation, exactly as I would pre-
dict. In the Pacifi c War, the Japanese concluded that signifi cant expan-
sion was necessary to forestall decline; the Americans, who failed to 
understand this fear, responded to the Pearl Harbor attack with the con-
clusion that negotiation with Japan was futile. Finally, in the Iran-Iraq 
War, Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of a temporary win-
dow of opportunity associated with the Iranian Revolution; the Iranian 
response was to launch an ideological crusade designed to remake the 
Iraqi state and thereby eliminate the dispositional threat that they associ-
ated with Saddam. All three cases thus provide further support for the 
arguments about situational and dispositional commitment problems. 
 Chapters 6 and 7 address the concern that a convincing explanation for 
large wars should also be able to explain small wars by examining four 
relatively small wars, which turn out to be driven by the informational 
and principal-agent mechanisms. Chapter 6 contains case studies of the 
1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1856–57 Anglo-Persian War, both of which 
match the expectations of the informational mechanism. In both cases, 
war occurred because the participants disagreed about relative strength or 
resolve, and in both cases the recognition of its errors forced the loser to 
make rapid political concessions that allowed for a quick negotiated set-
tlement. Chapter 7 turns to two cases—the 1982 Falklands confl ict and the 
1919–21 Franco-Turkish War—that were driven by domestic politics. In 
each case, the domestic political constraints identifi ed in the discussion of 
the principal-agent mechanism for war prevented the responsible national 
leaders from escalating the war as they might have wanted to do and ulti-
mately forced a political settlement long before the war produced destruc-
tion on the level of the large wars discussed in chapters 3 through 5. 
 Finally, in the Conclusion, I fi rst recapitulate the central question, main 
argument, and primary fi ndings of the study. The remainder of the chap-
ter highlights implications of my fi ndings for a number of signifi cant 
topics, including the study of civil wars, policies for encouraging the po-
litical settlement of ongoing confl icts, and the possibility for confl ict in 
the future, both between the United States and China and as a result of 
the continued spread of nuclear weapons. 
[11]
[1]
 Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Wars 
 War is, if not common, a persistent feature of international politics. Most 
wars between countries are, however, limited, lasting days, weeks, or 
months rather than years, and killing thousands rather than hundreds of 
thousands or millions. The few confl icts in which intense fi ghting persists 
for years, which I call unlimited wars, are thus responsible for a highly 
disproportionate amount of suffering. I argue that a good explanation for 
the most destructive confl icts should account both for why these wars did 
not end more quickly and for why other wars remained more limited. My 
argument is that unlimited wars are driven by a different mechanism—a 
different logic of war—from most limited confl icts. In particular, the com-
mitment problem mechanism lacks an internal logic that guarantees that 
opponents in the war will reach a negotiated settlement after some period 
of fi ghting, whereas under the two most prominent alternate logics of war, 
which I refer to as the informational and principal-agent mechanisms, the 
revelation of information through fi ghting ultimately creates a situation in 
which a mutually agreeable settlement is reached. 
 In the discussion of the commitment problem mechanism, I distin-
guish between two types of commitment problems, which I refer to as 
situational and dispositional. Situational commitment problems are as-
sociated with shifting power: in a situational commitment problem, de-
clining powers fear the implications of their decline and thus launch 
aggressive revisionist wars to prevent the decline from occurring. Given 
the centrality of preventing decline in this argument, I often refer to this 
explanation as the preventive war mechanism. The basic logic of 
this mechanism is quite well understood, although some of its implica-
tions are less well appreciated, and even well understood implications 
have not necessarily been subjected to rigorous empirical tests. Because 
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the mechanism is well understood, however, my theoretical discussion is 
relatively short. 
 The second—dispositional—type of commitment problem is less well 
understood, however, and thus merits closer analysis. In this case, lead-
ers decide to fi ght not because of fear of relative decline but because of a 
sincere belief that they face an opponent who is by nature committed to 
aggression, and thus that a viable peace requires at a minimum the re-
placement of the opposing leadership and possibly a thoroughgoing re-
form of the opposing society. This belief logically implies that almost any 
political settlement is unacceptable, with the consequence that only the 
opponent’s unconditional surrender is an acceptable basis for war termi-
nation. While the commitment problem logic here is clear, the reason 
why people come to believe that their opponents are implacably aggres-
sive is less obvious. I argue that these beliefs emerge when the targets of 
preventive wars misattribute the motivation for the initial attack. In these 
cases, one side initiates a war out of fear that impending decline will 
force unpalatable political concessions on it in the future. Their oppo-
nents, however, believe that the stated preventive motivation for war is 
merely rhetorical cover for a war of expansion, motivated not by the situ-
ation that confronts the declining power but by the character of the op-
posing leader, regime, or society. This belief is most likely when the target 
of the preventive war does not in fact intend to do what the declining 
power fears. It is this process that produces the refusal to negotiate that 
is a characteristic of some of the worst wars. 
 For both the informational and principal-agent mechanisms, the cen-
tral dynamic keeping war limited concerns information. In informa-
tional confl icts, the two sides in the war disagree about the likely 
consequences of fi ghting. Events on the battlefi eld and at the bargaining 
table confront combatants with developments that contradict their ex-
pectations, forcing them to revise their expectations of victory and to 
accept political concessions that ultimately allow for settlement. In 
principal-agent confl icts, leaders must lie to their publics to maintain 
support for the war, but their ability to do so diminishes as others in 
government and the public more generally observe developments in the 
war that contradict the leader’s claims. The internal limitations in both 
these mechanisms imply that, while they may account for many of the 
wars that we observe, they will not be individually responsible for the 
long, high-intensity wars that produce a disproportionate amount of 
human suffering. 
 The chapter begins with a short summary of the bargaining model of 
war, from which the three mechanisms are drawn. I then turn to explana-
tions for unlimited wars, starting with the situational commitment 
 problem and preventive wars and then turning to the dispositional 
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commitment problem and unconditional surrender. This discussion 
identifi es both general hypotheses about the destructiveness of these 
confl icts and more specifi c hypotheses that widen the range of possible 
empirical tests, ultimately allowing for greater confi dence in the general 
argument. The fi nal section examines the two mechanisms that are as-
sociated with more limited wars, focusing in particular on the informa-
tional dynamics that ultimately lead to settlement in each case. 
 The Bargaining Model of War 
 The arguments in this book are developed out of what has come to be 
the dominant framework used in the study of war in the international 
relations fi eld, the bargaining model of war. 1 This model starts from a 
few central assumptions about the nature and purpose of war and de-
rives the important implication that most of the time there should be 
political agreements that both sides in a dispute prefer to the costly gam-
ble of war. From this perspective, a cause of war is something that pre-
vents a settlement from being reached; theory has identifi ed a range of 
such potential causes. 
 The core assumptions of the bargaining model are that war is political 
and that fi ghting is costly. Both of these assumptions are generally ac-
cepted. Thus, for example, Clausewitz started his magisterial study of 
war with the observation that “war is merely a continuation of policy by 
other means”; in other words, war is the attempt to gain through force 
what could not be acquired through diplomacy. 2 But if war is fought to 
divide a political stake, and if diplomacy could also divide that stake 
without imposing the costs of fi ghting, then even people who disagree 
vehemently about the appropriate division have a strong reason to re-
solve their dispute without resorting to war. This fi nding accords with 
the empirical observation that there are many more political disagree-
ments in the world than there are wars. In contemporary politics, we 
have disagreements over territory (Israel and Syria or Bolivia and Chile, 
among many others), the pursuit of nuclear weapons (opposition to 
North Korea and Iran), economic or environmental policies (e.g., dis-
putes about plan to dam rivers like the Nile or the Jordan), access to natu-
ral resources (e.g., disagreements over access to oil and other resources in 
the South China Sea), the treatment of ethnic minorities (e.g., ongoing 
tensions related to the treatment of ethnic Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians, 
and others in Eastern Europe), and many other issues, yet wars arising 
from these disputes are rare. The puzzle of war, then, is why leaders 
sometimes fail to agree on a division of the political stake and instead opt 
to resort to force, with the costs that that decision entails. 
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 Many logically coherent answers to this question exist. Leaders might 
choose war because they disagree about the likely result on the battle-
fi eld, because they doubt that an agreement today would be upheld in 
the future, because they simply cannot divide the issue at stake without 
destroying its value, because they do not suffer the costs of war person-
ally and thus do not share their constituents’ preferences, because they 
are unusually acceptant of risk, because they (or their constituents) actu-
ally enjoy the experience of fi ghting, because they fail to coordinate on an 
effi cient equilibrium settlement, or because the costs of maintaining a 
suitable deterrent are higher than the costs of war. That said, some of 
these explanations are empirically more important than others. The re-
mainder of this section thus discusses these different logics, explaining 
why I choose to focus on the three that are central to my analysis while 
disregarding the others. 
 The three mechanisms on which I focus have been the subject of sig-
nifi cant scholarly research. The idea that war may happen when leaders 
disagree about how the war is likely to go draws strength from Blainey’s 
fi nding that mutual overoptimism has been present in a tremendous 
number of wars through history; it is thus unsurprising that this expla-
nation for war has received more attention than any other. 3 Similarly, the 
idea that fears associated with decline may bring about war has a long 
history, traced back to Thucydides’ argument that the Spartans started 
the Peloponnesian War because they feared the rise of Athens. 4 Argu-
ments about a link between domestic politics and war likewise have a 
long history, drawing on Kant’s argument that war happens because 
leaders do not suffer its costs, and building on a range of cases in which 
diversionary motives or other domestic political processes are believed 
to have accounted for one side’s decision to fi ght. 5 All of the mechanisms 
that are discussed in this project thus have been the subject of intensive 
prior inquiry, largely because scholars believe them to be quite important 
in the real world. 
 The remaining potential explanations do not meet this standard, and 
moreover for several there are signifi cant obstacles to their identifi ca-
tion in individual cases. Issue indivisibilities likely constitute the most 
controversial omission from this study. In practice, however, few issues 
are truly indivisible—even something like control over government can 
be divided through power-sharing—and even a dispute over truly indi-
visible issues can be resolved short of war if leaders have recourse to 
side payments. 6 The stance that indivisible issues are not particularly 
important has met some criticism, but from an empirical perspective an 
approach grounded in indivisible issues faces the signifi cant challenge 
that actors frequently claim that stakes are indivisible but subsequently 
proceed to divide them. 7 Thus, for example, rebel groups such as the 
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Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka long 
insisted on independence as an indivisible and nonnegotiable position 
only to backtrack to accepting autonomy once war turned against them. 
Given that people are ingenious enough to fi nd ways of dividing even 
the most apparently indivisible of goods, in practice convincing demon-
strations that indivisible issues prevent settlement are rare and typically 
arise not because a good is actually indivisible but because it comes to 
be seen as such. 8 Relatively few examples of this process have been ob-
served, however, and existing examples are drawn almost exclusively 
from internal confl icts. In a study of interstate wars, therefore, this 
mechanism can be safely discounted. 
 A number of other potential mechanisms exist, but all are ultimately 
problematic. Explanations grounded in a positive utility for the experi-
ence of fi ghting or risk-acceptant preferences both dramatically over-
predict the frequency of war and are thus theoretically uncompelling. 
For example, if war occurred because people enjoyed fi ghting, we 
would expect war to be a constant feature of politics, at least wherever 
those who enjoy fi ghting are found. From a more social scientifi c per-
spective, scholars have typically found explanations for ineffi cient be-
havior such as war that are grounded directly in preferences—people 
fi ght because they enjoy fi ghting, or because they like risk—to be theo-
retically unsatisfying. At base, they explain away outcomes that we be-
lieve to be undesirable by claiming that the people involved actually 
enjoyed them, an unsatisfying and, for an empirical perspective, typi-
cally unconvincing approach. 9 In this sort of case, it would be better if 
the preference were explained by a more general theory, as for example 
is done later in this chapter by demonstrating that the preventive logic 
of war provides a rationale to engage in more risk-acceptant behavior. 
Empirically, I am unaware of any cases in which scholars have made 
convincing arguments that a preference for war or a simple preference 
for risk led to war in the modern international system absent other, 
stronger explanations. 
 The remaining possibilities also have not been demonstrated to ac-
count for many wars empirically. The possibility that diffi culties coordi-
nating on an effi cient equilibrium might lead to war, while theoretically 
coherent, relies on the existence of multiple equilibria, making it very 
diffi cult to sort out empirically; it is unclear why leaders would ever co-
ordinate on an equilibrium that is nonobvious even for game theorists. 10
Likewise, the argument that the cost of maintaining a deterrent might be 
high enough to justify going to war is unconvincing at least for the mod-
ern era given the extraordinarily high costs of war, especially of a war 
that would be suffi cient to allow a country to abandon the need for sig-
nifi cant spending on deterrence. 11
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 Explanations for Unlimited Wars 
 The central argument in this book is that the most destructive wars are 
driven by commitment problems. I start by discussing the best-known 
source of commitment problems, in which a declining power fears that 
its rising opponent will make intolerable demands in the future and 
launches a war to prevent the decline from occurring. After discussing 
the reasons why starting a war under these circumstances may be ratio-
nal, I examine the ways in which such a war might end, highlighting in 
particular the absence of reasons why a negotiated settlement should 
necessarily become more likely over time. This argument, which implies 
that preventive wars driven by shifting power can be unlimited, has a 
number of testable implications for the destructiveness of war as well as 
the conduct of the war and the way in which it is ended. 
 The second half of this section then turns to a novel commitment prob-
lem logic that leads to a categorical refusal to negotiate with one’s op-
ponent despite unusually high costs. I argue that this behavior arises 
when targets of preventive wars conclude that the initiator of the confl ict 
is a war lover who will repeatedly attack absent a fundamental revision 
of its government or society. This inference occurs when the target of the 
preventive war does not in fact want to do what the initiator fears; given 
the inference, no negotiated settlement to which the initiator would ever 
agree is acceptable, leading to a sincere demand for unconditional sur-
render. Again, this argument identifi es a number of testable implications 
about when unconditional surrender demands will arise. 
 Shifting Power and Preventive War 
 The idea that fear of decline might lead someone to launch a preven-
tive war is certainly not new: Thucydides famously attributed the Pelo-
ponnesian War to “the growth of Athenian power, and the fear which 
this inspired in Sparta,” and just about every systemic war in the mod-
ern state system has been attributed to one side’s belief that time fa-
vored its opponents. 12 The rise and decline of great powers lies at the 
core of the power transition theory of war and of related cyclic theories 
of international politics. 13 There is thus precedent for believing that 
power transitions will tend to be associated with great power wars. 
More recently, work on the bargaining model of war has built on this 
logic, clarifying the reasons why war might be a rational response to 
decline. 14
 Historical examples of the preventive motivation for war are easy to 
fi nd. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 clearly fi ts with this preven-
tive logic: convinced that “time is not on our side” and that the danger 
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“only grows worse with time,” the government could not afford to wait 
for defi nitive evidence of Iraqi duplicity that might come “in the form of 
a mushroom cloud.” 15 Nor is this example unique in American history: 
one can point to preventive motivations in the American entry in World 
War II, and several leading military, political, and intellectual fi gures 
contemplated preventive war against either the Soviet Union or China 
after the war. 16 Innumerable examples from other countries and other 
eras provide further evidence that preventive motives, while often not 
acted on, are frequently present. 
 To understand why war might arise out of shifting power, it helps to 
start from the basic bargaining model observation that even countries 
with diametrically opposed interests will prefer to resolve their dis-
agreements politically rather than militarily: with the right settlement, 
both sides will prefer the political status quo to the costly gamble associ-
ated with war. 17 If power is shifting, however, the knowledge that your 
opponent prefers the status quo to war today does not guarantee that 
she will hold the same preferences in the future. If over time one side is 
becoming more powerful relative to the other, then as time passes it 
likely will demand more as a condition for not going to war. Indeed, a 
signifi cant literature has focused on the role of shifting power over 
time—largely as a consequence of differential economic growth—as a 
determinant of change within the international system. 18 Thus, for ex-
ample, once a unifi ed, powerful Germany supplanted the muddle of 
small principalities that preceded it, German demands grew to encom-
pass things in which they previously had shown no interest, such as 
African colonies (Germany’s “place in the sun”). This situation need not 
imply that war would inevitably happen in this scenario; indeed, it may 
well not. However, once the shift has occurred, the declining side will 
fi nd that it is in its interest to acquiesce in response to demands that it 
initially would have rejected. Thus, to continue the example, the other 
European powers found it prudent not to directly oppose the German 
acquisition of colonies in Africa and elsewhere, with the result that Ger-
many had assembled a signifi cant empire by World War I. In other 
words, once the power shift has taken place, the declining power has a 
choice between unpalatable concessions and war on more diffi cult 
terms. 
 Given the concerns that relative decline generates, the rising power—
which prefers to experience its rise unmolested—will often be trying to 
signal its peaceful intentions as clearly as possible, as for example China 
appears to be doing today. Yet precisely because the rising power wishes 
to be left alone until its rise is complete, even hostile rising powers will 
want to signal benign intentions; this possibility for duplicity means that 
the declining power may doubt the authenticity of the signal. Moreover, 
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in some cases rising powers may be unable or unwilling to signal peace-
ful intentions, even when an opponent’s fears are unjustifi ed. Prior to the 
Paraguayan War, discussed in chapter 3, the Brazilians did not signal 
benign intentions toward Paraguay, apparently because they believed 
their lack of hostility to be self-evident. Prior to World War II, Germany’s 
opponents—in particular the Soviets—failed to successfully reassure 
Hitler in part because they did not share his view of the world and thus 
did not recognize the threat that he perceived. 19 And more recently, Sad-
dam Hussein apparently felt unable to signal the absence of a WMD pro-
gram convincingly prior to the 2003 US invasion without simultaneously 
signaling weakness to Iran and thus inviting attack. 20
 Thus leaders who anticipate relative decline must decide how to re-
spond, often without knowing for sure what the rising power intends to 
do once stronger. In this context, there typically are no perfect policy op-
tions. If the declining power is confi dent that the rising power’s inten-
tions are benign, or if the anticipated shift is relatively small, it typically 
will make sense simply to accept whatever limited concessions are as-
sociated with decline. 21 Thus, for example, when initial expectations 
after World War II that Britain would be just as infl uential as the United 
States and the Soviet Union proved impossible to sustain, the British 
came to accept an apparently inexorable decline that saw the liquidation 
of the largest empire in history and increasing deference to the United 
States. 22 In some cases, as with the construction of NATO in response to 
the rising Soviet threat after World War II, it may be possible to build an 
alliance strong enough to deter core demands even after a shift has oc-
curred. An alliance strategy is risky, however: history is replete with 
shocking reversals in alliance structure, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact or the Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s. Alternately, in-
ternal balancing—shifting production from domestic consumption to 
military power—might allow a declining power to keep pace for a time, 
but in a competitive environment there may be little room for additional 
military expansion, while excessive production can have signifi cant eco-
nomic costs. 23
 From a formal perspective, a deal in which the rising power commits 
to an indefi nite continuation of the status quo—assuming that each 
power prefers the current status quo to war today—in return for being 
left alone will be preferable on each side to the expected utility of going 
to war. The problem, however, is that this agreement is not credible. 24
In effect, the declining power is making an immediate concession—
refraining from using force while it is relatively strong—in return for the 
rising power’s promise of future concessions—not taking advantage of 
its increased strength once its rise is complete. Having received what it 
wants from the agreement fi rst, however, there is nothing to prevent the 
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rising power from refusing to make its concessions in return; indeed, 
given the pressures of the international system, it may well be stupid for 
it not to. An intelligent leader of the declining power, however, must 
recognize these incentives and thus assume that no bargain of this sort 
with the rising power will actually work. In the end, then, declining 
leaders often expect diplomacy to yield the same outcome as simply 
permitting the rise to occur and accepting the consequent loss of 
infl uence. 25
 Given the limitations to diplomatic strategies, in at least some cases 
leaders will conclude that war is an attractive policy option. Specifi cally, 
a big enough victory in war potentially can resolve the declining power’s 
problem by preventing the power shift in the fi rst place. The declining 
power can aim to acquire militarily strategic territory that would make 
an attack by even a stronger opponent extremely diffi cult, or it could 
acquire territory that is critical for the other side’s industry. Thus, for 
example, one solution that the French pursued in the aftermath of the 
First World War to overcome the problems associated with the superior 
German economy and larger German population—which implied that 
Germany would inevitably recover from its defeat—was to either annex 
or render independent the Rhineland, which was the territory through 
which any German attack would have to come and which furthermore 
was the center of German industry. From a purely military position, the 
size of the Entente’s victory and especially the dissolution of the German 
army after the signing of the armistice meant that they were in a position 
to impose such terms; however, opposition from their Allies forced the 
French to settle for the demilitarization of the Rhineland. 26 Had they 
been successful, it would have been signifi cantly harder for Hitler to 
break out of the Versailles straightjacket and turn Germany once again 
into the sort of country that could threaten all of Europe. In general, if the 
declining power believes that it still has a reasonable chance of achieving 
a victory large enough to permit it to impose these kinds of concessions 
on its opponent, then going to war will be a potentially attractive option. 
This belief that recourse to arms may forestall the anticipated decline 
constitutes the preventive motivation for war. 
 To summarize, declining powers have few good options when faced 
with a potentially antagonistic rising power. Because of international an-
archy, diplomatic solutions are unreliable, while doing nothing invites 
eventual demands for concessions that the declining power either must 
accept or must oppose militarily from a position of relative weakness. In 
this context, forcibly imposing a signifi cant defeat on one’s opponent 
holds out the potential to resolve the entire problem in one quick move. 
Thus while power shifts need not necessarily cause war, they provide a 
potent motivation for fi ghting. 
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 How Do You End a Preventive War? 
 In those cases in which the declining power opts for war to prevent 
decline, however, they create a confl ict that is unusually diffi cult to bring 
to an end. For war to end, it is necessary that the problem that led to 
fi ghting be resolved. Thus, in this case, for the two parties to agree to a 
settlement it must be the case that the motivation to fi ght a preventive 
war either disappears or diminishes to the extent that disincentives to 
fi ght trump the desire to prevent the decline from occurring. As I discuss 
below, there are ways in which the motivation for preventive war might 
diminish or disappear, but none are guaranteed to occur. Indeed, in most 
formal models of war, when shifting power brings about war, the partici-
pants end up fi ghting to a fi nal military outcome in lieu of reaching a 
political settlement. 27
 For the war to end, it must be the case that the power that anticipates 
decline either be unable to continue to fi ght or see fi ghting as no longer 
in its interest. In a basic formal model of bargaining within a commit-
ment problem war, a round of fi ghting either renders one side in the 
confl ict militarily victorious over the other or leaves the actors confront-
ing the exact same situation as before, having simply suffered the costs of 
fi ghting. In this sort of model, if fi ghting was rational in the initial stage, 
it will remain rational in any subsequent stage (as the costs of fi ghting are 
sunk and should not infl uence prospective decisions), implying that 
commitment problem wars will only ever end when one side loses the 
ability to continue to fi ght. 
 In reality, of course, battles can change the relative situation of the 
participants without infl icting a decisive defeat on either side. The 
question is how much change would be necessary for settlement to be 
reasonable. Typically, addressing the sources of relative decline will re-
quire a major revision to the status quo, such as alienating productive, 
populous, or militarily strategic territory from an opponent’s control, 
replacing an existing government, or greatly weakening an enemy’s 
military. Thus, for example, the German fear of increasing Russian 
power prior to 1914 could be assuaged only through a dramatic revision 
of territorial control in Eastern Europe, as ultimately happened in the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which the Russians ceded Finland, the Baltic 
States, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine to German control or annexation. 
In the Crimean War, discussed in chapter 5, the British believed that 
preventing the Russians from gaining control over the Black Sea Straits, 
which would have uncorked the Russian fl eet in the Mediterranean and 
thus threatened British overseas interests, required that Russia cede 
most of its territorial gains around the Black Sea from the previous hun-
dred years. 
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 Such expansive war aims will be hard or impossible to achieve through 
a single battle. In 1914, the fi rst major battle on the Eastern Front—the 
surprise German victory in the Battle of Tannenberg—did little to ad-
dress the sources of Russian rise, which hinged on the potential power 
implicit in Russia’s population as well as military recovery from the sig-
nifi cant defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. It was only after several years 
of persistent defeats that the Russians could be convinced to make the 
concessions that the Germans saw as necessary for peace. 28 Absent such 
a victory, an end to the war on intermediate terms would simply have 
returned Germany to the strategic situation that had existed prior to 
fi ghting, when war was seen as preferable to peace. 
 This point should not imply that settlement is impossible. Large victo-
ries may address the concerns about decline that initially motivated the 
war, as the Eastern Front in World War I demonstrates. Alternately, a se-
ries of victories may put the rising power in a position to impose today 
the concessions that the declining power was fi ghting to prevent, or may 
render it impossible to achieve the victories necessary to prevent the rise 
from occurring. Once such a point is reached, there is nothing to be 
gained from further fi ghting, and the defeated declining power logically 
should be open to settlement. In the Paraguayan War, for example, Fran-
cisco Solano López demonstrated increased willingness to negotiate 
once repeated defeats demonstrated that Paraguay was not going to 
achieve the signifi cant victories he had initially sought. A similar situa-
tion could logically arise if the feared shift occurs in the course of the war, 
as, for example, in a case in which the target of a preventive war demon-
strates that it has acquired the nuclear arsenal that the war was designed 
to prevent it from getting. Another logical possibility is that if fi ghting 
destroys the value of the good over which participants are fi ghting, set-
tlement may eventually become possible as the future concessions be-
come relatively painless. 29
 Any of these scenarios could potentially arise, and indeed in some 
cases may arise relatively quickly. It is also, of course, possible that one 
side in the confl ict quickly achieves a decisive military victory, as with 
the American conquest of Iraq in 2003, which allowed the Americans as 
occupiers to address their concerns about the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. 30 None, however, are  necessary : if the military course of the war 
is such that the declining power fails to achieve the revisions necessary 
to prevent the decline from occurring and yet still believes those revi-
sions to be possible, it is likely that they will wish to continue the war. 
Moreover, the expansive war aims that are typically required to prevent 
the feared decline imply that even fairly signifi cant military victories 
may be insuffi cient to address the commitment problem concerns. At 
some point, of course, the participants will exhaust themselves—in the 
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limit, everyone will be dead—but well before this point is reached the 
war will have graduated from the limited to the large. 
 It is important that I be explicit about one aspect of this argument. 
I am not claiming that preventive wars are necessarily unusually de-
structive—cases like the conventional phase of the 2003 Iraq War provide 
obvious counterexamples to such a hypothesis. Instead, my argument is 
that there is nothing in the logic of this mechanism that  prevents these 
wars from being so destructive. Figure 1.1 illustrates this argument 
graphically: in an interstate context, commitment problem wars will be 
fought intensely, but may not be long if one side is able to achieve a quick 
and decisive victory. 31 By itself, therefore, this argument implies only 
that the commitment problem mechanism provides a logically coherent 
explanation for unusually destructive wars. The stronger argument that 
unusually destructive wars will tend to be driven by the commitment 
problem mechanism thus is incomplete without the argument, which I 
advance in the fi nal section of this chapter, that alternate logics of war are 
necessarily limited. In this sense, the logic behind the core argument that 
commitment problem wars will tend to be unusually destructive is as yet 
incomplete; I nonetheless present that argument here while acknowledg-
ing the need for further discussion of other mechanisms. 
 Hypothesis 1: Preventive wars will frequently be unusually destructive. 
 In addition to this central prediction, a closer examination of the logic of 
preventive wars uncovers a number of additional hypotheses; while the 














Figure 1.1 Commitment problem wars and war duration and intensity
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war, support for these ancillary hypotheses should increase our confi -
dence in the explanation for particularly destructive wars by demon-
strating that the preventive war mechanism is operating in the manner 
that theory predicts. Thus one relatively straightforward implication is 
that in preventive wars the declining power will frequently have unusu-
ally large war aims. 32 Addressing the preventive motivation, as noted 
above, will typically require substantial modifi cations to the status quo 
that address the source of the feared rise; absent such success, the prob-
lems that led to war in the fi rst place will not be resolved. This require-
ment is a reason why such wars will tend to be rare, but it also provides 
a rationale for relatively large war aims, as with the German desire in 
1914 to make major territorial gains at Russia’s expense. The contrast 
between American war aims in the Persian Gulf War and the 2003 inva-
sion of Iraq is also informative. In the former case, as discussed in chap-
ter 6, the informational mechanism accounted for fi ghting, and the 
United States, although committed to limiting the threat Iraq posed to its 
region, restricted its war aims by refraining from deep drives into Iraq or 
direct attempts to topple Saddam. In 2003, however, the fears associated 
with the belief that Iraq was nearing acquisition of nuclear weapons 
could be addressed only through occupation and regime change, hence 
the coalition’s willingness to pursue goals that had been seen as too 
costly or risky twelve years previously. 
 Hypothesis 1a: In confl icts driven by the preventive war mechanism, the 
declining power’s war aims will tend to be unusually large. 
 These large aims, however, are often beyond what the declining power 
would expect to achieve in a typical war. Thus, for example, in the Para-
guayan War case discussed below, a fear of future decline led Francisco 
Solano López to launch a highly aggressive war against both Brazil and 
Argentina, the great powers of South America; although he had some 
reasons for optimism, such a war would not typically be seen as a good 
gamble for a buffer state like Paraguay. Leaders thus will frequently 
need to resort to unusually risky war plans to have a reasonable chance 
of achieving such goals. In the Paraguayan War, these risks manifested 
as deep incursions into hostile territory, where elite forces were at risk of 
being cut off and forced to capitulate, as well as a risky diplomatic strat-
egy of provoking war with Argentina in the hope that several disaf-
fected Argentine provinces would rally to Paraguay’s side. Similarly, 
the conventional interpretation of German strategy in World War I high-
lights the riskiness of the Schlieffen Plan, in which the Germans left the 
eastern frontier weakly defended while striving to knock France out of 
the war in the fi rst six weeks; the subsequent shift in 1917 to unrestricted 
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submarine warfare was also recognized to involve great risks for 
Germany. 33
 Hypothesis 1b: In confl icts driven by the preventive war mechanism, the 
declining power will tend to adopt unusually risky strategies. 
 All the previous hypotheses in turn imply that confl icts driven by the 
preventive war mechanism will tend to end in military conquest rather 
than a negotiated settlement. Most obviously, resistance to volun-
tary war termination—negotiated settlement—makes involuntary war 
termination—conquest—more likely. The recourse to risky strategies 
amplifi es this point, as the risky strategies that the declining power is 
willing to adopt may produce decisive military breakthroughs or cata-
strophic defeats. Relatedly, these arguments imply that the increase in 
the destructiveness of preventive wars will be primarily a consequence 
of the diffi culty participants face identifying a mutually agreeable settle-
ment rather than anything about the speed with which one side conquers 
the other militarily; indeed, if anything, these wars should manifest 
faster conquest. 
 Hypothesis 1c: Confl icts driven by the preventive war mechanism will be 
unusually likely to end through military conquest as opposed to 
settlement. 
 Hypothesis 1d: Preventive wars will take an unusually long time to 
reach settlement, but will if anything be associated with quicker military 
conquest. 
 Before moving on, I need to briefl y distinguish among several different 
ways in which shifting power might be associated with war, only some 
of which are likely to produce these sorts of high-cost, high-risk confl icts. 
The most obvious scenario is one in which one country is consistently 
rising in power relative to another, as with the rise of China relative to 
the United States today. Alternately, one country’s sudden decrease in 
relative capabilities may create a temporary window of opportunity for 
an opponent, as with purges after the Iranian Revolution that weakened 
Iran relative to Iraq. A third possibility covers situations in which control 
over a particular good—most frequently strategically located territory—
could generate a discontinuous shift in relative capabilities. The Crimean 
War provides a pertinent example: the British feared that Russian acqui-
sition of Constantinople would dramatically shift the regional distribu-
tion of power by allowing Russia to exclude enemies from the Black Sea 
and to project power into the Mediterranean. All of these situations pro-
duce incentives to engage in the sorts of preventive war described here. 
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 By contrast, two other scenarios in which anticipated power shifts may 
infl uence policy do not produce the dynamics that I describe here. Pre-
emptive wars, in which one side begins a war to take advantage of fi rst-
strike advantages because it expects its opponent to attack in a matter of 
days, logically involve shifting power—the fi rst-strike advantage—in 
the decision to start the war. That said, preemptive wars are empirically 
rare and occur only when war was already very likely to occur. 34 The 
way in which the war is fought thus depends on what mechanism 
brought the opponents to the brink of war initially: preemption in the 
context of the preventive motivation for war may produce a large con-
fl ict, but preemption when the initial motivation for fi ghting is disagree-
ment about relative strength or relative resolve is likely to be associated 
with a more limited war. Second, sometimes developments within a war 
create an anticipation of future military shifts, for example because one 
side’s army is vulnerable. In this situation, the side with a military ad-
vantage will have an additional incentive not to settle until after the an-
ticipated defeat has been imposed. Thus, for example, once the Soviets 
encircled the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in World War II, they 
would have resisted a settlement that allowed the Germans to escape. 
Similarly, the seizure during war of strategic territory whose full utiliza-
tion would affect the future balance of power, as with the American sei-
zure of the Philippines in the Spanish-American War or the Iraqi control 
of Kuwait (and hence Kuwaiti oil) in the Persian Gulf War, can compli-
cate negotiations by rendering some possible agreements unsatisfactory, 
but leaders will be much more willing to negotiate away these advan-
tages when they are not the central problem at stake in the war. While 
these sorts of developments may marginally lengthen a war, the broader 
dynamics of the war will again depend on the mechanism that led to 
fi ghting in the fi rst place. 
 Commitment Problems, Evil Dictators, 
and Unconditional Surrender 
 The previous section argued that a leader who believes that a hos-
tile opponent is rising in power relative to her country at times will 
decide to launch an aggressive war that can end up being extremely 
destructive. This preventive war mechanism constitutes what I refer 
to as a situational commitment problem: because the opponent is ris-
ing in power, the declining power cannot trust its promises not to seek 
political concessions at a later time. In some cases, however, the con-
cern that an opponent cannot commit to the status quo is grounded in 
a different logic: rather than mistrust arising out of a logical response 
to shifting power, leaders simply conclude that the opponent is by 
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nature (i.e., dispositionally) committed to war. As I discuss below, this 
sort of belief is at odds with the conventional bargaining model of 
war, and existing studies have not deeply analyzed either the sources 
of such beliefs or their implications for foreign policy. 
 In this section, I examine dispositional commitment problems in 
greater detail. I fi rst discuss why the belief that one’s opponent is dispo-
sitionally committed to war is problematic for standard bargaining 
model approaches. I then turn to the implications of such beliefs for wars 
in which they arise. If one side sincerely believes that war is a conse-
quence of an opponent’s innately aggressive character, such that any 
peace agreement will merely set the stage for a new attack, then the only 
path to a viable peace is the reformation or removal of the offending ac-
tors on the opposing side, be they an individual leader, a broader gov-
ernment, or even the entire society of the opposing country. In practice, 
this sort of goal can only be achieved through a total military victory, 
rendering any possible political settlement unacceptable. Thus when 
leaders conclude that their opponent is dispositionally committed to 
war, they categorically reject negotiation, even in the face of high costs 
and uncertain military outcomes. I refer to this behavior as a sincere de-
mand for unconditional surrender. 
 The remaining question, however, is where this sort of belief comes 
from. While one could imagine a variety of different possible sources, I 
argue that interstate wars in which this sort of behavior has arisen have 
followed a common mechanism. Specifi cally, a declining power launches 
an aggressive preventive war, based on the belief that its rising oppo-
nent will impose painful concessions on it once its rise is complete. In 
some cases, however, the rising power lacks the intentions that the de-
clining power ascribes to it and as a result often fails to appreciate the 
true motivation behind the declining power’s aggressive war. In short, 
confronted by an opponent who justifi es an aggressive war by reference 
to a threat that the target of that war knows to be nonexistent, the target 
concludes that the stated justifi cation for war is merely cover for some 
other motivation. Given this disjuncture, leaders may reasonably con-
clude that only a character-based explanation can account for their 
opponent’s aggression. In summary, a declining power launches a pre-
ventive war in response to a feature of its environment—relative decline 
with respect to a presumed enemy—but that enemy misinterprets the 
attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression that in 
turn poses an insuperable obstacle to any possible political settlement. 
I thus argue that this process, which links situational and disposi -
tional commitment problems, is responsible for the most destructive in-
terstate wars. 
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 Stage Two: From Evil Dictators to Unconditional Surrender 
 Political scientists have noted the existence of the dispositional com-
mitment problem. Thus, for example, Reiter attributes the British refusal 
to negotiate with Germany in the summer of 1940 to the fact that they 
simply “did not trust Hitler to adhere to any war-ending commitment,” 
not because Germany was growing stronger but because Hitler was fun-
damentally untrustworthy. 35 To date, however, no one has provided a 
convincing explanation for the belief that an opponent cannot be trusted 
to live up to  any possible peace agreement. 
 Indeed, such a belief is at odds with the basic logic of the bargaining 
model to a degree that has not been fully acknowledged. The best extant 
explanation for such mistrust is that it is a consequence of the uncer-
tainty associated with international anarchy. 36 On closer examination, 
however, this argument is unsatisfying. Setting aside situations of shift-
ing power (situational commitment problems), and assuming that other 
mechanisms for war are not in play, mistrust alone should never provoke 
war. Mistrust is the assumption that one’s opponent’s intentions are hos-
tile when they may not in fact be so. Even if we assume the worst-case 
scenario of maximally hostile opponents (i.e., those with perfectly op-
posed preferences over the political stakes), the bargaining model pre-
dicts that given the costs of war each should prefer a political settlement 
along the lines that would be reached through fi ghting rather than going 
to war. In other words, the worst assumptions about your opponent’s 
interests should not mean that you are unwilling to negotiate. In these 
cases, however, as I discuss further below, the mistrust is associated with 
a categorical refusal to negotiate. 
 That said, certain types of actors might theoretically fi t the depiction in 
the dispositional commitment problem. An opponent who was unde-
terred by the costs of war, for example because she enjoyed the experi-
ence of fi ghting, might be expected continually to start new wars, even in 
the absence of any standard war-producing mechanism. Alternately, if 
one side in a war is by personality congenitally overoptimistic, such that 
it consistently holds reasonable political proposals by its opponents 
to be worse than what could be achieved through war, then that power 
might consistently launch new wars. 37 International relations theorists 
generally resist including such actors in their theories, as such actors 
would never cease fi ghting—a prediction that is at odds with the obser-
vation that even the most aggressive states have been open to political 
compromise. 38
 Yet in rare historical cases people do come to believe that they are 
faced with such an opponent, even if (as I argue below) the opponent’s 
motivations are frequently more complicated. Thus, speaking of the 
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main Axis powers in World War II, Franklin Roosevelt averred unless 
disarmed “they will again, and inevitably, embark upon an ambitious 
career of world conquest,” at least unless the Allies forced them to “aban-
don the philosophy which has brought so much suffering to the world.” 39
Similarly, in the Paraguayan War the Brazilians justifi ed their refusal to 
negotiate with the claim, apparently sincerely believed, that they were 
facing a tyrant with unlimited ambitions; in the Iran-Iraq War the central 
problem from the perspective of the Iranian leadership was that their op-
ponents were “corrupt.” 40
 The implications of this sort of conclusion are stark, as is apparent if 
we return to Blainey’s dictum that any cause of war must have an associ-
ated cause of peace, or in other words that for a war to end, the problems 
that led it to begin must be resolved. 41 If your opponent’s evil nature is 
the cause of your war, then peace cannot be restored so long as that evil 
nature is a concern. 42 In general, this sort of observation has tended to 
lead IR scholars to discount rhetoric about the evils of the opponent: 
leaders always allude to evils on the other side, but most wars end with-
out fundamental political change in either side’s regime. But this point 
should not blind us to the implications that arise when one side con-
cludes that war is a consequence of the opponent’s character. If evil dis-
positions are a cause of war, then fundamental change will be needed for 
peace. 
 What is required to solve this problem will depend on how deep-
seated the commitment to aggression is believed to be. It is conceivable, 
especially in more personalistic dictatorships, that the problem would 
be believed to lie solely with the individual leader, in which case the 
replacement of that leader might be suffi cient to bring peace. In the Par-
aguayan War, discussed in chapter 3, it is quite possible that the Brazil-
ians saw Paraguay in these terms. In other cases, however, all members 
of the governing regime, the military, or even the entire population of 
the country may be implicated, as was the case for Allied leaders trying 
to determine what to do about Germany. In this case, viable peace will 
require more thoroughgoing reform. In any case, however, leadership 
change is going to be seen as a nonnegotiable prerequisite to peace. That 
requirement in turn makes a mockery of negotiation with the existing 
government, and thus justifi es a stance of simply refusing to negotiate 
so long as that government is in power. To the extent that the source 
of the aggressive disposition is believed to lie deeper in society, negotia-
tion with any possible interlocutor will be similarly unacceptable, and 
thus the only viable peace will be one that permits complete reform 
of the offending country. Thus from a theoretical perspective there is a 
logical connection between the belief in the dispositional commitment 
problem and a refusal to negotiate: if you are unwilling to accept any 
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peace deal that could possibly be accepted by the opposing government, 
what purpose is there in holding talks? 
 In short, if leaders on one side believe that war follows from the char-
acter of the opposing leader, government, or society, then the only rea-
sonable policy response is a war explicitly fought for regime (or even 
societal) change, in which they refuse to countenance any form of nego-
tiation. I refer to this behavior as a sincere demand for unconditional 
surrender. By “unconditional surrender,” I refer to a demand that the op-
ponent’s military surrender in its entirety and that the opponent accept 
complete loss of control over territory and government. As Franklin 
Roosevelt said during World War II, unconditional surrender meant that 
he was “not willing at this time to say that we do not intend to destroy 
the German nation.” 43 This stance thus effectively forecloses political 
settlement as an option for ending the war. 
 The focus on  sincere demands for unconditional surrender highlights 
an additional requirement: that the side demanding unconditional sur-
render be willing to stand by this demand even in the face of high costs 
and an uncertain outcome from continued fi ghting. References to the 
iniquity of one’s opponent are common in war, as are claims that one 
will never negotiate. In most cases, however, leaders are not willing to 
stand by such demands when costs are high or when victory is uncer-
tain. In some cases, as for example in the latter phases of the Russo-
Hungarian confl ict of 1956 or at points during the American invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, leaders refuse to negotiate because they believe their side 
to be so overwhelmingly militarily dominant that limited fi ghting will 
permit the dictation of terms without negotiation. 44 In these sorts of 
cases, available evidence suggests that unexpected military setbacks 
will be associated with a new openness to negotiation, something that 
one does not see in cases of sincere demands for unconditional surren-
der. This defi nition also excludes limited military demands for uncondi-
tional surrender, as with American demands that Spanish forces on 
Cuba (but not elsewhere) surrender unconditionally during the Spanish-
American War, or the British demand that Argentines occupying the 
Falkland Islands (but not those on the mainland) surrender uncondi-
tionally during the Falklands War. Limited unconditional surrender de-
mands arise quite frequently within the context of war and do not follow 
the logic discussed here. Instead, a sincere demand for unconditional 
surrender constitutes a refusal to contemplate a negotiated end to a war, 
even in the face of high costs in the pursuit of uncertain military 
victory. 45
 Hypothesis 2: Dispositional commitment problems—the belief that one’s 
opponent is by nature committed to aggression—will be associated with 
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sincere demands for unconditional surrender, which produce wars to the 
death. 
 Sincere demands for unconditional surrender are thankfully rare—most 
wars end in a negotiated settlement, typically fairly quickly, and even in 
extended wars leaders are typically open to some political settlement, if 
not one that their opponent would also accept. Indeed, by the standards 
described above, only four interstate confl icts since 1816 fi t this descrip-
tion: the nineteenth-century Paraguayan War, the Pacifi c War in World 
War II, the European War in World War II, and the Iran-Iraq War. 46 At a 
per capita level, however, this list of wars comprises some of the bloodi-
est confl icts over the past two centuries, as might be expected from what 
are effectively wars to the death. 
 Stage One: From Preventive War to Evil Dictators 
 The discussion until now has assumed the existence of a sincere belief 
that one’s opponent is irrevocably committed to aggression. As was 
noted previously, however, the existence of such an opponent seems at 
odds with the assumptions of the bargaining model. More important, 
these beliefs simply are inaccurate. Franklin Roosevelt may have sin-
cerely believed that Hitler was planning to invade the Americas via 
Brazil, but subsequent historical studies—many intended precisely to 
demonstrate Hitler’s global intentions—have turned up no credible evi-
dence of such intentions. 47 Similarly, whatever the Brazilians believed 
about Francisco Solano López’s worldview, he was consistently willing 
to discuss peace with outside mediators, who complained more about 
Brazilian intransigence than about any Paraguayan commitment to 
war. 48 The question, then, is where the belief in the dispositional commit-
ment problem comes from. 
 While there are a variety of ways in which this belief might arise, I 
argue that a similar process drove all of the cases discussed here. Spe-
cifi cally, demands for unconditional surrender have arisen histori-
cally when the targets of preventive war have misinterpreted the 
motivations behind the attack. Attacked by an opponent who fears 
future decline, leaders attribute the attack to an innately aggressive 
disposition. This section details the reasons why one might expect 
such a misattribution to occur, as a prelude to any attempt to draw 
specifi c hypotheses about the circumstances in which it is more or less 
likely. 
 The fi rst step in this process is preventive war. Indeed, preventive 
motivations played a signifi cant role in the initiation of all wars in 
which demands for unconditional surrender were made. This connec-
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tion makes sense: as I argued above, in wars driven by a preventive 
motivation, the initiator tends to have particularly high war aims and 
is willing to adhere to those aims even in the face of initial military 
defeats. By contrast, informational and principal-agent confl icts are in-
ternally constrained: initial war aims are typically more limited, and 
leaders either choose to or are forced to scale back their demands rela-
tively quickly, especially if the war goes poorly. 49 From the perspective 
of the target of a preventive war, however, large or poorly expressed 
war aims that do not seem closely bound to military developments are 
particularly compatible with a view of the opponent as a war lover. 
Not every preventive war involves this sort of misunderstanding, 
however. Thus the British preventive motivation in the Crimean War—
to prevent Russia from acquiring control over the strategically signifi -
cant Black Sea Straits—was basically understood in Moscow, with the 
result that the Russians remained open to negotiation. It is thus worth 
exploring in greater detail the reasons why such a misinterpretation 
might occur. 
 Hypothesis 2a: Sincere demands for unconditional surrender occur in wars 
in which preventive motivations provided the primary reason to fi ght, but 
the demand will be made by the  target of the preventive attack. 
 A rationalist explanation would start from the assumption that leaders 
believe that a small but nonzero proportion of other leaders are war lov-
ers who will continue to launch aggressive wars until they are removed 
from power. Given that the behavior of some past leaders—most obvi-
ously Hitler—is popularly interpreted in precisely this way, such a belief 
would be reasonable, even if it accords poorly with the basic logic of the 
bargaining model. Starting from these prior beliefs, leaders would then 
revise their understandings of their opponent in response to the oppos-
ing leader’s policies. Given the low prior probability that any particular 
leader is a war lover, simply being attacked would not be suffi cient evi-
dence to conclude that one’s opponent was a war lover. By contrast, at-
tack by an opponent who espouses grandiose war aims—especially 
relative to her military capabilities—and who contends that those war 
aims are justifi ed by the prospect that you will engage in actions that you 
do not in fact intend to undertake will be seen as stronger evidence of a 
dispositional commitment to aggression. 
 The key element here is the disjuncture between one side’s fears and 
the other’s intentions: an attack justifi ed by fear that you will do some-
thing you do not intend to do will seem far more unreasonable than one 
justifi ed by fears that are in fact correct. Thus the central prediction is 
that sincere demands for unconditional surrender—which follow from 
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belief in a dispositional commitment problem—are more likely when the 
target of a preventive war does not intend to do what the initiator of the 
war fears it will do. 50
 Hypothesis 2b: Sincere demands for unconditional surrender are more 
likely when the target of a preventive war does not harbor the intentions 
ascribed to it by the initiator. 
 This argument, however, just redirects the question to how such an un-
necessary preventive war might arise: under what circumstances might 
we observe a leader launching an aggressive war to prevent something 
that in fact was not going to happen? The security dilemma—the prob-
lem that actions taken to advance one’s own security may inadvertently 
threaten others—provides the most likely answer to this question. 51 The 
critical point here is that given uncertainty about intentions, each side 
may undertake actions that are basically defensive in nature but that ap-
pear to its opponent as evidence of aggressive intent. Indeed, people fre-
quently fail to appreciate the degree to which their intentions are unclear 
to others. For example, in the early Cold War, the Soviets installed un-
democratic communist governments in Eastern Europe, a move that 
they believed provided the only reliable guarantee of a friendly buffer 
against a future invasion from the West; Western powers, however, saw 
the move as evidence of Soviet expansionism. Both sides saw the other’s 
stance as threatening, in large part because they failed to understand the 
other side’s reasoning. 52 The security dilemma is particularly salient in 
the context of shifting power, as rising powers have strong incentives to 
conceal any hostile intentions while they are still relatively weak, mak-
ing it diffi cult or impossible for a rising power with genuinely benign 
intentions to make those intentions clear. In this context, a declining 
power may mistakenly come to believe that a rising neighbor with be-
nign intentions is in fact hostile and may come to believe that war is an 
appropriate response to such hostility. The target of such an attack, 
knowing that its intentions are benign, could be forgiven for putting 
little credence in the declining power’s stated fears. 53 As I discuss in 
chapter 3, this dynamic was likely at play in the Paraguayan War, in 
which Brazilian leaders appear to have been completely unaware that 
Paraguayans might view what appeared to be quite expansionist poli-
cies as threatening. 
 If this argument is correct, an additional implication is that interpreta-
tions of the opposing side’s motivations will change in response to its 
preventive policies. In other words, rather than always believing the op-
ponent to be dispositionally committed to war, leaders will come to this 
conclusion in response to the opponent’s aggressive expansion. Thus, for 
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example, while Churchill consistently warned about the danger posed 
by Hitler’s Germany, the logic behind that warning changed over time, 
from a basically Realist argument that a stronger Germany would natu-
rally expect some political concessions to a dispositional argument that 
Hitler was uniquely aggressive. 
 Hypothesis 2c: In cases of sincere demands for unconditional surrender, 
the conclusion that the opposing leadership or regime is ineluctably ag-
gressive will develop in response to the opponent’s preventive policies. 
 To summarize, I argue that leaders demand unconditional surrender 
when they conclude that they have been attacked by a country whose 
leadership is dispositionally aggressive and hence would attack again 
if given the chance. The context for this development is preventive 
war, in which the initiator attacks out of the belief that war today is 
preferable to permitting a presumed-hostile rising neighbor to com-
plete its rise and then demand concessions or fi ght a war from a posi-
tion of relative strength. The target of that war may in turn attribute 
this attack not to the situation of shifting power but to a predisposition 
toward aggressiveness, thus producing the belief that justifi es uncon-
ditional surrender. This inference is in turn more likely, I argue, when 
the target of the preventive attack does not actually harbor the hostile 
motivations ascribed to her by the rising power. Given the rarity of 
sincere demands for unconditional surrender, the hypotheses that fol-
low from this argument cannot be tested quantitatively. 54 It is possible, 
however, to test them through careful case studies, as I do in later 
chapters. 
 Explanations for Limited Wars 
 I thus argue that commitment problems, under two different guises, 
produce particularly destructive wars. This argument gains strength, 
however, to the extent that other mechanisms that can bring about fi ght-
ing  cannot account for wars that are both long and intense: given that 
commitment problem wars can be either short or long, depending on 
whether one side is able to achieve a quick and decisive military victory, 
the argument that the commitment problem mechanism provides the 
primary explanation for the most severe wars is credible only to the ex-
tent that alternative logics can account only for limited wars. This section 
thus examines the two primary alternative mechanisms: overoptimism 
arising out of private information, and principal-agent problems in do-
mestic politics. Both provide a credible explanation for why war would 
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begin, but I argue that in both the revelation of information from in-
trawar diplomacy and events on the battlefi eld ultimately will lead to a 
settlement before the war becomes unusually destructive. 
 Limited Wars I: Overoptimism 
 Overoptimism on at least one side about the probability and ease of 
victory is easily the most common nontrivial feature of the start of war. 55
It is easy to understand why overoptimistic leaders might demand too 
much at the bargaining table and hence conclude that the use of force is 
preferable to the bargain that the other side is willing to accept. As Geof-
frey Blainey notes, if disagreement over the likely outcome of war leads 
to fi ghting, then in general a necessary condition for war termination 
will be that the two sides come to agree. Indeed, the bulk of work on ra-
tionalist explanations for war has focused on this hypothesis, which I 
refer to as the informational mechanism. 56
 One potential explanation for long wars, then, is that for some reason 
the participants took a particularly long time to change their beliefs. In 
practice, however, I argue that overoptimism arising from private infor-
mation cannot reliably explain long wars. A number of studies have 
noted that fi ghting reveals information, forcing leaders to update their 
expectations and revise their demands; these revisions lead to conver-
gence in political demands and thus provide the basis for peace. Indeed, 
I argue that this process will generally happen quite quickly, especially 
when fi ghting is intense. This argument implies that informational wars 
must be limited in either duration or intensity. 
 Divergent Expectations and the Decision for War 
 The basic intuition of the informational mechanism is straightforward: 
if leaders on both sides believe that victory will be achieved easily, 
then they will prefer war to what their opponent will be willing to con-
cede at the bargaining table. 57 Because each side’s bargaining position is 
a function of its expectations, we would expect that when both sides 
think that they will win, their demands will differ substantially, and 
thus may be mutually incompatible even considering that a prewar deal 
has the benefi t of avoiding the costs of war. 58 Indeed, it is not even neces-
sary that both sides think that they can win, so long as their predictions 
for the course of the war differ markedly. Thus, for example, in the Viet-
nam War, the North Vietnamese did not necessarily believe that they 
could infl ict a decisive military defeat on the Americans, but they did 
believe that American demands were based on an overestimation of the 
ease with which they would be able to defeat the Viet Cong militarily. 
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For this reason, they were unwilling to make the concessions that the 
Americans would have demanded as a condition for the end of the war; 
ultimately, the Americans abandoned their demands and withdrew even 
though their military was undefeated and remained by most standards 
far superior. 59
 Divergent expectations can arise from a wide range of possible 
sources. At the simplest level, participants may simply disagree about 
the likely course of events on the battlefi eld. The conventional view of 
World War I, for example, holds that both sides believed that their supe-
rior militaries would permit them to punch through the enemy defenses 
and impose a decisive defeat in short order. Similarly, in the 2003 Iraq 
War, confi dence in the ease with which Saddam Hussein could be over-
thrown (and the anticipated positive implications of regime change in 
Iraq) led American policymakers to believe that even quite revisionist 
demands were appropriate, while Saddam’s confi dence that he could 
embroil the invaders in a costly urban war was one basis for his decision 
to stand fi rm. 60 Military strategy provides another potential basis for 
divergent expectations about battlefi eld prowess. German generals 
drew confi dence prior to their stunning defeat of France in 1940 in part 
from the knowledge that their opponents were expecting an attack at 
the wrong point and thus that there was a chance for an immediate and 
crushing breakthrough. 61 In 1967, the Israelis were confi dent that a fi rst 
strike—which their opponents did not expect—could destroy the Egyp-
tian and Syrian air forces, dramatically shifting the balance of capabili-
ties in that war. 62 And in 1991, the fi rst Bush administration gained 
confi dence, and increased its demands, as it became apparent that a 
fl anking attack west of Kuwait would allow coalition forces to avoid the 
extensive frontal defenses that the Iraqis had established. In all of these 
cases, knowledge of one’s strategy provided a reason for optimism 
that could not be credibly conveyed to the opponent without prompt -
ing the opponent to take countermeasures that would eliminate the 
advantage. 
 Relatedly, in some cases the two sides disagree about the likely behav-
ior of external actors. Thus, for example, the German willingness to at-
tack France and Russia in 1914 is often credited in part to miscalculations 
about British intentions. 63 Similarly, in both 1848 and 1864 Denmark ad-
opted an aggressive bargaining position in a dispute with Prussia, in 
large part based on an overoptimistic reading of the probability that the 
British would intervene on their behalf. 64 More recently, as detailed in the 
case study of the Persian Gulf War in chapter 6, one reason why Saddam 
Hussein believed that an invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a worthwhile 
gamble was the ultimately erroneous expectation that the Saudis would 
not permit American forces to operate out of their territory. As with 
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disagreements about relative capabilities, divergent expectations about 
the likelihood of external support can lead to drastically different beliefs 
about the likely outcome of fi ghting, which in turn provides reason for 
each side to believe the other’s political demands to be unjustifi ed. 
 Finally, expectations may diverge because of misperceptions about 
relative resolve, with one side underestimating the importance of the 
issue at stake for its opponent and hence the opponent’s willingness to 
fi ght, either at all or for an extended period of time. Formally, an actor’s 
resolve will be infl uenced both by her valuation for the stake—how 
much she cares about the issue in dispute—and by her valuation for the 
likely costs of war: the more she values the stake, and the less importance 
she places on the suffering imposed by war, the more resolved she is. 
Leaders could miscalculate about either of these components to resolve. 
Thus, for example, in the Anglo-Iranian War of 1856–57, which I examine 
in chapter 6, the Iranians recognized that they could not win a war 
against Britain but believed that changes in the strategic environment 
meant that the British no longer had any reason to care about the inde-
pendence of Herat: the British were believed to be irresolute because 
their valuation for the stake was believed to be low. Alternately, there are 
cases in which one side miscalculates the willingness of the other to ab-
sorb punishment. Thus, for example, one reading of the Vietnam War is 
that the United States dramatically underestimated the willingness of the 
Viet Cong to absorb incredible amounts of punishment without capitu-
lating on the political issue at stake. 65 More recently, Saddam Hussein 
appears to have relied in both 1991 and 2003 on the expectation that 
Americans would not have the stomach for the deaths on both sides that 
would accompany urban warfare, an estimation that likely followed 
from the perception of American, and more generally democratic, casu-
alty aversion. 66
 The bases for disagreement about the likely outcome of a war typi-
cally lie in the different information available to the two sides: each 
knows more about its own capabilities, resolve, and strategy than it 
does about its opponent’s. For this reason, I refer to this explanation for 
war as the informational mechanism. 67 As expectations diverge, lead-
ers on both sides may come to believe that war is preferable to any 
negotiated resolution to their dispute that the other would be willing 
to accept. Once this conclusion is reached, war becomes a logical 
choice. 
 Overoptimism and Reality Once War Begins 
 If divergent expectations account for the decision to go to war, then 
what happens once the war begins? Prior to fi ghting, negotiations 
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are complicated by the incentive an irresolute or weak actor has to 
claim to be resolute and strong to get a better settlement. Leaders may lie. 
War, however, does not. Once fi ghting begins, the two sides’ divergent 
expectations are put to the test. A leader who adopted an aggressive bar-
gaining position out of the belief that her opponent lacked the resolve to 
fi ght can be presented with immediate disconfi rmatory evidence when 
the war begins. If the two sides disagree about whether or not a third 
power will intervene in the confl ict, at least one is likely to be surprised 
by that power’s behavior when the request for assistance goes out. And 
if the two sides disagree about the relative quality of their fi ghting forces 
or of the strategies that those armies implement, events on the battlefi eld 
necessarily must be at odds with at least one side’s expectations. In Blain-
ey’s words, when both sides are optimistic about the likely course of con-
fl ict, “war itself . . . provides the stinging ice of reality” that forces 
expectations to converge until the two sides’ beliefs are close enough to 
permit a settlement. 68
 In building the intuition for this argument, it is useful to contrast it to 
an earlier claim that new information such as unexpected battle results 
might lead each side to adjust its expectations equally, so that the loser 
might make concessions that previously would have ensured peace but 
still end up fi ghting when the winner no longer is willing to accept those 
terms. 69 Where these two arguments diverge, and where the earlier ar-
gument is fl awed, is in the source of divergent expectations, which likely 
concern exactly the things that are revealed in war. The loser of a battle 
is likely to be more surprised by its results than the winner, and thus will 
update her beliefs to a greater extent, meaning that expectations, and 
hence political demands, are closer after the battle than they were be-
fore. Even in those cases in which success in battle surpasses the victor’s 
prior expectations, she will still end up updating her expectations by 
less than her opponent, as the opponent is substantially more surprised. 
Thus, in some cases, as with the Israelis in 1967, one side’s demands may 
be greater at the end of the war than they were at the beginning, but 
overall convergence still occurs as the defeated opponent scrambles 
back from demands that battlefi eld events have proven to be entirely 
unachievable. 
 Updating is neither instantaneous nor perfect, of course. The knowl-
edge that NATO was willing to carry out a bombing campaign against 
Serbia in the Kosovo War did not necessarily give Slobodan Milosevic 
insight into whether his opponents would be willing to launch a ground 
war. And new private information is undoubtedly generated within war, 
as with the British development of the tank in World War I or the success 
of the Manhattan Project to construct the fi rst nuclear weapons in World 
War II. On average, however, the trend is toward settlement. If a 
Chapter 1
[38]
bombing campaign is not proof of complete resolve, it certainly belies 
any prior belief that the opponent is completely unresolved. Likewise, 
there is no reason why new private information will consistently be 
good. For every technological innovation in war, there are programs like 
the Nazi search for a superweapon in World War II that deliver less than 
was expected. In other cases, governments have learned before their en-
emies that their publics are more war weary or their armies less loyal 
than previously believed. For new private information to prevent con-
vergence of beliefs, it would have to be consistently positive to an 
extraordinarily improbable degree so as to offset the inevitable disap-
pointments on the battlefi eld and at the negotiating table. 
 The Franco-Austrian War of 1859, in which France aided Sardinia-
Piedmont in seizing Austrian territory in Italy, provides a useful example 
of this process in action. 70 Both sides in this war expected to win quite 
quickly. The Austrians initially expected to overrun Piedmont before the 
French could supply effective assistance, and they thus expected to hum-
ble the upstart Sardinians and secure their position in Italy; their oppo-
nents expected victories that would permit them to detach the Austrian 
provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. The fi ghting went unexpectedly 
poorly for the Austrians, however, convincing them that their initial aims 
were unrealistic; at the same time, increasing agreement over the proba-
bility that Prussia would intervene on the Austrian side (thus shifting the 
balance of capabilities) convinced the French to abandon the demand for 
Venetia. After a few months of fi ghting, therefore, it became possible for 
the two sides to reach a settlement in which Austria gave up Lombardy 
but kept Venetia. 
 This example is far from unique. In the 1939 Nomonhan border war 
between Japan and the Soviet Union—a little-known but quite intense 
confl ict—the Japanese were quite confi dent that Soviet logistical prob-
lems, command defi ciencies resulting from Stalin’s purge of the army, 
and the inherent superiority of Japanese troops would force the Soviets 
to back down. An intense Soviet offensive in August 1939 demonstrated 
the inaccuracy of this assessment, and by the middle of September 
the Japanese were forced to admit that “the enemy had won, and every-
body knew it.” 71 The Soviets were on the opposite side of the over-
confi dence ledger later that year, however, when they dramatically 
over-estimated the ease with which they would be able to force Finland 
to capitulate in the Russo-Finnish War. While numerical superiority ul-
timately permitted the Soviets to make territorial gains at Finnish ex-
pense, Stalin had to abandon plans to impose a communist government 
on Finland. 72 In each case, intense battles quickly brought expectations 
into line and hence brought about a political settlement in a matter of 
months. 
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 It is by this process, then, that a war driven by the informational mech-
anism logically will come to an end. The question from the perspective of 
this project is how long this process is likely to take. In formal models, 
bargaining typically results in a settlement within a small number of 
rounds of interaction, but nothing within the model dictates how long a 
single “round” would last. As a result, formal theorists have disagreed 
about this question, with Powell arguing that settlement will typically 
occur quickly, while Smith and Stam argue that leaders who operate on 
the basis of divergent theories of war may alter their beliefs only slowly, 
with the implication that the informational mechanism can account for 
quite extended wars. 73
 Resolving this apparent dilemma requires adding just one additional 
piece of information. As Blainey observes, overoptimism typically ap-
pears not simply in the expectation of victory, but in the expectation that 
victory will come quickly and at relatively low cost. 74 This observation is 
unsurprising from a theoretical perspective: as anticipated costs grow, 
the incentive to resolve a dispute politically likewise increases, meaning 
that a greater disparity in military expectations is necessary for war to 
occur, and hence that even substantial variation in expectations about the 
eventual result frequently will be insuffi cient to bring about violence. For 
such optimistic expectations to be reasonable, leaders must have theories 
about how the war will proceed, which predict for example that the su-
periority of their armed forces will manifest itself in the initial battles and 
soon put them in a position to dictate terms, or that the costs imposed by 
the initial few clashes will break the opponents’ resolve and force them 
to sue for peace. When both sides have such optimistic beliefs, not only 
will war ultimately belie expectations on at least one side (and quite pos-
sibly both), it will do so before costs have mounted unduly. Thus, for 
example, scholars who have advanced an informational interpretation of 
World War I have argued that the participants saw war as attractive be-
cause they expected to win “by Christmas”; it is hard to imagine how 
leaders on both sides would have been both expecting an intense, multi-
year war and so confi dent of ultimate victory that fi ghting was prefera-
ble to a negotiated settlement. 75 This observation, however, points to a 
central weakness of informational explanations for World War I—why 
did the war continue past Christmas 1914? 
 Hypothesis 3: Wars driven primarily by the informational mechanism will 
be limited. 
 Tests of hypothesis 3 must confront two unfortunate complications. The 
fi rst is that there is no direct quantitative measure of whether a war was 
driven by the informational mechanism. Thus while case studies can 
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examine the validity of this hypothesis for a smaller sample of wars, 
quantitative tests must make use of a more indirect testing strategy. In 
particular, the statistical tests rely on identifying an empirical relationship 
that would be expected to hold within the subset of informational 
confl icts. 
 The speed of settlement in informational wars depends on two factors: 
how far apart the two sides’ initial expectations were, and how quickly 
they converge over time as new information is revealed. Of these two 
factors, the rate of information revelation is the more theoretically ap-
propriate, as it avoids selection effects that arise for variables that act 
prior to the onset of fi ghting. The problem for tests based on the diver-
gence in initial beliefs, which must necessarily be measured through 
proxies, is that leaders take readily observable information into account 
in deciding whether or not to go to war in the fi rst place. 76 This point is 
clearest in the context of a specifi c variable, so to that end it is worthwhile 
to consider the contention that relative capabilities proxy for the degree 
of uncertainty in a confl ict. 77 According to this argument, when the con-
tending parties in a war are relatively evenly matched, both can believe 
themselves likely to win, allowing for wide variation in beliefs, whereas 
when one side is substantially stronger than the other, the range for dis-
agreement is much narrower. This claim, although diffi cult to evaluate 
directly, is plausible; the important point is that its effects should be felt 
not with respect to war duration or severity but with respect to war 
onset. Thus, if beliefs vary more widely in relatively equal dyads, then 
those dyads should be more likely to fi ght, but in those rare cases in 
which war occurs in unequal dyads it will be happening because the 
beliefs diverge to an unusually substantial degree. As a result, despite 
the population-wide variation in uncertainty between equal and unequal 
dyads, in the limited sample of dyads that go to war the degree of diver-
gence will not differ markedly, meaning that the expected time to settle-
ment also should not differ greatly. This point will apply to any variable 
that might proxy for the general degree of variation in expectations in a 
disputing dyad. 
 The speed at which updating occurs is more tractable, however. 
Under the informational mechanism, participants update their beliefs 
in response to events on the battlefi eld and in the diplomatic arena. Up-
dating occurs as leaders learn that their beliefs about relative capabili-
ties, resolve, strategies, or the intentions of outside actors are incorrect. 
Measuring the degree of updating about the intentions of third parties 
is not possible in a statistical context, unfortunately: observed interven-
tions may not be informative if both sides expected them to occur, as 
for example with the German knowledge that France would inevita -
bly come to Russia’s aid in 1914, while noninterventions can be quite 
Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Wars
[41]
informa tive if one side believed that it was likely to get help, as with the 
aforementioned Danish disappointment with British neutrality in the 
Schleswig-Holstein Wars. For capabilities, resolve, and strategies, how-
ever, information is revealed as military clashes occur. Competing beliefs 
about the relative capabilities of different armies and the superiority of 
generals’ strategies are put to the test in battle, while beliefs about rela-
tive resolve are confi rmed or belied by the opponent’s willingness to 
keep fi ghting once costs start to be imposed. Thus we can expect that 
once the fi ghting begins, updating will quickly ensue. 
 Moreover, more intense fi ghting will typically lead to faster updating. 
Limited clashes reveal less about capabilities, strategy, or resolve than 
full-scale battles, while a series of battles in a short period of time will be 
more informative than a single one. In the extreme of a very intense war 
like the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, a few days of fi ghting may suffi ce to 
bring the two sides’ expectations into alignment. The opposite extreme is 
provided by a case like the Russo-Polish War of 1919–21, in which the 
new Polish government and their Bolshevik opponents effectively put 
their war on hold shortly after it started so that the Bolsheviks could fi ght 
the mutually detested Whites in the Russian Civil War. 78 Because fi ght-
ing between the two sides was extraordinarily limited in the initial 
phases, both sides could persist in mutually incompatible expectations 
for some time. These observations thus imply that more intense  fi ghting—















Figure 1.2 Informational wars and war duration and intensity
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settlement, at least when the informational mechanism is involved. 
 Figure 1.2 illustrates the realm in which wars driven by the informational 
mechanism will typically be found—intense wars will reach settlement 
quickly (and hence be short), while less intense wars may be longer but, 
because they are less intense, are still limited. 
 Hypothesis 3a: Wars driven by the informational mechanism will reach 
settlement more quickly when fi ghting is more intense. 
 The identifi cation of a quantitatively tractable hypothesis for the informa-
tional mechanism brings us to the second complication for empirical tests, 
however. While intense informational wars will reach settlement quickly, 
the same relationship between war intensity and the speed of settlement 
will not necessarily apply to commitment problem wars. The inclusion of 
long, intense commitment problem wars in the same empirical sample as 
informational confl icts thus may disguise the relationship between war 
intensity and war duration in the informational confl icts. Chapter 2 exam-
ines this problem in greater detail and identifi es a strategy using the inter-
action between war intensity and the proxy for the presence of commitment 
problem wars to more accurately test  hypothesis 3a. 
 Limited Wars II: Misbehaving Leaders 
 A third logic of war starts from the observation that, because the peo-
ple are the ones who, through conscription and through taxes, pay the 
costs of war, they should naturally be disinclined to wage it. 79 If war hap-
pens nonetheless, this argument supposes that it may be because the 
people are not ones who decide whether or not to fi ght. War may simply 
be the “sport of kings,” or it may be that leaders use war to achieve per-
sonal objectives, whether to improve their hold on power or to achieve 
political goals domestically or abroad that could not be achieved without 
recourse to war. From this perspective, one might argue that wars, 
whether limited or unusually large, occur because leaders are attracted 
by their benefi ts and simply are not deterred by their costs, which they 
after all do not have to pay. 
 On closer analysis, however, I argue that leaders are far less free than 
this initial perspective implies. All political systems constrain the free-
dom of leaders to impose preferred decisions unilaterally, whether 
through institutional checks like the oversight of democratically elected 
legislatures or practical obstacles like the obstinacy of recalcitrant gener-
als. In the extreme, leaders must worry about being displaced, while 
publics always have the extreme option of simply refusing to fi ght. From 
this perspective, war remains a feasible policy option only so long as the 
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leader can convince her constituents that doing so serves their interest. 
The leader may, of course, resort to all manner of rhetoric and lies in an 
effort to convince the constituents that launching and continuing the 
war is worthwhile, but her account of why the war is worth fi ghting 
must be reconcilable with publicly known events from the war. To the 
extent that the leader’s accounts of ongoing successes and promises of 
eventual victory are contradicted by the observation of military stale-
mate or defeat and the demonstrable falsity of past promises, public and 
institutional constraints will begin to bind more tightly, until the point at 
which the leader must either acquiesce to a settlement or be evicted from 
offi ce and replaced by someone else who is willing to do so. 
 Ultimately, I argue that the precise path of a war driven by this mech-
anism is determined by the reason why the leader resorted to war in the 
fi rst place. In diversionary wars—in which leaders attempt to use war to 
improve their hold on power—the requirement that the war be politi-
cally salient (so as to divert public attention) means that leaders are 
more constrained in their ability to systematically misrepresent the way 
that the war is going; as a result, these wars tend to be short. By contrast, 
when leaders use war to pursue parochial policy objectives such as co-
lonial gains overseas or domestic political programs that would be un-
dermined by defeat abroad, they can afford to limit public attention to 
the war and hence in at least some cases may be able to systemically 
misrepresent how well the war is going to a far greater degree. These 
confl icts, which for shorthand I refer to as “policy wars,” thus can last 
much longer,  but only to the extent that the leader can keep the public dis-
tracted , which in turn implies that the war cannot be particularly in-
tense. Thus I argue that both types of principal-agent wars necessarily 
will be limited. 
 Principal-Agent Problems in Domestic Politics 
 Historians and political scientists have identifi ed a range of domestic 
political explanations for war. Diversionary war—in which leaders use 
war either to distract the public from other troubles or to stave off chal-
lenges to their hold on power—provides likely the best-known exam-
ple. 80 Leninists famously argued that the aggression associated with 
imperialism arose because the state, which represented the interests of 
the capital-owning minority, sought to address those capitalists’ de-
mands for new markets. 81 Other studies have focused on the way in 
which domestic coalition-building has contributed to external aggres-
sion, as with the argument that a coalition of industry and Prussian agri-
culture led Imperial Germany to a counterproductive policy that 
alienated both Russia and Britain. 82 Alternately, in some cases domestic 
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political pressure has forced reluctant leaders into war, as with the Span-
ish-American confl ict, in which popular pressure for war with Spain, fa-
mously encouraged by Hearst’s newspapers, ultimately overcame 
President McKinley’s reluctance to fi ght. 83 Similarly, Fidel Sánchez 
Hernández, president of El Salvador during the 1969 Football War 
against Honduras, claimed after the confl ict that public pressure for war 
in response to Honduran mistreatment of Salvadoran nationals was so 
high that, had he not ordered the invasion when he did, he would have 
faced a coup within twenty-four hours. 84
 Ultimately, these arguments about domestic politics can be divided 
into two camps. On the one hand, those in which a reluctant leader is 
forced by domestic pressure into war ultimately rely on some other 
mechanism to explain why the public believes war to be in its interest. 
By contrast, those in which the leader, or an unrepresentative coalition 
that forms the government, is more war prone than the public can be 
captured by the logic of the principal-agent problem. This problem was 
fi rst identifi ed in economics in the relationship between an employer 
and an employee: at its core, the problem is that the employee—the 
agent—is being paid to perform certain tasks for the employer—the 
principal—but has incentives to shirk, reducing effort or engaging in ac-
tivities of which the principal would not approve, if she can get away 
with doing so. 85 Shirking in turn is possible because the agent is better 
informed about her effort and the diffi culty of the task that she is under-
taking than is the principal. Applied to politics, the principal-agent logic 
starts from the observation that although effective political rule requires 
the centralization of power, rulers must always worry about the fi nal 
sanction of (potentially violent) removal by the public. In this context, 
we can think of the leader as the agent, empowered by the public to 
adopt and carry out policies on its behalf. This possibility means that 
even the most institutionally unconstrained leader must concern herself 
to some degree with the preferences of her constituents (even if she re-
fuses to think of them in those terms). Thus there are risks to deviating 
from the preferences of constituents, even at the same time that devia-
tion may be personally rewarding. It is this tension between the poten-
tial benefi ts and costs of hewing to the socially optimal strategy as 
opposed to deviating for personal gain that lies at the core of principal-
agent theory. 
 When thinking about what goals leaders might have when diverting 
policy away from socially optimal strategies, the natural starting point 
is to assume that leaders wish to maintain and strengthen their hold on 
power. 86 In any system, retaining power carries with it personal benefi ts 
that leaders are loath to surrender, while in many political systems loss 
of power may be associated with exile, loss of freedom, or even death. 87
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Because regular people care relatively little about the specifi c identity of 
their leader in contrast to the quality of that person’s leadership, there 
is a natural divergence of preferences between governor and governed. 
As the leader, in the course of carrying out her responsibilities, has ac-
cess to information not available to the regular public, she has an op-
portunity to shirk, claiming that policy decisions serve the general 
interest when in fact they are undertaken to serve her interests: for ex-
ample, by strengthening her hold on power, or by pursuing policy in-
terests that benefi t a small coterie of supporters but not society more 
generally. 
 Misbehaving Leaders and the Conduct of War 
 The best-known argument about domestic politics and war duration and 
severity builds on this intuition. Goemans argues that, while all leaders 
fear that losing a war will have negative consequences for their hold on 
power, leaders of partial democracies have reason to be particularly con-
cerned. 88 Leaders of full democracies expect that defeat in war will result 
in the loss of power, but they are protected by the democratic rule of law 
from worse consequences. Leaders of autocracies, on the other hand, ex-
pect punishment (exile, imprisonment, or death) should they lose power, 
but their hold on power is generally suffi ciently secure to ensure that 
they need not fear the consequences of a lost war. Thus it is the leaders of 
partial democracies, where the move toward democratic rule has left 
leaders less secure in their hold on power without providing them with 
guarantees of personal well-being once they leave offi ce, who have the 
greatest incentive to gamble for resurrection, refusing to settle a losing 
war in the hope that a miracle will restore their fortunes. 89 This argument 
thus constitutes a potential explanation for long, bloody confl icts: such 
wars occur when leaders reject settlements that their constituents would 
accept, if equally informed and empowered to negotiate, because they 
believe that doing so is in their own interest. More generally, a domestic-
political explanation for unusually destructive wars would simply ob-
serve that, because they are insulated from the immediate costs of war, 
leaders may choose to continue wars that their publics would bring 
to an end. 
 This argument focuses on the incentives leaders have to implement 
socially suboptimal policies. The logic of principal-agent problems dem-
onstrates that the agent’s (i.e., leader’s) incentives are only part of the 
story: leaders are monitored by society, which can impose constraints on 
leaders’ ability to continue wars against constituents’ interests. These 
constraints come in a number of forms. At one extreme, if a war is suffi -
ciently unpopular (as happened to some degree with the Russians in 
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World War I) or a leader is suffi ciently despised (as happened in Idi 
Amin’s Uganda during the Uganda-Tanzania War), the population may 
simply refuse to fi ght. 90 This option is obviously used rarely, as its adop-
tion effectively grants victory to an opponent that is likely to have prefer-
ences that diverge sharply from those of the local population. That said, 
this possibility is frequently a concern for leaders even when it does not 
arise. Thus, for example, by the end of World War I the troops of all the 
major participants demonstrated suffi cient unrest to seriously concern 
their leaders, including the often-forgotten mutinies among French 
troops at the time of the Nivelle Offensive in spring 1917 on top of the 
revolutions in Russia and the Kiel mutiny in Germany. 91 Leaders may 
also fi nd themselves directly constrained by other signifi cant fi gures or 
branches of government. Congress’s power of the purse makes it possi-
ble for the legislature to refuse to fund efforts in an ongoing confl ict, in 
effect forcing the president to fi nd a way to bring a precipitous end to 
fi ghting. In practice, these types of constraints too are exercised rarely, as 
any politician will be extremely chary of taking actions that can be por-
trayed as benefi cial to the “enemy.” That said, in both cases the knowl-
edge that such actions can be taken can force leaders to adopt different 
policies from the ones that they would choose were they entirely uncon-
strained. To cite a recent example, it is likely that the American surge in 
Iraq, undertaken in 2007 after signifi cant domestic debate, would have 
been both quicker and larger had President Bush not had to worry about 
substantial Democratic opposition in both houses of Congress. 
 More frequently, leaders may simply be removed from power. Indeed, 
leaders on the losing side of a war are frequently replaced prior to war 
termination. War termination is often preceded by a shift in the ruling 
coalition on one side, as with the two revolutions that preceded Russia’s 
withdrawal from World War I or the shift from the Truman administra-
tion to the Eisenhower administration that arguably hastened the end of 
the Korean War. 92 Even when leaders end a war prior to removal from 
offi ce, they may do so because they fear that further fi ghting would only 
weaken their hold on offi ce. Thus, for example, a signifi cant motivation 
for Emperor Hirohito’s decision to call for an end to Japanese resistance 
in World War II was his desire to preserve the institution of the emperor 
and the imperial house. 93 Similarly, in the Persian Gulf War, Saddam 
Hussein was willing to accept humiliating conditions imposed by the 
coalition in part because he needed to redirect his efforts to put down the 
developing revolt against his rule. 94
 A close examination of existing work on domestic politics and war 
provides reason to think that these constraints are quite active. Quantita-
tive studies have found far more limited evidence for diversionary war 
than early work expected. 95 In particular, while domestic political factors 
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often are related to the use of force, the relationships typically are not 
what the diversionary hypothesis would predict. 96 Thus in contrast to 
the expectation that presidents facing reelection would be more likely to 
start a foreign confl ict to secure their hold on power, presidents have in 
fact been substantially  less likely to begin foreign adventures as elections 
approach. 97 Indeed, in a more general study, Chiozza and Goemans fi nd 
that confl ict initiation is substantially higher when leaders have a secure 
hold on power, precisely the opposite of what one would expect from the 
diversionary hypothesis. 98 Similarly, the tremendous boosts in popular-
ity that leaders sometimes gain from crises such as the September 11 at-
tacks on the United States turn out to be less manipulable than initially 
might have been thought. On average, these gains are quite small, while 
the big gains in popularity—the conventional “rally ‘round the fl ag” 
effect—occur only in cases in which the country was subject to an unam-
biguous external attack of the sort that leaders simply cannot engineer 
whenever it would be convenient. 99
 One could of course argue that the constraints that appear to limit the 
ability of leaders to resort to diversionary war are lifted once war begins; 
after all, it has long been a truism that the nation rallies behind the leader 
once war has begun, and hawks opposed to settlement repeatedly have 
used this expectation to accuse moderates of treason. 100 Yet a closer ex-
amination reveals reasons for caution here, too. To the extent that the 
public rallies behind the executive, they often do so because society gen-
erally accepts (without substantial misrepresentation by the leadership) 
that war is in the national interest. Thus, for example, while there existed 
a substantial isolationist sentiment prior to Pearl Harbor, the Japanese 
attack genuinely convinced a broad range of Americans that Japan and 
Germany represented serious threats, and therefore that fi ghting a long, 
diffi cult war to remove those threats was a worthwhile task. 101 Just as 
large rallies in popular support for the president may occur in response 
to genuine external threats, we may observe the coincidence of a free 
executive and a long war in a case in which the people are willing to 
grant the leader freedom to act precisely because the threat is so obvious 
that there need be no fear that the executive is extending the war 
unnecessarily. 
 More important, the common argument that society inevitably rallies 
behind the government in war is simply historically incorrect. Indeed, in 
no recent American war has the US government been free from criticism. 
Eisenhower won election in 1952 in part by criticizing the Truman ad-
ministration’s policy in the Korean War, while Vietnam of course grew 
tremendously contentious over time. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 
congressional resolution to use force passed by only a narrow 52–47 mar-
gin, and absent the quick and decisive victory that coalition forces 
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achieved the Democrats undoubtedly would have returned to public 
criticism quite quickly. 102 Republicans repeatedly insinuated that the 
1999 Kosovo War was undertaken to defl ect attention from the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal and Clinton’s subsequent impeachment. 103 More re-
cently, the 2003 Iraq War was consistently divisive, with John Kerry 
heavily criticizing Bush administration policy in the 2004 election and a 
quite public debate over the wisdom of Bush’s proposed “surge” in 2007. 
When presidents hearken back to the bipartisan accord of the World 
War II period, therefore, they are skipping over half a century in which 
the occurrence of war hardly guaranteed domestic agreement. 104 Nor is 
public opposition restricted to the United States. While there almost al-
ways are majorities supporting the leader’s policies, especially early in 
wars, minorities in opposition are frequently vocal and sometimes sur-
prisingly effective. Even the paragon of totalitarian control over his 
 country—Adolf Hitler—faced an assassination attempt, which came re-
markably close to success, by an opposition that hoped to negotiate a 
separate peace with the Western powers. 
 Given the ability of other actors in government, the army, or society in 
general to reign in misbehaving leaders, the question is when they will 
choose to do so. If they had perfect control over the leader’s activities, 
principal-agent wars would never occur. In reality, of course, leaders 
have signifi cant advantages. The fi rst is that imposing constraints on 
leaders in the context of war is risky and potentially costly: generals and 
politicians who oppose orders face charges of treason, and soldiers who 
refuse to fi ght may be shamed or even executed. People who are uncer-
tain about whether the leader’s decisions are reasonable thus face incen-
tives to stay quiet. The second advantage is that leaders are better 
informed about the true situation in the war that most or all of their po-
tential opponents—they have private reports from the battlefi eld and 
know the details of secret negotiations with the enemy. 105 The existence 
of this information gap is critical. When the principal-agent mechanism 
is responsible for war, fi ghting is not in society’s interest; leaders there-
fore can avoid resistance only by lying. So long as the leader can  convince 
her supporters that her publicly professed optimism is justifi ed, or that 
the opponent is as resistant to settlement as she claims, she will be able to 
continue the war unconstrained. 
 Thus, just as in the informational mechanism, the continuation of 
 principal-agent wars over time requires that expectations about the fu-
ture course of the war not converge: the more that society knows about 
the true state of affairs, the harder it will be for the leader to avoid the 
imposition of constraints that force her toward a settlement. As a result, 
the revelation of information through fi ghting and negotiations will 
steadily undercut the leader’s narrative about why the war is in the 
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national interest, ultimately bringing about war termination when either 
the leader is replaced by someone more amenable to peace or is backed 
into a corner and forced to agree to settle. As in informational confl icts, 
the faster that information is revealed, the faster that we would expect to 
see war end. 
 To summarize, leaders start principal-agent wars because they hope to 
achieve personal benefi ts, but they can continue them only so long they 
can convince society to back them, by maintaining a plausible story 
about why further fi ghting will be in the national interest. As the war 
continues, however, the leader’s misrepresentations will become increas-
ingly apparent, as past promises are not achieved and battlefi eld set-
backs make the opponent’s terms seem more reasonable. As time passes, 
therefore, the leader will be increasingly constrained in the positions she 
can advance; ultimately she will either be forced into an undesired settle-
ment or replaced by a leader who is willing to end the war. This argu-
ment thus implies that principal-agent wars will be limited in duration, 
intensity, or both. 
 Hypothesis 4: Principal-agent wars will be limited. 
 Indeed, there are two differentiable types of principal-agent wars, distin-
guished by the end that the leader is pursuing. The fi rst are diversionary 
wars, in which leaders see external confl ict as a means to improve their 
hold on power. The second, to which I refer as “policy wars,” cover con-


















Figure 1.3 Principal-agent wars and war duration and intensity
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either does not support or would not be willing to pay the costs of war to 
achieve. While the basic logic of the principal-agent mechanism is the 
same in each case, the difference in the leader’s goals turns out to have 
important implications for the way in which the confl ict is conducted 
and hence for the nature of the war. Figure 1.3 illustrates my predictions 
for where each type of principal-agent war will typically fall in the theo-
retical space, again identifying a basic trade-off between intensity and 
duration that keeps these confl icts limited. 
 The point of diversionary wars is to divert attention from the reasons 
why leaders might have lost popularity or come to face threats to their 
hold on power. As such, the war must be a public event: the people can-
not be distracted by something that they do not know about. More pre-
cisely, if the war is intended to distract focus from other matters, it must 
be more salient than those matters; if it is a forum for demonstrating the 
leader’s capabilities, the public must be able to observe the leader in ac-
tion. By raising the salience of the confl ict, however, the leader loses 
much of her ability to misrepresent how it is going. As a result, when 
things go wrong—as they quite often do, given that the leader typically 
is adopting a risky policy in the hope that it will salvage her position—it 
will be hard to present the available facts in a good light. Consequently, 
she will have a hard time making a convincing case that the war should 
continue, and if she tries she may fi nd her ability to do so effectively 
quite constrained. The Falklands War, discussed in chapter 7, provides 
an obvious example of this dynamic. In another case, Idi Amin’s invasion 
of Tanzania in 1978 is frequently attributed to his belief that the army 
was about to overthrow him and thus that by manufacturing a territorial 
dispute with Tanzania he might succeed in distracting the army and thus 
securing his hold on power. In the event, when the Tanzanians launched 
a counterinvasion, the soldiers of the Ugandan army simply refused to 
fi ght, with the result that Amin was rapidly driven from power and the 
war ended in a matter of months. 106 In short, if a diversionary war starts 
poorly, the public will quickly realize that the leader has been lying to 
them; in the less-likely scenario in which it begins well, the leader will 
usually have achieved her goal and be open to settlement. In either case, 
diversionary wars will typically be short. 
 Hypothesis 4a: Diversionary wars will typically be short. 
 Leaders can also start wars to pursue idiosyncratic personal interests of 
which society would not approve. Because the goal of these wars is not 
to infl uence public opinion, it is not necessary that the public be able to 
observe them. Indeed, these leaders will benefi t from having an unin-
formed public that is unable to critically evaluate their claims about the 
Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Wars
[51]
necessity and course of fi ghting, as an uninformed public will be more 
likely to give the leader the benefi t of the doubt when she asserts that 
fi ghting is in the national interest. As a result, we can expect that leaders 
in these confl icts will make an effort to limit the availability of informa-
tion about the war effort, and in particular to limit critical perspectives. 
Thus, for example, several scholars have argued that Lyndon Johnson 
escalated the Vietnam War because he believed that allowing South Viet-
nam to go communist would torpedo his ambitious domestic agenda, 
headlined by his Great Society program, much as the “loss” of China had 
hamstrung President Truman before him. Johnson thus authorized a 
steady expansion of the Vietnam War, consistently misrepresenting in-
creased efforts that were designed simply to keep the situation in Viet-
nam from completely falling apart as the last pieces necessary to achieve 
a fi nal victory, while discouraging coverage of events on the ground. 107
This situation could also arise when leaders believe that the public does 
not accurately perceive the national interest, as for example when Frank-
lin Roosevelt deliberately misled the American public about the extent of 
the assistance that he was providing to Britain in the months prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 108
 There are limits to what leaders can hide from their constituents, of 
course. Modern media and a free press mean that events anywhere in the 
world can be reported quickly and in detail, so that no country now can 
wake up one morning to discover, as Britain repeatedly did, that it has 
acquired a new colony of sometimes dubious actual value in a distant 
part of the world. 109 The emergence and spread of this technology thus 
has undoubtedly limited the ability of leaders to fi ght wars that their 
publics would not endorse. 110 There is, however, still substantial varia-
tion in the speed with which publics will learn about ongoing wars and 
the urgency with which constraints on leaders may be imposed. In gen-
eral, members of the public tend to be better informed and to care more 
about things that directly affect them or people whom they know. 111
From this perspective, the more salient a war is and the easier that it is to 
understand and interpret events within it, the quicker the public will 
develop clear ideas about what is happening and thus the less leeway 
that leaders will have for continuing wars that their constituents would 
not endorse. 
 Salience in turn can come in multiple forms. An increase in death tolls, 
confl ict over highly symbolic or strategically important stakes, and 
 fi ghting within the territory of the country in question would all tend to 
increase the salience of a particular confl ict, thus hastening the speed 
at which the public learns and limiting the leader’s fl exibility. The obser-
vation that Americans who know someone who was injured or killed in 
the 9/11 attacks or in the Iraq War were more likely to disapprove of 
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President Bush is consistent with this argument. 112 Differences in the 
speed of learning can also arise from variation in the nature of the war, 
with the distinction between conventional wars and insurgencies partic-
ularly important here, as citizens (and even governments) have to iden-
tify alternate methods for assessing how well the war is going. 113 Whereas 
in conventional wars the participants generally fi ght distinct battles that 
provide an obvious focal point for attention, in insurgencies such battles 
are far rarer. From this perspective, the quintessential low-salience war 
would be a low-intensity guerrilla confl ict in a peripheral part of the 
world fought over stakes of little importance to regular people. These 
sorts of principal-agent wars thus will be largely the prerogative of great 
powers, which have the wherewithal to undertake military interventions 
in far-off lands even over issues of relatively low immediate importance. 
 Hypothesis 4b: Policy wars may be of extended duration, but only if they 
are not particularly salient. 
 Case studies, especially in chapter 7, shed light on several of these hy-
potheses. As with the informational mechanism, however, statistical 
analysis is complicated by the lack of any  ex ante quantitative indicator of 
whether a war was driven by the principal-agent mechanism, which 
forces me to resort to indirect tests. Two additional testable hypotheses 
follow from the theoretical discussion above. The fi rst, already discussed, 
is that quicker information revelation should be associated with quicker 
settlement. The second is that wars will tend to be more limited the more 
tightly leaders are constrained. Constraints come from several different 
sources, including the army, other centers of power within the govern-
ment, and at an extreme the citizenry as a whole. In practice, most of 
these constraints (such as the presence of additional centers of power) 
are more likely to exist, or are likely to take on a more substantial form, 
in democracies. 114 Some of course exist in every political system: soldiers 
can always refuse to obey orders, and people can always engage in 
strikes, large protests, or revolutions. However, even in these cases, dem-
ocratic leaders will have fewer options in responding to such actions: an 
autocrat has the option of killing dissidents en masse and without trial, 
something a democrat will have much more trouble doing. Thus one 
prediction of this model is that increased democracy will result in re-
duced opportunities to pursue personal gains at public expense. Most 
obviously, this argument implies that democratic leaders will have 
greater diffi culty in refusing to settle an unsuccessful war, meaning that 
wars in which the loser is more democratic will tend to be more limited. 
In addition, a number of scholars have argued that democratic leaders, 
anticipating greater constraints, are more cautious when initiating wars, 
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which should imply that the wars that they initiate will be more 
limited. 115
 Hypothesis 4c: Principal-agent wars will end more quickly when fi ghting 
is more intense. 
 Hypothesis 4d: More democratic war losers and war initiators will be 
associated with quicker settlement. 
 What separates the few unusually destructive wars from the many that 
either end more quickly or are fought less intensely? This chapter argues 
that the most destructive wars are typically driven by commitment prob-
lems. Specifi cally, I argue that preventive wars driven by situational 
commitment problems—in which a power anticipating relative decline 
starts a war to stop the decline from occurring—are unusually diffi cult to 
resolve, because the drive to prevent the decline entails large war aims 
that the declining power is reluctant to reduce, even in the face of mili-
tary diffi culties. In addition, I identify a novel mechanism, which I refer 
to as the dispositional commitment problem, in which targets of preven-
tive wars attribute aggression not to the initiator’s fear of decline but to 
an aggressive disposition, with the implication that the initiator will con-
tinue to launch unprovoked attacks if given the opportunity. Given these 
beliefs, no negotiated settlement can be expected to last, and thus it 
makes sense to pursue the opponent’s unconditional surrender. 
 This chapter also examines in detail two other mechanisms that can 
produce wars but that for related reasons do not produce unlimited 
wars. In the informational mechanism, wars begin because leaders have 
divergent expectations about how fi ghting will go. Once fi ghting starts, 
those expectations begin to converge, more quickly when fi ghting is 
more intense, until they are close enough that settlement becomes pos-
sible. In principal-agent confl icts, leaders start wars that serve their own 
interests, but not those of their constituents. These wars are sustainable, 
however, only to the extent that the leader can hold onto power and 
avoid pressure to settle. Constraints on leaders in turn become stronger 
as their constituents realize, again on the basis of events on the battlefi eld 
and at the negotiating table, that they have been misrepresenting how 
well the war can be expected to go. This argument thus implies that both 




 Research Strategy and Statistical Tests 
 In chapter 1 I made general arguments about the sources of limited 
and of unusually destructive wars and more specifi c predictions about 
the implications of different logics of war. This chapter examines those 
predictions quantitatively, focusing fi rst on general predictions about the 
sources of unusually destructive wars and then turning to specifi c hy-
potheses drawn from the different mechanisms. Before doing so, how-
ever, I will introduce and justify the multiple-method research strategy 
used in this book, which is particularly appropriate for a project like this 
one, which combines multiple theoretical arguments—complicating 
pure case analysis—with hypotheses that at times cannot be tested quan-
titatively. After that discussion, I turn to the data used in the quantitative 
analysis focusing on measures of war destructiveness and my operation-
alization of key independent variables. The subsequent analysis begins 
with tests of general predictions about war destructiveness before more 
briefl y addressing subsidiary hypotheses. 
 Research Stra tegy 
 The existence of multiple mechanisms that all provide a suffi cient ex-
planation for war, but that differ in their implications for the course and 
destructiveness of the wars that they cause, raises a number of signifi cant 
challenges for empirical research. On the one hand, equifi nality raises 
the prospect that different cases may be driven by diverse causal pro-
cesses, thus potentially casting doubt on the results of purely qualitative 
studies, especially studies of a relatively small number of cases. In short, 
we cannot count on fi ndings from a case driven by one mechanism to 
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apply to a case driven by another. This problem provides a good reason, 
beyond the many that already exist, for quantitative tests of the hypoth-
eses generated in the past two chapters. Moreover, quantitative ap-
proaches provide a useful check on the tendency of researchers to 
extrapolate from the most familiar cases, a particularly signifi cant prob-
lem if the most familiar cases are unrepresentative, as with the tendency 
of international relations researchers to know more about particularly 
deadly or consequential wars. 
 At the same time, central variables in the bargaining model are diffi -
cult to observe and to operationalize, casting doubt on the results of 
purely quantitative studies. Because no available variables can reliably 
identify which mechanism is driving confl ict in a particular case, I am 
forced to rely on proxy variables or on more indirect tests of central hy-
potheses in quantitative work. These tests are still quite useful, but there 
is always the concern that indirect tests may pick up relationships that 
exist for reasons other than those identifi ed by theory and that proxy 
variables may not be operating in the manner expected. Moreover, sev-
eral arguments in this book simply cannot be tested quantitatively, either 
because (as in the case of unconditional surrender) the number of rele-
vant historical cases is too small or (as in the case of predictions about the 
size of war aims) there is no good way to quantify a variable of interest 
validly and reliably. Case studies thus provide important additional tests 
of my arguments. In addition to their obvious utility in testing broad 
predictions about unconditional surrender that cannot be tested statisti-
cally, case studies are particularly useful when there is potential for dis-
agreement about  why an observed empirical relationship exists—the 
only way to adjudicate between competing explanations for the same 
phenomenon is to derive and test additional, divergent implications of 
the competing theories. Even if such tests can only be conducted in a 
limited number of cases, they can still provide a substantial increase in 
confi dence in the validity of one interpretation relative to another. For 
this reason, the approach taken here is to use a multiple-method research 
strategy that combines statistical analysis with close case studies. The 
statistical analysis provides confi dence that results hold across a wide 
range of wars through history; the case studies provide confi dence that 
broad patterns found in the statistical results are present for the reason 
that theory predicts that they should be present. 
 With respect to the qualitative analysis, the next question is what cases 
a study should examine. Given the need for signifi cant variation on the 
dependent variable, I must examine both large and small wars. I also 
wish to ensure that results do not simply refl ect the bias of the fi eld to-
ward examining well-known cases—in other words, if the well-known 
cases (for example, the major-power wars) result from a different causal 
Chapter 2
[56]
process, I want to vary my case selection to be able to identify those dif-
ferences. 1 At the same time, I also want to ensure that readers have an 
opportunity to check my interpretations against their own readings of 
cases with which they are familiar. 
 Given these disparate goals, I ultimately opted for a bipartite case-
selection strategy. The fi rst approach was to select three cases from a 
stratifi ed random sample, choosing one each from the sample of short 
wars; long but low-intensity wars; and long, high-intensity wars. 2 This 
selection process identifi ed the Anglo-Iranian War of 1856–57 (short), the 
Franco-Turkish War of 1919–21 (long but low-intensity), and the Para-
guayan War of 1864–70 (long and high-intensity). These case studies 
force me to address unfamiliar confl icts, thus helping to allay concerns 
that cases were chosen because they were known to conform to theoreti-
cal expectations or that intentional case selection (which often focuses on 
more familiar confl icts) unintentionally introduces bias into the analysis. 
The drawback to random case selection, however, is that it often high-
lights cases that are unfamiliar to readers—meaning that they must 
put greater trust in the researcher’s honesty in presenting relevant 
information—and for which evidence is often scarcer, with the result that 
tests of core hypotheses may be less defi nitive. 
 Thus I supplemented the randomly selected cases with a number of 
cases chosen intentionally as confl icts that would be more familiar to 
readers and that might be seen as providing a particularly fair test of key 
arguments. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 was a short confl ict that pro-
vides a useful test of hypotheses about short wars. The Falklands War of 
1982 is frequently seen as the preeminent example of a diversionary war 
and thus sheds important light on arguments about the logic of principal-
agent problems in domestic politics. The European theater of World War II 
constitutes by most measures the most destructive war in history; any 
serious attempt to explain such wars must grapple with this case. I exam-
ine all three of these cases in signifi cant detail in later chapters. In addi-
tion, given the signifi cance of case study tests for my argument about 
unconditional surrender (which I cannot test quantitatively), I present 
minicases of the Crimean War, the Pacifi c component of World War II, 
and the Iran-Iraq War in chapter 5. Although these cases receive a more 
superfi cial discussion than others in this project, their inclusion provides 
an opportunity to further highlight the ways in which the commitment 
problem mechanisms act, as all involve signifi cant preventive motiva-
tions for war, while two of the three (all but the Crimean) involve one 
side sincerely refusing to negotiate, in line with the unconditional sur-
render mechanism. 
 With case selection complete, the remaining question is what sort of 
evidence I will use to test the various hypotheses. The most important 
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evidence concerns what leaders do: lowering political demands or rais-
ing them in response to battlefi eld and diplomatic events, adopting risk-
ier or less risky military strategies, expanding wars to new participants 
or keeping them limited, and so forth. After all, these are the decisions 
that determine the length and severity of wars. At the same time, how-
ever, specifi c decisions frequently are open to multiple interpretations, 
some of which would be compatible with hypotheses advanced here and 
some of which would not. Distinguishing among different interpreta-
tions requires that I examine the beliefs and statements of leaders. These 
statements introduce additional challenges, in that leaders may dissem-
ble or be inconsistent in their beliefs. Given these concerns, I privilege 
private statements, which are less likely than public discourse to be rhe-
torical, and attempt to verify that stated beliefs and rationales are consis-
tent across multiple data points. I also ask whether stated beliefs are 
consistent with observed behavior: if, for instance, a leader professes re-
newed optimism after a battle but privately lowers her political de-
mands, that observation provides reason to think that the stated optimism 
is insincere. 
 Given the number of cases, the individual studies rely primarily on 
secondary sources, although I do make use of primary sources for cases 
for which they are readily available, typically in confl icts involving West-
ern democracies. Unsurprisingly, there is a far more extensive literature 
on some of these cases than on others, and thus evidence is more defi ni-
tive for some arguments than for others. Given these limitations, I indi-
cate when data limitations reduce certainty in conclusions. Where 
possible, this problem was also addressed by the use of French, German, 
and Russian-language sources. 
 Quantitative Analysis 
 The remainder of this chapter introduces the quantitative data used in 
the statistical analysis, discusses statistical specifi cations, and presents 
and discusses statistical results. There are several central fi ndings. First, 
and most important, wars that are preceded by signifi cant shifts in rela-
tive capabilities, which I argue should be associated with fear of future 
decline for one side in the war and hence with the commitment problem 
mechanism, tend to be substantially longer, deadlier, and more economi-
cally costly than wars in which such shifts are absent. This result, which 
is statistically robust, provides strong support for the argument that the 
commitment problem mechanism is responsible for the most destructive 
wars. Moreover, further analysis fi nds that the measure of commitment 
problems is associated with greater diffi culty settling wars but also with 
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quicker conquest, as well as with a higher probability that leaders adopt 
relatively risky military strategies and that wars end through conquest 
rather than settlement. All of these fi ndings are consistent with the theo-
retical argument that leaders launching preventive wars will typically 
resist settlement absent a major victory, but also will adopt risky military 
and diplomatic strategies that increase the probability and speed of deci-
sive military victory or defeat. 
 In addition, the statistical analysis fi nds that, once we set aside the 
sample of commitment problem wars (which tend to be both long and 
intense), increased war intensity is associated with quicker settlement. 
This fi nding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that wars driven 
by the informational or principal-agent mechanisms are necessarily lim-
ited in either intensity or duration. These mechanisms, then, cannot ac-
count for the most destructive wars, which are both long and intense. In 
addition, the statistical results reveal that greater institutional constraints 
on leaders tend to be associated with quicker settlement, consistent with 
the argument that whatever incentives leaders may have under the 
principal-agent mechanism to extend wars unnecessarily will eventually 
be overridden by the constraints that they face. 
 Data and Measurement 
 Following the standard approach in international relations, the uni-
verse of cases for this study consists of all interstate wars in the post-
Napoleonic period, where an interstate war is defi ned as a violent clash 
between two internationally recognized states in which at least a thou-
sand battle-related fatalities occur. 3 The starting point for this list is ver-
sion 4.0 of the Correlates of War (COW) list of interstate wars. Following 
the standard approach in quantitative studies of the duration and out-
come of war, I disaggregate several large multilateral confl icts like World 
War II. 4 The specifi c coding rule for disaggregation stipulates that no two 
countries may be principal belligerents in multiple wars at the same time 
and requires that the political issue at stake in the fi ghting differ substan-
tially across fronts. This approach produces a total of 103 primary 
observations. 
 In a number of cases, however, reasonable doubt exists as to whether 
or how a specifi c confl ict should be included in the dataset; to facilitate 
robustness checks, I include all questionable cases but fl ag them to per-
mit their inclusion or exclusion as necessary. There are fi ve different rea-
sons why observations may be fl agged. In some cases, particularly in a 
number of nineteenth-century Latin American confl icts, reasonable 
doubt exists as to whether the participants suffered more than a thou-
sand deaths. Others, as with the Israel-Syria clash in Lebanon in 1982 or 
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the American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, arguably are better 
described as internationalized civil wars. In a few cases, the political 
leadership on one side opposes and tries to prevent the fi ghting, as with 
the Moroccan sultan’s opposition to confl ict carried out by Rif tribesmen 
against the Spanish in 1909; this situation is potentially problematic given 
the theoretical assumption that leaders are the ones choosing to go to 
war. 5 Fourth, given past disagreement about when and how to disaggre-
gate multilateral wars, I also include observations that reaggregate the 
separate confl icts. Finally, in some cases fi ghting stops for a short period 
before resuming, raising potential doubts about whether the case should 
be considered a single case or two separate wars. I thus include observa-
tions that aggregate or disaggregate wars over time differently. Supple-
mentary fi les available online provide the data used in the analysis, a full 
discussion of the universe of cases and justifi cation for specifi c coding 
decisions, instructions (a Stata .do fi le) to replicate the main fi ndings, and 
an appendix containing results from statistical robustness checks. 6
 Measuring the Destructiveness of War 
 The suffering imposed by war comes in many forms, most obviously 
dead and wounded soldiers, but also civilians who are harmed by fi ght-
ing, those who suffer and die from disease and privation associated with 
war, as well as those who suffer the lesser but still real opportunity costs 
that arise when the state diverts money to pay for war. No one measure 
can capture all these costs, and various possibilities involve different 
trade-offs. For the analysis here, I ultimately use three measures: total 
battle deaths, war duration, and government spending, each with its 
own advantages and disadvantages. 
 The most obvious measure of the cost of war is how many people are 
killed. Death data pose both conceptual and data quality challenges, 
however. Conceptually, the responsibility of war for deaths can occur 
along a continuum, ranging from clear cases such a soldier who is shot 
on the battlefi eld to very indirect incidents such as an elderly woman 
who succumbs to pneumonia in part because war restrictions have left 
her less well nourished. 7 Contrast, for example, three deadly helicopter 
crashes, one while the pilot maneuvers under fi re, one on returning 
from a mission, and one during training far from the battlefi eld: on the 
one hand, none might have occurred absent the war (although training 
accidents certainly happen in peacetime), but all are to some extent ac-
cidents and hence less unambiguously war deaths than the case of a 
soldier felled by an enemy’s bullet. In part for these reasons, and in part 
because in war records may be destroyed, falsifi ed, or simply not kept, 
precise records of deaths in war are frequently simply unavailable, 
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especially for incidents less directly connected to the battlefi eld. Given 
the data quality concerns, this study focuses on deaths in battle. Be-
cause of concerns about existing sources on battle deaths, I collected 
this data myself, relying primarily on Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of war 
statistics. 8
 The duration of war presents a different trade-off. Relative to other 
measures, war duration is particularly reliable—it is much easier to 
know when fi ghting started and stopped than to identify exactly how 
many soldiers died. 9 The existence of war imposes costs on society that 
continue to be borne as long as fi ghting continues: all else equal, a longer 
war is a more destructive one. Of course, in reality we cannot assume 
that all else is equal—from the perspective of the United States, the Viet-
nam War was clearly longer than World War II, but World War II was 
undeniably costlier. Thus with war duration we are confi dent in the reli-
ability of our measure of the destructiveness of war, but its validity is 
somewhat reduced. As with battle deaths, to maximize the validity of the 
war duration measure, I rely on novel data, in this case dates of war 
onset and termination collected for the War Initiation and Termination 
project. 10 This data focuses specifi cally on the date on which fi ghting 
starts and stops, rather than, as in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, 
diplomatic developments like declarations of war or peace treaties. 11 As 
with war deaths, substituting the standard COW data for the measure 
used in primary analyses results in effectively identical results. 
 The economic cost of a war is a third way of capturing its destructive-
ness: money spent to pay soldiers and buy weapons cannot be spent on 
food or to hire teachers. As with deaths, precisely measuring the cost of 
a war is complicated conceptually and in terms of data availability. In 
addition to paying for procurement costs during the fi ghting, war par-
ticipants typically must rebuild arms stocks after the war, pay for veter-
ans’ benefi ts, and pay interest on any debt incurred during the war. 
Moreover, the economy of a country at war suffers from the economi-
cally ineffi cient allocation of resources—farmers who are fi ghting cannot 
sow and harvest crops, for example. 12 A reliable measure for a wide 
range of wars necessarily must focus on a more restrictive set of costs, 
specifi cally procurement costs during the confl ict. Here I rely on infor-
mation gathered by Cappella, who collected secondary source data on 
government expenditures for war as part of a project on how states fi -
nance wars. 13 The specifi c measure uses total spending in the war as a 
share of GDP in the year of war onset, with GDP data coming from Mad-
dison. 14 Unlike the data I have collected for war deaths and war dura-
tion, I have data on monetary cost for only a subset of observations 
(sixty-four countries in thirty different wars, with shorter and less deadly 
wars disproportionately unlikely to have data). Results from analyses of 
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spending are thus less defi nitive than are those for other dependent vari-
ables, but they do shed some additional light on costs. 
 Explanatory V ariables 
 Fear of Future Decline 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that fear of decline will be associated with more 
destructive wars. To test this claim, I need some measure of the degree to 
which participants in a war might fear relative decline. 15 The ideal mea-
sure would capture projected future shifts in capabilities. Observed shifts 
after the start of the war are clearly inappropriate, however, as the con-
duct and outcome of war can dramatically infl uence relative capabilities 
in a way that cannot be anticipated precisely at the outset. Indeed, to the 
extent that a strategy of preventive war is effective and the rising power 
is defeated, this measure might indicate that it was in fact the  rising 
power (if anyone) that anticipated a decline. Instead, I argue that shifts in 
capabilities prior to the start of war provide a reasonable, if imperfect, 
proxy for anticipated shifts in future capabilities. In general, the best pre-
diction that actors have for future developments is a function of current 
trends: the expectation today that China will continue to rise in the fu-
ture is based largely on the observation that it has experienced signifi -
cant growth in the recent past. This tendency can perhaps be demonstrated 
most convincingly in cases in which extrapolation from current trends 
proved to be incorrect. Thus, for example, a 1990 survey found that 60 
percent of the American general public and 63 percent of leaders viewed 
economic competition with Japan as a “critical threat,” and in the early 
1990s Americans were concerned by books that augured increased future 
competition with Japan, including a prediction of a coming war; these 
fears dropped off, however, as Japan descended into its lost decade. 16
 Indeed, this approach can capture not only the gradual but apparently 
inexorable rise of countries like Japan or China, but also windows of op-
portunity associated with dramatic but temporary drops in relative capa-
bilities, generally resulting from domestic upheaval. Salient examples 
here—both driven by purges of the military—include the Soviet Union 
in the later 1930s and Iran following the 1979 revolution. In such cases, 
we would typically expect that countries that experience decline will re-
cover in the future, with the size of the recovery correlated to the size of 
the initial decline. The existence of contrasting possibilities does indicate 
that we need to look at the details of cases before deciding which side 
faced motivations for preventive war in situations of signifi cant capabil-
ity shifts. When the shift is associated with an inexorable rise (the United 
States compared to China today), then the side that has become weaker 
at the end point fears continued decline. When the shift is temporary 
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(Iraq compared to Iran), then the side that is  stronger might consider pre-
ventive war, as its advantage cannot be expected to last. While this ap-
proach does not directly measure anticipated shifts, I argue that it 
provides a useful proxy: as the size of shifts prior to war increases, it is 
more likely that leaders on at least one side will be acting out of preven-
tive motivations, and those motivations will likely be more severe. 17
 I develop the specifi c variable used in the statistical analyses using 
COW’s National Military Capabilities dataset, which generates a 
yearly index of state power based on the size of the military, military 
expenditures, total population, urban population, iron/steel production, 
and energy consumption. 18 The degree of shift in capabilities for a 






























 To ensure that the variable is well behaved I construct it so that  k ∈
{0,1}, which corresponds to assigning  A to be the power that has experi-
enced decline in the period prior to war. For ease of interpretation, I then 
subtract this variable from 1 to ensure that it is rising in the degree of the 
power shift. The primary power shift variable used in the analysis uses 
data for all actors in the dispute; I also construct alternate measures that 
restrict the variable either to the primary dyad in the war, where the 
members of the primary dyad are the countries that most historians de-
scribe as the most important actors on each side of the war, or to those 
actors initially involved in the confl ict, where initial involvement in-
cludes all countries that were actively involved within the fi rst month of 
fi ghting. I used time lags of fi ve and ten years prior to the war based on 
the expectation that leaders would need several years to infer a shift in 
capabilities; the primary analyses use lags of ten years. 19 To avoid poten-
tial concerns about shifts arising as a consequence of war, capabilities 
data for the year of war onset is the lagged value from the previous year. 
 This variable is of course an imperfect measure of fears of future de-
cline. Case studies in chapters 3–5 present evidence of signifi cant fear of 
decline in a number of wars from history. Of these, most score quite high 
on this measure. Thus, for example, the Paraguayan War, the World War II 
clash between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the Iran-Iraq War all 
lie above the seventy-fi fth percentile in the size of the prewar power 
shift. That said, there do exist cases in which fears of decline are not 
picked up by the measure. The British fear of decline in the Crimean War, 
for example, hinged on a potential development (the Russian acquisition 
of Constantinople) that had not happened and thus could not affect 
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prewar capability levels, with the result that the capability shift variable 
is low in this case. On the other hand, a few cases such as the Second 
Central American War or the Vietnamese-Cambodian War score quite 
high on the measure despite the absence of any clear evidence that par-
ticipants worried about future decline. These sorts of cases introduce 
measurement error, which necessarily reduces confi dence in the results, 
thus providing an additional rationale for qualitative work. That 
said, the close relationship in the remaining cases provides reason to be-
lieve that the fi t is not unacceptably poor. Moreover, this proxy benefi ts 
from the absence of any other reason to believe that prewar shifts in ca-
pabilities would be associated with worse wars. 
 Revelation of Information 
 Hypotheses 3a and 4c predict that more intense fi ghting will reveal 
novel information to relevant actors more quickly, producing quicker 
belief updating and hence quicker settlement, at least in wars that are 
not driven by the commitment problem mechanism. 20 I measure war 
intensity—defi ned as the rate at which battle deaths accumulate—using 
the war deaths data discussed above. When it comes to measuring inten-
sity, of course, we must account for the size of the combatants: a battle in 
which a thousand soldiers die may be a minor skirmish between Ger-
many and Russia or an epic clash between Guatemala and El Salvador; 
leaders would obviously learn much more about their relative strength 
from the latter battle than from the former. The specifi c variables are thus 
adjusted for population size, using the measure of national populations 
from COW’s National Military Capabilities dataset. The resulting vari-
able is then logged to correct for skew, to limit the possibility that other-
wise outlying observations might drive the results. 
 Constraints on the Executive 
 Hypothesis 4d predicts that increased constraints on the executive, 
either for the war initiator or for the side that is losing militarily, will be 
associated with quicker settlement. The best available measure of such 
constraints is the country’s level of democracy. The standard measure 
of democracy in international relations scholarship comes from the Pol-
ity dataset, which is the only available measure that provides coverage 
over the entire post-Napoleonic period. 21 Countries are coded on two 
composite scales, one capturing the level of autocracy and one captur-
ing the level of democracy; these are frequently combined to generate a 
single, twenty-one-point scale. Both the autocracy and the democracy 
scores are generated from several separate variables that capture as-
pects of democracy like the openness and competitiveness of executive 
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recruitment (i.e., how wide a circle of people has a chance to become the 
leader? how are leaders selected?). It thus is focused primarily on the 
institutions of government rather than on things like civil society or 
democratic norms. While this focus may be a problem in many contexts, 
it is ideal for a study such as this one that is concerned with the way in 
which domestic political institutions may affect leaders’ incentives and 
constraints. 
 I generate two different regime variables from the Polity data. The fi rst 
is the Polity score of the side that loses militarily, with the military loser 
identifi ed by the War Initiation and Termination (WIT) dataset. 22 Com-
plications for this coding strategy arise in the context of multilateral wars 
and of wars that end in military draws. In multilateral wars, there is the 
possibility of an alliance of highly dissimilar regimes, with cooperation 
between Russia and the Western powers in both World Wars providing 
the most obvious examples. In this context, averaging scores would be 
quite misleading, while coding one extreme or the other would be open 
to challenge. One step here is to limit the focus to those countries that 
actually could infl uence central decisions about the war, omitting those 
(like Poland in the Iraq War) that contribute troops but have minimal say 
over military and political strategy. This decision is taken for obvious 
theoretical reasons—the domestic political incentives facing leaders of 
countries that do not have much sway over whether the war should be 
settled or continued logically should not much infl uence the nature of 
the war—but it has the ancillary benefi t of eliminating some cases of al-
lied but dissimilar losers, such as Germany and Finland in World War II. 
Separately, and extremely conveniently, it happens that in most multilat-
eral wars a single country loses to a coalition, and furthermore when a 
coalition loses the countries involved generally share similar governance 
structures. As a result, substantial deviations are quite rare, and turn out 
not to affect statistical results. 23
 The second regime variable captures whether or not the war initiator 
was democratic, drawing on the argument that democratic leaders tend 
to be particularly selective in the wars that they start, initiating confl icts 
that they can win easily. 24 This variable is a dummy that is coded 1 when 
the initiator has a Polity score of 7 or higher on the standard -10 to 10 
scale. 25 Data for the war initiator comes from the Correlates of War inter-
state wars dataset. 
 Control V ariables 
 Finally, I control for a range of variables that other studies have identi-
fi ed as signifi cant predictors of war duration and severity. Given the pos-
sibility that rough terrain will slow down the process of fi ghting and 
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thereby extend wars, I control for the nature of terrain, using data from a 
prior study by Branislav Slantchev. 26 Contiguity similarly has a plausible 
association with war duration, as more distant opponents will have 
greater diffi culty bringing force to bear against each other. Contiguity 
data comes from version 3.0 of the Correlates of War’s contiguity dataset; 
the dichotomous variable captures whether the primary participants in 
the war shared a land border. 27 Similarly, given the argument that the 
involvement of additional states in a confl ict increases the number of 
veto players who might reject a possible settlement, I control for the 
number of major participants in a war. 28 Data on major participants 
comes from the WIT project, which identifi es a major participant as a 
country that has a substantial infl uence over its side’s political or mili-
tary decisions. 
 Several authors have argued that relative capabilities also infl uence 
war duration and severity, typically with the prediction that relative 
equality will be associated with worse wars. 29 Data for relative capabili-
ties comes again from the Correlates of War National Military Capabili-








capi is the sum of capabilities for the primary participants on one side 
and capa capb. The variable thus ranges between 0.5 and 1, with higher 
values representing a more unequal distribution of capabilities. 30 I also 
control for major power involvement with a dichotomous variable that 
captures major power involvement on both sides of the war, using Levy’s 
identifi cation of major powers over time. 31
 Others might expect that cultural or ideological differences would pro-
duce worse wars. 32 I code cultural difference using Huntington’s delin-
eation of the major world civilizations around which he predicted that 
confl ict would occur, generating a dichotomous variable that captures 
whether the primary dyad in a war (coded as above) belong to different 
civilizations. 33 For political ideology, I generated two related variables. 
One is based on a division of regime ideologies into democratic, monar-
chic, communist, fascist, and “other authoritarian” categories; the sec-
ond subdivides the “other authoritarian” category to allow for 
progressive/liberal and religious/conservative categories in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. 34 In both cases, I code a clash of 
ideologies if the members of the primary dyad adhere to different regime 
philosophies. 35
 A fi nal control variable captures each side’s choice of military strategy 
(among the options of maneuver/blitzkrieg, attrition, and punishment/
guerrilla war), which has been found in past studies, particularly by Ben-
nett and Stam, to signifi cantly infl uence war duration. 36 I use Bennett 
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and Stam’s codings where possible, while coding observations that do 
not appear in their dataset myself. The specifi c variable codes strategy 
along a single dimension, with the midpoint occupied by a baseline cat-
egory of conventional attrition, which contrasts to maneuver/blitzkrieg 
strategies (lower values) and guerrilla/punishment strategies (higher 
values). Higher military strategy scores thus should generally be associ-
ated with longer (but not necessarily deadlier) wars. Inclusion of strat-
egy variables in my analysis is potentially problematic given the 
argument that the strategy may be endogenous to the mechanism the led 
to war; in practice, however, results for other variables are unchanged by 
the inclusion of the strategy variable. I also use the strategy variable to 
test hypothesis 1b, which predicts that preventive wars will tend to fea-
ture the use of riskier military strategies. 
 Conquest and Settlement 
 Finally, testing several of the subsidiary hypotheses requires that I 
have a measure of how war ended, distinguishing between logical pos-
sibilities of settlement and conquest. Game theorists have found that 
generating a compelling model of the conduct of war requires allowing 
for the possibility that war ends either through a negotiated agreement 
between the two sides or the military collapse of one side that renders its 
leaders incapable of continuing to contest control over the political issue 
at stake. 37 From this perspective, we can contrast the Korean War, which 
ended with both sides capable of continuing to fi ght, to World War II in 
Europe, in which Hitler and leading Nazis would have liked to continue 
the struggle in May 1945 but lacked the means to do so. The theoretical 
discussion of commitment problem wars predicts that leaders who fear 
decline will resist settlement but also will adopt risky military strategies 
that at times will result in relatively quick conquest; jointly, reluctance to 
settle and the use of risky military strategies should make conquest more 
likely in these confl icts. Testing these offsetting predictions requires that 
I be able to distinguish between types of war termination. 
 As no data on the nature of war termination in interstate wars exist, I 
collected this information myself. 38 Conquest occurs when one side loses 
the ability to sustain organized resistance, which typically forces capitu-
lation to the conqueror’s demands. 39 Any form of war termination that 
falls short of conquest is coded as settlement. Settlement thus covers 
cases such as the Korean War in which extensive negotiations preceded a 
signed armistice as well as wars such as the Sino-Indian confl ict of 1962, 
in which India tacitly accepted China’s declaration that the war was over 
by refraining from continuing to contest the disputed border. In other 
words, as long as both sides retain the capacity to fi ght, I code the war as 
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ending through settlement; if one side loses that ability, as defi ned in 
specifi c coding rules, the war ends through conquest. 
 The basic approach is to code a war as ending through conquest if the 
military on the losing side ceases to exist as a viable fi ghting force (im-
plying that war termination is, from the perspective of the political lead-
ership, involuntary). 40 This can happen, as with Germany in World War II, 
when all individual units in the army are either destroyed or forced to 
capitulate, or it can happen, as for example in the Uganda-Tanzania War, 
when the army on one side simply stops fi ghting and goes home, leaving 
the leaders on that side with no way of continuing the war. As with any 
coding exercise in international politics, however, there inevitably are 
marginal cases over which reasonable people could disagree. Thus, for 
example, how should we handle a case like the end of the Pacifi c War in 
World War II, in which the Japanese military surrendered in its entirety, 
thereby losing the capacity to continue to fi ght, in return for one political 
concession (the retention of the emperor in a fi gurehead role) on which 
the Allies could subsequently have reneged? Alternately, how should we 
handle a case like the Falklands War, in which both sides retain an ability 
to fi ght, but one has been forced out of the territory under dispute and is 
 Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables
Variable  Mean  Median  
Standard 
deviation
War duration (days) 419 120 741
Battle deaths 242,699 8,600 1,093,075
Government spending 0.55 0.11 1.9
Conquest (primary coding) 28 of 103 wars end in conquest
Conquest (restrictive coding) 21 of 103 wars end in conquest
Conquest (expansive coding) 35 of 103 wars end in conquest
Prewar capability shift 0.28 0.24 0.22
Loser’s political regime –3.3 –5 5.6
Democratic initiation 21 of 103 wars were initiated by a democracy
Log (per capita war intensity) –6.6 –6.4 2.0
Terrain 0.62 0.6 0.24
Contiguity 61 of 103 wars involve directly contiguous 
countries
Relative capabilities 0.79 0.81 0.14
Number of war participants 2.4 2 0.76
Major power war 14 of 103 wars involve a major power on each 
side
Military strategy 4.0 4 1.1
Total population (100,000,000s) 0.19 0.067 0.27
Total GDP of Allies 0.40 0 0.83
Own GDP 0.27 0.058 0.82
Cultural/civilizational clash 62 of 103 wars involve a clash of civilizations
Ideological clash  63 of 103 wars involve a clash of ideologies
Note: All reported statistics are for the default set of wars used in the primary analyses.
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incapable of returning? Because of the existence of such marginal cases, I 
ultimately developed three versions of the conquest/settlement variable. 
Under the primary coding, conquest is coded whenever the army sur-
renders or ceases to exist or when further resistance is impossible (for 
example because the entire territory of the defeated country is occupied). 
Under a more restrictive coding, cases initially coded as conquest are 
switched to settlement whenever the loser’s surrender was purchased 
with minimal and unenforceable concessions, as with Japan’s surrender 
in World War II. Under a more expansive coding, cases are coded as con-
quest if the war ended in conquest under the primary coding rule or if 
the war ended when one side overran a geographically separated and 
discrete region that constituted the central issue at stake in the war, as in 
the Falklands case. 
 Statistical Analysis 
 The fi rst section of the statistical results examines broad hypotheses 
about the relationship between different mechanisms and the destruc-
tiveness of war, focusing in particular on the prediction that commitment 
problem wars will be unusually destructive. The next section examines 
several subsidiary hypotheses that, while less directly connected to the 
overall destructiveness of wars, allow for additional tests of the different 
mechanisms. The fi rst set of results is thus critical in demonstrating that 
the broad theoretical predictions drawn from the different mechanisms 
are consistent with the historical record; the second set provides addi-
tional checks that help to increase confi dence that the observed relation-
ship exists for the reason that theory posits. 
 The analysis here makes use of events history models, which are de-
signed to deal with questions related to duration. 41 In an event history 
framework, observations (here wars) are compared with respect to how 
long it takes for them to exit the sample, in this case by ending. This ap-
proach is obviously appropriate for analysis of war duration, but it also 
makes sense for examining deaths and spending. Just as each additional 
day a war continues is a further day of suffering, so each additional death 
or dollar spent is a further cost that could have been avoided by a quicker 
settlement. The fi rst set of results use the semiparametric Cox specifi ca-
tion. 42 For the second set of regressions, I distinguish between different 
types of settlement to allow for the possibility that a variable might si-
multaneously delay settlement and hasten conquest. For these analyses, 
I use a competing risks regression framework. 43 The fi nal set of tests ex-
amines dichotomous dependent variables (whether or not participants 
resorted to relatively risky maneuver strategies, and whether wars ended 
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through conquest or settlement), for which a probit specifi cation is statis-
tically appropriate. 
 Tests of General Predictions 
 The single most important hypothesis in this book is that wars driven 
by commitment problems will tend to be more destructive than those 
driven by other mechanisms. Table 2.2 presents results for regressions 
examining the determinants of war duration (models 1–2), total battle 
deaths in war (models 3–4), and government spending (models 5–6). The 
reported estimates are variable coeffi cients (rather than hazard ratios), 
and as such have a somewhat unintuitive interpretation: a positive coef-
fi cient implies that an increase in the variable in question is associated 
Table 2.2 Predictors of war duration, battle deaths, and government spending
 
War duration Battle deaths Government spending
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Capability shift –1.29*  –1.58** –1.40** –1.53* –2.90* –2.68*
(0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.60) (1.37) (1.21)
Log (war intensity) 0.23* –0.46** –0.36
(0.11) (0.13) (0.33)
Democratic initiator  0.71* 0.54 0.30
(0.33) (0.38) (0.58)
Loser regime type  0.044*  0.049*
(0.021) (0.022)
Terrain –2.51** –2.42** –1.45** –1.52* –0.24 –0.80
(0.52) (0.60) (0.54) (0.71) (1.52) (1.64)
Contiguity 0.027 –0.038 –0.24 0.14 0.29 0.49
(0.24) (0.26) (0.22) (0.25) (0.51) (0.50)
Relative capabilities 0.90 0.69 –0.089 –0.52 2.43 1.59
(1.02) (1.12) (0.91) (1.06) (2.19) (2.52)
# of war participants 0.036 –0.049 –0.11 –0.039 –0.72** –0.52†
(0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.28)
Military strategy  –0.40**  –0.48** –0.16 –0.21
(0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15)
Major power war –0.59  –0.96* –1.50** –1.69**
(0.38) (0.46) (0.43) (0.47)
Cultural difference  –0.46† –0.29 –0.57** –0.93**
(0.26) (0.27) (0.22) (0.25)
Total population –0.56 –2.12**
(0.55) (0.64)
Total GDP of Allies 0.41 0.31
(0.32) (0.39)
Own GDP 0.36 0.33
(0.29) (0.33)
Observations 86 77 86 77 49 49
Note: Standard errors: robust (models 1–4), clustered by war (models 5–6). † p < .1, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Signifi cance tests are two-tailed.
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with an increase in the probability of war termination at any point, and 
hence with a  decrease in expected war duration. 
 The single most important fi nding in table 2.2 is that for the capability 
shift variable. Larger prewar shifts in relative capabilities, which should 
be associated with greater worries about future decline and hence more 
intense commitment problems, are consistently associated with more de-
structive wars. Thus, in model 1, while controlling for a range of vari-
ables that existing literature indicates affect war duration, larger shifts in 
the years prior to confl ict are associated with greater diffi culty ending 
confl icts and hence longer wars. This prediction also holds once I intro-
duce variables intended to capture the effects of other mechanisms of 
interest in this study, in model 2. Models 3 and 4 shift the focus to battle 
deaths. Given that a war between Germany and Russia, for example, has 
the potential to be far more deadly than a war between Guatemala and 
El Salvador, I include a control for the total population of the war partici-
pants. Prewar shifts in capabilities are again associated with a robust and 
statistically signifi cant increase in total destructiveness. Finally, models 5 
and 6 examine total government spending as a share of GDP. Given the 
limited N, I omit controls for military strategy, major power war, and 
cultural difference, which are all consistently insignifi cant once I control 
for the number of war participants, and I also omit the variable capturing 
the loser’s regime, which in the limited sample of cases for which I have 
data consists entirely of nondemocratic states (with a maximum Polity 
score of 1). These regressions do however include controls for the coun-
try’s GDP and the total GDP of its military allies, both of which plausibly 
could infl uence the country’s level of spending. Once again, larger pre-
war capability shifts are associated with greater spending, and hence 
with an increased deadweight economic loss from war. By any of three 
different measures of war destructiveness, therefore, when relative capa-
bilities shift dramatically prior to war—a situation that should induce 
commitment problem concerns—wars tend to be markedly more 
destructive. 
 Table 2.2 contains only six of the hundreds of different ways in which 
we might run each analysis, taking into account possibilities for chang-
ing the operationalization of key concepts, the list of control variables, 
the statistical specifi cation, and the universe of cases. An important ques-
tion, therefore, is whether these results are representative. While both 
page limits and the limits to a reader’s patience prevent me from present-
ing results from every possible regression here, I do make results from a 
wide range of robustness checks available in the supplemental appendix 
available online, and I summarize them here. 
 In brief, the results in table 2.2 are strikingly robust. In a minimalist 
regression with no controls, the capability shift variable misses 
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conventional signifi cance levels, although it is always associated with an 
increase in war destructiveness. With the standard set of controls, how-
ever, the size of the prewar capability shift is  always signifi cant and in the 
predicted direction, adopting a range of operationalizations (i.e., capabil-
ity shifts over fi ve or ten years, for all participants, the primary dyad, or 
initial participant), whether a different (parametric log-normal) statisti-
cal specifi cation is used, whether the universe of cases in several differ-
ent ways to deal with marginal cases is altered, and whether the 
Correlates of War data is substituted for the duration and deaths data 
used here. 44
 In addition to being statistically robust, the relationship between pre-
war capability shifts and war destructiveness is also substantively quite 
signifi cant. Building on models 2 and 4, fi gure 2.1 graphs the survivor 
function (the probability that war would still be ongoing) for scenarios in 
which the power shift variable is at either its tenth or its ninetieth percen-
tile, while all control variables are held at their median values. Wars pre-
ceded by limited shifts tend to be relatively short and not particularly 
deadly. Thus, for example, median predicted war duration in this case is 
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Figure 2.1 Fear of decline (commitment problems) and predicted war dura-
tion and battle deaths
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continue beyond one year. By contrast, in wars preceded by large capa-
bility shifts, median war duration is about half a year, more than a third 
of confl icts last over a year, and roughly a quarter are predicted to last 
more than two years. Similarly, in wars preceded by limited shifts in ca-
pabilities, deaths most often number in the thousands—in only a quarter 
are battle deaths more than 10,000, and well under 1 percent kill more 
than 100,000 soldiers—while wars preceded by signifi cant capability 
shifts are far deadlier, with the median war killing roughly 15,000 sol-
diers, while about 10 percent kill more than 100,000. These results are 
quite consistent with the prediction that commitment problem wars will 
be unusually deadly. 45
 The results in table 2.2 shed some light on the informational and 
principal-agent mechanisms, as well. When the initiator or the losing side 
in a war is more democratic, the war tends to be more limited, although 
this relationship is less robust than it is for the capability shift variable. 
Specifi cally, when the losing side in a war is more democratic, the war 
tends to be both shorter and less deadly—this result is consistent across 
a wide range of robustness checks. (Recall from above that this variable 
is omitted from the analysis of spending because of the absence of any 
remotely democratic war losers in the sample of wars from which there 
is spending data; if included, the variable is statistically insignifi cant.) 
More democratic war initiators, who likewise are conjectured to be con-
strained from launching particularly open-ended wars, are consistently 
associated with less destructive wars, however typically at a statistically 
insignifi cant level. This relationship is consistent with the argument that 
greater constraints on democratic leaders mean that they will likely face 
greater pressure to settle wars more quickly. 
 The results discussed so far do not provide an adequate test of Goe-
mans’s argument that leaders of partially democratic regimes are par-
ticularly resistant to settlement, however. 46 Such a test requires the 
inclusion of a quadratic term to allow for nonlinearities in the effect of 
regime type on willingness to settle. Table 2.3 thus presents results when 
including a quadratic term, which is equal to the square of the loser’s 
regime score, alongside the variables in models 2 and 4 of table 2.2. If 
partially democratic losers are particularly resistant to settlement, we 
would fi nd that the sign on the linear regime term would become nega-
tive, while the quadratic term was positive. Indeed, this is what we ob-
serve for the duration analysis (model 1), although the variables are 
individually insignifi cant. A graph of predicted effects in fi gure 2.2 dem-
onstrates that in reality what is occurring is that partially democratic re-
gimes are effectively identical to fully autocratic regimes, rather than that 
they are unusually prone to extending losing wars. Moreover, in model 2, 
the results indicate that an increase in the loser’s democracy level is 
Table 2.3 Effects of losing for partial democracies
 Duration Deaths
Capability Shift  –1.56**  –1.52*
(0.54) (0.61)
Log (war intensity) 0.25* –0.45**
(0.11) (0.13)
Democratic initiator 0.75* 0.58
(0.31) (0.38)
Loser regime type –0.043 0.00086
(0.069) (0.072)
Loser regime type2 0.0049 0.0027
(0.0035) (0.0036)




Relative capabilities 0.48 –0.62
(1.07) (1.06)
# of war participants –0.023 –0.036
(0.23) (0.18)
Military strategy  –0.42* –0.18
(0.18) (0.15)
Major power war  –1.03*  –1.72**
(0.47) (0.49)
Cultural difference –0.27  –0.92**
(0.27) (0.25)
Total population  –2.11**
(0.63)
Observations  77  77





























Figure 2.2 Losing regime type and predicted war duration
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consistently associated with a reduction in total battle deaths at any level 
of regime type. While signs sometimes change across robustness checks, 
the basic fi nding that losing partial democracies are not associated with 
unusually destructive wars is quite robust. These results thus suggest 
that there is nothing particularly special about losing partially demo-
cratic regimes. 
 The effect of war intensity varies across specifi cations, albeit in easily 
understandable ways. Wars characterized by higher intensity fi ghting 
tend to be shorter, as we would expect if the learning permitted by more 
intense fi ghting facilitated quicker settlement, but also are unsurpris-
ingly deadlier. The variable is also associated with an increase in total 
spending, albeit not at a statistically signifi cant level. This variable is of 
interest primarily for its effect on war duration, which is as predicted. 
That said, I defer more in-depth discussion of this result to the next sec-
tion, where I can address potential concerns about whether this relation-
ship actually refl ects quicker settlement in more intense wars, as opposed 
to the quicker military collapse of one side in the war. 
 The control variables all either perform as expected or are consistently 
insignifi cant. Wars fought in rough terrain are consistently longer and, 
more surprisingly, deadlier. Similarly, military strategy has a strong ef-
fect on war duration, with blitzkrieg wars shorter and guerrilla wars lon-
ger than conventionally fought confl icts. These strategies, however, have 
contrasting effects on war duration and war intensity—guerrilla wars, 
for example, are longer in part because they are fought less intensely—
and it is thus unsurprising that military strategy is not a statistically sig-
nifi cant predictor of total deaths in war. Wars involving major powers on 
both sides are also consistently longer and deadlier than other confl icts. 47
Cultural difference is typically associated with both increased war dura-
tion and deadliness. 48 Wars involving more populous countries are also 
typically deadlier, although this relationship is surprisingly statistically 
insignifi cant in model 4. 
 Other control variables are consistently insignifi cant. Thus there is no 
clear relationship between contiguity and the duration or deadliness of 
wars. Similarly, the relative capabilities variable is never statistically sig-
nifi cant, and moreover is associated with shorter and less costly but 
deadlier wars. Finally, an increase in the number of states involved in a 
war is associated with an unexpected reduction in war duration and at 
times in deaths, and the variable again is never statistically signifi cant. 
 Disaggregating Types of War Termination 
 Many of the hypotheses derived from the different theoretical mecha-
nisms make predictions specifi cally about the speed with which actors 
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settle their confl icts, rather than the speed with which wars end, which 
can happen through both settlement and military conquest. Most nota-
bly, hypotheses 1c and 1d predict that commitment problem wars will be 
particularly diffi cult to settle, but that powers that fear decline face in-
centives to adopt relatively risky military strategies that produce an in-
creased probability of quick conquest. If these predictions are borne out, 
we should be more confi dent that the general relationship between pre-
war capability shifts and war duration exists for the reasons given by 
theory. Similarly, the argument that the informational and principal-
agent mechanisms are inherently limited focuses on the factors impelling 
leaders toward settlement, rather than anything about the time at which 
continued military resistance becomes impossible. In each case, how-
ever, general fi ndings could be interpreted as arising primarily because 
of the relationship between the variable and the speed of conquest. Thus, 
for example, it is possible that more intense wars would end more quickly 
because increased levels of fi ghting encourage faster updating of expec-
tations and hence quicker settlement, but also that intense wars will re-
sult in the quick military collapse of one side in the war. Similarly, given 
the knowledge that a substantial number of democratic losses in war in-
volved European countries conquered by Germany in World War II, it is 
possible that the fi nding that more democratic war losers fi ght shorter 
wars may not refl ect anything about the propensity of democracies to 
 settle more quickly. 
 Adjudicating the effects of variables on the speed of conquest and of 
settlement thus requires a different statistical specifi cation. This section 
thus presents competing-risks analyses of war destructiveness. A com-
peting risks specifi cation allows for the possibility that war may end in 
one of several ways, and thus does not force us to assume, for example, 
that the end of fi ghting in Europe in May 1945 refl ected Hitler’s new-
found willingness to reach a mutually acceptable settlement with the Al-
lies. The specifi c approach adopted here is that of Fine and Gray. 49 The 
results appear in table 2.4. Starting with the same set of variables as in 
models 2, 4, and 6 of table 2.2, each regression presents the relationship 
between variables of interest and the speed of either settlement (models 
1, 2, 4, and 6) or conquest (models 3, 5, and 7). 50
 As before, I start with tests of predictions from the commitment prob-
lem mechanism. For all three dependent variables, an increase in the ca-
pability shift variable is associated with an increase in time until 
settlement—consistent with the general fi nding that commitment prob-
lem wars tend to be more destructive—but also with a  decrease in time 
until conquest. This result indicates that the regressions in table 2.2 were 
pooling multiple competing effects: on the one hand, declining powers’ 
reluctance to settle meant that ending these wars diplomatically is 
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diffi cult, but the true size of this effect is undercut by the occurrence of 
quick conquest in some cases. 51 These wars tend to be more destructive 
on average (as was seen in table 2.2) because the capability shift variable 
has a stronger substantive effect on speed of settlement than on speed of 
conquest and, more important, because most wars end through settle-
ment rather than conquest. Substantively, when holding control vari-
ables at their medians, a war preceded by a small capability shift (variable 
at the tenth percentile) typically reaches settlement in about three months. 
By contrast, these results suggest that less than a quarter of wars pre-
ceded by a signifi cant capability shift (variable at the ninetieth) percen-
tile would end through settlement in the fi rst two years of war. Similarly, 
in a war preceded by a limited capability shift, the median number of 
battle deaths prior to settlement is 7,500, a substantial total but no com-
parison to wars preceded by signifi cant capability shifts, less than a quar-
ter of which are predicted to settle even as battle deaths pass 100,000. 
Substantively strong and statistically signifi cant results across a number 
of different dependent variables provide strong support for hypotheses 
derived from the logic of the commitment problem mechanism. 
 The results also shed light on the potential alternate interpretations of 
the war intensity and political regime variables. On the one hand, the 
fi nding that regime variables are primarily related to the speed of settle-
ment rather than the speed of conquest demonstrates that the relation-
ship we observe is not simply a consequence of Germany’s quick 
conquest of democratic opponents in World War II but instead is primar-
ily driven by quicker settlement in wars involving more democratic los-
ers. 52 This observation should increase our confi dence that the observed 
effects of regime variables exist because democratic institutions constrain 
leaders from continuing wars that society would prefer to see ended on 
terms acceptable to the opponent. 
 On the other hand, once we focus specifi cally on duration until settle-
ment, war intensity is no longer a statistically signifi cant predictor of 
quicker war termination (although the effect is still in the predicted di-
rection). This result is apparently inconsistent with the prediction, drawn 
from the discussion of the informational mechanism, that high-intensity 
fi ghting will encourage faster updating of beliefs and hence produce 
quicker settlement. If this relationship is not supported, then there is rea-
son to doubt (at least on the basis of statistical fi ndings) the argument 
that noncommitment problem confl icts are logically limited. 
 The analysis should not stop here, however. The equifi nality of war 
poses a particular challenge in testing this hypothesis: not all wars are 
driven by the informational mechanism, and in particular the presence 
of commitment problem confl icts, which are frequently both intense and 
diffi cult to resolve, introduces cases with the opposite relationship 
Table 2.4 Competing risks regressions of war destructiveness prior to settlement/conquest
  War duration     Battle deaths
    Government 
    spending
Settle Settle Conquest Settle Conquest Settle Conquest
Capability 
shift
–3.29** –10.4*    3.67** –3.56**   3.50** –5.41*   4.28†
(0.91) (4.52) (1.17)   (0.95) (1.15) (2.61) (2.29)
Log (war 
intensity)
0.11   0.35†   0.057 –0.24 –0.10 –0.81** 1.81







0.45 0.41 –0.049     0.070 –0.20   0.82† 0.57
(0.37) (0.34) (0.74)    (0.44) (0.69) (0.48) (0.95)
Loser regime 
type
0.065*   0.074** –0.015    0.10** –0.033
(0.027)    (0.027)   (0.034)   (0.036)   (0.037)
Terrain –1.43* –1.71* 1.23   –2.60* 1.28 –0.97 1.37
(0.67) (0.68) (0.89)    (1.11) (0.92) (1.46) (1.13)
Contiguity 0.15 0.20 –0.091    0.34 –0.14 0.18 –1.61
(0.30) (0.31) (0.61)    (0.31) (0.68) (0.60) (1.39)
Relative 
capabilities
–1.25 –1.58 1.56 –0.58 0.48 –2.81 3.02
(1.27) (1.25) (2.28)    (1.40) (2.22) (2.67) (3.52)
# of war 
participants
–0.22 –0.31 0.46 –0.11 0.55 –0.15 –0.42
(0.22) (0.23) (0.58)   (0.24) (0.42) (0.24) (0.38)
Major power 
war
–0.72 –0.90 –0.41 –0.58 –0.67
(0.61) (0.66) (0.98)   (0.56) (0.96)
Military 
strategy
0.14   0.061  –0.71**    0.38* –0.51*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.27)   (0.17) (0.22)
Cultural 
difference
0.56 0.55   –1.58**   0.74 –1.56**
(0.36) (0.36) (0.57)   (0.47) (0.57)
Total 
population
  –2.51* –0.27
  (1.23) (1.20)
Total GDP of 
Allies
0.65   0.033
(0.44) (0.32)
Own GDP 0.25 0.12
(0.50) (0.45)
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 49 49
(Failures due 
to risk)
52 52 25 52 25 31 18
Note: Standard errors: robust (models 1–5), clustered by war (models 6–7). † p < .1, 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Signifi cance tests are two-tailed.
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between intensity and speed of settlement from that predicted for the 
informational and principal-agent mechanisms. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
problem, focusing for clarity on the commitment problem and informa-
tional mechanisms—the expected relationship for principal-agent con-
fl icts would be the same as for informational ones. Assuming a situation 
in which a third of wars are driven by the commitment problem and are 
relatively intense, a third are informational and involve intense fi ghting, 
and a third are informational but involve less intense fi ghting, this fi gure 
graphically represents the share of each group that theory predicts would 
still be ongoing at any point in time. High-intensity informational wars 
end quickly, whereas low-intensity informational and especially com-
mitment problem wars drag on longer. At time t1, most of the wars that 
are ending are high-intensity informational confl icts, and thus we would 
expect a statistical analysis to indicate that increased intensity would be 
associated with quicker settlement, although the effect would be weak-
ened by the presence of high-intensity commitment problem wars that 
are not ending. By time t2, however, all the high-intensity informational 
wars have ended, leaving only the low-intensity informational wars and 
the particularly intractable commitment problem wars. With only com-
mitment problem wars represented among the high-intensity confl icts at 
this stage, we would expect a statistical analysis to reveal that increased 
intensity is associated if anything with  slower settlement. Statistical anal-
ysis that does not take the equifi nality of war into account thus risks 
concluding that there is no relationship between war intensity and the 
speed of settlement, or even that the relationship is opposite that pre-















Figure 2.3 War intensity and speed of settlement under different mechanisms
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 This situation thus implies the existence of an interactive effect: in-
creased war intensity should be associated with quicker settlement when 
the commitment problem mechanism is not in play, but not when com-
mitment problem concerns are present. 53 The second model in table 2.4 
presents results from tests of this prediction. If the interactive argument 
is correct, then we would expect an interaction term between war inten-
sity and the size of the prewar capability shift to be negative (implying 
increased time until settlement), while the uninteracted war intensity 
term would have a positive coeffi cient. This prediction is indeed pre-
cisely what we observe. 
 For competing risks regression, the most intuitive statistically appro-
priate method of presenting predicted duration is through the cumula-
tive incidence function, which graphs the predicted proportion of 
confl icts that have ended in the particular method of interest (here settle-
ment) at any point in time. Figure 2.4 graphs this function for three dif-
ferent scenarios: intense wars with signifi cant commitment problem 
concerns and both intense and nonintense wars without signifi cant com-
mitment problem concerns. Specifi cally, the graph presents cumulative 
incidence functions when prewar capability shifts and war intensity are 
either one standard deviation above (high) or below (low) their means, 
holding all control variables at their medians. The central observation 
here is that the effect of war intensity is highly conditional on commit-
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and commitment problem concerns are hence presumably limited, more 
intense wars reach settlement quickly relative to less intense wars. When 
commitment problem concerns are salient, however, high-intensity con-
fl icts take a particularly long time to settle. By failing to account for the 
different relationship between war intensity and the speed of settlement 
under these cases, the noninteractive analysis in the fi rst model of table 2.4 
thus underestimated the strength of support for the prediction that in-
creased war intensity is associated with quicker settlement for wars not 
driven by the commitment problem mechanism. 
 Stepping back, this fi nding is consistent with the most central argu-
ment in this book, namely that commitment problem wars are not neces-
sarily limited in the same way that wars driven by other mechanisms are. 
Wars can be limited either because they are short or because they are not 
intense. For noncommitment problem wars, we are observing the exis-
tence of an intensity-duration trade-off: these results suggest that these 
wars may be either long or intense, but not both. This trade-off does not, 
however, apply to commitment problem wars, which thus can account 
for unusually destructive confl icts. 
 Finally, the control variables operate in a manner generally consistent 
with what was observed in the pooled analysis in table 2.2. Rougher ter-
rain particularly impedes settlement, resulting in both longer and dead-
lier wars. By contrast, shifts away from maneuver toward punishment in 
military strategy are associated with an unsurprising increase in war du-
ration and battle deaths prior to conquest; this effect is slightly offset, 
however, by a countervailing reduction in battle deaths prior to settle-
ment. Leaders are also willing to tolerate more deaths prior to settlement 
when the populations of the war participants are higher. Other variables 
are either consistently insignifi cant (contiguity, relative capabilities, GDP 
variables) or have weak and contrasting effects (number of war partici-
pants). Two results are somewhat surprising, however. First, major 
power wars, although still consistently more destructive, are no longer 
statistically signifi cant. Second, the competing risks approach reveals 
that the relationship between cultural difference and increased war de-
structiveness identifi ed in table 2.2 exists not because difference impedes 
successful negotiation, as we would expect, but because the amount of 
destruction prior to conquest is unusually high. 
 Tests of Ancillary Hypotheses 
 I am primarily interested in explaining what makes some wars more 
destructive than others. That said, the discussion of the logic of commit-
ment problem wars identifi ed several predictions that concern other de-
pendent variables. In particular, hypotheses 1b and 1c predict that 
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countries fi ghting preventive wars driven by shifting power will be more 
likely to adopt risky military strategies and that these wars will be more 
likely to end through conquest instead of settlement. Neither of these 
predictions directly concerns the amount of suffering that a war causes, 
although the choice of military strategy and the nature of war termina-
tion obviously have important political implications. Tests of these hy-
potheses do however provide a further check on the broader preventive 
war mechanism: because they follow from the same theoretical argu-
ment that predicts that fear of decline will be associated with particularly 
destructive wars, support for their predictions provides further reason to 
believe that central argument. 
Table 2.5 Tests of predictions about war strategy and the nature of war termination, 
probit regression
Strategy Conquest
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 5
Capability shift 1.94* 1.99*   2.97** .39** 2.94**
(0.96) (0.99) (1.00) (0.75) (0.92)
Log (war intensity) 0.097
(0.11)
Loser regime type –0.038
(0.029)






Terrain 0.52 0.65 0.73 0.66 1.21
(0.81) (0.86) (1.00) (0.70) (0.76)
Contiguity 0.61 0.67 0.98† –0.13    –0.18
(0.47) (0.46) (0.59) (0.37) (0.44)
Relative capabilities 4.45* 4.51* 1.95 0.43 0.33
(2.01) (1.97) (1.70) (1.38) (1.49)
# of war participants 0.11 0.056 –0.033 0.30     0.43†
(0.23) (0.23)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.24)
Major power war 1.54* 1.72* 1.22† 0.20     0.022
(0.71) (0.68)  (0.63) (0.50) (0.57)
Prior experience 1.11* 0.99* 0.14
(0.44) (0.48) (0.48)
Iron/steel production –4.60 –6.25 –5.64
(5.66) (5.80) (7.31)
Military strategy  –0.46**    –0.42*
(0.13) (0.20)
Constant  –6.53** –6.72**  –5.79** –0.91   –0.82
(1.98) (1.90) (1.91) (1.47) (1.84)
Observations 86 86 86 86  77
Note: Robust standard errors reported; two-tailed signifi cance tests. †p < .1, * p < .05, 
** p < .01.
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 Table 2.5 thus presents tests of both hypotheses. I begin with the pre-
diction that preventive wars will feature unusually risky strategies. 
While we lack a perfect measure of the riskiness of military strategies, it 
is generally agreed that maneuver strategies involve a higher than usual 
degree of risk. 54 By attempting to strike into the rear of the opposing 
army, attackers using a strategy of maneuver create the possibility of a 
decisive victory that will free them from having to directly defeat the 
bulk of the opposing forces. This strategy will be particularly attractive 
to an attacker who has high war aims and yet may not be particularly 
overoptimistic about the likelihood of military victory, as I expect will 
often be the case in preventive wars. The risk, however, is that these 
strikes typically rely on deception and on the inability of the enemy to 
respond quickly to the initial attack; an enemy that is undeceived or that 
redeploys forces quickly may be able to cut off and encircle the attacking 
force in hostile territory, potentially depriving the attacker of its stron-
gest units. By contrast, both a conventional attrition strategy and a strat-
egy based on punishment, while certainly not free of risk, are much less 
likely to produce either catastrophic victory or defeat. 
 I thus test hypothesis 1b by examining when actors choose to use ma-
neuver strategies. The primary variable used in this analysis codes 
whether either side in a war uses a strategy of maneuver; model 3 fo-
cuses by contrast only on cases in which the initiator resorts to maneuver 
warfare. In addition to the standard controls used elsewhere in this chap-
ter, I also include controls for several variables—the level of economic 
development, democratic involvement in the war, and past experience 
with maneuver warfare—that were found to be signifi cant predictors of 
maneuver strategies in a previous study by Reiter and Meek. 55 The proxy 
for economic development uses the level of iron/steel production from 
the National Military Capabilities dataset. 56 The measure of past experi-
ence with maneuver is intended to capture a hypothesis based on learn-
ing. The variable is coded 0 if the primary participant on a side has had 
no direct experience with maneuver warfare over the previous twenty-
fi ve years. It is coded 1 if the country successfully used maneuver war-
fare or had maneuver warfare used successfully against them, and -1 if it 
used maneuver unsuccessfully or if it defeated an opponent who used a 
maneuver strategy. 57 The democratic involvement variable measures the 
presence of a democracy on either side, to capture the argument that 
democracies are more likely to use maneuver strategies. In all cases, the 
variable used combines data for each side in the war (by summing the 
variables for economic development and past experience, and by coding 
democratic involvement as 1 as long as at least one democracy was in-
volved); substituting the attacker’s data alone produces effectively iden-
tical results, however. 
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 Model 1 of table 2.5 presents a probit regression of military strategy on 
the prewar shift in capabilities and a set of standard controls. Consistent 
with the argument that preventive motivations for war tend to be associ-
ated with the use of riskier strategies, prewar shifts in capabilities are 
associated with a signifi cant increase in the probability that one side in 
the war uses a maneuver strategy. Model 2 adds a control for democratic 
involvement in the war. The prewar power shift variable is again statisti-
cally signifi cant. In both these regressions, most controls behave as ex-
pected, although not always at a statistically signifi cant level. 58 Model 3 
restricts the dependent variable to cases in which only the war initiator 
uses a maneuver strategy. Again the power shift variable is statistically 
signifi cant. Using model 2 and holding control variables at means or me-
dians, the predicted probability that a maneuver strategy is used rises 
from about 5 percent when the prewar power shift is at its tenth percen-
tile to about 35 percent when it is at its ninetieth percentile, roughly a 
sevenfold increase in likelihood. 
 Models 4 and 5 test the prediction that preventive wars driven by fear 
of future decline will be more likely to end in conquest, as opposed to 
settlement. Model 4 presents the results with baseline controls; model 5 
adds in war intensity and regime variables. Larger shifts prior to war 
turn out to be strongly associated with an increased probability that war 
ends through conquest. This result holds for a range of alternate specifi -
cations, including substituting the more expansive and more restrictive 
codings of conquest described above. Using model 5 and holding other 
variables at means or medians, an increase in the power shift variable 
from its tenth percentile to the ninetieth percentile is associated with an 
increase in the predicted probability of conquest from just over 5 percent 
to more than 50 percent. These results are strongly supportive of the pre-
diction that preventive motivations driven by shifting power will be as-
sociated with an increased probability that wars ends through conquest 
instead of settlement. 59
 The statistical analysis in this chapter is quite supportive of the central 
claims of this book. Most signifi cantly, I fi nd that high prewar shifts in 
relative capabilities, which I argue proxy for anticipated future shifts (ei-
ther through a continuation of current trends, as with the US-China rela-
tionship today, or through a reversion to the mean that closes an existing 
window of opportunity, as with the German-Soviet relationship after the 
purge of the Red Army), are associated with a consistent increase 
in the destructiveness of war. This result holds for three different mea-
sures of war destructiveness—duration, battle deaths, and government 
 expenditures—and is robust to a wide range of changes to the analysis, 
including using different operationalizations of prewar power shifts, 
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altering the universe of cases, or changing the statistical specifi cation. 
These fi ndings are strongly consistent with the prediction that fear of 
decline is associated with unusually destructive wars. 
 Moreover, further analysis demonstrates support for additional hy-
potheses that follow from the same theoretical arguments that predict 
that commitment problem wars will be unusually severe. In particular, 
the commitment problem mechanism creates incentives for leaders who 
fear decline to resist settlement but also to adopt risky military strategies 
that increase the likelihood that either they or their opponent will experi-
ence military collapse. Consistent with this argument, competing risks 
regressions demonstrate that prewar capability shifts are associated with 
a dramatic increase in the time that it takes for settlement to arise in war, 
but also with a signifi cant reduction in the time that it takes for wars to 
end through conquest. Probit analysis of whether war participants adopt 
maneuver strategies, which generally are riskier, and whether the war 
ultimately ends through settlement or conquest, produce results that are 
similarly consistent with theory. The statistical analysis thus suggests not 
just that commitment problem wars are unusually destructive, but that 
they are destructive for the reasons that theory leads us to expect. 
 The statistical analysis also provides support for theoretical arguments 
about limited wars. Most important, consistent with the arguments 
about limited wars, when fi ghting is more intense, and both leaders and 
the people they represent thus have greater opportunities to update their 
beliefs, settlement occurs more quickly. Demonstrating this relationship 
required separating out (by inserting an interaction between prewar 
shifts and war intensity) the countervailing effect of commitment prob-
lem wars, which tend to be both intense and diffi cult to settle. This fi nd-
ing suggests that noncommitment problem wars can be either intense or 
long, but not both, implying in turn that the informational and principal-
agent mechanisms provide reasonable accounts for limited wars but not 
for unlimited ones. 
 Similarly, wars involving more democratic initiators and losers tend to 
be more limited, consistent with the argument that increased institu-
tional constraints on leaders limit their ability to continue wars unneces-
sarily. At the same time, I fi nd no support for prior arguments, which 
focus on leaders’ incentives rather than on constraints, that losing partial 
democracies are particularly resistant to settlement. Although these fi nd-
ings constitute less direct tests of my arguments than others presented 
here, they are consistent with the claim that leaders face signifi cant con-
straints on their ability to continue wars that are not in the interest of a 
substantial portion of society, which in turn provides further reason to 
expect that principal-agent wars will be limited. 
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 Overall, then, these results provide strong support for the central argu-
ments in this book. That said, the fi ndings in this chapter are certainly 
not beyond all doubt. Thus, for example, prewar shifts in capabilities are 
an admittedly imperfect proxy for fears of future decline. Moreover, all 
these analyses require me to test hypotheses drawn from specifi c mecha-
nisms on cases in which those mechanisms likely were not active. In this 
context, then, these results will gain strength to the extent that they are 
bolstered by evidence from specifi c cases from history. The next fi ve 
chapters thus shift to a series of case studies, which allow me to test hy-
potheses more directly, if on a smaller sample of cases. These case studies 
will also permit me to test claims about dispositional commitment prob-
lems and unconditional surrender, which could not be tested quantita-
tively given the limited number of cases in which this behavior has arisen 
throughout history. Thus, while the statistical analysis in this chapter 
provides reason to believe that the theoretical arguments in this book are 
correct, the evidence is as yet incomplete—the remainder of the book 
aims to fi ll in the remaining gaps. 
[86]
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 War to the Death in Paraguay 
 The war between Paraguay and its neighbors, which was fought from 
1864 to 1870 and which ended with the utter destruction of Paraguay, is 
one of the great unknown wars in history, little studied despite being at 
a per capita level quite possibly the deadliest confl ict in the past two 
centuries. 1 While disagreement exists about the exact numbers of dead, it 
is undeniable that Paraguayan human losses were huge, by some esti-
mates as high as two-thirds of the prewar populavtion. 2 For outsiders, 
the sketch of the war makes the Paraguayan president—Francisco So-
lano López—appear frankly insane. As leader of a small buffer state 
whose independence was far from assured or even fully acknowledged, 
he attacked both Brazil and Argentina, the great powers of South Amer-
ica. He then refused to back down, fi ghting against worsening odds for 
six years, in the process dragging his country to ruin. Traditional histo-
ries generally portrayed López as a psychopath, a nineteenth-century 
Hitler determined whatever the odds to turn his country into an empire 
or to destroy it in trying. 3 Such a man seems well outside the ken of ratio-
nalist theories of war. 
 Closer examination, however, shows that López had clear and reason-
able justifi cations for engaging in the war that he undertook. While the 
course he chose was risky, he believed for understandable reasons that 
inaction was also quite risky. Brazil posed a constant creeping threat to 
Paraguay’s survival, while Argentine leaders in Buenos Aires had never 
truly reconciled themselves to Paraguayan independence. Historically, 
Paraguay had survived, like most buffer states, by playing off the two 
powers against each other, but the rapprochement of Argentina and Bra-
zil, associated most strongly with Bartolomé Mitre’s acquisition of power 
in Argentina, fundamentally reshaped power politics in the region. 
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Brazil’s intervention in Uruguay, supported by Argentina and justifi ed 
on fl imsy pretexts, was not unsurprisingly interpreted as the fi rst step in 
the annexation of Uruguay and Paraguay. Paraguay’s only real access to 
the outside world—essential for supplies both military and mundane—
was through the various rivers that fed into La Plata; all ran through 
Argentina, Uruguay, or both. The loss of a Uruguayan ally thus weighed 
more heavily than Uruguay’s slight capabilities might have indicated. 
 Had he recognized how the war would go, López likely would not 
have chosen to start it. However, the decision to attack was less insane 
than it at fi rst appears. Paraguay by most accounts had the best army in 
the region and thus had a reasonable chance of defeating the Brazilians 
in open battle. Moreover, one of the apparently most inexplicable deci-
sions of the war—attacking Argentina when already at war with Brazil—
becomes much more understandable when we recognize that it was far 
from certain that all Argentina would rally against him. The country was 
deeply divided, and infl uential fi gures—most notably Justo José de 
Urquiza, the governor of Entre Ríos Province—had more in common 
with López than they did with Bartolomé Mitre in Buenos Aires. An alli-
ance with important Argentine Federalists was defi nitely a possibility, 
and had it occurred the war could easily have followed a very different 
path. When he launched his attack, therefore, López was less crazy than 
in retrospect he appears to have been. 
 Given the strategic problem posed by the gradual increase in Brazilian 
and Argentine ability to project power into the interior and the closer 
relations between the two traditional rivals, López needed a signifi cant 
victory to force his opponents to abandon their claims to Uruguay and to 
force a fi nal delineation of the disputed border. When his initial attack 
miscarried, therefore, he was willing to continue to fi ght. Once the Allies 
forced their way onto Paraguayan territory, however, it was clear that the 
best possible military result for Paraguay would be a successful defen-
sive war, which would not address the sources of Paraguay’s strategic 
decline. It was only at this point, then, that he began to demonstrate will-
ingness to negotiate on terms in line with the military situation on the 
ground. This behavior accords closely with what we would expect were 
a fear of future decline to be the primary motivation for war. 
 Yet here the logic of the dispositional commitment problem intervened 
to assure a war to the fi nish. Deeply offended by Paraguayan policy, key 
Brazilian offi cials, central among them Emperor Pedro II, had concluded 
that a viable peace required the expurgation of López and the entire sys-
tem of  caudillo politics that he represented. Indeed, this case provides 
crucial evidence for the unconditional surrender mechanism. The Brazil-
ians, who appear not to have intended to do what López feared, con-
cluded that the Paraguayan leader was a menace with whom negotiation 
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was impossible, whereas the Argentines, who actually did want to annex 
Paraguay, understood his motivations and hence were willing to negoti-
ate. In the end, convinced of López’s iniquity, the Brazilians rejected en-
treaties from all quarters to negotiate, instead carrying the war forward 
at high cost until the Paraguayan defenses crumbled, Asunción was oc-
cupied, and López himself fell on the fi eld of battle. 
 The History and Anomalies of Paraguayan Policy 
 Under the Spanish Empire, Paraguay was part of the same viceroyalty 
as what ultimately became Argentina, with effective power centralized 
in Buenos Aires. Following independence from Spain during the Napo-
leonic period, the Paraguayans resisted attempts to bring them under the 
auspices of a new government in Buenos Aires and declared indepen-
dence, although no power recognized them as independent for thirty 
years. 4 Indeed, at this time and continuing through the Paraguayan War, 
it was unclear which regions (if any) would remain independent and 
which would be absorbed under the control of Buenos Aires or Brazil. 
Paraguay and Uruguay ultimately emerged as independent (if highly 
constrained) states from this process, but others in similar positions—
such as Corrientes, Entre Ríos, and Rio Grande do Sul—did not. 5 The 
new Paraguayan state had disputes, including large border disagree-
ments, with both its larger neighbors, and following the classic strategy 
of a buffer state, it played each against the other to secure its own 
independence. 
 This approach worked well when both Buenos Aires and Rio de Ja-
neiro lacked the capacity to project signifi cant power into the South 
American interior, and it remained functional even when that guarantee 
vanished so long as the Paraguayans could ensure that each of their 
larger neighbors would oppose any unilateral move by its rival. Para-
guayan strategy was undermined, however, by a rapprochement be-
tween Brazil and Argentina that began with Bartolomé Mitre’s accession 
to power in Buenos Aires in 1860. The primary manifestation of this rap-
prochement was agreement on affairs in Uruguay, where liberals ( Colora-
dos ) under Venancio Flores had rebelled in an effort to overthrow the 
conservative  Blanco regime. The Argentines stood by passively, even aid-
ing Flores behind the scenes, while the Brazilians provided increasing 
support, ultimately intervening directly. The Blancos appealed to López 
for assistance, and he remonstrated with the Brazilians, but to no effect. 
At this point, therefore, he decided to go to war. 
 Geography posed a signifi cant obstacle to direct assistance, however, 










































Figure 3.1 South America prior to the Paraguayan War. Reprinted from 
The Paraguayan War, Volume I: Causes and Early Conduct by Thomas L. 
Whigham by permission of the University of Nebraska Press. Copyright 
2002 by Thomas L. Whigham.
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and passage through Brazilian territory would have been extremely dif-
fi cult. 6 López’s fi rst move was therefore to attack northeast into the Bra-
zilian province of Mato Grosso, which allowed him to capture a large 
cache of arms and had the potential to divert the Brazilians from their 
interference in Uruguay. His incursions succeeded militarily but failed 
strategically, as the Brazilians did not signifi cantly oppose the Para-
guayan advance into the province, instead pressing the attack on Monte-
video in Uruguay. López then turned south and requested permission 
from Buenos Aires to cross the province of Corrientes, which was fre-
quently rebellious but generally acknowledged to be Argentine territory. 
Mitre in Buenos Aires refused, prompting López to declare war. By this 
point, however, the Brazilians had taken Montevideo and installed 
Flores in power; the Paraguayans advanced down the Uruguay River to 
reverse the decision, but ultimately failed and were forced back to their 
territory. 
 In response to the Paraguayan attack, Brazil, Argentina, and a now-
occupied Uruguay formalized their alliance through a treaty signed on 
May 1, 1865 (hence the common name “the War of the Triple Alliance”). 
In this secret alliance, Brazil and Argentina each agreed to permit the 
other to satisfy the full extent of its claims on Paraguayan territory. 
Achieving these goals required that the Allied forces advance into Para-
guay, a task that proved far more diffi cult than expected, as rough terrain 
and stiff Paraguayan resistance slowed progress. After a buildup, the Al-
lies forced their way across the Paraná River into Paraguayan territory in 
April 1866. The subsequent advance toward the main Paraguayan defen-
sive fortifi cations at Humaitá was slow and costly, and it stopped com-
pletely following a signifi cant Allied defeat in September at Curupaity, 
which, when combined with domestic unrest, forced Argentina to with-
draw the bulk of its army from the war effort. The scale of this defeat 
forced the war into a pause of almost a year during which the Allies 
brought forward reinforcements; during this time, the front did not 
move, although Paraguayan forces constantly harassed their opponents. 
The Allies began to move again in August 1867 and, after hard fi ghting, 
eventually circumvented the Paraguayan defenses and captured Hu-
maitá; its fall doomed Asunción, which fell on January 5, 1869. At this 
point, López transitioned to a strategy of guerrilla war, reforming his 
army (which by then consisted almost entirely of the very old and the 
very young) and fi ghting the Brazilians on the run. The war thus contin-
ued for more than a year, ending only when Brazilian forces tracked 
down and killed López on March 1, 1870. 
 That the war continued this long militarily was a function of diffi cult 
terrain, Allied disorganization and strategic errors, and the conviction 
and ability of Paraguayan soldiers. Yet politically there were many 
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opportunities to end the war far earlier. Although international involve-
ment was limited, American representatives made a number of serious 
attempts to mediate, while representatives of European powers made 
some more half-hearted tries. Moreover, at several points in the later por-
tion of the confl ict, including a well-known meeting at Yataity-Corá just 
before the Battle of Curupaity as well as in response to several mediation 
offers, López indicated a willingness to negotiate. Throughout the war, 
however, the Brazilians consistently rejected all talk of negotiations or 
peace, even on quite advantageous terms. This resolution to carry the 
fi ght through to the fi nish was not shared by the Argentines or the Uru-
guayans, and indeed after Curupaity the two countries withdrew all but 
a token force. In the end, therefore, the confl ict became a war to the death 
between Paraguay and Brazil. 
 Ultimately, this case contains a number of important puzzles. Why 
would López pick a fi ght with the region’s greatest power when his abil-
ity to defeat his opponent was quite questionable? Why, having done so, 
would he then decide to go to war against the other regional power as 
well? Why would he continue to fi ght even after the fall of Uruguay, when 
the military odds were stacked against him? Why, in other words, would 
he precipitate and then fi ght a serious war in which Paraguay’s chances 
seemed so poor? On the other hand, once López began to demonstrate a 
greater willingness to negotiate, why were the Brazilians so implacably 
opposed to talks, especially considering the high costs and limited 
material benefi ts of a war to the fi nish? 
 As I detail below, the answer to the questions about Paraguayan inten-
tions hinged in part on the fact that López had reasons for optimism that 
are not immediately apparent, largely because some of them did not 
work out the way that he (not unreasonably) expected. A larger part, 
however, was structural: Paraguay was in a dangerous position that 
threatened only to get worse, and given reasonable fears about the inten-
tions of his opponents, López decided that Paraguay’s choice was be-
tween fi ghting an unattractive war or waiting for its neighbors to 
partition the country at a later date. In this context, he was willing to ac-
cept even a fairly risky and costly war, given what he saw as the alterna-
tive. He failed, however, to anticipate the nature of the Brazilian response, 
and as a result the war that he got resulted in the utter destruction of 
Paraguay. 
 Divergent Expectations: Necessary but Not Suffi cient 
 One of the more obvious puzzles of the Paraguayan War is why López 
decided to challenge either one of South America’s great powers, let 
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alone both. While the decision to start a war against both Brazil and Ar-
gentina has led some to question López’s sanity, the Paraguayan leader’s 
behavior was less utterly inexplicable than it initially appears. Paraguay 
was far more capable than would have been expected from its isolated 
geography and relatively small territorial size. Moreover, López started 
the war with the ultimately incorrect but hardly unjustifi ed belief that he 
would have important allies on his side. From this perspective, the infor-
mational mechanism has at least a partial claim to explaining the deci-
sion to start the war. 
 Consider fi rst Paraguayan capabilities. 7 Under Carlos Antonio López, 
the father and predecessor to Francisco Solano López, the country moved 
away from its previous autarchy, importing both goods (including weap-
ons) and advisers from Europe. When combined with the imposition of 
a universal draft, the creation of a domestic capacity to produce muni-
tions, and a strong state role in the economy that facilitated extraction, 
these policies meant that Francisco Solano López inherited a surprisingly 
capable army upon assuming power. 8 By contrast, Paraguay’s two 
main opponents were unprepared for war. While Brazil had a huge na-
tional guard, that force was poorly equipped, untrained, and effectively 
 useless—when the war began, the government created a new army 
rather than rely on the guard—and the standing army was a small, ill-
trained force that consisted largely of press-ganged vagrants. 9 Moreover, 
the conservative elites who dominated the country viewed a strong army 
as a threat to the existing social order. In Argentina, there was no national 
army, as the political divide between Buenos Aires and the provinces 
(discussed in greater detail below) was paralleled in the military. While 
Mitre was taking steps to develop a national army centered on Buenos 
Aires when the war began, this process had only just begun. Uruguayan 
forces, on either side of the Blanco-Colorado political divide, were expe-
rienced but few in number and poorly trained. Overall, therefore, Para-
guay had the largest and best-equipped army in the region, while its 
opponents would need more than a little time to make up the gap. In-
deed, in the opening stages of the war, Mitre apparently worried that the 
invading Paraguayan armies would join up at the junction of the Uru-
guay and Paraná rivers to directly threaten Buenos Aires. 10
 As for the apparently inexplicable decision to provoke a war with 
Argentina when already at war with Brazil, here hindsight is a hin-
drance to our ability to accurately understand López’s decision. In brief, 
he had good reason to believe that were Argentina to get involved in the 
war much of the country would fi ght on Paraguay’s side. The country 
was split between Federalists, led by Justo José de Urquiza of Entre Ríos 
province and disproportionately populated by the rural caudillos, and 
centralists led by Mitre and concentrated in Buenos Aires, although also 
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present elsewhere. Attempts immediately after independence to im-
pose a centralized government run from the capital encountered signifi -
cant resistance that ultimately forced the adoption of a federal 
constitution. For more than twenty years, Juan Manuel de Rosas effec-
tively ruled the country as governor of Buenos Aires, but he had to con-
tend constantly with regional caudillos and ultimately angered enough 
people domestically and internationally to generate a coalition that ral-
lied behind Urquiza to overthrow him. 11 For six years after the over-
throw Buenos Aires was legally independent from the rest of Argentina, 
until Urquiza, recognizing that the provinces were dependent on reve-
nue from the main city’s trade, invaded in 1859 and reestablished the 
political link. When Mitre took power as governor of Buenos Aires in 
1860, therefore, he was in a decidedly secondary position. It was only 
when he successfully fought off yet another invasion by Urquiza in 1861 
and then was elected the fi rst president of the Argentine Republic in 
1862 that he had any serious claim to ruling the country, and even then 
he could not count on Urquiza’s loyalty. To say that López attacked Ar-
gentina is thus to give the country greater fi xity than it actually pos-
sessed at the time. 
 This situation was integral to López’s planning. When he requested 
permission to cross Corrientes, he believed that, should war happen, 
Urquiza would side with him. Indeed, he had good reason for believing 
this, as Urquiza had said he would: during the Mato Grosso campaign, 
the caudillo allegedly told López’s representative that “he favored Para-
guay in its war against Brazil and that if it were to go through Corrientes 
to invade the empire, he would personally come and offer himself as a 
volunteer.” 12 Moreover, Urquiza’s followers, and even his son, were in-
censed with Mitre’s Uruguay policy and thus were pressing him to back 
Paraguay. 13 While Urquiza began to backtrack prior to López’s request, 
he could not undo the effect that previous signals of support had had on 
López’s calculations. 14 Even after Urquiza’s loyalty to Mitre became 
clear, internal unrest posed a signifi cant obstacle to Argentina’s vigorous 
prosecution of the war. 15
 Overall, therefore, to use the words of one of the foremost experts on 
the war, “the marshal’s plan was ambitious but not insane.” 16 López was 
clearly gambling, and arguably gambling at fairly long odds, when he 
took his country to war against the two foremost powers of the region, 
but it was not wishful thinking for him to have hoped that his gamble 
might pay off. He was ultimately mistaken in his expectations, particu-
larly with respect to Urquiza, and had he better understood the situation 
in Argentina he probably would have been more cautious in taking his 
country to war. It is thus impossible to account for his behavior without 
recourse to the informational mechanism. 17
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 That said, there are signifi cant limits to the informational mechanism. 
To say that López’s plan was not insane is not to say that it was necessar-
ily a good idea. If López had reason for optimism, a war with Brazil was 
nonetheless a signifi cant risk, and his declaration of war on Argentina 
likely made it easier for Urquiza to stay loyal. Moreover, throughout the 
period of the Paraguayan offensive against Brazil and Argentina, López 
did not articulate clear political demands of the sort that his opponents 
might conceivably agree to, nor does he appear to have scaled back his 
ambitions in response to the unfavorable revelation that Urquiza would 
not back him. In addition, the decision to push Paraguayan troops far 
outside his country’s territory entailed signifi cant risks that, from the 
perspective of the informational mechanism, were unnecessary. Simply 
holding Mato Grosso, the Brazilian province captured in the initial 
months of the war, might well have been suffi cient to induce Brazil to 
negotiate a fi nal delineation of the two countries’ borders, long a Para-
guayan objective. 18 In all, based solely on expectations, it is hard to un-
derstand why López felt the need to launch a risky military adventure to 
assist an ally (the Uruguayan Blancos) of dubious loyalty and minimal 
capacity when a more limited policy might have achieved signifi cant 
gains, nor can the informational mechanism explain why he did not try 
harder to escape from the war as Paraguay’s diplomatic situation dete-
riorated. To understand these decisions, we must turn to the preventive 
war mechanism. 
 Paraguay’s Perilous Position and Fears of the Future 
 Ultimately, an explanation for López’s ambitious foreign policy and 
his willingness to run acknowledged risks must take into account the 
diffi cult, and worsening, position in which Paraguay found itself. The 
basic problem was that the country was surrounded by expansionist 
neighbors whose refusal to guarantee Paraguay’s borders or at times 
even acknowledge its independence prompted fears that any passive 
policies would merely acquiesce in the gradual dismantling of the coun-
try. Traditionally, and again after the war, Paraguayan leaders had dealt 
with this problem by playing the two powers off against each other. Mi-
tre’s rise and the subsequent Brazilian intervention in Uruguay funda-
mentally undermined this strategy and raised the specter of a blockade 
of the Paraná River—Paraguay’s outlet to the sea—that by cutting off 
access to Europe would slowly strangle López’s country and set the stage 
for an eventual partition. In this context, continuation of current trends 
threatened Paraguay’s survival, while war provided the only available 
option to upset those trends. This interpretation thus explains why López 
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adopted such a risky strategy and made such apparently extreme de-
mands. Ultimately, of course, Paraguay failed militarily and had to re-
vert to a defensive posture. Consistent with the preventive war argument, 
López refused to negotiate until it was clear that there was absolutely no 
hope of achieving the kind of victory that would be necessary to prevent 
Brazil from consolidating its position in Uruguay. 
 To understand the dangers that López confronted, it is necessary fi rst 
to briefl y review his country’s history. In the fi nal decades of the Spanish 
Empire, Paraguay was united administratively with Argentina and Uru-
guay under the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. In this context, Buenos 
Aires used its favorable geographic position to impose shipping taxes 
that stifl ed Asunción (as well as the Argentine interior). 19 Following the 
break with Spain in 1813, the Paraguayans established an effective inde-
pendence that was, however, only tenuously acknowledged by its neigh-
bors, who advanced signifi cant territorial claims that were the basis for 
persistent border disputes. Repeated attempts to resolve the disputes 
under Francisco Solano López’s predecessors—José Gaspar de Francia 
and Carlos Antonio López—ended in failure, with the Paraguayans typi-
cally given little evidence that opposing interlocutors were willing to ne-
gotiate in good faith. 20
 The Brazilians, who inherited the Portuguese strategy of encouraging 
settlement to subvert legal border agreements by changing the facts on 
the ground, were pushing settlers into Mato Grosso, an isolated interior 
province that was almost impossible to reach except along the river 
through Paraguay. 21 From there, geography provided a clear motive for 
a policy of gradual expansion: “from the Brazilian point of view, Para-
guay was the natural extension of Mato Grosso, and any geographer 
could see that the republic stood poised like a dagger at the entrails of the 
empire.” 22 Meanwhile, the Paraguayans were exercised by the shipment 
of cannons into Mato Grosso that, while in reality of limited military util-
ity, provided apparent evidence of hostile intentions. 23 López could thus 
be forgiven for concluding that inaction merely invited the Brazilians to 
subvert his country’s independence gradually. 
 Meanwhile, Paraguay and Argentina disputed ownership over a large, 
if sparsely populated, region. The real danger here, however, was that 
many in Argentina, Mitre among them, had never reconciled themselves 
to Paraguayan independence and hoped to reunify the disparate territo-
ries of the old Spanish viceroyalty in a large Argentine state that would 
constitute a true rival to Brazil for hegemony in South America. 24 In this 
context, a centralized government dominated by Buenos Aires would 
pose the greatest threat (infl uential provinces like Entre Ríos and Corri-
entes frequently shared interests with Paraguay and indeed contem-
plated independence). 25 As head of the  porteños —the inhabitants of 
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Buenos Aires who tended to favor a strong, centralized government—
Mitre thus posed a threat purely from the perspective of Argentine-
Paraguayan relations. 
 That said, the threat posed by a centralized Argentine government was 
dwarfed by the danger associated with Mitre’s improved relations with 
the Brazilian Empire. 26 Paraguay was a buffer state, and buffer states—
generally unable to guarantee their independence through force of arms 
alone—have always had to rely for their survival on their ability to ma-
nipulate tensions between their stronger neighbors. Should such ten-
sions vanish (or should the rivals work out an equitable plan for 
partition), even simple survival cannot be guaranteed; it is thus unsur-
prising that buffer state status is the strongest predictor of state death 
in the international system. 27 Geopolitically a buffer state, Paraguay was 
however unusual in that in 1864 it had the means plausibly to do 
something to address the problems created by an Argentine-Brazilian 
rapprochement. 
 Internal Argentine divisions, discussed with reference to López’s bases 
for optimism above, were at the center of the issue. Mitre’s hold on power 
was threatened by opposition from the Federalists, many of whom felt 
greater affi nity to the Paraguayans than they did to the citizens of Bue-
nos Aires. Thus, for example, Ricardo López Jordán, who ultimately 
would assassinate Urquiza in 1870 in large part in response to his poli-
cies in the war, appealed to him at the time, saying, “You call us up to 
fi ght in Paraguay. Never, General: those people are our brothers. Call us 
up to fi ght against  porteños or Brazilians. We are ready. They are our en-
emies. . . . This, I’m sure, is the true sentiment of the  entrerriana people.” 28
Given these internal divisions, Mitre saw an alliance with the Brazilians 
as a means to cement his authority and that of his faction. This political 
situation thus served as the basis for cooperation in Uruguay, where Bra-
zil intervened directly while Argentina funneled weapons and supplies 
to Flores. From Paraguay’s perspective, of course, a strategy of playing 
the two rivals off each other ceased to work if the rivals became friends. 
López had two options available to him: to wait and hope that opposi-
tion within Argentina to cooperation with an old enemy would bring 
about Mitre’s fall, or to take action to break up the incipient alliance and 
perhaps precipitate that fall directly. Both options were risky; he chose 
the latter. 
 Reasons and Aims: López’s Decisions for War 
 The fi nal piece of the puzzle was the Brazilian intervention in Uru-
guay. British intervention in the Cisplatine War of the 1820s, undertaken 
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to protect trade throughout the region, was the original reason why Uru-
guay attained independence. 29 Uruguay’s independence thus benefi ted 
Paraguay, as it complicated any attempt to bottle up Paraguayan trade 
and contact with the outside world. Indeed, over time Paraguay became 
increasingly dependent on international trade, both for economic devel-
opment and for the military supplies that would be needed to fend off 
encroachments into Paraguayan territory. 30 When Argentina and Brazil 
turned away from their traditional rivalry to jointly back Flores and the 
Colorados in Uruguay, however, the specter of encirclement came fully 
into view. With Uruguay under hostile control, there was little that the 
Paraguayans could do to prevent Argentina and Brazil from simply shut-
ting off commerce to Asunción to slowly but surely strangle Paraguay, 
especially as the Argentine occupation and fortifi cation of the island of 
Martín García in the context of the Uruguayan intervention increased the 
direct control that the Argentines could exercise over the Paraná River 
delta. 31
 Nor did the participants do much to allay Paraguayan fears. The Bra-
zilians never provided a satisfactory explanation for the buildup of mili-
tary forces in the Mato Grosso, nor did either Brazil or Argentina give 
good reason why a fi nal delineation of the borders was impossible. 32
When López sent his ultimatum to the Brazilians, the Brazilian ambas-
sador in Asunción took it on himself to reply snippily that Paraguay’s 
involvement in the Uruguayan affair was not needed. 33 Caricatures of 
López that appeared in the press in both Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro 
certainly did not help: from his perspective, not only did his neighbors 
ignore his legitimate concerns; they belittled him for raising complaints. 34
All of these developments could only have added to López’s concern 
that, if Paraguay wished to remain independent, it would need to act 
quickly. 35
 To the extent that they have survived, López’s public and private state-
ments are consistent with the view that a fear of future decline drove his 
policy decisions. In his ultimatum to Brazil, he closed by stating that 
 the government of the Republic of Paraguay will consider any occupation 
of the Oriental territory [i.e. Uruguay] as an attempt against the equilib-
rium of the states of the Plate which interests the Republic of Paraguay as 
a guarantee for its security, peace, and prosperity; and that it protests in the 
most solemn manner against the act, freeing itself for the future of every 
responsibility that may arise from the present declaration. 36
 Likewise, one of López’s European advisers reported that, when decid-
ing whether to seize the Brazilian ship  Marqués de Olinda —the fi rst Para-
guayan act of war—López averred that “if we don’t have a war now with 
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Brazil, we shall have one at a less convenient time for ourselves.” 37 More 
generally, throughout the war he accused the principal Allies of aggres-
sion despite the fact that neither of them had directly attacked him. 
 Paraguayan war aims are similarly consistent with what we would 
expect from the preventive motivation for war. Although signifi cant dis-
pute exists as to exactly what López hoped to achieve, his minimal aims 
seem clear. By invading down the rivers, he hoped ultimately to reach 
Uruguay, where he would then restore the Blancos to power. This action 
would restrict the Brazilian and Argentine infl uence in Uruguay, pre-
venting the anticipated shift in capabilities that their domination over 
Uruguay would ultimately imply. This goal was audacious: Paraguay 
did not share a border with Uruguay, and thus the Paraguayan army had 
to advance through several hundred miles of non-Paraguayan territory 
and then reverse the status quo by taking a city that not many years ear-
lier had successfully withstood a nine-year siege. 38 This plan thus in-
volved sending his best units far forward, where they were in danger of 
being cut off and forced to surrender, as indeed ultimately happened. As 
a military plan, it was thus far riskier than a more defensive strategy, 
such as seizing Mato Grosso and then waiting to repel the Brazilian 
counterattack. Only this aggressive strategy held out any prospect of 
dealing with the problems that motivated López to start the war in the 
fi rst place, however: if Paraguay simply occupied Mato Grosso and 
waited, nothing would prevent Brazil from simply waiting until a block-
ade had crippled Paraguay, or from reaching an agreement only to abro-
gate it later. 
 As long as the phase of Paraguayan offensive operations continued, 
López never raised the prospect of negotiations. The naval defeat at Ria-
chuelo and the subsequent capitulation of the forward armies, most no-
tably the surrender at Uruguaiana in September 1865, blunted the 
Paraguayan ability to attack, however, and once the allies forced their 
way across the Paraná into Paraguayan territory López had to admit that 
his war aims were no longer achievable. It was thus not until 1866 that he 
began to show an interest in negotiations. Historians have debated the 
degree to which these offers were sincere, with both detractors and ad-
mirers of López frequently arguing that they were intended only to buy 
time for his army to build up their defenses. 39 Yet there is good reason to 
believe that he was genuinely interested in peace, should peace be avail-
able on reasonable terms. He was the leader who proposed the discus-
sions at Yataity-Corá, and in the discussions he was willing to entertain a 
range of proposals, although the refusal of the Brazilian representative to 
talk (and the Allied refusal to scale down territorial demands) consti-
tuted an insuperable bar to any agreement. 40 At later points, he was will-
ing to discuss specifi c bases for peace with American and European 
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representatives who might serve as mediators with the Allies. 41 What he 
was not willing to do was to sign over his country’s independence when 
the Allies were not yet in a position to compel him to capitulate. Aware 
that Paraguay was bottled up with no prospect for escape, he nonethe-
less sought to use Paraguay’s still-considerable capacity to resist inva-
sion to save his country at least for the time being. His position at this 
point was quite reasonable: the Allied territorial conditions went well 
beyond what they could reasonably demand given the military situation 
prior to the fall of Humaitá in late 1868. Throughout this period, 
therefore, Paraguayan policy was consistent with what we would expect 
from a country responding to an anticipated adverse shift in relative 
capabilities. 
 Summary of a Preventive War 
 The puzzles of the length and destructiveness of the Paraguayan War 
are in many ways closely connected to the puzzles of its onset. Why did 
the leader of a buffer state start a war with not just one but two regional 
powers? Why adopt a risky and aggressive military strategy when a 
more limited approach would have increased the challenges for his op-
ponents? Why were the Paraguayans and López willing to fi ght so fa-
natically, literally to the death? The willingness to adopt an aggressive 
military strategy and to countenance high costs in the pursuit of victory 
was closely connected to the extraordinary destructiveness of this war. 
As with any war, the answer to these questions is nuanced, but the broad 
theoretical predictions from chapter 1 are borne out quite well. A full 
understanding of López’s strategy must draw on both the informational 
and the preventive war mechanisms. The informational dynamic is par-
ticularly pertinent for López’s decision to attack Argentina when already 
at war with Brazil: given the expectation that Urquiza and much of rural 
Argentina would rally to his side, it was far from clear that the invasion 
of Argentina would greatly worsen Paraguay’s strategic position. 42 The 
aggressiveness and urgency of Paraguayan policy can be understood 
only given the understanding of Paraguay’s perilous and, more impor-
tant, worsening strategic position. Intervention to prevent Brazilian and 
Argentine domination of Uruguay was reasonable given the inference 
that Paraguay was a logical next target and that undermining Para-
guayan independence would be easier once Brazil and Argentina were in 
a stronger position cut Paraguay off from the outside world. Moreover, 
war with Argentina, by provoking civil unrest in that country, had a 
good chance of unseating Bartolomé Mitre and thus addressing the pri-
mary source of Paraguay’s strategic decline, which was the rapproche-
ment between Brazil and Argentina under Mitre. In this context, an 
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aggressive war, even at relatively long odds, made sense. It was this stra-
tegic setting that provoked López into launching an unusually aggres-
sive and risky war and that helped to ensure that Paraguayan resolve 
would be so high: although the aggressor in this confl ict, the Paraguay-
ans sincerely believed that they were fi ghting for their independence. 
 War to the Death 
 An explanation for why and how the war started and the way in which 
it was initially waged starts, therefore, from the Paraguayan fear of de-
cline. Yet Paraguayan fears, and the policies that followed from them, 
cannot account fully for the way in which this war ultimately was fought. 
By the midpoint of the war, López began to indicate a willingness to 
settle the war on terms that were reasonable given the military situation. 
At this point, then, we might have expected to see the war move to a 
close. Indeed, on behalf of Argentina, Bartolomé Mitre repeatedly indi-
cated his willingness to negotiate, both in talks with López and in discus-
sions with potential mediators. 43
 The Brazilians, however, were resolutely opposed to peace. In Novem-
ber 1865, Emperor Pedro issued an order that formally “forbade any 
meeting with López or one of his representatives . . . and decreed that 
any proposals of peace, or of an armistice, should immediately be re-
jected, no matter what the circumstances in which they were made.” 44
Brazilian commanders consistently obeyed both the letter and the spirit 
of this command. Thus, in the negotiations at Yataity-Corá, the Brazilian 
general refused to shake López’s hand and departed before any negotia-
tions could begin. Likewise, several American offers of mediation foun-
dered on the refusal of the Brazilians to contemplate negotiation. 45 This 
attitude was also in evidence after the fall of Asunción, which consti-
tuted the effective military denouement to the war: for Brazilian political 
leaders, including Emperor Pedro, as long as López remained in Para-
guay the war was not over. 46 It was for this reason that the war could 
only end when the Brazilian army tracked down López’s remaining 
force—by now consisting almost exclusively of the very young and the 
very old—and killed the Paraguayan leader on the fi eld of battle. By this 
time, Paraguay had been utterly destroyed, while the costs of fi ghting 
the war had led to extensive internal rebellion in Argentina and had 
forced signifi cant social changes in Brazil that eventually would lead to 
the overthrow of the monarchy. 47
 If Brazil had been committed to conquering and annexing Paraguay, 
this decision might have been understandable, although the war would 
still have been extremely costly. In reality, however, their actions after the 
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war demonstrated quite clearly that the Brazilians had no intention of 
annexing or partitioning Paraguay. This situation thus raises a number of 
important puzzles. Why were the Brazilians so adamantly opposed to 
negotiation, especially when their ultimate political aims were in many 
respects quite limited? And why was their opposition to negotiation not 
shared by the Argentines? 
 In this section, I argue that unconditional surrender occurred in this 
case by the logic of the dispositional commitment problem: facing an 
unexpected, and unexpectedly ambitious, military attack, the Brazilians 
were unable to comprehend López’s decisions and thus concluded that 
their adversary was implacably aggressive and that a sustainable peace 
would require regime change in Paraguay. This inference followed cen-
trally from the disconnect between Paraguayan fears and Brazilian inten-
tions: although López’s belief that the Brazilians sought to extinguish 
Paraguayan independence was reasonable given the available evidence, 
it was incorrect. By contrast, available evidence indicates quite clearly 
that the Argentines did desire to annex Paraguay. In this context, how-
ever, they had a better understanding of López’s decisions and thus did 
not reach the extreme conclusions of their allies. 
 Explaining a War to the Finish 
 Hypothesis 2b predicts that the target of a preventive war will be more 
likely to demand unconditional surrender when it does not intend to do 
what the initiator fears. López feared that his opponents were conspiring 
to extinguish Paraguayan independence and launched an aggressive 
war in an attempt to address that threat. Actions prior to, during, and 
after the war clearly indicate that his suspicions about Argentine inten-
tions were largely correct, whereas his beliefs about the Brazilian inten-
tions, if not unfounded, were untrue. There is good reason to believe that 
it was this difference that drove the variation in Argentine and Brazilian 
policies. 
 Consider fi rst the evidence that the Argentines, or more accurately the 
 porteños under Mitre, had never reconciled themselves to Paraguayan in-
dependence and would, given the opportunity, happily have extended 
their domain to Asunción and beyond. Under the Spanish Empire, Para-
guay had been governed from Buenos Aires, and while internal disunion 
in the decades after independence militated against an attempt at restor-
ing control, they retained a formal claim to Paraguay. Thus, for example, 
when Austria (at Brazilian behest) recognized Paraguayan independence 
in 1848, Juan Manuel de Rosas in Buenos Aires sent a long protest in 
which he asserted that “the Argentine Republic always preserved its 
rights over the territory of Paraguay and regards it as one of the 
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Argentine provinces.” 48 In the negotiations over the terms of the Treaty 
of Triple Alliance, the Argentines were greatly frustrated by the (mini-
mal) restrictions that the Brazilians wished to impose on Argentine de-
mands, with Foreign Minister Rufi no de Elizalde observing to the British 
representative in Buenos Aires that he “hoped he should live to see Bo-
livia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Argentine Republic united in one Con-
federation.” 49 Once the fi ghting stopped, Argentine territorial demands 
were limited only by opposition of the Brazilians, who as the primary 
occupying power were however in a position to signifi cantly limit Ar-
gentine territorial gains. 50 The Argentine leaders thus cannot have been 
overly surprised when López accused them of seeking to subvert his 
country’s independence. 
 The discussion in the previous section demonstrated that López also 
had good reason to fear Brazil, given how little the Brazilians had done 
to allay Paraguayan concerns over the years. Yet with the benefi t of 
hindsight we can see quite clearly that the Brazilians did not in fact in-
tend to partition or annex Paraguay. The aforementioned negotiations 
over the Treaty of Triple Alliance provide one relevant data point: al-
though the Brazilians have been criticized for their territorial promises 
to the Argentines, they held the line on maintaining Paraguay as an in-
dependent state. 51 More important, once the war was over, the Brazilians 
were the primary occupying power, a result of their willingness to con-
tinue to fi ght after the Argentines had withdrawn all but a token force. 
In a position to impose whatever settlement they desired, they instead 
quickly signed a separate deal with the Paraguayans in which they were 
granted their relatively limited territorial demands and then backed 
Paraguay in forcing Argentina to accept less than had been promised 
under the Treaty of Triple Alliance. 52 Under these circumstances, it is far 
from surprising that when López justifi ed his war by claiming to be the 
target of Brazilian aggression, the Brazilians reacted with uncompre-
hending rage. 
 And it is not an overstatement to say that the Brazilians responded 
with rage. Facing López’s invasion, the Brazilians discounted his stated 
concerns and convinced themselves that he must be some sort of minia-
ture Napoleon, bent on continual expansion and hence a threat to peace 
as long as he remained in offi ce. More specifi cally, they concluded, and 
publicly averred, that “they were fi ghting the unbridled ambitions of a 
tyrant and no one but they themselves could guarantee his extinction.” 53
Given that inference, peace short of complete victory was folly: in short, 
in the assessment of one expert on the war, the Brazilians were moti-
vated by an “ideological conviction . . . that López, and those like him, 
must go.” 54 Subsequent historiography built on these wartime views, in 
part, as one scholar points out, because “[López’s] own explanation for 
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his actions—that he was responding to aggression by Brazil which con-
stituted a threat to Paraguay’s survival—has not been taken seriously, on 
the ground that later history proves that Brazil was not the menace to his 
nation that Solano López imagined it to be”; this interpretation, as this 
scholar points out, is “hindsight with a vengeance,” as it neglects the 
good reasons López had to suspect the Brazilians. 55
 Consistent with hypothesis 2c, this assessment contrasts sharply with 
the way the Brazilians had viewed López and Paraguay prior to the war. 
In the past, of course, the Brazilians had worked with Paraguay to check 
Argentina and had appreciated Paraguayan support for the overthrow 
of Rosas in 1851. 56 Prior to becoming president in 1862, López had been 
heavily involved in policy, for example mediating a peaceful solution to 
a dispute between Mitre and Urquiza in 1859 that brought him a brief 
period of general acclaim. 57 Before the Paraguayan declaration of war, 
few in Brazil had even heard of López, and the few who knew of him 
thought of him as the unimportant leader of an economically backward 
state, far from the monster he was eventually seen to be. The central role 
of the Brazilian inference that the cause of the war was the aggressive 
character of the Paraguayan leadership can also be seen in the disappear-
ance of almost all animosity toward Paraguay once López and other 
high-ranking individuals had been replaced. 58
 The fi ndings from this case thus strongly support the argument that 
“innocent” targets of preventive wars are more likely to demand uncon-
ditional surrender. In particular, the contrast between Brazil and Argen-
tina is unusually illuminating: within the context of the same war, Brazil, 
which did not intend to do what Paraguay feared, demanded uncondi-
tional surrender, while the Argentines, whose motives were more in line 
with López’s expectations, did not. Moreover, the trajectory of Brazilian 
beliefs accords with the expectations of the theory advanced here: it was 
only after his preventive attack that he came to be seen as an aggressive 
monster whose removal was a necessary precursor to a sustainable 
peace. 
 The Alternative Ex planations 
 The three main rationalist explanations cannot provide a convincing 
account of unconditional surrender. While one could certainly attribute 
initial Brazilian intransigence to overoptimism, the diffi culties that they 
encountered along the way to victory, and in particular the signifi cant 
delay and escalation of costs following the disastrous Battle of Curupa-
ity, provided ample opportunity for updating prior beliefs. That the Bra-
zilians continued to refuse to negotiate beyond this point cannot be 
attributed to excessive optimism. There is also no great evidence that 
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they were more optimistic about the ease of victory than were the 
Argentines. 
 Similarly, a domestic political story has signifi cant weaknesses, except 
insofar as it acknowledges Emperor Pedro’s ability to impose a policy 
that at least some in Brazil may have thought overly harsh. Of all the in-
terested factions relevant for this confl ict, the Unitarians in Argentina 
arguably benefi ted the most, as the country’s unity was far greater after 
the war than it had been before, but Mitre was consistently open to nego-
tiation. 59 By contrast, Emperor Pedro ultimately weakened his hold on 
power by insisting on the prosecution of the war to the fi nish, most nota-
bly by freeing slaves who were willing to fi ght and by opening the 
army—traditionally the prerogative of the nobility—to the lower and 
middle classes. 60 These changes turned the army into a signifi cant force 
in domestic politics, one that was ultimately able to launch a coup in 
1889 that overthrew Pedro and ushered in a federal republic. 61
 Nor can commitment problems grounded in a fear of decline provide 
a convincing account. The Brazilians appear to have recognized that the 
tide of history was on their side, and they certainly did not believe that 
Paraguay was headed for a signifi cant expansion in capabilities, espe-
cially after the defeat of the forward Paraguayan army. The constant 
harping on López’s iniquities contrasts with the absence of any commen-
tary focusing on shifts in future capabilities. Certainly the refusal to con-
sider the war over even following the fall of Asunción cannot be 
understood on the basis of fear of an imminent increase in Paraguayan 
capabilities. 
 Overall, then, this case provides strong support for my theory. Consis-
tent with the argument, López initiated the war out of a preventive mo-
tivation, based on the fear that Paraguay’s larger neighbors were 
conspiring to partition his country. The Argentines, who genuinely de-
sired to annex Paraguay, understood these fears and thus treated López 
as a normal politician with whom negotiation was entirely possible. The 
Brazilians, by contrast, had no intention of taking over Paraguay; they 
misinterpreted López’s behavior and concluded that only a complete 
victory could bring a sustained peace. 
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 World War II 
 German Expansion and Allied Response 
 In contrast to the Paraguayan War and to many other bloody wars 
from history, which historians have often described as unnecessary and 
tragic, World War II seems less puzzling: Adolf Hitler did it. While ancil-
lary questions remain, such as why the German people were willing to 
rally to Hitler’s standard, the man himself has been seen as history’s ul-
timate outlier, and World War II as simply the extension of his unique 
personality. It is likely for this reason, for example, that international re-
lations scholars have spent far more time examining World War I, which 
is frequently seen as unnecessary and hence puzzling, than World War II. 
A serious attempt at explaining variation in the duration and severity of 
wars cannot afford, however, to simply paper over an extreme case as an 
unexplainable outlier, however attractive that approach may seem. It is 
thus worth asking to what extent the theory advanced here can account 
for German foreign policy prior to and during World War II. 
 Indeed, I argue that the preventive war mechanism provides an ex-
cellent account of Hitler’s decisions. In this case, there are two sepa-
rate components to Hitler’s fear of decline. First, and more important, 
Hitler operated according to a clear and consistent ideology that in-
formed him that absent signifi cant territorial expansion Germany was 
headed for long-term decline. This belief thus was the basis for the 
 Lebensraum policy and the conclusion that an expansionist war was in 
Germany’s interest. Second, given that prior conclusion, Hitler then 
calculated that the late 1930s would be the optimal time to under -
take that expansion, as rapid German rearmament and internal disor-
der in the Soviet Union had given Germany a temporary advantage 
that would not be sustainable in the long run. Thus, while the ideo-
logical basis for Hitler’s actions informed him that an aggressive war 
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to acquire territory in Eastern Europe was necessary, the material situ-
ation in Europe—in particular the anticipation of relative German de-
cline over the next few years—explains why Hitler was so anxious to 
fi ght the war soon. 
 While Hitler’s decisions guaranteed an unusually destructive war, 
they do not provide an entire explanation for the way the war ended. 
Even during the war’s darkest hours, after the collapse of France and 
when the German advance into Russia seemed unstoppable, the Allies 
consistently rebuffed repeated attempts by a wide range of Nazi offi cials, 
military leaders, and others to reach some sort of understanding. By sup-
porting unconditional surrender, Churchill, for all his greatness, effec-
tively broke Britain as a world power, forcing the dissolution of the 
empire that he valued so highly and leaving his country permanently in 
the American shadow. 1 Soviet deaths numbered in the tens of millions, 
while the Americans availed themselves of a Soviet alliance whose costs 
they were to regret for forty-fi ve years. Peace with Hitler, or with a mili-
tary government that replaced him, would have been unpalatable, but 
almost all peace agreements contain something unpalatable for both 
sides, the more so when each has the ability to impose great costs on the 
other. That the Allies sincerely and consistently refused to negotiate with 
any possible interlocutor is thus, from the perspective of the standard 
bargaining model, simply astounding, and certainly worthy of further 
consideration. 
 The second half of this chapter thus analyzes the consistent Allied 
refusal to negotiate, focusing in particular on two periods—British ob-
stinacy after the collapse of France and the Allied decision, announced 
in January 1943, to demand Germany’s unconditional surrender—in 
which Allied leaders most explicitly discussed the question of whether 
or not to talk to Hitler or other German representatives. I fi rst summa-
rize the relevant history, in the process highlighting standard explana-
tions for the decision not to negotiate. In each case, I argue that the 
unconditional surrender mechanism discussed in chapter 1 does a bet-
ter job of explaining the refusal to negotiate than existing explanations 
or than any of the other three central mechanisms discussed in this 
book. Starting from the preventive motivations for German expansion, I 
argue that this case provides one of the clearest possible examples of in-
nocence of intentions, as the Allies simply did not have the intentions 
that Hitler attributed to them. Lacking the correct understanding of Hit-
ler’s policies, the Allies concluded that he was engaged in expansion 
without limit, and thus that only fundamental change in Germany 
would bring a viable peace. Given this conclusion, the decision to fi ght 
to the end followed naturally. 
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 Explaining German Expansion 
 The outline of German policy in World War II is well known, and thus 
the recapitulation here will serve primarily to identify the questions on 
which the rest of the analysis will focus. Prostrate after World War I, Ger-
many began to reassert itself after Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933, 
fi rst breaching caps on the size of the German military and remilitarizing 
the Rhineland, and later resorting to aggressive and risky diplomacy to 
incorporate Austria and Czechoslovakia. The annexation of rump 
Czechoslovakia in early 1939, after Hitler had expressly promised that 
German territorial ambitions were sated at the Munich Conference the 
previous fall, spurred more active resistance from the European powers, 
and when Hitler turned to Poland war became inevitable. Just before 
crossing the brink, however, Hitler pulled off what was likely his greatest 
diplomatic coup with the Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact with 
the Soviet Union, which allowed Germany to avoid a two-front war. 
 The German army’s series of stunning victories over the next year 
brought western Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and France under Hitler’s control, apparently freeing Germany from the 
danger of fi ghting a two-front war. At this point, Hitler considered the 
issue in the West to be decided and offered a settlement to Britain, which, 
while undefeated, had no plausible strategy to reverse the new status 
quo on the continent. Churchill’s refusal left Hitler fi ghting a war that he 
did not want. His solution to this problem, however, has puzzled com-
mentators ever since: unable to force a British capitulation, he launched 
an invasion of the Soviet Union. It was this decision, and to a lesser de-
gree the full entry of the United States into the war following the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor, that doomed Germany: rather than the 
quick victory in Russia that Hitler (and his Western opponents) expected, 
Germany found itself embroiled in a multiyear war against an opponent 
who would not capitulate despite crushing casualties and the loss of 
huge expanses of territory. The defeat at Stalingrad sealed Germany’s 
fate, but Hitler showed no interest in negotiations with the Soviets, while 
his underlings tried to entice the Western powers into a separate peace 
and a crusade against communism. A convincing explanation for the du-
ration and severity of World War II thus must confront Hitler’s expan-
sive political aims, his willingness to start one war while still fi ghting 
another, and his refusal to negotiate with the Soviets at the same time 
that he was open to negotiation with Britain. 
 To put the questions in a more positive form, why did Germany aim so 
high in World War II? Why was Hitler willing to undertake so many sig-
nifi cant risks, including most obviously the decision to start new wars 
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while old ones were not completed? And why was Hitler far more will-
ing to negotiate with Britain than he was with the Soviet Union? 
 Historians have of course engaged these questions, albeit not from the 
theoretical perspective of the bargaining model. At one extreme are 
scholars, such as Hildebrand and Hillgruber, who argue that Hitler de-
veloped a blueprint for European domination, and potentially world 
conquest, even before seizing power in 1933, and that his subsequent 
actions merely implemented this blueprint. 2 At the opposite extreme are 
scholars such as Taylor, Broszat, and Mommsen, who contend that Hit-
ler was fundamentally an opportunist primarily concerned with main-
taining his position in Germany, and that the extreme policies that Nazi 
Germany adopted arose either from efforts to secure domestic legiti-
macy or from a bureaucratic race to the extremes in the absence of clear 
guidance. 3 This debate has obvious connections to the intentionalist-
functionalist debate that focuses most heavily on the origins of the Ho-
locaust, with intentionalists arguing that Hitler planned the Holocaust 
prior to seizing power, while functionalists argue that the Holocaust was 
an improvised response of the German bureaucracy to Nazi racial ideals 
and the absence of clear directives from above. 4 That said, explanations 
for Nazi aggression and for the Holocaust need not be the same, and my 
argument that Hitler intended to engage in signifi cant territorial expan-
sion (albeit not to the point of world conquest) prior to seizing power 
should not be seen as implying that he similarly entered offi ce intending 
to carry out the Holocaust. 5
 As I discuss in greater detail below, I agree with the argument that 
Hitler planned to engage in signifi cant territorial expansion at Russian 
expense even prior to seizing power, but disagree with strong arguments 
that he had mapped out the entire program prior to assuming power or 
that he foresaw either the conquest of or a fi nal titanic clash with the 
United States after the acquisition of Lebensraum. 6 In the end, I argue 
that all of these questions can be answered once we understand both the 
long-term and the immediate decline that Hitler, guided by his ideology 
and his observation of the world, believed Germany to face. In this con-
text, and given his beliefs about the intentions of his opponents, the ex-
tent and nature of German aggression becomes explicable. 
 Not Just Leaders, Not Just Information 
 Before examining these arguments, however, it is worthwhile to briefl y 
review the limitations of informational and principal-agent answers to 
these central questions. With respect to optimism, while it is true that 
Hitler’s military expectations were belied at times, in particular in the 
invasion of the Soviet Union, the decision to attack France was carried 
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out despite low confi dence in the probability of victory, while the reluc-
tance to negotiate with the Soviet Union in the later stages of the war 
simply cannot be explained by a belief that future fi ghting would go 
well. A domestic political explanation is similarly unconvincing: while 
Hitler both worried about overthrow and enjoyed unusually wide free-
dom of action for a leader, the available evidence indicates that he sin-
cerely believed that his policies would advance German interests and 
that much of the German public and military shared these beliefs. 
 To start with the informational mechanism, Hitler drew confi dence in 
the likely outcome of a war from a number of sources, including the sup-
posed martial superiority of the German race, an expected alliance with 
Britain, and a confi dence in mechanized warfare and air power that led 
him to believe that World War II was not destined to be a repeat of World 
War I. 7 Prior to Operation Barbarossa, the confi dence of both Hitler 
and his generals was buoyed by Germany’s quick victories in the West 
and by Soviet weakness—as a consequence of the purge of the Red Army, 
roughly 75 percent of Soviet offi cers had less than a year of experience, 
creating limitations that were apparent in the Russo-Finnish War—and 
was consistent with the expectations of Germany’s opponents in the 
West. 8 Advocates for the informational mechanism thus could point to 
high expectations prior to both invasions. 
 An informational perspective has diffi culty accounting for the broader 
scope of Hitler’s policies, however. He was confi dent from even before 
entering offi ce that achieving his goals would require war; had he be-
lieved that his aims were justifi ed by Germany’s capabilities he logically 
should have expected that there would be at least some chance of achiev-
ing them at the bargaining table. 9 An informational perspective likewise 
has diffi culty accounting for the major risks that Hitler was willing to 
run, as with the remilitarization of the Rhineland, which could have been 
achieved through negotiation had he been willing to wait but instead 
was undertaken unilaterally despite his knowledge that French interven-
tion would have forced the Germans “to withdraw again with our tails 
between our legs.” 10
 The most important decision of the war was to attack the Soviet Union 
while still at war with Britain, but the informational mechanism provides 
an essentially unconvincing explanation for that incident. While Hitler 
was quite confi dent that Germany would win, this confi dence in itself 
provides no reason why Germany should start a second war before it 
had completed the fi rst. The standard informational explanation for this 
decision was that Hitler had (incorrectly) concluded that the British were 
continuing to fi ght because they expected the Soviets to intervene and 
thus thought that crushing Russia would fi nally convince the British to 
capitulate. 11 Yet the Soviets were effectively allied to Germany and quite 
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solicitous of German goodwill—had Hitler in fact believed that the Brit-
ish were holding out because they expected Soviet aid, a far more effec-
tive strategy would have been to keep the military pressure on Britain 
while continuing cooperation with the Soviets; invading the Soviet 
Union by contrast would involve giving Churchill exactly what he 
wanted. 12 This is not to say that Hitler did not hope that defeating the 
Soviets would fi nally convince the British to negotiate; rather it is to say 
that such a motivation provides at best a markedly incomplete account 
of the German decision. 
 Most important, the informational mechanism simply cannot explain 
the decision to refuse to negotiate on the Eastern front as Germany’s mil-
itary position deteriorated. While refusal to negotiate might be consis-
tent with the informational mechanism in the opening stages of the war, 
when he might expect further victories that would give Germany more 
than Stalin would be willing to surrender at the bargaining table, after 
the Wehrmacht got bogged down outside Moscow, and especially after 
the catastrophe of Stalingrad, one would expect him to be interested in 
some sort of settlement with the Soviets as an alternative to a fi ght to the 
death that Germany looked increasingly likely to lose. Hitler clearly 
knew that the war was going poorly, but rather than scale down his de-
mands he vested his hopes in the potential development of miracle 
weapons or the collapse of the opposing alliance. Similarly, the leading 
Nazis (with the possible exception of Goebbels) and generals harbored 
few doubts after Stalingrad about the eventual outcome of the war, but 
they too did not encourage negotiation with Stalin. 13 This behavior is 
simply inconsistent with the informational mechanism. 
 Domestic political answers to the central questions about German pol-
icy in World War II are similarly unconvincing. Hitler was admittedly an 
extreme autocrat with substantial policy freedom, although it is easy to 
overstate his autonomy, especially in foreign and military affairs where 
he had at times diffi cult interactions with the generals. 14 Throughout his 
time in offi ce, he was particularly concerned about retaining the support 
of the general public and of the generals, and he tracked opinion in each 
group closely. Thus, for example, evidence that the German public was 
unenthusiastic about a possible war contributed to his decision to call off 
an invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. 15 Similarly, he was increasingly 
worried by indications of public dissatisfaction in the months prior to the 
invasion of France. 16
 The generals constituted the clearest constraint, however. Even after 
the stunning successes of 1940, Hitler complained that 
 before I became Reich Chancellor, I believed that the General Staff was 
like a mastiff that had to be held fi rmly by the collar as otherwise it 
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would threaten to attack everyone. Since becoming Reich Chancellor I 
have been forced to the conclusion that the General Staff is anything but 
a mastiff. This General Staff has always tried to prevent me doing what I 
held to be necessary. . . . It is I who have always had to incite this 
mastiff. 17
 The most obvious manifestation of the degree to which Hitler had to 
worry about the generals’ opinions is obviously the failed coup of July 
1944, which came quite close to supplanting him. Although the failure of 
this coup led to the destruction of most of the German resistance, peace 
probes by Germans promising to overthrow Hitler in return for a negoti-
ated peace continued until the end of the war, only to be stymied by the 
Allied policy of unconditional surrender. 
 A major component of Hitler’s success was his ability to convince both 
the generals and a substantial portion of the German public that his poli-
cies advanced their interests. Thus, for example, a contemporary Ameri-
can journalist noted at the time that he had “still to fi nd a German, even 
among those who don’t like the regime, who sees anything wrong in the 
German destruction of Poland… . As long as the Germans are successful 
and do not have to pull in their best too much, this will not be an un-
popular war.” 18 A widespread fear of both communism and Russia and a 
sense of German superiority contributed greatly to a willingness to keep 
fi ghting on the Eastern front, even in the face of signifi cant setbacks. 19
The high costs for getting on the wrong side of the Nazi state no doubt 
played a signifi cant role in dampening opposition, but so did patriotism 
and a belief that Hitler was the best man to lead Germany through the 
crisis. 20
 Similarly, as Dale Copeland demonstrates, the generals mostly agreed 
with Hitler’s goals; when they opposed him, it was because they were 
less optimistic about what the Wehrmacht was  capable of achieving. 21
Once Germany’s early victories validated Hitler’s prognostications, the 
generals became quite supportive, however much they may have denied 
this fact when it became inconvenient after the war. Thus, for example, 
General Beck, who is best known to history for his leading role in the 
failed coup of 1944, concurred in a report that Germany “needs greater 
living space” that “can only be captured through a war.” 22 The coup was 
driven by the realization that Germany was headed for inevitable defeat 
and that the Allies would not negotiate with Hitler: in this context, re-
moving Hitler was a step to save the German state. 23 This discussion is 
not to say that support was unanimous, of course—many Germans were 
deeply and sincerely opposed to Hitler’s policies. Enough supported 




 Nazi Ideology and German Decline 
 A more convincing explanation for Hitler’s policy choices must rely on 
his ideologically founded belief that Germany was headed for signifi cant 
decline, especially relative to Russia. 24 As the argument here is uncon-
ventional and potentially controversial, it makes sense to lay it out in a 
reasonable amount of detail, starting with the history and core compo-
nents of his ideology. 25 
 Nazi ideology was not a fundamentally new creation, but instead 
drew on a number of currents in German thinking that had been around 
long before Weimar. While it contained some internal contradictions, es-
pecially as it pertained to domestic politics (where it was, for example, in 
Hitler’s interest as a party politician to appear as both a capitalist and a 
socialist), and while its expression in  Mein Kampf and in Hitler’s unpub-
lished second book was turgid and poorly organized, in the realm of 
foreign policy Nazi ideology contained a clear, stable, and basically co-
herent set of core ideas. Moreover, because intellectually Hitler was a 
reorganizer of existing ideas rather than a creator of new ones, his view 
of the world was readily understood by the soldiers, government offi -
cials, and regular Germans whose support he needed to prosecute the 
war. 26 Ultimately, it was this ideology, and the implications that it held 
for the German nation’s position in the world, that made Hitler and the 
state he governed such a menace to the international system. 
 Hitler started from a desire for security for the German people; for him 
the issue was “nothing other than the question of preserving the German 
people’s possibility of existence.” 27 That existence, however, relied on the 
Germans’ ability to protect themselves, both from external invasion and 
from the starvation that he predicted would soon beset a nation growing 
by 900,000 people a year while living in a territorially constrained space 
only one-fi ftieth the size of Russia. 28 In short, absent the acquisition of 
signifi cant additional territory (Lebensraum), the Germans would soon 
be forced, whether from voluntary population controls or simple starva-
tion, to constrain their numbers while their neighbors continued to grow; 
when at last the world reached what he believed to be the inevitable 
stage at which total population matched the earth’s potential output, the 
“brutal” and hence more populous races would be the ones to survive. 29
Indeed, Germany was uniquely constrained in this manner, as alone 
among the great powers it controlled relatively little territory both on its 
own continent and overseas in the form of colonies. 30 Thus, without ad-
ditional territory, the Germans faced “the danger of vanishing from the 
earth or of serving others as a slave nation.” 31 From the simple argument 
that territory determined population and that population and territory 
together determined security, Hitler thus derived a prediction that the 
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German nation was experiencing an extended and, if not addressed, ter-
minal decline. 
 Solving this problem, however, would not be easy. Diplomacy might 
possibly restore territory lost in World War I (although he doubted it), 
but even a full restoration of the borders of 1914 would have been insuf-
fi cient. 32 Moreover, he believed that any attempt at a diplomatic resolu-
tion to Germany’s problem would inevitably fail given the racial enmity 
that Slavs and Jews supposedly held toward Germans: in his words, 
“You do not make pacts with anyone whose sole interest is the destruc-
tion of his partner.” 33 Recourse to the most common strategy of dealing 
with decline—tacitly acquiescing in a loss of infl uence—was thus unac-
ceptable. Instead, Germany needed to expand to new realms. This 
might be done through colonial expansion, but good colonies in which 
Europeans might settle were not available for the asking and pursuing 
colonial expansion would inevitably alienate Germany’s otherwise nat-
ural ally, England. 34 If Germany had to fi ght to expand, far better that it 
do so in its own continent, where it could rely on its strength, land 
power. And he was convinced that the only reasonable target for such 
expansion was Russia, which simultaneously posed the greatest long-
term threat and the best opportunity for overcoming that threat. 35 He 
rued what he saw as the missed opportunity of 1904, when German 
leaders might, in alliance with England, have taken advantage of Rus-
sia’s defeat in war with Japan to address once and for all Germany’s 
territorial problems. 36 The defeat of 1918 weakened Germany, but in one 
respect the war was benefi cial, as it brought about the overthrow of the 
capable (and ethnically German) traditional rulers of Russia and re-
placed them with a group that, if bent on Germany’s destruction, was 
far less capable. 37
 Thus already in the 1920s Hitler had developed the diagnosis of the 
German strategic situation that was to guide his policy upon his assump-
tion of power. Germany was territorially constrained, and absent expan-
sion it was doomed to population decay and eventual destruction. The 
constraints on the existing population and the loss (to racial miscegena-
tion) of ethnic Germans outside the borders of the Reich meant that op-
portunities for addressing this problem diminished with every passing 
day. 38 Hence the urgency of quick action, supported by “undivided de-
votion” and the “harnessing of the very last possible ounce of energy.” 39
He was not naive enough to believe that this aim could be achieved 
peacefully, but he argued that when it comes to self-preservation, “what 
is refused to amicable methods, it is up to the fi st to take.” 40 Indeed, far 
from shrinking from preventive war, he encouraged it. He expressed dis-
may at the failure to capitalize on the opportunity provided by the 
Russo-Japanese War, while hailing what he saw as Frederick the Great’s 
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preventive initiation of the Seven Years’ War and taking issue with the 
claim that Bismarck opposed preventive action. 41
 That Hitler’s ideology was wrong on many points does not mean that 
it was not sincerely believed. He truly considered himself to be a member 
of a race that was surrounded by implacable enemies and that was 
headed for decline, but that had an opportunity, if a fl eeting and far from 
guaranteed one, to assure its own future security through aggressive ac-
tion. While opportunistic in the nature of his subsequent expansion and 
more restrained in his public statements, he was consistently guided by 
the perceived need to acquire signifi cant Lebensraum, as quickly as pos-
sible and at Russian expense. Thus, in his fi rst meeting with the General 
Staff on assuming power in 1933, he laid out both the short-term aim of 
rebuilding the army and the long-term goal of “conquest of new living-
space in the East and its ruthless Germanization.” 42 Similarly, in a meet-
ing with the chiefs of the armed forces in November 1937, he emphasized 
the importance of acquiring additional territory, revisiting and again re-
jecting alternate strategies to assure the nation’s security, and declaring 
that failure to address this problem would ultimately pose “the greatest 
danger to the preservation of the German race.” 43 One year later, at the 
height of the Sudeten Crisis, Hitler proclaimed himself entirely ready for 
war, “even if it lasts from two to eight years.” 44 The connection between 
the belief in inexorable decline and the sheer ambition of his aims is en-
tirely in keeping with the predictions of the preventive war mechanism. 
 Rearmament and the Window of Opportunity 
 Once in offi ce, Hitler had an opportunity to move German foreign 
policy in what he viewed as the appropriate direction. He started by vio-
lating restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty on the size of the 
army and the militarization of the Rhineland. Next, taking advantage of 
the enshrinement of self-determination in Versailles, he began to push 
for limited territorial expansion as a fi rst step on the road to acquiring 
suffi cient Lebensraum. During the fi rst few years of his rule, Hitler’s for-
eign policy easily could have been that of a more conventional German 
nationalist, although given the urgency created by Germany’s perceived 
decline he was willing to resort to risky faits accomplis rather than wait 
for diplomacy to yield its likely gains. 45 Behind the scenes, of course, his 
ambitions remained far greater. 
 By the late 1930s, these policies, in particular rearmament, had com-
bined with Soviet military purges to give Germany a window of oppor-
tunity during which it had its best chance of winning the war for 
Lebensraum. 46 Already in 1937 he was forecasting that action must be 
undertaken by 1943–45, after which “only a change for the worse, from 
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our point of view, could be expected.” 47 The year before he had warned 
about the developing Red Army, observing, “One has only to compare 
the Red Army as it actually exists today with the assumptions of military 
men 10 or 15 years ago to realize the menacing extent of this develop-
ment. Only consider the results of a further development over 10, 15 or 
20 years and think what conditions will be like then!” 48 Indeed, between 
1933 and 1939 the total number of men under arms in the Russian army 
more than quadrupled (to more than 4 million), while military spending 
went from 10 percent to 25 percent of the national budget. 49 These assess-
ments conformed with those of the military, which broadly shared the 
fear of Russia’s rise and believed it to be in Germany’s interest to fi ght 
while still relatively strong. 50
 At the same time, the Germans were also constrained by the knowl-
edge that France, and almost certainly Britain as well, would not simply 
accept the sort of expansion into Eastern Europe that Hitler envisaged. 51
The likelihood of British involvement, however, provided an additional 
reason for urgency, as both sides recognized that increased British rear-
mament meant that the German window of opportunity was rapidly 
closing. 52 In this context, Ribbentrop predicted that the British would 
play for time in diplomacy, while Germany should move quickly while 
its advantages persisted. This attitude carried over once war was de-
clared: in the closing days of the defeat of Poland, Hitler was already 
pushing for an invasion of France  that fall , on the grounds that “time may 
be reckoned more probably as an ally of the Western Powers rather than 
of ours,” while the British and French were content to hide behind the 
Maginot Line—the main French fortifi cations—in the belief that rearma-
ment and economic warfare were continually sapping Germany’s ability 
to fi ght. 53
 Germany’s temporary advantage was further heightened by Stalin’s 
purge of the Red Army offi cer corps in 1937 and 1938, which left the So-
viet Union unprepared for war in the immediate future, as the poor per-
formance in the Russo-Finnish War was to demonstrate. 54 Hitler was 
fully aware of the effects of the purge, which he found inexplicable but 
which afforded him greater freedom of action, at least in the immediate 
term. 55 Most important, Hitler recognized that Stalin’s desire to avoid a 
war while the Red Army recovered would make him amenable to a non-
aggression pact that would allow Germany to avoid having to fi ght a 
two-front war. 56 Thus, after the fall of Poland, Hitler observed that “at the 
present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one to two 
years the present situation will remain.” 57 Indeed, Molotov reported that 
Stalin “had felt that only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal 
footing,” thus militating against Soviet intervention in the western war. 58
Despite what he saw as the fundamental antagonism between the 
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Germans and the ethnically Slavic and ideologically communist Soviets, 
Hitler was quite confi dent of Soviet neutrality once the war began, at 
least in the short term, precisely because the Soviets stood to gain from 
delay. The opportunity to dispatch France at a time when the Russians 
would prefer not to fi ght, as well as the subsequent opportunity to attack 
the Soviet Union before it had recovered from the purge, thus provided 
an additional incentive for haste. 
 The deal with Stalin was always intended to be temporary, however, 
and Hitler was eager to make it as temporary as possible. Even while the 
war in the West was still raging, he remarked to General Jodl that he 
would “take action against this menace of the Soviet Union the moment 
our military position makes it at all possible”; Jodl himself subsequently 
commented that “it was better therefore to have this campaign now, 
when we were at the height of our military power.” 59 In December 1940 
Hitler remarked that Germany needed to deal with Russia in the next 
year, “because in 1942 the United States would be ready to intervene.” 60
The same month, he gave the formal order to begin planning for Opera-
tion Barbarossa, the massive invasion of the Soviet Union initially sched-
uled for the following May. In internal planning, the preventive nature of 
this invasion was anything but a secret; indeed, Hitler explicitly referred 
to the war as preventive on June 6, 1941, only a few weeks before the 
attack. 61
 Some have argued, based on Hitler’s apparent belief that the continu-
ation of the war in the West was a consequence of “Britain’s hope on 
Russia,” that Germany invaded Russia to convince Britain to come to 
terms, and that from this perspective Barbarossa was Hitler’s greatest 
mistake. 62 The evidence presented here indicates the problems with this 
perspective, however. The desire for a war with Russia was present in 
 Mein Kampf , when Hitler believed that Britain would be on Germany’s 
side. That Hitler was shifting his sights eastward as soon as the defeat of 
France became apparent, and before the extent of British obstinacy had 
become clear, likewise demonstrates that the invasion of the Soviet Union 
was always a primary motivation. In sum, if Russia’s defeat brought Brit-
ain to terms, that would be a bonus, but the war with Britain was always 
a sideshow to the main operation. Indeed, given that the war in the West 
was undertaken to clear the path for the war in the East, and given the 
belief that any delay weakened Germany relative to its opponents, from 
within Hitler’s view of the world the decision to attack in the summer of 
1941 was the correct one, even if the invasion ultimately miscarried. 
 Overall, the history of German foreign policy prior to and during the 
war conforms strongly with hypothesis 1b, which predicts that leaders 
who fear decline will adopt unusually risky policies. As was previously 
noted, Hitler’s diplomacy in the 1930s repeatedly achieved by fait 
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accompli—with the attendant dangers of armed retaliation by France or 
other neighbors—what a more patient leader might easily (if less quickly) 
have achieved through more patient negotiation. At Munich, he came 
close to throwing away an agreement that neutered Czechoslovakia as 
an effective opponent out of a desire not to postpone the inevitable war. 
Although far from obvious in hindsight, the blitzkrieg invasion of France 
also carried serious risks to the elite German units at the core of the inva-
sion force. On the basis of war games prior to the invasion, German gen-
erals concluded that victory relied almost entirely on the complete 
success of attempts to hide the German drive through the Ardennes; had 
the British and French caught on more quickly and called back units sent 
north into Belgium and the Netherlands, the invasion of 1939, like that of 
1914, might have failed to bring the decision that the Germans needed. 63
Finally, and most obviously, he launched the invasion of the Soviet Union 
without fi rst defeating Britain. 
 To summarize, while the ideological belief in the decline of the Ger-
man nation lay behind Hitler’s quest for Lebensraum, more immediate 
calculations of shifting capabilities helped determine the timing and di-
rection of his expansion. Indeed, as late as 1937, he hoped to have an-
other six years for preparation, but quick British rearmament combined 
with the window of opportunity created by the Soviet purge provided 
reason to accelerate the schedule. 64 The belief that time favored Ger-
many’s opponents, which suffused military and political discussions 
prior to and during the war, provided a reason for urgency and helped 
motivate Hitler’s war aims as well as the risks that he was willing to run 
in their pursuit. 
 Negotiation versus War to the Death 
 The rationale behind Hitler’s expansive political aims and risky for-
eign policy prior to the war helps to explain otherwise puzzling deci-
sions taken once the war was underway. In addition to his willingness to 
take risks—evident most obviously in the decision to invade the Soviet 
Union before Britain was defeated—the belief that Germany faced termi-
nal decline relative to Russia helps to explain why Hitler repeatedly pur-
sued negotiations with the British while showing no interest in a 
settlement with Stalin. 65 Starting basically from the British and French 
declarations of war, Hitler and those under him sought to restore peace 
with the Western powers, especially with Britain. Almost immediately 
after the collapse of Poland, Hitler made a public appeal for peace on the 
basis of a free hand for Germany in Eastern Europe and the restoration of 
some of Germany’s lost colonies. 66 During the same period, Hermann 
Göring sought more quietly behind the scenes to establish peace with the 
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British. 67 Indeed, in his discussions with his generals Hitler repeatedly 
indicated his confi dence that the British would come around, at various 
points in May and June of 1940 observing that his goal was “to arrive at 
an understanding with Britain on the basis of a division of the world,” 
that the British could have “a special peace at any time,” and that “his 
aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that would be consistent 
with her honor to accept.” 68 Ultimately, he only abandoned the pursuit of 
peace with Britain once the British made it unambiguously clear that 
they would not countenance settlement, and even then his underlings, 
especially Himmler, continued to pursue back-channel possibilities. 69
 By contrast, evidence of attempts to reach peace with the Soviets once 
the war began is slim and unconvincing. There is speculative evidence 
that the Soviets may have sent peace feelers via Bulgaria in October 1941, 
but this evidence is uncertain, and if such feelers were sent they were 
defi nitely rejected. 70 Others have pointed to rumors of approaches in 
1943 and 1944 by the German Peter Kleist to Soviet representatives in 
Stockholm, but these approaches, if they happened, did not have offi cial 
authorization and achieved nothing. 71 Most important, whereas we have 
clear and unambiguous evidence of Hitler’s openness to negotiations 
and an eventual settlement with Britain, there is no similar evidence of 
plans for negotiation with the Soviets. Similarly, whereas he clearly was 
willing to leave the British Empire alone and appears to have envisioned 
the survival of France (minus “historically German” territory along the 
Rhine), German plans for the East involved the complete destruction of 
Russia in Europe, including the razing of Leningrad and the incorpora-
tion of Poland, the Baltic region, and Ukraine into the Reich, with only a 
rump Russia surviving behind the Urals. 72
 This contrast is hard to explain from many perspectives but is com-
pletely consistent with the shifting power motivation for war. Given the 
belief that Germany’s primary problem was eventual decline with re-
spect to Soviet Russia, war with Britain was a regrettable distraction, 
which furthermore the British, if they understood Hitler’s motivations, 
would recognize was unnecessary—German expansion in Eastern Eu-
rope would not undermine the British Empire. A negotiated settlement 
with Britain was both desirable and, he expected, achievable. By con-
trast, the fi ght with the Soviet Union was the one that he actually wanted, 
and he believed that victory could only be achieved via the destruction 
of Russia in Europe. Given that goal, settlement on intermediate terms 
was unacceptable, and thus discussions of such settlements (which of 
course were the only ones that the Soviets would countenance so long as 
they had an army in the fi eld) were simply a waste of time. Similarly, 
Hitler’s aims on the Eastern Front did not wax or wane with German 
victories or defeats, instead remaining remarkably constant from the 
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writing of  Mein Kampf through to the fi nal Battle of Berlin. 73 Given the 
belief that a Germany that failed to achieve Lebensraum was doomed 
anyway, he saw no reason to reduce his war aims as the battles turned 
against Germany, instead putting his faith in increasingly unlikely sce-
narios that might bring about a dramatic military reversal and eventual 
victory. 
 While Hitler was not entirely insensitive to costs—at several points in 
his writings he decried the extreme waste of German blood in World War 
I in pursuit of what he saw as an inappropriate aim, for example—given 
what he saw as the costs of inaction he was willing to countenance Ger-
man (and Allied) deaths on an almost unimaginable scale. 74 A leader 
who could not be deterred by even extraordinarily high costs of war and 
who refused to moderate his (always extravagant) demands in response 
to a steadily deteriorating military position guaranteed that no peace 
settlement would be possible and thus that the war on the Eastern 
Front—which lasted almost four years and in which tens of millions of 
people died—would continue until the total defeat of either Germany or 
Russia. The connection between the belief in German decline, the desire 
for signifi cant gains at Russia’s expense, and the refusal to negotiate with 
Stalin once the war began, conforms closely to theoretical expectations 
and provides strong support for hypothesis 1, which predicts that wars 
driven by preventive motivations will be tend to be unusually long and 
deadly. 
 From a theoretical perspective, one might wonder why Germany did 
not capitulate as defeat became increasingly inevitable. After all, theory 
predicts that once a feared decline has occurred and the opponent is in a 
position to impose today the concessions that were expected down the 
line, there is no reason to continue to fi ght. The multilateral nature of the 
war, however, militated against such a development: down to the fi nal 
days, the Germans could hope that the opposing coalition might splinter 
and the Western powers, whose concerns about the Soviet Union were 
well known, might come to Germany’s aid. 75 This hope provided reason 
not to seek terms with Stalin, especially as the Soviets had not signaled 
an interest in a negotiated peace. Furthermore, anyone who sincerely be-
lieved Hitler’s racial theories expected that the consequences of defeat 
would be the extermination of the German nation. Given this expecta-
tion, acknowledgement of defeat as long as there was any possibility of a 
recovery was simply suicide. 
 The Limits to German Expansionism 
 The discussion thus far has made the argument that a belief in German 
racial decline motivated an ambitious and risky attempt to expand into 
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Eastern Europe, an attempt that ultimately failed but that came remark-
ably close to success. Some readers, however, may object that the per-
spective on Hitler advanced here does not conform to their understanding 
of the man, in particular with respect to his fi nal political aims. In the aca-
demic discussion of international relations, Hitler’s Germany is the para-
gon of the “unlimited aims revisionist,” a country that would continue to 
expand until either it was stopped or it had conquered the world. 76 My 
argument, however, implies that Hitler’s aims, while certainly not small, 
also were not unrestricted. 77 As the belief that Hitler’s aims were in fact 
unlimited is widely held, and as such aims would be inconsistent with 
the argument advanced here, it is worth briefl y examining the evidence 
that has been advanced in support of this claim. 78
 Historians have come down on both sides of the question about the 
extent of German war aims, with the distinction clearest in a debate be-
tween so-called globalists and continentalists. 79 Globalists traditionally 
have supported their position with respect to three categories of evi-
dence: various comments attributed to Hitler over his time in offi ce, in 
particular the comments recorded by Hermann Rauschning; available 
evidence about long-term German military planning; and Hitler’s dis-
cussion of the United States in his unpublished second book. On closer 
examination, however, all three of these lines of evidence are either of 
questionable validity or amenable to an alternate and more convincing 
interpretation. 
 The simplest way to support the argument that Hitler sought to con-
quer the world is to point to instances in which he reported such a desire 
himself. To this end, Hermann Rauschning’s recollections of personal 
conversations with Hitler provide the most useful evidence: in more 
than one hundred reported conversations, all from his early years in 
power, Hitler speaks openly of his intention to conquer the world and 
lays out plans that include the conquest of Africa and the Americas. 80
Subsequent historians, however, have concluded that the book is fabri-
cated, more a work of wartime propaganda than a useful source on Hit-
ler’s thinking. 81 Outside this discredited source, other evidence of 
Hitler’s stated intention to conquer the world is far more circumstantial, 
consisting of one-off comments, such as the ambiguous references to 
Germany becoming a “world power” ( Weltmacht ) in  Mein Kampf . 82 Over-
all, in the words of one historian, “no evidence exists setting forth Hit-
ler’s declared intention to conquer the world.” 83
 A second line of argument has focused on German military plans, and 
in particular plans (never realized) to build a signifi cant surface fl eet as 
well as potential plans to build long-range bombers to be stationed on 
the Azores, where they could strike at the United States. 84 Here again the 
evidence is far from convincing, however. The cited military plans were 
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never really pursued, and in any event are amenable to less expansionist 
interpretations. Thus, for example, plans for naval development were 
designed to address European problems—the blockade of Britain or a 
possible falling out with Spain. 85 Similarly, the desire to develop the ca-
pacity to bomb the American mainland was a reasonable response to the 
strategic problems created by the anticipated entry into the war of an op-
ponent whom Germany could not directly attack: the Germans believed 
that an ability to impose direct costs would increase the probability that 
the Americans would back down, just as they hoped that bombing Lon-
don would induce Britain to agree to a settlement. 
 The fi nal argument for unlimited aims has focused on apparent evi-
dence that Hitler foresaw a fi nal titanic clash with the United States at 
some point, perhaps after his death. 86 This argument relies primarily on 
the apparently dramatic revision in Hitler’s thinking about the United 
States between the time that he wrote  Mein Kampf and the time that he 
wrote his unpublished second book in 1928, in which he went from de-
scribing the United States as weak and irrelevant to describing it in far 
more positive terms and raising it as a possible future opponent. 87 This 
discussion, however, occurs in the context of an analysis of a proposal for 
a pan-European policy; in arguing against this policy, Hitler found it use-
ful to have an example of a nation that expanded by conquest and then 
populated the conquered lands itself—as he argues Germany should do 
in Europe—and thus presents the United States in a light that is consis-
tent with this argument. In short, the United States is not even the subject 
of this discussion and enters in a way that is best suited to serve Hitler’s 
rhetorical purpose. 88 Consistent with this view, Hitler reverted subse-
quently to his standard dismissals of the United States thereafter. 89 Simi-
larly, Hitler’s oft-cited prediction of a fi nal titanic clash with the United 
States was made to Soviet foreign minister Molotov at a time when he 
was trying to convince the Soviets to accept a manifestly unequal deal 
that would allow Germany to dominate Europe in return for Russian 
expansion in Central Asia; in this context, an appeal to an external enemy 
was rhetorically useful. 90
 Ultimately, the claim that Nazi Germany was an unlimited aims revi-
sionist is, I would argue, a theoretical one grounded in the observation 
that every German gain under Hitler was simply the prelude to another 
attempt at expansion. In short, given a leader who repeatedly lied about 
the extent of his aims, claiming that each territorial demand was his last, 
why should we believe that the land grab that failed would have proved 
the fi nal act of expansion? Absent a good explanation for why Hitler 
might seriously believe that he needed to take over most of Eastern Eu-
rope but not the rest of the world, it is not unreasonable to believe that he 
in fact sought to conquer the world. In contrast, the observation that 
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from the writing of  Mein Kampf he identifi ed Lebensraum acquired from 
Russia as the primary goal, that evidence of plans for further expansion 
is at best quite weak, and most important, that a drive to acquire Russia’s 
territory in Europe (but not more) was the logical implication of his the-
ory of the world all provide evidence that German expansion would in-
deed have stopped of its own accord. 
 Unconditional Surrender and War to the Death 
 German aggression is, however, only part of the puzzle of World War II. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the Allied refusal to negotiate, 
focusing in particular on the British and the Americans, with whom Hit-
ler was quite interested in reaching an agreement. Although typically 
seen as self-explanatory, the Allied refusal to negotiate is deeply puz-
zling from the perspective of the bargaining model, given the extent of 
German military successes and the high cost of conquering Germany. By 
examining both the British refusal to negotiate in the summer of 1940, for 
Britain the war’s darkest hour, and the joint Allied decision to demand 
Germany’s unconditional surrender, I argue that this behavior can only 
be explained by reference to the dispositional commitment problem: the 
Allies, who did not share Hitler’s theory of international politics and 
hence did not understand his motivations for expansion, concluded that 
the Germans were committed to aggression, and that peace could be en-
sured only by fundamental reform of German government and society. 
 British Intransigence in the Absence of Options 
 From the British and French declaration of war in September 1939, Hit-
ler was already publicly discussing settlements to restore peace. 91 His 
opponents, however, refused to negotiate. During the Phoney War, the 
British and French rebuffed both these proposals and several offers of 
mediation from neutral powers while developing plans for a multiyear 
war that would ultimately wear Germany into submission, as they had 
done in World War I. 92 The British expected an initial German attack that 
would break against the Maginot Line, after which the combination of 
trench warfare and economic blockade would undermine the German 
economy and eventually force Hitler out of power. 93 This strategy was 
critically dependent on the French: General Edmund Ironside in January 
1940 wrote in his diary that “we must have confi dence in the French 
army. It is the only thing in which we can have confi dence. Our own 
army is just a little one and we are dependent upon the French. . . . All 
depends on the French army and we can do nothing about it.” 94
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 The catastrophic defeat of the French army in May and June 1940 thus 
eliminated what Lord Halifax, the British foreign minister, described as 
“the one fi rm rock on which everybody had been willing to build for the 
last two years,” leaving Britain’s strategy for victory in tatters. 95 With the 
French gone and the Low Countries in German hands, the British not 
only lost the primary means of striking at Germany; they also, for the 
fi rst time since 1805, had to confront the imminent threat of an invasion 
of the British Isles. Reports commissioned once the possibility of French 
collapse arose paint a dark picture: to continue the war, Britain would 
have to resort to “a form of government that approached the totalitar-
ian,” and even then the best hope was simply to hold out until the United 
States entered the war, which was possible only so long as the RAF sur-
vived. 96 Moreover, the British overestimated the impact that German 
aerial bombardment would have—reasonable people (including Prime 
Minister Churchill) expected that the fi rst week of bombing would kill 
thirty thousand people in London alone—providing a good reason to 
seek peace earlier rather than later. 97
 Moreover, despite this catastrophic defeat, Hitler’s proposed terms of 
peace with Britain were quite moderate: rather than bearing, as Churchill 
predicted, a particular animus toward Britain, he offered to leave the 
British Empire untouched, even withdrawing prior demands for Ger-
many’s old colonies. 98 In a series of intense discussions in late May 1940, 
at arguably the darkest point of the entire war from the British perspec-
tive, the War Cabinet debated whether to join the French in accepting 
Italian mediation, ultimately deciding against this and any other form 
of negotiation. 99 Scholars have subsequently mined these discussions 
quite thoroughly, although debates remain about the extent to which 
any of the principals directly advocated accepting Hitler’s terms. Vis-
count Halifax, the foreign minister and the strongest proponent of 
agreeing to the French approach, justifi ed his position by arguing that 
rejecting the French proposal would make them more likely to capitu-
late in the immediate future, rather than on the grounds that Britain 
should negotiate with Germany. 100 That said, the possibility of negotia-
tion was defi nitely raised at several points, and Churchill won the de-
bate largely by insisting that negotiation with Hitler was generally 
unacceptable. The content of their discussions thus provides insight 
into why, despite their military defeat, the British rejected the French 
proposal to seek mediation and turned down Hitler’s subsequent 
proposal of peace on the basis of the military situation at the time. Al-
though the invasion threat lasted through the summer and the U-Boat 
attacks on British shipping constituted a serious threat through the fol-
lowing spring, the War Cabinet never again seriously contemplated an 
approach of any form to Germany. 
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 War to the Death: Unconditional Surrender 
 In the summer of 1940, the British sought only to survive; by the end of 
1942 it had become more reasonable to talk publicly about the terms of a 
possible Allied victory. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, 
Churchill and Roosevelt duly announced their conclusion that “peace 
could come to the world only through . . . the unconditional surrender of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.” 101 In practice, however, this statement merely 
constituted the formal announcement of a decision that had been made 
substantially earlier. 102 The Americans had begun internal planning for 
the postwar world almost immediately after Pearl Harbor, most notably 
through the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Post-War For-
eign Policy. 103 The committee dealt with a wide range of issues related to 
war termination and the postwar peace, focusing in particular on the 
nature of the international organization that would be created once the 
war was won. The discussion of war termination, by contrast, was re-
markably brief, as from the outset the participants unanimously agreed 
that peace could only come through the total defeat of Germany and 
Japan. Thus, for example, on March 21, 1941, the committee met to con-
sider the sequence of events that would follow on war termination 
through the surrender of the enemy; no other possible way of ending the 
fi ghting was considered. 104 The discussions of the political subcommittee 
“throughout were founded upon belief in the unqualifi ed victory by the 
United Nations,” and the security subcommittee rapidly concluded that 
“as between a negotiated cessation of hostilities or armistice on one hand 
and an imposed unconditional surrender on the other . . . nothing short 
of unconditional surrender by the principal enemies, Germany and 
Japan, could be accepted, though negotiation might be possible in the 
case of Italy.” 105 Nor was this stance limited to participants in the Advi-
sory Committee: in September 1941 the Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall 
and Admiral Stark, submitted a report on production requirements in 
which they conveyed their conviction that 
 the fi rst major objective of the United States and its Associates ought to be 
the complete military defeat of Germany. . . . An inconclusive peace be-
tween Germany and her present active military enemies would be likely to 
give Germany an opportunity to reorganize continental Europe and to re-
plenish her strength. Even though the British Commonwealth and Russia 
were completely defeated, there would be important reasons for the United 
States to continue the war against Germany, in spite of the greatly in-
creased diffi culty of attaining fi nal victory. 106
 This statement—three months  before Pearl Harbor and the formal Ameri-
can entry into the war—demonstrates the degree to which key American 
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policymakers had concluded that Germany  by nature posed a threat that 
could only be eliminated by total military defeat and the remaking of the 
German political system. Roosevelt’s statements betray a similar convic-
tion: thus, for example, in March 1941 he pledged maximal American aid 
to the opponents of the Axis powers “until total victory is won,” and in a 
December 1940 Fireside Chat he averred that “there is far less chance of 
the United States getting into war, if we do all we can now to support the 
nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we ac-
quiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our 
turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.” 107 When Roosevelt 
announced at Casablanca that the Allies would only accept uncondi-
tional surrender, therefore, he was advancing a long-established position 
that accorded with the views of a wide range of Americans. 
 Nor did the commitment to unconditional surrender waver subse-
quently. German peace feelers grew increasingly importunate as the war 
turned against the Axis powers—Heinrich Himmler in particular pro-
posed a variety of deals, including an alliance against the Soviet Union 
or the ransom of Jews set to die in the Holocaust. 108 In every case, how-
ever, the Allies responded that no peace on terms other than Germany’s 
unconditional surrender was acceptable, even when the Germans ac-
cepted that total occupation was inevitable and sought only to make sure 
that the British and Americans would be the primary occupying pow-
ers. 109 Roosevelt also insisted that the surrenders of Germany’s allies be 
offi cially unconditional, although (as discussed in more detail below) the 
Allies in practice were open to fudging the content of unconditional sur-
render in a way that they were not for Germany or (until the very end) 
Japan. 
 The Standard Explanations and Their Limits 
 Scholars have proposed a number of explanations for both Britain’s 
refusal to negotiate and the decision to demand unconditional surrender. 
None, however, provide a wholly convincing account of what in com-
parative terms are very unusual policy decisions. This section reviews 
those arguments, connecting them where relevant to the informational, 
principal-agent, and situational commitment problem mechanisms. 
 Hopes, Not Expectations 
 In the context of catastrophic defeat, the informational mechanism 
clearly predicts that the British would have lowered their political de-
mands in an effort to escape from an increasingly unattractive war. That 
they not only rejected Hitler’s proposals but rejected the entire possibil-
ity of negotiation thus would seem to be prima facie evidence that the 
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informational mechanism played little role in this case. Readers may be 
surprised to learn, then, that the standard explanation for British policy 
is basically consistent with the informational mechanism. According to 
this view, which is most closely associated with the historian David 
Reynolds, the British fought on because they sincerely (if incorrectly) be-
lieved that American intervention and attacks on the German economy 
would quickly bring the Germans to their knees. 110 Such optimism might 
indeed justify rejecting negotiation at a time when Hitler believed him-
self to be in a position to dictate peace terms. A closer look, however, 
identifi es some signifi cant problems with this argument. At the core, the 
central problem is that British leaders, simply put, were not particularly 
optimistic about Britain’s prospects. 
 Consider fi rst the possibility that British leaders believed that the 
United States would intervene and turn the tide of the war. It certainly is 
true that Churchill pushed the Americans for every ounce of support 
they could provide, even ending his famous “we shall fi ght” speech by 
looking forward to the day when “the New World . . . steps forth to the 
rescue and liberation of the old.” 111 That said, he had few illusions about 
the willingness and ability of the Americans to provide practical assis-
tance in the immediate future: antiwar public opinion meant that Roos-
evelt could not declare war, and even had he been able to overcome that 
obstacle the immediate effect of American entry would have been mini-
mal given the time it would take to remobilize the American army, which 
had been all but disbanded after World War I, and to redirect the econ-
omy for war production. The British leadership was fully apprised of 
this situation—indeed, for Churchill, the primary benefi t of American 
intervention would be the fi llip it would give to British (and, prior to 
their capitulation, French) morale. 112 While American intervention did 
ultimately help Britain to win a long war, in the summer of 1940, when 
the British feared that a German invasion force might arrive any day, 
American entry would have done little to help Britain survive. To argue 
that Churchill and the War Cabinet rejected negotiation because they ex-
pected that American intervention would dramatically improve their 
military prospects in the short term thus is simply untenable. 
 A slightly stronger case can be made for the argument that British 
leaders resisted settlement because they believed the German economy 
to be vulnerable. Based on a reading of World War I that saw the block-
ade of Germany as the primary determinant of victory, the British com-
mitted to a plan of using blockade and aerial bombardment to weaken 
the German economy and thereby secure victory. 113 The belief that at-
tacks on the German economy might prove fruitful endured even 
through the collapse of the French army. Thus, for example, in a War 
Cabinet meeting on May 26, Chamberlain averred that Hitler would 
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need to win by winter, while Halifax used the putative German economic 
weakness to cast doubt on Churchill’s claims that Hitler would advance 
maximalist demands. 114 Churchill, always the strongest proponent of 
continuing the fi ght, also held to this view, arguing on June 13 that the 
blockade would become increasingly effective. 115
 With the defeat of France, however, the British were incapable of seri-
ously targeting the German economy. The blockade was already badly 
weakened by Soviet shipments under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
while the need to take over French duties fi ghting Italy in the Mediter-
ranean left the Royal Navy badly overstretched. The fallback plan of re-
sorting to aerial bombardment was no better. 116 Initially reluctant to 
resort to bombardment because of fear of German retaliation in kind, the 
British ultimately discovered that aerial bombing was far less effective 
than advertised: a wartime study found that only one third of British 
planes managed to drop their payloads within  fi ve miles of their target. 117
Given the high costs, especially of daylight raids and raids beyond the 
range of fi ghter escorts, the British were rapidly forced to acknowledge 
that a knockout blow “was utterly beyond Bomber Command’s capacity 
or means in 1940” and thus to curtail aerial bombardment. 118 Realisti-
cally, therefore, the strategy of economic coercion could be expected to 
work, if at all, only over a long time frame—indeed, given that the British 
initially expected that it would take several years for Germany to col-
lapse, it would be surprising for them to expect the strategy to work bet-
ter once it became clear that Germany would not have to fi ght an 
extended war of attrition along with border with France. When we com-
bine these diffi culties with the immediate threat of a German invasion 
and the longer-term threat from the German U-Boat blockade of Britain 
(which would come to constitute a serious threat to Britain’s ability to 
stay in the war), it was entirely possible that Britain would be defeated 
before the attacks on the German economy even began to take effect. 119
 Indeed, whatever Churchill’s public confi dence in ultimate victory, in 
private he and Britain’s other leaders were far more pessimistic. Once the 
scale of the disaster on the continent became clear, Churchill asked of his 
General Staff only whether they could “hold out  reasonable hope of pre-
venting serious invasion,” while Halifax acknowledged that “it was not 
so much a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany but of 
safeguarding the independence of our Empire and if possible that of 
France.” 120 Similarly, in letters to Roosevelt, Churchill repeatedly raised 
the specter that a future government might capitulate—accepting a sta-
tus as a Nazi protectorate and surrendering the fl eet—in return for 
peace. 121 To take one historian’s assessment, the policy of continuing to 
fi ght “did carry with it the possibility of ultimate victory should Hitler 
blunder, but also the more likely spectre of national annihilation.” 122
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 Ultimately, British confi dence in the summer of 1940 can be better in-
terpreted as an example of motivated bias than as the informational 
mechanism at work. 123 One of the motivations behind Chamberlain’s ap-
peasement policy was the recognition that Britain could neither win a 
short war nor afford a long one; that basic constraint did not disappear 
once war actually arrived, and thus British leaders went searching for a 
scenario in which they might achieve victory in short order without actu-
ally having to do much fi ghting. 124 Having adopted a strategy of indirect 
attack, they continued to hold out great hopes for this approach until 
Soviet and American involvement supplied them with a strategy that 
was actually viable. In an assessment after the fact, one commentator 
noted that 
 so long as the enemy held the initiative, and especially after the collapse of 
France and while American opinion was resolute not to enter the war, there 
was bound to be something unrealistic about many appreciations and pro-
posals. The writers of course assumed their country’s survival and . . . 
eventual victory. But how that victory was to be won could not be forecast. 
What was required was not detailed forecasts of the future but practical 
recommendations as to how to keep our heads above water through the 
critical months immediately ahead and how to preserve a correct balance 
in our plans for expansion. This should be remembered if some of the ap-
preciations of the early phases of the war seem unduly optimistic. 125
 In other words, faced with a diffi cult situation from which they saw no 
escape, the British conjured up the best plans that they could and then 
put their hopes in them. 126 Of course, a motivated bias requires a motiva-
tion: if a conviction that peace was impossible led British leaders to con-
clude that they might still be able to win, the true explanation for the 
decision to fi ght lies in that prior conviction that peace was impossible. 
The informational mechanism provides no explanation for that belief. 
 Unconditional Sur render 
 In contrast to the plausible, if ultimately unconvincing, argument that 
the informational mechanism drove the British refusal to negotiate in the 
summer of 1940, there simply is no plausible informational interpreta-
tion of unconditional surrender. Under the informational mechanism, 
unconditional surrender would only be a viable policy if the side de-
manding it expected to be able to achieve victory both with a probability 
approaching certainty and, equally importantly, at quite low cost. By 
contrast, in World War II the Allies were confronted with an oppo -
nent with the most capable army in world history that at the time 
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of the Casablanca announcement controlled territory stretching from 
the Atlantic almost to the Caspian. Even after the Soviet victory at 
Stalingrad—the turning point of the war—the Allies could not be en-
tirely confi dent of victory, and no one could deny the high costs that the 
complete reduction of German forces would require. Given these costs, 
an informational approach would predict that the Allies would be open 
to negotiation on some terms (if not necessarily terms to which Hitler 
would agree); categorical refusal to negotiate is simply inexplicable 
within this mechanism. 
 Domestic-Political Unity 
 A domestic political (i.e., principal-agent) explanation for these deci-
sions would highlight private ends that the Allied leaders might achieve 
through continued war, which they would attempt to achieve by mis-
leading their publics about the likely course of future fi ghting. While one 
might argue that the Allied leaders benefi ted personally from a continu-
ation of the war, it is impossible to argue that they attempted to mislead 
their publics about the diffi culty of achieving military victory. That their 
publics remained supportive of the war effort indicates that they gener-
ally believed a continuation of the war to a decisive fi nish to be in the 
national interest. 
 It is true that both Churchill and Roosevelt arguably stood to gain 
from the continuation of the war. Churchill was an unpopular iconoclast 
who never would have gained power absent the war and who did not 
foresee much of a future for himself as prime minister once the war was 
over. 127 Moreover, he was dependent on the support of fi gures like Cham-
berlain and Halifax who were more highly esteemed than he when he 
entered power. 128 Roosevelt likewise benefi ted personally from the war, 
as the unsettled international political situation provided a justifi cation 
for violating the longstanding norm against presidents serving more 
than two terms in offi ce. Moreover, convinced of the danger posed by 
Germany and Japan, he was willing to mislead the American public 
about the nature of his commitments in an attempt to provide the maxi-
mum possible aid to Britain prior to Pearl Harbor. 129
 Once their countries were at war, however, neither leader engaged in 
the deception that is central to the principal-agent mechanism; indeed, 
both took pains to guard against unwarranted optimism. Thus, after the 
unexpected successful evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at 
Dunkirk, Churchill reminded the public that Britain had nonetheless just 
suffered a “colossal military disaster” and that “wars are not won by 
evacuations.” 130 The American leadership likewise moved away from 
misrepresentation once in the war. Roosevelt in fact toned down his 
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rhetoric on total victory after Pearl Harbor because he feared that it might 
lead to public overoptimism about the ease with which such a victory 
could be achieved; he also repeatedly emphasized the threat posed by 
Nazi Germany to the United States. 131 Similarly, the day after the at-
tempted assassination of Hitler, Secretary of State Hull commented that 
the attempted coup indicated that the Germans recognized their im-
pending defeat but cautioned that “we should not let these apparent de-
velopments give rise to over-optimism,” for “the fi ghting ahead will be 
hard.” 132
 Given the absence of signifi cant deception, as well as the high salience 
of the war, the principal-agent mechanism would predict that leaders 
who were pursuing personal ends would face increasing criticism over 
time, ultimately forcing them to settle. Instead, both the public and po-
litical opponents rallied behind the leadership in Britain and the United 
States. This support was crucial—Churchill, for example, was initially 
extremely reliant on the support of Chamberlain and Halifax, and was 
able to get his way only because the two (especially Chamberlain) backed 
him. 133 Likewise, the Labor Party consistently backed Churchill both in 
the War Cabinet (where it had two representatives) and in public, despite 
the recognition that the war would undermine its cherished social pro-
gram. 134 Public opinion likewise backed the decision to continue to fi ght, 
even while recognizing that the fall of France was a calamity. 135
 The story was similar in the United States, where both elite and mass 
opinion rallied behind Roosevelt after the Pearl Harbor attack. Whereas 37 
senators and 194 members of the House of Representatives had voted in 
November against a revision of the Neutrality Acts, the day after the Japa-
nese attack the declaration of war passed with the sole opposition of a 
single representative. 136 Isolationists in Congress, fi nding themselves po-
litically exposed, publicly acknowledged that their preferred policies 
would not have worked. 137 While Republican criticisms continued 
throughout the war, the focus was on ineffi ciencies in the war effort; they 
did not criticize the decision not to negotiate. 138 In public opinion, where 
even before Pearl Harbor a clear majority favored involvement in the Eu-
ropean War, the Japanese attack basically ended all debate. 139 Moreover, 
wartime polling consistently recorded more than 50 percent of the Ameri-
can public opposed to even  discussing peace with a government headed by 
the German army, with substantially higher majorities opposed to actu-
ally agreeing to peace on available terms or to negotiating with Hitler. 140
 The Missing Preventive Motivation 
 To the extent that the bargaining and war literature has developed an 
explanation for the Allied refusal to negotiate, it concerns commitment 
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problems: the Allies fundamentally did not trust Hitler to abide by any 
war-ending agreement. 141 This concern, however, had nothing to do with 
the preventive motivation to fi ght. Although Germany had achieved 
great gains with respect to its opponents, those opponents did not expect 
Germany to become stronger with time. Without some belief that it was 
better to fi ght now than later, however, the preventive war mechanism is 
unable to account for the Allied refusal to negotiate. 
 The British leadership obviously recognized that victory over France 
made Germany far more powerful relative to Britain, even to the extent 
of creating a credible invasion threat. The problem with an argument 
grounded in shifting power, however, is that British leaders do not ap-
pear to have believed that capabilities would continue to shift against 
them. Hitler was not alone in believing that time favored Germany’s op-
ponents; British leaders agreed. Halifax, for example, argued that time 
was on Britain’s side both before and after the declaration of war. 142 The 
collapse of France strengthened Germany substantially, but this accre-
tion of power was a one-time thing rather than the start of a broader 
trend. In other words, when the War Cabinet debated policy after the fall 
of France, they were confronting a new strategic situation, but not neces-
sarily a deteriorating one—no one raised the possibility that Hitler might 
be better able to invade the British Isles after a period of peace than he 
was in the months immediately after the French capitulation. Indeed, the 
belief that the German economy was overstretched, as well as the expec-
tation that the United States would provide more effective assistance 
over time, provided reason to think that Britain would benefi t from 
delay. 
 A similar problem exists with a preventive explanation for uncondi-
tional surrender. If Germany’s rise was the primary concern, then it 
should be possible to reverse it by forcing the Germans back to some-
thing like their previous borders. After the defeat at Stalingrad, the Ger-
mans were no longer capable of conquering Europe militarily. While a 
deal with Hitler would have been unattractive, it could have saved the 
lives of millions on both sides who died in the fi nal two years of fi ghting. 
It is of course a legitimate question whether Hitler would have been 
willing to accept a deal that returned Germany to its prewar frontiers—
the answer almost certainly is no—but the fact that the Allies showed 
absolutely no interest in this sort of solution indicates that they were not 
primarily concerned with material commitment problems. Similarly, the 
constant harping on the nature of the Nazi regime, “Hitlerism,” and 
Prussian militarism, which I discuss in greater detail below, is inconsis-
tent with the basic commitment problem argument. If material power 
shifts were the primary concern, then we would not expect Churchill and 
Roosevelt to spend so much time focusing on the character of German 
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leaders. All these observations indicate that unconditional surrender 
cannot be explained by reference to a belief that German power was in-
creasing over time. 
 Alliance Politics and Unconditional Surrender 
 Finally, a number of historians have highlighted the signifi cance of al-
liance politics for the decision to demand unconditional surrender. 143 At 
Casablanca, Roosevelt explicitly raised the possibility that unconditional 
surrender would alleviate Stalin’s fears of abandonment, which were 
likely to be heightened by the renewed Anglo-American decision to 
postpone the creation of a true second front in Europe. 144 The policy also 
had the benefi t, at least from the American perspective, of postponing 
discussions of postwar spheres of infl uence, which in Roosevelt’s view 
could only foster Allied disunity. 145
 The problem with this argument, however, is that it is more useful for 
explaining why the Allies decided to make the unconditional surrender 
policy public than why they decided on the more general policy in the 
fi rst place. The Casablanca announcement was no doubt driven largely 
by alliance politics, but as the discussion of the historical origins of the 
policy above demonstrates, it was only a public statement of a decision 
that had been made some time earlier. It is certainly the case that alliance 
politics cannot explain the British refusal to negotiate when they had no 
allies, nor can it explain why American generals would advocate a 
fi ght to the fi nish even if Britain and the Soviet Union were knocked out 
of the war. 
 An interesting analogue to this point concerns criticism of the uncon-
ditional surrender policy, which was widespread both at the time and 
subsequently, but which focused almost entirely on its public nature 
rather than on the initial decision not to negotiate. 146 Contemporary criti-
cism by American generals (including Eisenhower) and by Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull consistently was predicated on the belief that it hin-
dered military victory by emboldening German resistance; the critics ac-
cepted the complete defeat of Germany and Japan as a goal, but believed 
that it would be easier to achieve if the Allies kept that demand secret for 
as long as possible. 147 Thus, for example, the propaganda experts who 
complained that announcing unconditional surrender would strengthen 
German resistance “were not necessarily opposed to the principle of total 
defeat—but they considered it a disastrous mistake for the president to 
announce it publicly.” 148 Similarly, after expressing his opposition to un-
conditional surrender, Hull then clarifi ed that he thought that “the most 
severe terms should be imposed” on Germany and Japan; he just wanted 




 Explaining Two Decisions Not to Negotiate 
 Ultimately, the unconditional surrender mechanism provides the only 
credible account of the Allied decision not to negotiate with Germany. I 
argued above that Germany’s expansion was driven by a pervasive fear 
of decline, grounded both in Hitler’s ideology and the window of oppor-
tunity created by German rearmament and the purge of the Red Army. 
The targets of this expansion, however, did not share Hitler’s ideology, 
did not intend to do to Germany what Hitler feared, and thus concluded 
that Hitler was a madman who was out to conquer the world. Allied lead-
ers thus explained German expansion in terms of a dispositional commit-
ment problem: Germany by nature was expansionist and aggressive, and 
thus any strategy for peace that did not address German character was 
inherently fl awed. This inference thus led directly to the conclusion that 
no peace short of unconditional surrender was acceptable. 150 
 This fi rst part of this chapter is suffi cient to validate several predic-
tions derived from the unconditional surrender mechanism. Consistent 
with hypothesis 2a, the demand for unconditional surrender was made 
by the targets of a preventive war. Moreover, none of the targets of this 
war shared Hitler’s view of the world, and thus all were innocent in the 
sense meant by hypothesis 2b. Indeed, a number of obstacles prevented 
an accurate understanding of German policies. Hitler’s views of the 
world were frankly bizarre, and despite the thorough depiction of them 
in  Mein Kampf, contemporaries frequently understood them at best 
poorly. 151 The campaign to revise the Versailles Treaty further muddied 
these waters, as Hitler publicly backtracked from his true intentions. In 
this context, when Hitler claimed that German security required the ac-
quisition of large amount of territory in Eastern Europe, contemporaries 
understandably saw these comments as at best a joke. Moreover, ideo-
logical differences complicated comprehension. The Western powers did 
not share his racial view of international politics, nor did they see Ger-
many’s territorial limitations as a threat to the survival of the German 
nation (which after all they saw as the primary threat to Europe); there is 
no indication that they ever seriously considered the idea that Hitler 
might think of his policies in anything approaching defensive terms. As 
for the Soviets, the communist belief in class confl ict was fundamentally 
at odds with Hitler’s racial theories. While the Soviets believed the capi-
talist powers to be doomed in the long run, there was nothing special 
about Germany in this regard, nor did Stalin expect the German people 
to support what Marxism-Leninism saw as a war for the interests of high 
capital. 152 
 The remaining discussion thus focuses on several additional implica-
tions of the unconditional surrender mechanism. In particular, the 
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theoretical discussion in chapter 1 predicts that the demand for uncondi-
tional surrender will be justifi ed in terms of the opponent’s character and 
that the belief that the opponent is dispositionally aggressive will follow 
from the opponent’s preventive war. In addition, the logic of this mecha-
nism implies that leaders will see unconditional surrender as necessary 
only for the countries that actually initiated the preventive war, and not for 
allies of those countries that entered the war opportunistically or out of 
compulsion. Further, if the dispositional commitment problem argument 
is correct, then beliefs among leaders about the “source of the evil” (i.e., 
what parts of German government or society were responsible for the 
commitment to aggression) should infl uence openness to negotiation in 
possible contingencies such as the overthrow of Hitler by the army. On all 
of these points, the historical record is remarkably clear. 
 The Emergence of Dispositional Interpretations of German Aggression 
 Although Hitler’s regime was viewed as distasteful and untrustworthy 
from the time he entered offi ce, it was not seen as necessarily aggressive 
or as nearly the threat to Europe and the world that it was to become. In 
response to Hitler’s behavior, however, attitudes hardened, with the re-
sult that by the time of the Phoney War, and more intensely as the war 
continued, Allied leaders concluded that Hitler’s Germany was disposi-
tionally aggressive, and thus that only the complete restructuring of Ger-
man politics and society would suffi ce to guarantee peace. Given the 
potential concern that public complaints about German character might 
be rhetoric for domestic political consumption, the examples I highlight 
to demonstrate these points come primarily from private discussions; 
many more examples, both public and private, are readily available. 
 Starting with British leaders, scholars often fail to recognize the degree 
to which key fi gures’ views of Hitler and the Germans evolved over time 
because we focus on the period in which specifi c leaders had the greatest 
infl uence over policy. Thus, Chamberlain and Halifax—the architects of 
appeasement—are believed never to have recognized the menace of Ger-
many, whereas Churchill—the stalwart lion of opposition—is believed 
always to have recognized Hitler as a particular danger to the world. 
Both views, in fact, are mistaken. 153
 Chamberlain and Halifax both sincerely hoped that limited conces-
sions to Germany might prevent a second world war; the colossal failure 
of this policy has left them with the reputation of “decayed serving men” 
whose pusillanimity betrayed their country. 154 In both cases, however, 
Germany’s continual aggression ultimately led them to conclude that no 
settlement was possible. While initially quite hopeful that appeasement 
would work, Halifax fundamentally revised his opinions of Hitler 
World War II
[135]
in response to Munich and to the subsequent invasion of rump Czecho-
slovakia. During the Phoney War, he had the responsibility of respond-
ing to those who wished to see a settlement; at the time he noted in his 
diary that 
 to defi ne your war aims precisely as people want would mean for me, if I 
spoke all my mind, that I wished to fi ght long enough to induce such a 
state of mind in the Germans that they would say they’d had enough of 
Hitler! And that point is not really met by talking about Cz[echoslovakia], 
Poland and all the rest of it. The real point is, I’m afraid, that I can trust no 
settlement unless and until H[itler] is discredited. When we shall achieve 
this nobody can say, but I don’t think any “settlement” is worth much 
without! 155
 During the critical War Cabinet meetings in May 1940, he repeatedly ex-
pressed his doubts about Hitler’s reliability; to the extent that he contem-
plated peace, he thought of any possible deal as analogous to the Treaty 
of Amiens, which had allowed for one year of peace in the otherwise 
unbroken twenty-two-year war between England and Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic France. 156 In September he agreed fully with Churchill 
that a peace proposal by Sweden should be summarily rejected, despite 
the imminent threat of German invasion. 157 Chamberlain’s views fol-
lowed a similar trajectory. Prior to war, of course, he strove vigorously 
for peace and was willing to make signifi cant concessions as the price to 
avoid war. One consequence of this approach, however, was that when 
his best efforts failed he had no doubt that it was because he had “come 
up against the insatiable and inhuman ambitions of a fanatic.” 158 Espe-
cially once the war began, Chamberlain and Churchill disagreed far less 
than is frequently believed. 159 In the War Cabinet discussions, he ac-
knowledged that continuing discussions might mollify the French, but 
he believed that an actual approach to Mussolini “would serve no useful 
purpose,” while “it was right to remember that the alternative to fi ghting 
on nevertheless involved a considerable gamble.” 160
 As for Churchill, his persistent and prescient warnings about the Ger-
man threat, even prior to Hitler’s accession to offi ce, belie the extent to 
which the rationale for these warnings changed over time. Initially, his 
argument was a traditional Realist one: Britain could not both allow Ger-
many to rearm and expect it to abide by the humiliating terms of the 
Versailles Treaty, just as would be the case for any other country in Ger-
many’s situation. Thus, in November 1932, he argued in the House of 
Commons that “the removal of the just grievances of the vanquished 
ought to precede the disarmament of the victors. To bring about any-
thing like equality of armaments . . . while those grievances remain 
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unredressed, would be almost to appoint the day for another European 
war.” 161 He returned to this point the following April—arguing that “as 
surely as Germany acquires full military equality with her neighbours 
while her own grievances are still unredressed . . . so surely should we 
see ourselves within a measureable distance of the renewal of general 
European war”—and with increasing frequency thereafter. 162 In general, 
rather than advocate unstinting opposition to German demands to revise 
Versailles, he favored early action, undertaken from a position of strength. 
As for Hitler, as late as October 1937 he noted in print that 
 although no subsequent political action can condone wrong deeds or re-
move the guilt of blood, history is replete with examples of men who have 
risen to power by employing stern, grim, wicked, and even frightful meth-
ods, but who, nevertheless, when their life is revealed as a whole, have 
been regarded as great fi gures whose lives have enriched the story of man-
kind. So it may be with Hitler. 163
 Moreover, once convinced that the Government had begun taking the 
steps necessary to rearm, Churchill noted that “in spite of the dangers 
which wait on prophecy I declare my belief that a major war is not im-
minent, and I still believe there is a good chance of no major war taking 
place in our time.” 164
 This attitude was not to endure, however. In his fi rst speech after 
Chamberlain’s triumphant return from Munich, Churchill warned 
against passivity, arguing that “this is only the beginning of the reckon-
ing. This is only the fi rst sip, the fi rst foretaste of a bitter cup which will 
be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral 
health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom 
as in olden time.” 165 By the Phoney War, Churchill was of the opinion 
that Britain “must and should fi ght [the war] to a fi nish.” 166 In a speech 
on October 1, 1939, he asserted that “how soon [victory] will be gained 
depends on how long Herr Hitler and his group of wicked men . . . can 
keep their grip upon the docile, unhappy German people. It was for Hit-
ler to say when the war would begin; but it is not for him or for his suc-
cessors to say when it will end.” 167 As prime minister, he resolutely 
opposed negotiation, repeatedly returning to the theme of a German dis-
position toward militarism. 
 Roosevelt’s beliefs about Hitler and Germany also changed substan-
tially in response to German aggression. Prior to Munich, he believed 
that it was possible and indeed desirable to co-opt Hitler and Mussolini 
to preserve peace in Europe. 168 Thus, for example, he was initially sup-
portive of Chamberlain’s appeasement strategy, and he was open to a 
proposal by Sumner Welles to organize a conference to seek a general 
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negotiated solution to the world’s problems. 169 For him, Munich was a 
decisive turning point; in particular, Hitler’s aggressive style, captured 
most centrally in the rejection of a proposal that would have given him 
his entire demand with respect to the Sudetenland, provided evidence of 
extreme aggressiveness. During the Phoney War, Roosevelt was already 
referring to Hitler as a “nut” and a “wild man,” and arguing that the war 
could end only with his death or removal, from either within or with-
out. 170 At the same time, he started to worry about the possibility, highly 
improbable in retrospect, that Germany would launch a direct attack on 
the Americas, most likely moving from North Africa to Brazil. 171 Indeed, 
this concern persisted throughout the war, although Hitler had never 
expressed any interest in the Americas. There is thus ample evidence that 
Roosevelt sincerely believed that Hitler aimed to expand without limit. It 
is unsurprising to learn that at one point he confi ded to his closest ad-
viser that he “shudder[ed] to think of what will happen to humanity, in-
cluding ourselves, if this war ends in an inconclusive peace.” 172
 Unconditional Surrender and Germany’s European Allies 
 A further implication of my argument is that the demand for uncondi-
tional surrender should apply only or primarily to those countries that 
were waging a preventive war, and not to those countries’ allies. In the 
context of Europe, this prediction implies that Italy and Germany’s east-
ern satellites would be able to get better peace terms than Germany. 
While the offi cial line—that all surrenders except for that of Finland were 
unconditional—is at odds with this prediction, a closer examination 
shows a clear difference between Germany (and Japan) and the Axis al-
lies. In the United States, the early discussions of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Post-War Foreign Policy drew a distinction between Germany and 
Japan on the one hand and Italy on the other, leaving open the possibility 
of negotiation with the latter. 173 Likewise, the British and Soviets were 
both open to setting aside unconditional surrender with respect to the 
satellite states. 174 Among the Allies, President Roosevelt was the stron-
gest opponent of any weakening of terms for Italy or the satellite states, 
but he justifi ed his position not by arguing that these states were innately 
aggressive but on the grounds that he did not want to weaken the prin-
ciple of unconditional surrender before it had been applied to Germany 
and Japan. 175 Moreover, when advocating unconditional surrender at 
Casablanca, he initially advocated applying it only to Germany and 
Japan; Churchill requested Italy’s inclusion at the behest of the War Cabi-
net. 176 In the event, Italy’s surrender—the fi rst by any country on the 
Axis side—involved far greater fl exibility than was to be shown to Ger-
many. 177 Finland, as previously noted, was allowed to reach a negotiated 
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settlement, while the remaining three German satellites—Hungary, Ro-
mania, and Bulgaria—were inevitably going to end up occupied and ad-
ministered by the Soviets given the need to pass through their territories 
to reach Berlin. Overall, there is a clear sense that in the European war 
Germany constituted a unique evil that required a special and unusual 
response. 
 Acceptable Alternatives to Hitler? 
 A fi nal microlevel prediction that follows from my argument concerns 
attitudes toward contingencies that never arose. Specifi cally, Allied lead-
ers repeatedly confronted the possibility that Hitler might be overthrown 
and thus had to decide whether or not they would negotiate in such a 
scenario—this point was most salient in light of failed July 1944 military 
coup, but the steady stream of peace feelers, many promising to over-
throw the existing government, meant that the issue was raised repeat-
edly over the course of the war. My argument would predict that the 
answer to this question would depend on what they believed to be the 
locus of evil in Germany. If, for example, the innately aggressive disposi-
tion was found only among Hitler and the Nazis, then it would be rea-
sonable to negotiate with a military government after a coup. If the 
military or all of society was implicated, however, then replacing Hitler 
would not remove the obstacles to peace, and thus negotiation would be 
unacceptable. As Allied leaders differed in their diagnoses, this predic-
tion thus implies that we should see variation in their openness to 
negotiation. 178
 History is indeed consistent with this prediction, at least in the case of 
the three Allied leaders for whom we have the most information. Roos-
evelt’s views of the source of the evil expanded over time, so that by 
1943 he was arguing that not just Hitler or the Nazis but the whole of 
German society was committed to aggression. 179 Thus, when rebuffi ng a 
proposed memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would ad-
vance a clearer defi nition of unconditional surrender with an eye to 
weakening German resistance, he explained his stance by noting that a 
 somewhat long study and personal experience in and out of Germany 
leads me to believe that German philosophy cannot be changed by decree, 
law or military order. The change in German philosophy must be evolu-
tionary and may take two generations. To assume otherwise is to assume, 
of necessity, a period of quiet followed by a third world war. 180
 It is thus unsurprising that Roosevelt saw no room for negotiation with 
any possible German government. 181 Stalin similarly believed that there 
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was something fundamentally wrong with German society, as he had 
expected the German proletariat to oppose the invasion of the Soviet 
Union; he thus doubted that even the multigenerational processes of re-
form that Roosevelt advocated would stamp out the German disposition 
to aggression. 182 Churchill, by contrast, believed that the root of the prob-
lem was Hitler, the Nazi Party, and Prussia; he tended not to blame the 
German military or the people more generally, for example in 1941 blam-
ing previous British governments for not addressing German grievances 
and hence “goading them to Hitlerism.” 183 As a result, while he was ada-
mant that Prussia must be broken off from the rest of Germany after the 
war, and while he was committed to not negotiating with Hitler or any 
Nazi regime, he “thought that it would be going too far to say that we 
would not negotiate with a Germany controlled by the army.” 184 This 
observable difference, which can be attributed to differing beliefs about 
the depth of the commitment to aggression in Germany, provides further 
evidence that beliefs about a German dispositional commitment to ag-
gression really did drive the demand for unconditional surrender. 
 World War II was the worst war in history, spreading death, destruction, 
and poverty throughout Europe and beyond. An explanation for this de-
struction must account fi rst and foremost for German aggression, and in 
particular the willingness to fi ght another major power war, so soon after 
World War I, to acquire vast tracts of territory in Eastern Europe. I argue 
in this chapter that the best explanation for this aggression is Hitler’s fear 
of relative decline, grounded both in his ideology (which predicted that 
the territorially constrained German nation would experience funda-
mental decline relative to continent-sized powers, most importantly 
Russia) and in the window of opportunity created by German rearma-
ment and Stalin’s purge of the Soviet armed forces. This explanation pro-
vides an account of Hitler’s expansive war aims, his repeated resort to 
risky diplomatic and military strategies (including most notably the will-
ingness to invade the Soviet Union prior to the defeat of Britain), and the 
contrast between repeated attempts to work out a deal with Britain and 
the United States and the refusal to contemplate serious negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. Hitler’s actions guaranteed that World War II 
would be extraordinarily destructive. 
 A full explanation, however, must also account for the Allies’ refusal to 
negotiate with Germany. I argue that conventional explanations 
grounded most obviously in overoptimism or alliance politics provide 
an unconvincing account of Allied behavior. Instead, the unconditional 
surrender mechanism provides the best explanation. Hitler’s preventive 
war was intended to save the German nation from annihilation. The Al-
lies, however, did not intend to destroy it, and thus dismissed the 
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possibility that German behavior might be motivated by security con-
cerns, instead concluding that Hitler, the Nazis, and in the extreme the 
German military and the whole of German society were dispositionally 
committed to aggression. Given this conclusion, no settlement that did 
not allow the Allies to fundamentally reform Germany would guarantee 
peace. It was this conclusion that meant that all peace proposals would 
be rejected, and that the war would end only with Germany conquered, 
divided, and occupied for multiple generations. 
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 Additional Commitment Problem Cases 
 The Crimean, Pacifi c, and Iran-Iraq Wars 
 In-depth case studies of the Paraguayan War and of World War II in 
Europe both have provided support for my central explanations for the 
particularly deadly wars that I am most interested in explaining. This 
chapter supplements those case studies with minicases of the Crimean 
War, World War II in the Pacifi c, and the Iran-Iraq War. Although these 
cases are presented in far less detail than the previous two, they provide 
an additional opportunity to see both the preventive war and the uncon-
ditional surrender mechanisms in action. In all three wars, one partici-
pant had signifi cant preventive motivations for fi ghting that contributed 
both to their decision to fi ght and to the way in which they conducted the 
war. Moreover, in the Pacifi c and Iran-Iraq Wars, the target of this pre-
ventive war refused to negotiate with its opponent, justifying its position 
in dispositional terms. The Crimean War by contrast provides a useful 
negative case, in that the preventive motivation behind British policy did 
not lead the Russians to refuse to negotiate, for reasons that turn out to 
be consistent with my theoretical argument. 
 The Crimean War 
 Although the diplomacy preceding the fi ghting was unusually com-
plex, the Crimean War was a relatively straightforward case of a confl ict 
driven largely by preventive motivations. The British observed Russia’s 
seemingly inexorable expansion with trepidation, and for strategic rea-
sons related to the Black Sea Straits found the logical next steps in that 
expansion extremely worrisome. When the Russians made an attempt to 
start to formalize their infl uence over the Ottoman Empire, the British 
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saw a possibly fi nal opportunity to stem the Russian tide before the Rus-
sians maneuvered themselves into Constantinople. They thus launched 
an aggressive war, with highly ambitious war aims that would have 
placed a clear limit on Russia’s future ability to encroach on British inter-
ests. Although the British did not achieve their greatest aims, they did 
manage to force the Russians to step back from the kind of expansion 
that they might otherwise have achieved. This behavior is consistent 
with the preventive motivation for war. 
 In contrast to the other cases of preventive wars discussed in this book, 
the Russians did not respond to the British policy by demanding uncon-
ditional surrender. This development is consistent with hypothesis 2b, as 
the Russians clearly desired to do what the British feared and hence, al-
though angered by British policy, did not explain British policy in dispo-
sitional terms and consequently remained open to a negotiated 
settlement. 
 A Quick Review of Events 
 As I discuss in further detail below, the central fact leading to war was 
the slow but sure decline of the Ottoman Empire, which raised the pros-
pect of its eventual collapse. 
 The actual path to war was convoluted, proceeding from a French-
initiated dispute over the Holy Lands through Russian counterdemands 
that, to outside eyes, seemed designed to render the Porte—the Ottoman 
court—a protectorate of Russia. Britain and France offered support to the 
Turks, who, emboldened, refused to back down even after the Russians 
without resistance occupied the Ottoman principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. When the Russians refused to evacuate the principalities, the 
sultan declared war in October 1853, and a few months later the British 
and French followed suit. 1
 An Austrian ultimatum convinced the tsar to pull Russian troops out 
of the principalities, and as a result the Crimean Peninsula ultimately 
became the primary locus of fi ghting. After an extended siege, the 
French and British managed to capture the city of Sevastopol in late 
1855; the Russians offset this defeat slightly with the capture of the Turk-
ish fortress of Kars, east of the Black Sea. With Austria threatening to 
enter the war and with France quite ready to exit it, the two sides were 
fi nally able to agree on an armistice followed by a peace conference. The 
resulting conference consisted primarily of all other involved parties 
conspiring to force concessions on Britain, which by then constituted the 
primary obstacle to peace but was unable to continue the war without 
French support. In the fi nal agreement, Russia returned Kars in ex-
change for Sevastopol, relinquished infl uence in the Ottoman Empire, 
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and agreed to the neutralization of the Black Sea and to free transit on 
the Danube. These terms involved signifi cant and painful Russian con-
cessions that limited their direct infl uence over the Ottoman Empire, 
although they fell short of the more extreme war aims held by some in 
Britain. 
 Preventive Motives for British Policy 
 The basic problem in the Crimean War was not that the central partici-
pants were unsatisfi ed with the status quo, but that they feared with 
good reason that the status quo could not survive. In particular, both 
Britain and Russia (the actors on whom this discussion will focus) had 
reason to worry about the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Russia was the dominant land power of Europe, having demonstrated in 
living memory the ability to project power all the way to Paris, but its 
navy, although not irrelevant, was weak. The Russians thus benefi ted 
from the existence of a large but weak and internally divided buffer to 
the south in the form of the Ottoman Empire; indeed, at the tail end of 
the successful 1828–29 Russo-Turkish War the Russians concluded that it 
was in their interest to limit their own territorial gains so as to preserve 
the Ottoman Empire, a policy that they retained up through the Crimean 
War. 2 From their perspective, the Black Sea Straits provided a useful de-
fense against the naval power of Britain and France. 
 For the British, the straits also provided a useful defense. Britain had 
built a worldwide empire on the strength of its naval power; mainte-
nance of that empire required that naval routes remain open. Russia was 
not an immediate threat to British naval preeminence—to take one ex-
ample, Nicholas’s renunciation of the favorable treaty of Hünkâr I
·
skelesi, 
signed after Russia came to the Porte’s aid in a crisis in 1833, constituted 
a realistic assessment that Russia gained nothing from having the option 
of sending its fl eet into the Mediterranean. 3 This situation, however, 
merely acknowledged that geography had granted Russia limited op-
portunities for an active use of its fl eet—the British feared that granted a 
warm-water port the Russians would gradually build up their navy to 
the point that it would threaten British dominance in the Mediterranean. 
From the British perspective, the Mediterranean was strategically signifi -
cant not only because of the importance of the territories that directly 
bordered the sea but because it provided the most direct route for British 
connections to India. Indeed, signifi cant Russian territorial gains in Ana-
tolia, even in the absence of a signifi cant fl eet, would have threatened the 
overland route to India even had Russia not acquired a signifi cant fl eet—
at a time when the Suez Canal had yet to be built. Moreover, by the time 
of the Crimean War British commerce had developed extensive interests 
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in the Black Sea region that would have been directly threatened should 
the Russians gain the ability to close off the straits. 4
 Thus from both sides’ perspectives there were reasons to desire that 
the Ottoman Empire hold on, as a weak power unable to use its control 
over the straits to the detriment of anyone. The problem, however, was 
that the Ottoman Empire was obviously dying. 5 Internally decrepit and 
incapable of serious reform, the empire had suffered a serious blow to its 
prestige with Greek independence in 1830 and was threatened to the core 
immediately thereafter by an Egyptian rebellion, which returned as a se-
rious threat a few years later. At the time of the war, then, few would 
have guessed that the Ottoman Empire was destined to survive another 
sixty-fi ve years. At the same time, the strategic signifi cance of Ottoman 
territories raised the specter of a serious war in the event of the Porte’s 
collapse. In this context, it was unsurprising that all the Great Powers 
favored the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. 
 That said, Russia’s desire for Ottoman survival was driven by balance 
of power concerns rather than sincere preferences: as I discuss in more 
detail in the next section, the Russians had both ideational and strategic 
reasons to want gains at Turkey’s expense, with gains in Ottoman Eu-
rope, including Constantinople, the most salient. In this context, Tsar 
Nicholas’s history of ruminating publicly on the consequences of Otto-
man collapse—on the ostensible grounds that it was better to be pre-
pared when the inevitable happened—tended to unsettle his neighbors. 
In early 1853, his repeated return to the issue in discussions with the Brit-
ish ambassador, Lord Seymour, raised the concern that Nicholas sought 
an agreement on partition as a prelude to actually carrying it out. The 
subsequent Menshikov Mission to the Porte, in which the Russians used 
threats of force to try to get the Turks to abrogate promises extorted from 
them by the French, further raised these concerns, especially as the Rus-
sians advanced views of their own capitulatory rights in the Ottoman 
Empire that were not supported by prior treaties. 6 An Austrian attempt, 
in consultation with Britain and France, to advance compromise terms 
faltered when Russian foreign minister Nesselrode advanced what came 
to be known as the “Violent Interpretation” of the Austrian proposal, 
which insisted on Russia’s right to intervene in the Ottoman Empire to 
protect the Orthodox population, a right that others feared would render 
the Porte a direct protectorate of St. Petersburg. 
 This sequence of events thus convinced the British that Russia aimed 
at the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, from which it hoped to benefi t 
by the acquisition of Constantinople and the straits. In the words of 
the Duke of Argyll, a member of the Aberdeen cabinet, “There was in 
the mind of all of us one unspoken but indelible opinion—that the 
absorption by Russia of Turkey in Europe, and the seating of the Russian 
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emperor on the throne of Constantinople, would give to Russia an over-
bearing weight in Europe, dangerous to all the other Powers and to the 
liberties of the world.” 7 This logic is what we would expect were the 
preventive motive for war in action: the British feared that left unchecked 
the Russians would precipitate the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and 
benefi t from the consequences, putting themselves in a position to 
threaten British interests around the world. War then was worthwhile if 
it could forestall such gains. The problem, however, was that under the 
status quo Russia already held an overbearing position with respect to 
the Ottoman Empire; if the tsar was committed to undermining the Otto-
man Empire, the only way to prevent him from doing so would be to 
force Russia back. 8 British decision makers thus pursued war aims that 
would have involved a major reduction in Russian infl uence over the 
Ottoman Empire. 9 While the British ultimately had to abandon their 
most aggressive aims, they did so only once the departure of the French 
made it militarily impossible to impose the kind of defeat on Russia nec-
essary to secure such gains, and even so they were able to force through 
terms such as the neutralization of the Black Sea and the limitation of 
Russia’s ability to intervene in Ottoman domestic affairs that greatly re-
stricted Russia’s ability to impose unilateral changes. Indeed, the 
Crimean War marked the end point of Russian territorial aggrandize-
ment into the Balkans; subsequently, Ottoman losses in Europe led to 
the emergence of new states whose loyalty to Russia was not guaran-
teed. British behavior was thus clearly consistent with a preventive 
motivation. 10
 The Absence of Unconditional Surrender 
 According to the theory advanced here, demands for unconditional 
surrender are typically made in the context of preventive wars, when the 
target misunderstands the initiator’s behavior. This section thus exam-
ines that theoretical claim, as well as the broader linked question of why 
the Russians remained open to negotiation. Historians unsurprisingly do 
not generally spend much time evaluating nonevents, and thus there is 
no historical consensus (or even discussion) of why the Russians re-
mained willing to consider negotiation. That said, consistent with my 
theoretical expectations, there is good evidence that the Russians sin-
cerely desired to do precisely what the British feared. As a result, it is not 
surprising that Russian aims remained limited. 11
 That the Russians were open to negotiation throughout the war can be 
readily demonstrated, even if specifi c Russian war aims were not always 
clear. 12 Prior to the war, the Russians were consistently open to negotia-
tions; for example, formally accepting the Vienna Note (albeit subject to 
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Nesselrode’s “violent interpretation”). Once the war began, the Russians 
recognized that they would be forced on the defensive in the Black 
Sea but hoped to press an advantage in the Balkans; an Austrian 
ultimatum—made because of fears that a Russian advance would lead to 
uprisings of Slavs in Turkish territories that then would spill over into 
Austrian territory—compelled the Russians to abandon that aim. Rich, 
quoting Russian prince Gorchakov, summarizes Russia’s war aims as the 
relatively limited desire “to reaffi rm on a solid basis the religious immu-
nities of our brothers of the Orthodox Church,” which would require ef-
fective guarantees beyond just the highly debased word of the Porte. 13 At 
no point in wartime negotiations did the Russians indicate any refusal to 
negotiate, instead simply rejecting the terms that the British were willing 
to accept. 14
 The Russians had extensive experience with realpolitik, which aided 
them in understanding British policy. Perhaps the most critical fi gure 
here was Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode, whose steady hand helped 
to limit the damage done when Tsar Nicholas entertained one of his spec-
ulative fl ights of fancy in which ideology trumped reality. Nesselrode’s 
accurate prognostications even well prior to the start of the war, which 
were based on a deep understanding of international politics accrued 
over four decades of high-level service, provide a remarkable testament 
to his understanding of the working of international politics. Thus, for 
example, early in 1853 he predicted that if Russia went to war it would 
have no allies and would end up fi ghting a diffi cult war against both 
France and Britain (whose involvement at that date was far from obvi-
ous). 15 He was fully aware of the fears that Nicholas’s speculative fl ights 
of fancy might provoke and worked assiduously behind the scenes to 
provide less unsettling interpretations of his monarch’s more intemper-
ate statements. As for the tsar, despite his tendency for verbal faux pas, 
he also fully understood that the collapse of Turkey would create many 
more problems than it would solve; he simply had come to believe that 
Turkey’s collapse was imminent, whatever outsiders did. 16
 At the same time, however, the Russians sincerely desired Constanti-
nople, which had strong historical, geographic, and cultural attractions. 
The tsars considered themselves to stand at the head of the “Third 
Rome,” successor to the Roman and Byzantine empires; possession of 
Constantinople, capital or co-capital of both empires, thus held strong 
religious overtones. 17 Possession of Constantinople would also have pro-
vided substantial prestige to a country that saw itself very much as on 
the margins of Europe. 18 Moreover, the Russians saw themselves as the 
leaders of the Slavic peoples and thus took an active interest in the Chris-
tian populations of the Ottoman Empire; conquest of Constantinople 
would perforce bring about the end of Ottoman control over the Slavic 
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populations of Europe. Finally, for reasons articulated above, the Rus-
sians had a strong strategic interest in acquiring Constantinople and the 
straits. Overall, then, the British fears of Russian intentions had merit. 19
In this context, Norman Rich asks “How justifi ed were Turkish and West-
ern fears of Russia?” and answers, “As the Turkish experience over the 
previous two centuries had shown—and as had the experience of almost 
every other neighbor of Russia—they were very justifi ed indeed.” 20
 In this context, it is unsurprising that Nicholas responded to the dis-
pute with Turkey by formulating a plan that would have involved a 
quick naval strike to capture Constantinople and the Bosporus, with a 
force sent out shortly thereafter to secure the Dardanelles. 21 While mili-
tary warnings about the improbable success of such an endeavor con-
vinced him to abandon these plans for the eventual decision to occupy 
the Principalities, he retained the hope that the war might liberate Con-
stantinople up until the combination of Anglo-French intervention and 
the Austrian ultimatum forced Russia entirely onto the defensive. 
Given this desire, rather than view British statements about the Russian 
threat to Constantinople as pretexts, the Russians took them at face 
value. 
 Overall, then, this case fi ts the commitment problem arguments well. 
The British had a clear preventive motivation for war, and consistent 
with that motivation they pursued large war aims that they were reluc-
tant to abandon even in the face of military and diplomatic setbacks. As 
with the Argentines in the Paraguayan War, however, the Russians 
wanted to do exactly what the British feared and hence understood the 
British motivation for fi ghting. Given this understanding, they had no 
need to resort to a dispositional explanation for British policy and hence 
remained open to negotiation throughout the war. 
 World War II in the Pacifi c 
 The puzzle of the Pacifi c theater in World War II is why Japan started 
a war with the United States, an opponent that had an economy over fi ve 
times Japan’s size and a population nearly twice as large, especially 
when the Japanese were already stretched by an ongoing war in China 
and when they combined the attack on the United States with the inva-
sion of British and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. Al-
though some have attributed this decision to simple irrationality, a more 
convincing explanation is that by 1941 the Japanese believed that peace 
with the United States was if anything riskier than war. 22 This logic fi ts 
perfectly with the preventive explanation for war, as does the audacity of 
the subsequent Japanese attack. At the same time, the American response 
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to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was to conclude that the Japanese 
must be insane. This inference led naturally to the conclusion that sus-
tained peace with Japan would require the remaking of the Japanese po-
litical system; it was thus only when the Japanese surrender guaranteed 
that such a degree of reform would be possible that the war ended. 
 Japanese Expansion and the American Response 
 After the forced opening of Japan to the world in 1854, the Japanese 
launched an accelerated program of modernization that within a few de-
cades would put them in a position to win wars against China in 1894–95 
and against Russia in 1904–5. These victories established Japan as a great 
power with a sphere of infl uence on the Asian continent. In the 1930s, the 
Japanese began to expand that sphere through repeated incursions into 
Chinese territory in Manchuria, culminating in the 1937 invasion out of 
Manchuria into mainland China. That war ultimately turned into a quag-
mire for the Japanese, as they controlled large parts of mainland China 
but could not impose a fi nal defeat on their Chinese opponents. More-
over, the Chinese adventure generated rifts with the rest of the world, 
and in particular with the United States, which by the second half of 1941 
was the only great power not committed to the war in Europe. Cursed by 
dependence on the United States for resources, in particular oil, the Japa-
nese eyed expansion into British and Dutch colonial possessions (most 
signifi cantly present-day Indonesia, which had signifi cant oil reserves), 
but feared that such a move would bring the United States into the war. 
An American oil embargo in the summer of 1941 changed the strategic 
calculus. Intense internal discussions that fall ultimately produced the 
decision that Japan would attack the United States absent an agreement 
that reopened the oil supply. When the United States demanded a com-
plete withdrawal from China as a prerequisite for such a move, the Japa-
nese decided that they had no choice but to invade the European colonial 
possessions. Given that decision, they decided also to attack the Philip-
pines (an American possession) and the US fl eet at Pearl Harbor in 
Hawaii. 
 The Japanese war plan called for a lightning strike south to acquire the 
colonies, after which they, conscious that they could not conquer the 
United States, would pursue a negotiated settlement on terms that would 
effectively exclude the United States and its allies from East Asia. 23 On 
the military side, their plans worked well: the Japanese rapidly overran 
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, carried out a damaging attack 
on Pearl Harbor, and were quickly moving into the Dutch East Indies. 
Diplomatically, however, the strategy failed, as the United States refused 
to negotiate, ultimately deciding to demand Japan’s unconditional 
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surrender. 24 While the Allies put primary importance on winning the 
war in Europe, they also prosecuted the Pacifi c campaign with increas-
ing success and were poised by the summer of 1945 to launch an inva-
sion of the Japanese mainland. The combination of the atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet entry into the war 
convinced the Japanese government that defeat was inevitable, and they 
thus surrendered, subject to the proviso, which the Americans accepted, 
that the emperor remain in at least a fi gurehead position. The war thus 
ended with the Allied occupation of Japan, which set the stage for the 
complete reform of the Japanese political system. 
 Japan’s Preventive War 
 The puzzle of Japanese policy has been the ambition of its aims when 
contrasted to the relative pessimism that Japanese offi cials expressed 
about the likelihood of victory in a war with the United States. 25 Thus 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, key military fi g-
ures acknowledged that Japan lacked the capability to force the Ameri-
cans to surrender, while Admiral Yamamoto advised Prime Minister 
Konoe that Japan would fare well in the initial six months to a year of 
war but that he had “no confi dence, however, if the war continues for 
two or three years.” 26 The navy—which would bear primary responsibil-
ity for fi ghting a war against the United States—remained skeptical 
throughout the critical discussions, with Admiral Nagano for example 
observing immediately after the imposition of the oil embargo that even 
in the event of an immediate attack “it was doubtful whether or not 
we would even win, to say nothing of a great victory as in the Russo-
Japanese War.” 27
 The problem, however, was that peace was no more attractive. Japa-
nese scholars had long argued that the continual growth of American 
power into East Asia meant that Japan needed to expand simply to main-
tain the current level of relative capabilities. 28 By the late 1930s, the Japa-
nese had a number of immediate reasons to believe that they were 
confronted with a narrow window of opportunity in which to act. Per-
haps most signifi cantly, the war in Europe effectively removed a range of 
probable opponents: both the British and the Soviets were fi ghting for 
their lives, while the French and the Dutch were occupied and hence ill-
equipped to resist Japanese expansion into their colonies. 29 An end to the 
war in Europe would greatly reduce the Japanese opportunity to address 
its resource problems. 30 Moreover, those resource problems had wors-
ened dramatically with the inability to bring an end to the war in China. 
The urgency of addressing the resource problems increased markedly 
when the United States imposed the oil embargo, as the Japanese were 
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now confronted with a situation in which whatever slender chance of 
victory they enjoyed was vanishing rapidly. 31 At the same time, however, 
the American price for dropping the embargo—a complete withdrawal 
from China—stood to weaken Japan substantially, raising fears that the 
Americans would simply pocket the concession and then return to attack 
a few years later. 32
 At a number of points, Japanese leaders advanced arguments that 
could serve as textbook examples of the preventive motivation for war. 
In a critical discussion on October 30, 1941, the Japanese leadership was 
almost unanimous in its assessment that acceptance of American terms 
would eventually relegate Japan to the status of a third-rate power, eco-
nomically dependent on the United States and its allies; doves were 
overwhelmed by the argument that “it [was] better to go to war now 
than later.” 33 Similarly, a document prepared in consultation between 
the government and the military leadership prior to a meeting on 
September 6, 1941, argued that war was inevitable and that Japan was 
better off fi ghting soon: 
 It is historically inevitable that the confl ict between [Japan and the United 
States] . . . will ultimately lead to war. It need not be repeated that unless 
the United States changes its policy toward Japan, our Empire is placed in 
a desperate situation, where it must resort to the ultimate step—namely, 
war—to defend itself and to assure its preservation. Even if we should 
make concessions to the United States by giving up part of our national 
policy for the sake of a temporary peace, the United States, its military 
position strengthened, is sure to demand more and more concessions on 
our part; and ultimately our Empire will have to lie prostrate at the feet of 
the United States. 34
 The same document advocated expansive war aims, specifi cally the 
elimination of all British, American, and Dutch infl uence in East Asia. 
Such a development would allow Japan to escape its resource predica-
ment and would protect it even should American power continue to 
grow in the future. Indeed, the simultaneous attacks on the Malay Penin-
sula, the Philippines, and Pearl Harbor constituted an audacious under-
taking that the Japanese recognized was quite risky. While the Japanese 
clearly contemplated a compromise peace, it was understood that this 
peace would be on terms that would involve American capitulation after 
serious setbacks in the war. 35 These ambitious aims, in contrast with the 
pessimism about Japan’s military prospects, are clearly inconsistent with 
any explanation grounded in optimism, but they are what one would 
expect from a preventive war driven by fear of decline. 
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 Unconditional Sur render 
 The Japanese strategy thus failed not because they overestimated their 
military chances but because their political gambit—hoping that the 
United States would lack the stomach to carry out the costly war to de-
feat Japan—did not pan out. Indeed, the American response was not 
only to refuse to negotiate on Japanese terms but to refuse to negotiate at 
all. Chapter 4 lays out the background to the decision to demand uncon-
ditional surrender, in which Allied discussions quickly concluded that 
negotiation with either Germany or Japan was unacceptable, although 
they waited some time to publicize that position and debated thereafter 
whether the public announcement was in fact the correct move. 36
 This case provides support for all of the hypotheses derived from the 
dispositional commitment problem. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, the 
US demand for unconditional surrender arose in response to Japan’s pre-
ventive war. The justifi cation for unconditional surrender was consis-
tently advanced in dispositional terms. Thus, in his 1942 State of the 
Union address, Roosevelt observed “the militarists in Berlin and Tokyo 
started this war” and that the war would end only with “the end of mili-
tarism” in those countries; “there never has been—there never could 
be—successful compromise between good and evil.” Elsewhere he 
promised that the United States was going to “strangle the Black Dragon 
of Japanese militarism forever.” 37 The immediate reaction to Pearl Har-
bor, in Congress and among the public, was to conclude that the Japa-
nese must be insane; this point was made most strongly by the isolationists 
who had previously opposed American entry into the war. 38 In contrast 
to Germany, where the obvious evils of the leadership seemed to provide 
some defense for ordinary German citizens, the American public saw all 
the Japanese people as fundamentally aggressive. 39 In this context, both 
the public and the leadership repeated the theme that there could be no 
negotiation with such an opponent throughout the war. 
 This argument is also borne out by the way in which the war ended. As 
the war turned against them, the Japanese, like the Germans, tried re-
peatedly to convince the Allies to reduce their war aims. 40 In the fi nal 
months of the war, this strategy focused in particular on convincing the 
Soviets, who were still upholding an April 1941 neutrality pact, to serve 
as mediators, a strategy that was undermined by Stalin’s interest in en-
suring that the war lasted long enough to permit the Soviets to intervene 
and thereby gain a share of the postwar spoils. 41 The attempt to gain Al-
lied concessions seemed to have some chance of success, given the ex-
tremely high expected costs of an invasion of the Japanese home islands. 
The Soviet entry into the war, which directly followed the atomic attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, undercut this strategy, however, and forced 
Chapter 5
[152]
the Japanese to capitulate. That said, the role of the emperor—who was 
philosophically the center of the Japanese political system—remained a 
potential sticking point. The initial Japanese acceptance contained the 
stipulation that the emperor would retain his political position in post-
war Japan. Consistent with the dispositional argument, the Americans 
rejected this condition, despite the desire to avoid the horrendous losses 
of an invasion of Japan and to limit Soviet gains in East Asia, requiring 
instead that the emperor be subordinate to the Allied Supreme Com-
mander. 42 It was only when Emperor Hirohito accepted this demand—
abandoning his political role so as to at least save the imperial house—that 
the war actually ended. 43
 Overall, then, the Pacifi c War provides a further example of both com-
mitment problem arguments in action. The Japanese launched an aggres-
sive war, despite prevailing pessimism about their military prospects, 
because they believed that the decline that they would experience under 
peace would be if anything more risky. Consistent with the logic of pre-
ventive war, the Japanese aimed high and were willing to accept a star-
tling amount of risk in pursuit of a peace that would inoculate them 
against decline, although they would have been open to negotiation on 
terms that prevented the decline from occurring. The Americans, how-
ever, inferred from the Japanese attack that they were confronted with 
madmen who could not be reasoned with. Given this conclusion, peace 
could come only through the reform of the Japanese political system, and 
the Americans consequently rejected any Japanese terms that preserved 
anything more than a fi gurehead role for the emperor. The war thus 
ended only with the surrender and military subjugation of Japan. 
 The Iran-Iraq War 
 The Iran-Iraq War, fought between 1980 and 1988, is one of the longest 
and, at a per capita level, deadliest wars of the last two hundred years. 
What started nominally as a border war escalated into a confl ict that 
proved remarkably diffi cult to end, with the Iranians in particular con-
sistently rejecting settlement proposals. Eight years of fi ghting ultimately 
demonstrated that neither side had the ability to impose a decisive defeat 
on the other: although the Iranians managed to contain the initial attack 
and force the Iraqis back into their own territory, they were unable to 
achieve the sort of breakthrough that would allow them to dictate peace. 
Ultimately, then, the Iranians were forced to abandon their long-standing 
refusal to negotiate and accept a cease-fi re. 
 This case presents a number of analytical diffi culties. Given both the 
recency of the war and the autocratic nature of the participants, we do 
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not have access to the sorts of details about each side’s decisions that are 
available for most of the other case studies in this book. Most notably, 
information on the Iranian decision to negotiate, after years of rejecting 
talks, is largely limited to public statements in which the incentive for 
rhetoric is clear. 44 From a theoretical perspective, this case occupies a 
somewhat ambiguous (although for that reason potentially informative) 
role with respect to the dispositional commitment problem argument, as 
the Iranians clearly framed their eight-year refusal to negotiate in dispo-
sitional terms but ultimately backed off of their demands and accepted a 
negotiated settlement. That said, while the limits of available evidence 
mean that we cannot distinguish among competing explanations as de-
fi nitively as we would like, the available evidence is certainly consistent 
with my argument. 
 A Brief History of the War 
 Iran and Iraq had long contested the exact location of their border, es-
pecially along the strategically signifi cant stretch near the Persian Gulf. 
The 1975 Algiers Agreement between Saddam Hussein and the shah of 
Iran, at a time when Iraq was confronting a signifi cant Kurdish uprising 
backed by Iran, appeared to settle this dispute in Iran’s favor. 45 When the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 deposed the shah, however, Saddam saw an 
opportunity to revise the settlement in Iraq’s favor and thus launched an 
invasion. Although the Iraqis made signifi cant initial gains, the Iranians 
managed to stop the Iraqi advance within the fi rst few months, and by 
1982 pushed the war back into Iraqi territory. 
 As Iraq’s fortunes turned, Saddam began to signal a greater interest 
in peace. The Ayatollah Khomeini—the supreme ruler of the new Ira-
nian government—categorically rejected negotiation, however, from 
the outset of the war averring that “we will not negotiate with them 
because they are corrupt. . . . Only if they surrender, for the sake of 
Moslems, we might consider something.” 46 The international commu-
nity initially viewed these statements as rhetoric, but the continued 
Iranian refusal to negotiate even after the Iraqis were expelled from 
Iran demonstrated Khomeini’s sincerity. The war thus stretched on for 
eight years, during which the Iranians launched a series of offensives 
with the goal of ultimately imposing regime change on Iraq. The 
Iraqis, backed by the United States and by Middle Eastern powers 
anxious to limit the infl uence of revolutionary Iran, managed to hold 
off the Iranian invasions and achieved a signifi cant strategic victory in 
1988 by recovering the Fao Peninsula, the site of Iran’s most signifi -
cant victory. Shortly after this setback, the Iranians began to signal a 
greater willingness to negotiate; the war ended with Iran’s acceptance 
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of a UN Security Council resolution that called for a return to the pre-
war status quo. 
 Saddam Leaps through the Window of Opportunity 
 Studies of this war are nearly unanimous in their agreement that Saddam 
launched a preventive war, although they also note that he overesti-
mated the ease of Iraqi victory. 47 Iraq was substantially smaller than Iran 
both demographically and economically, and moreover was threatened 
by internal tensions related to both the recently rebellious Kurds and the 
majority Shi’a population. This disadvantage was central to the humiliat-
ing Algiers Agreement, and it could certainly be expected to be a feature 
of relations with Iran in the indefi nite future. Meanwhile, intemperate 
Iranian commentary about spreading the revolution focused in particu-
lar on Iraq, given its proximity to Iran and its large Shi’a population, 
which could be expected to be more sympathetic to Shi’a Iran than the 
Sunni populations of the Gulf monarchies. 48 The Iranian Revolution cer-
tainly seems to have emboldened religious dissidents in Iraq. 49 These 
statements, combined with evidence of violent intentions such as the at-
tempted assassination of Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz (which may or 
may not have had direct Iranian backing), appear to have convinced the 
Iraqis in the fi rst half of 1980 that war with Iran was inevitable. 50 At the 
same time, the failure of internal coups and of the American attempt to 
rescue the hostages in Iran demonstrated that Saddam could not count 
on anyone else to eliminate the Iranian regime for him. 51
 If war was inevitable, however, then there were strong reasons to pre-
fer to fi ght sooner rather than later. Attempted counterrevolutionary 
coups forced the new government in Iran to purge both the military and 
the civil service, depriving the state of many of its most qualifi ed leaders. 
Even before the purges, the revolutionary government had stripped the 
military of much of its advanced technology while overseeing wide-
spread desertions. 52 The resulting chaos presented Iraq with an opportu-
nity to achieve the sort of victory that would not be possible at any other 
time. At the same time, Iran was diplomatically isolated, having alien-
ated the United States—its traditional superpower ally—through the 
taking of a large number of American hostages at the same time that it 
objected publicly to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 53 Moreover, 
Saddam had managed to put down challenges from the Shi’a and Kurd-
ish populations in Iraq, leaving Iraq well positioned to fi ght. 
 Debate exists about the exact extent of Iraqi war aims. Saddam’s stated 
goals included Iraqi control over the Shatt al-Arab—the strategic water-
way that had been in dispute with Iran prior to the 1975 agreement—and 
over several Persian Gulf islands as well as autonomy for several 
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minority groups in Iran, most notably the Arab minority in Khuzistan. 54
The territorial gains would have addressed a central strategic problem—
Iraq had only thirty miles of coastline and thus was vulnerable to attacks 
on its oil exports. Moreover, several commentators have argued that the 
demand for autonomy for Iranian minority groups, which might appear 
as mere window-dressing, was a harbinger of plans to establish an ef-
fectively or juridically independent region including Khuzistan, which 
contained most of Iran’s oil wealth, with the goal either of permanently 
weakening Iran or of precipitating the overthrow of the Khomeini re-
gime. 55 Saddam explicitly disavowed any specifi c limits to Iraqi war 
aims, claiming that Iranian actions in border skirmishes prior to the war 
granted Iraq “additional rights,” the extent of which he would only dis-
close at a later date. 56
 Unconditional Surrender Pursued and Abandoned 
 If the war initially arose primarily because of incentives to engage in 
preventive action, for much of its duration the primary obstacle to settle-
ment was the Iranian refusal to negotiate. The most common explanation 
for this refusal is a domestic political one: fi ghting the war allowed the 
regime to consolidate the revolution, and they thus continued to fi ght 
until evidence of public unrest indicated that the war was no longer serv-
ing this purpose. 57 This unrest in turn is supposed to have followed from 
the high costs of the war and the military reversals that Iran suffered in 
1987 and 1988. This argument is of course inconsistent with my theoreti-
cal arguments in multiple ways. For one, I argue that domestic politics 
cannot account for extended, high-intensity wars because society will 
catch on to the leaders’ misbehavior and force a settlement. Moreover, I 
argue that this sort of nonnegotiation will follow from a sincere belief in 
a dispositional commitment problem. In this case, that argument would 
imply that the Iranians inferred from Iraq’s preventive war that Saddam 
Hussein was by nature aggressive and hence that some degree of regime 
change was a prerequisite for settlement. Unfortunately, we do not have 
access to internal Iranian discussions of policy, meaning that a defi nitive 
resolution between these two explanations is impossible. That said, I 
highlight several reasons to believe that my argument provides a more 
convincing account of Iranian behavior than one grounded in domestic 
politics. 
 It is undeniably true that the war facilitated the consolidation of the 
revolution in Iran. The theoretical discussion in chapter 1 nonetheless 
raises two questions about a domestic-political explanation for Iranian 
behavior. First, did the Iranian leadership choose not to negotiate  because 
they expected that war would help them to consolidate power, or did 
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they prefer continued war for other reasons and gain a stronger hold on 
power as an ancillary benefi t? Given that the regime would never admit 
this aim publicly, and given that we lack information about internal de-
bates, we have no direct evidence that this motive drove the govern-
ment’s behavior. The existence of an alternative explanation for the 
decision to keep fi ghting thus could seriously undercut the domestic-
political one. This point is especially true in light of the second question 
theory leads us to ask: if the regime was fi ghting for domestic political 
reasons, why was the Iranian public willing to put up with this behavior 
for so long? 
 The revolutionary regime certainly did not downplay the extent of 
suffering that was going on in the war with Iraq. Instead, it drew atten-
tion to its citizens’ sacrifi ces, hailing the many dead as martyrs and even 
maintaining a “fountain of blood” (complete with dyed water) in Teh-
ran to honor the fallen. 58 Indeed, Iranian tactics, which frequently relied 
on human wave attacks that used young men in the  Basij as cannon fod-
der to offset Iraq’s qualitative technological advantage, seemed almost 
designed to impose a high cost on society. Yet the majority Persian pop-
ulation remained broadly supportive of the war, with thousands volun-
teering for the  Basij , even as military reverses meant that the date of fi nal 
victory stretched ever further into the distance. 59 That they did so sug-
gests that they shared the government’s goals and were willing to pay 
the price necessary to achieve them. The continued popularity of the 
war, despite the leadership’s openness about its high costs, provides a 
reason to believe that the regime was not continuing the war primarily 
for domestic-political reasons. 
 My argument by contrast would claim that the Iranian refusal to nego-
tiate followed from a sincere belief that Saddam was dispositionally ag-
gressive, which in turn was motivated by Iraq’s preventive war. Again a 
defi nitive conclusion about the validity of this interpretation is impossi-
ble given the dearth of evidence, but there are a number of suggestive 
points. The Iranian leadership certainly justifi ed the war in dispositional 
terms, repeatedly referring to Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party as 
“corrupt” and un-Islamic. 60 Moreover, its demands were consistent with 
the dispositional commitment problem. From the opening days of the 
war, the Iranians specifi ed that a minimal condition for peace would be 
that Saddam Hussein be tried as a war criminal, for which his removal 
from power would be an obvious prerequisite. As the war continued, the 
Iranians demanded the purging of the entire Ba’ath Party from the Iraqi 
government, a requirement consistent with the belief that the Ba’athists 
were dispositionally aggressive—indeed, Foreign Minister Velayati re-
peatedly compared the Iranian efforts to the Allied policy of uncondi-
tional surrender during World War II. 61 More generally, they clearly 
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preferred to try to spread the revolution to Iraq by not only removing the 
offending regime but replacing it with a kindred Islamic government. 
Moreover, after accepting the cease-fi re, Khomeini repeatedly warned 
the Iranian people that the matter was not closed and that the Iranian 
people should be prepared for another attack, consistent with the belief 
in a dispositional commitment problem. 62
 As for the origin of the belief that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was by na-
ture aggressive, the preventive nature of Iraq’s attack is obviously con-
sistent with my argument. My theory contends further that this sort of 
inference is particularly likely when the target of the preventive war 
does not intend to do what the initiator fears. Saddam’s most central fear 
was that once consolidated in power the Iranians would seek to actively 
spread the revolution through an invasion of Iraq. This fear was not un-
reasonable given the stated Iranian desire to see their revolution spread 
throughout the world and given the support and encouragement that the 
revolutionary regime provided to disaffected groups in Iraq. Thus, for 
example, on the day that the revolution triumphed, the Ayatollah Kho-
meini proclaimed, “We will export our revolution to the four corners of 
the world because our revolution is Islamic; and the struggle will con-
tinue until the cry of ‘There’s no god but Allah, and Muhammed is the 
messenger of Allah’ prevails throughout the world.” 63 That said, the Ira-
nian regime repeatedly consistently disavowed any intention to spread 
the revolution through force, instead claiming that they merely wished 
to see others achieve an Islamic revolution in their own countries. 64 Skep-
tics of course will observe that the Iranians likely would have made this 
claim whatever their true intentions, although it is true that they did not 
take advantage of subsequent opportunities to attack Iraq, for example 
during the period immediately after the Persian Gulf War when Sad-
dam’s hold on power was threatened. Absent better information about 
their ultimate plans, therefore, it is impossible to prove defi nitively that 
they were innocent in the sense meant by hypothesis 2b. It is not implau-
sible that they did not intend to do what Saddam feared, however, and 
my argument predicts that were more information on Iranian intentions 
to emerge, it would turn out that they did not have the intentions that 
Saddam ascribed to them. 65
 The obvious puzzle for this perspective is why the Iranian government 
abandoned its refusal to negotiate and accepted a resolution that left 
Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist Party in power. Here again the an-
swer must be speculative, but the best available explanation is that the 
Iranians came to realize that they simply lacked the capacity to impose 
the defeat that was necessary to force Saddam from power. After fi ve 
years of seeking to break through Iraqi defenses, the loss of their most 
signifi cant military gain—the Fao Peninsula—and the evidence of 
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renewed Iraqi strength in 1988 indicated that Iran would never break 
through and achieve the military victory it sought. 66 To the extent that we 
have information about the internal discussion prior to the cease-fi re, it 
is consistent with this interpretation: the Ayatollah Khomeini described 
accepting the peace as “drinking a chalice of poison,” which he did only 
because victory was impossible without a major military buildup and 
the development of “laser and nuclear weapons” of the sort that were 
entirely out of Iran’s reach. 67
 Overall, then, although the limits of available evidence mean that con-
clusions cannot be as defi nitive as they are in other cases, the Iran-Iraq 
War is certainly consistent with my argument. Presented with a window 
of opportunity, Saddam Hussein launched a preventive war that held 
out the potential to lock in Iraq’s historically unprecedented relative ad-
vantage over Iran. When this attack miscarried, the Iraqis found them-
selves fi ghting a defensive war against an adversary that refused to 
contemplate settlement with the existing Iraqi government, claiming that 
it was corrupt and hence not an acceptable negotiating partner. While the 
Iranians ultimately abandoned their aims and accepted a compromise 
peace, they did so only after fi ve years of enormously destructive war-
fare when it became apparent that they could never impose the regime 
change that they sought. 
[159]
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 Short Wars of Optimism 
 Persian Gulf and Anglo-Iranian 
 Thus far, I have examined only long, high-intensity wars. The repeated 
appearance of commitment problem concerns among the central motiva-
tions to fi ght in these cases provides strong evidence in favor of the claim 
that concerns about an adversary’s inability to commit—whether be-
cause of adverse shifts in relative capabilities or because of a belief in the 
opponent’s dispositional commitment to war—produce unusually de-
structive wars. As I noted at the outset, however, a research strategy that 
involves examining only large wars is problematic. Most fundamentally, 
if similar commitment concerns are also present in more minor wars, 
then it is hard to argue that they account for the difference between big-
ger and smaller confl icts. Moreover, an explanation for large wars be-
comes more compelling to the extent that we also have a coherent 
explanation for more limited confl icts, such as those provided by the in-
formational and principal-agent mechanisms. 
 This chapter and the next thus examine a set of wars that were more 
limited in severity and, typically, duration than the wars discussed thus 
far. In every case, either the informational or the principal-agent mecha-
nism turns out to have been most signifi cant in bringing about the war, 
while signifi cant commitment problem concerns were absent. This chapter 
examines the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the Anglo-Iranian War of 1856–
57, each of which I argue was driven by the informational mechanism. 
 The Persian Gulf War 
 The optimism about international peace that followed the end of the 
Cold War did not last long—the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer 
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of 1990 and the subsequent war between Iraq and a coalition led by the 
United States demonstrated that the use of force would remain a feature 
of the new international system. Whereas in the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam 
Hussein launched his invasion in response to a fear of relative decline, in 
this case closer analysis reveals that his attack was a consequence of 
overoptimism about the likelihood that outside powers would intervene 
to reverse his fait accompli and the degree to which Iraq could success-
fully defend its conquest in the event of war. It is thus not surprising that 
the war followed the logic of the informational mechanism quite closely. 
Starting from quite disparate expectations about the likelihood and con-
sequences of war, the participants advanced incompatible demands that 
precluded a peaceful settlement. Indeed, this process occurred twice, 
fi rst with the failure of negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait prior to the 
Iraqi invasion, and then with the inability to reach a negotiated settle-
ment to the resulting crisis between the Iraq and the coalition that mobi-
lized against it. Ultimately, it took war to bring these expectations into 
alignment: once the fi ghting started, and especially once the shift to 
ground combat demonstrated that the Iraqi army was not capable of re-
sisting the opposing coalition effectively, Saddam Hussein rapidly scaled 
down his demands, ultimately accepting a settlement far worse than the 
one on offer prior to the outbreak of violence. 
 A Brief Review of Events 
 Iraq emerged in 1988 from its eight-year war with Iran militarily and 
economically exhausted. In the course of that confl ict, the country had 
accrued signifi cant debts, including loans from many of its neighbors that 
it subsequently resisted repaying, on the rationale that its armed opposi-
tion to Iran had served the general interest of the Arab Gulf states. The 
refusal of these governments to forgive the loans after the war thus was a 
source of signifi cant discord, as was overproduction of oil by some of the 
smaller OPEC countries—notably including Kuwait—which drove down 
the price of Iraq’s primary export and thus hindered the country’s efforts 
to recover fi nancially and rebuild after the war. 1 At the same time, the 
Iraqis had long claimed, on the basis of the internal organization of the 
Ottoman Empire, that Kuwait was legitimately part of the province of 
Basra and hence should be governed by Iraq. 2 When the Kuwaitis refused 
to address Iraqi grievances, war thus was an attractive option, and the 
Iraqi army duly invaded on August 2, 1990, completing the conquest of 
Kuwait within a day. 
 The fi rst Bush administration in the United States reacted strongly 
to the Iraqi invasion, helping to secure a series of UN resolutions 
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denouncing Iraq’s actions and organizing a coalition of thirty-four 
countries who sent soldiers, fi rst to defend Saudi Arabia against poten-
tial further Iraqi expansion and then to compel an Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait. When the imposition of economic sanctions failed to in-
duce compliance, the coalition moved fi rst to aerial bombing and then 
eventually to a ground war. Impartial observers had predicted high po-
tential death tolls on both sides, but American technological superiority, 
a superior coalition strategy, and the reluctance of most Iraqi soldiers to 
actually fi ght resulted in a far more one-sided confl ict than many had 
expected. Rather than launching an attack directly into Kuwait, the co-
alition instead fl anked the Iraqi army by invading from Saudi Arabia 
into southern Iraq, from where it was in a position to cut off communi-
cation between Baghdad and Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The success of this 
attack forced the Iraqis into a rapid withdrawal at high cost, with the 
coalition demolishing units retreating along the highway from Kuwait 
City to Basra. The course of fi ghting forced Saddam into a rapid politi-
cal retreat and even opened up the possibility of a march on Baghdad, 
which the Bush administration however opted not to pursue. The two 
sides thus reached a political settlement in which Iraq not only recog-
nized Kuwait as sovereign and independent but made a slew of addi-
tional concessions, including the imposition of a UN monitor force, the 
destruction of its weapons of mass destruction program, and the pay-
ment of reparations to Kuwait. 
 A number of questions follow from this brief history. Why did Iraq 
take the gamble of invading Kuwait? Why did Saddam refuse to back 
down even after a broad coalition had formed to compel withdrawal? 
And, most important from the perspective of this project, why, given the 
sharply contrasting positions that each side established prior to war, did 
fi ghting end so quickly? To preview fi ndings, the war conformed well to 
the predictions of the informational mechanism. Although the Ameri-
cans arguably underestimated the ease with which they would win, 
they still expected to do far better than the Iraqis believed they would. 
Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein had serious (and not unfounded) doubts 
about the willingness of the United States and others in the West to actu-
ally fi ght, the strength of American resolve once war began, and the 
ability of the coalition to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait at anything ap-
proaching acceptable costs. Given this divergence in expectations, pre-
war negotiation failed to identify a mutually acceptable political 
settlement. Once fi ghting began, both sides learned about the other’s 
capabilities and resolve, and the new information forced Saddam to ac-
quiesce rapidly to demands that he had ruled out as unacceptable prior 
to the war. 
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 The Sources of Optimism 
 The central disagreement for the Persian Gulf War was between the 
United States and Iraq, but it obviously followed a prior disagreement 
between Iraq and Kuwait. A few words on Kuwaiti policy will thus be 
useful, as there is reason to believe that the entire confl ict might not have 
happened had the Kuwaiti leadership understood that Saddam was will-
ing to invade. The two countries had a number of disagreements—
including the aforementioned loan disputes, Iraqi sovereignty claims, 
the possibility of Iraqi usage of the Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiya, 
Iraqi grievances about Kuwaiti overproduction of oil, and disagreements 
related to the Rumaila oil fi eld—on which the Kuwaitis consistently re-
fused to make any signifi cant concessions. 3 This unyielding negotiating 
position was in large part a function of confi dence, grounded in reports 
from the United States and from Arab intermediaries—most notably 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak—that Saddam was bluffi ng and would not in 
fact invade. 4 From the opposite perspective, however, this situation 
meant that an Iraqi government that was willing to resort to force, and 
that enjoyed overwhelming military superiority, was confronted with an 
opponent whose demands were unreasonable given the likely outcome 
of a war. The ensuing fi ghting amply demonstrated that Saddam was 
willing and able to enforce his demands, but his capability and resolve 
could only be credibly demonstrated to the Kuwaitis by the actual use of 
force. 
 Of course, invading Kuwait was attractive only so long as the Iraqis 
had reason to think that they could get away with doing so. The available 
evidence, however, indicates that Saddam did in fact believe that the 
consequences of an invasion for Iraq would be mild. This expectation 
was grounded in three separate beliefs: that the United States lacked the 
resolve to fi ght over Kuwait; that even if the Americans were willing to 
fi ght the Saudis would not be willing to supply the bases that would be 
needed for an effective response; and that in the unlikely event of a war 
the Iraqi army would be able to impose signifi cant casualties on its op-
ponents, which in turn would lead the Americans (and hence the broader 
coalition) to back down. It is thus worth spending some time discussing 
the origins of these beliefs. 5 
 Expectations of American irresolve—whether with respect to the will-
ingness to oppose the Iraqi conquest or the willingness to stick it out in a 
war once fi ghting began—stemmed in large part from a belief that the 
American people, and thus the government that represented them, were 
unwilling to suffer signifi cant casualties, especially in pursuit of political 
aims in peripheral parts of the world. 6 Thus, for example, in his fi rst and 
only meeting with US ambassador April Glaspie, on July 25, Saddam 
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observed that “yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one 
battle.” 7 This belief was not new. A decade earlier, in the face of fears of 
Iran engendered by that country’s revolution in 1979, Saddam concluded 
that relying on the United States for protection was a losing proposition, 
as the Americans had found that providing such protection was too 
costly and risky a venture to undertake. 8 Likewise, at a meeting of the 
Arab Cooperation Council in February 1990, he had observed that “all 
strong men have their Achilles’ heel. . . . We saw that the U.S. as a super-
power departed Lebanon immediately when some Marines were killed.” 9
Moreover, Saddam increasingly came to think that his opponents cared 
more about his citizens than he did, and that images of Iraqi suffering 
would undermine public support for the war even in the event that his 
armies were unable to impose signifi cant casualties on coalition forces. 
Thus, for example, at one point during the crisis the Iraqi leader pre-
dicted that CNN coverage of the fi rst two bombing runs on Baghdad 
would generate enough public pressure on the administration that Bush 
would have to call off the air war. 10
 The belief that the Americans lacked the resolve to respond to the in-
vasion with force gained support from the policy of “constructive en-
gagement,” under which the United States tried to remain conciliatory in 
the face of Iraqi provocations in the expectation that moderation would 
turn Iraq into a regional partner, if an admittedly sometimes diffi cult 
one. 11 In this regard, the criticism that Ambassador Glaspie endured for 
not providing a stronger deterrent threat—by some accounts giving 
Saddam a “green light” to invade—is overblown, as she was simply car-
rying out the administration’s policy of trying to avoid directly antago-
nizing Saddam. 12 For advocates of constructive engagement, the policy 
held out the prospect of turning the regime with the largest army in the 
Middle East into a responsible member of the international community. 
This policy had the downside, however, that the United States made 
no clear deterrent threats, thus giving the Iraqis reason to believe 
that, although not welcomed, their invasion would not be forcefully 
opposed. 13
 Even in the event of a ground war, Saddam had reason to think that 
Iraq might emerge, if far from unscathed, politically victorious. The Iraqi 
army had gained an incredible amount of experience in the eight-year 
war with Iran, and the elite Republican Guard units were expected to 
pose a signifi cant challenge to even well-trained Western units, while the 
huge size and impressive armament of the Iraqi general army—the 
fourth-largest in the world, larger than that of the United States—meant 
that even absent elite training it would pose a formidable obstacle. 14
Meanwhile, by the time the air war broke out, the Iraqis had had almost 
six months to reinforce their defensive line in Kuwait with minefi elds, 
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oil-fi lled fi re trenches, sand embankments, and other obstacles. 15 In this 
context, Saddam could quite reasonably believe that any attempt to push 
the Iraqis out of Kuwait would prove suffi ciently costly for the coalition 
that public opinion would force a premature end to the campaign. 
 A less-recognized basis for Iraqi overoptimism was the belief that the 
Saudis would not invite American soldiers to operate out of their terri-
tory. Thus, for example, Saddam reportedly ordered the occupation of all 
of Kuwait, rather than just disputed border areas, in the expectation that 
doing so would preempt a Kuwaiti invitation to the United States, which 
in turn would leave the Americans with no place to establish bases. 16 It 
was in keeping with this expectation that the Iraqis indicated a desire for 
an Arab solution to the problem, which in practice presumably would 
have involved signifi cant concessions to Iraq, likely fi nanced by the Sau-
dis and others in the Gulf. 17 In practice, this expectation was undone by 
standard security dilemma fears: the Iraqis have consistently professed 
not to have had any plans to attack Saudi Arabia, but even if their inten-
tions were limited the Saudis could not know that for certain, while the 
massive Iraqi army in Kuwait obviously was capable of continuing its 
offensive southward. It was this fear that induced King Fahd to accept 
the signifi cant domestic political costs associated with inviting the 
United States and other Western powers into Saudi Arabia. 18
 The Evolution of Beliefs 
 Political disagreements and a diffi cult fi nancial situation provided 
Iraq with reason to consider an invasion of Kuwait, and the weakness of 
the Kuwaiti defenses, the refusal of Kuwaiti leaders to make signifi cant 
concessions, and a belief in American irresolution and inability to act 
indicated that the consequences of an invasion would likely be minimal. 
In this sense, Saddam Hussein had good reason to be quite confi dent 
when he ordered the invasion of Kuwait. Subsequent events, of course, 
would belie that initial optimism. Some bases for optimism had to be 
abandoned quite quickly: the Saudis took only fi ve days to decide to in-
vite in American forces. Others, however, persisted. 
 In particular, the belief that the United States was fundamentally ir-
resolute continued to provide a reason for optimism, even as world opin-
ion turned quickly against Iraq. The confi dence in irresolution can be 
seen in Saddam’s prewar diplomatic strategy, which consisted of repeat-
ing with great frequency the claim that American resolve would not 
withstand the fi rst few encounters. 19 These beliefs can only have been 
strengthened by the internal divisions in the United States, where only a 
slender majority of the public supported the threat to use force and many 
in Congress were arguing vociferously for greater time to allow 
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sanctions to take effect and calling on Congress, in the words of Senator 
Edward Kennedy, to “stop this senseless march to war.” 20 When former 
secretary of state Cyrus Vance testifi ed that in the event of war the United 
States would fi nd itself “virtually alone in a bitter and bloody war that 
will not be won quickly or without heavy casualties,” he was capturing—
and broadcasting for anyone to hear—the sentiments of a large portion 
of the American public that believed that war would be a disaster. 21 Pres-
ident Bush was willing to go to war even without the support of Con-
gress, but that kind of willingness was impossible to demonstrate 
credibly before the fact, while the Iraqis could listen to Democratic sena-
tors arguing that even a few thousand casualties in the liberation of Ku-
wait would be too high. 22
 The American leadership was fully aware that Iraq might not take 
American threats seriously, given the incentives to bluff. 23 Indeed, at the 
fi nal meeting between leaders on the two sides, Secretary of State James 
Baker started his comments by observing to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 
Aziz, “You think we are bluffi ng.” 24 This task was complicated, however, 
by the need to maintain the domestic and international coalition for war, 
which involved demonstrating that all possible efforts had been made 
to reach a diplomatic settlement. Thus, regional experts reported 
that Bush’s proposals for last-minute talks between Baker and Aziz—
undertaken to demonstrate that all efforts to reach a peaceful solution 
had been taken—would be interpreted in Baghdad as evidence of irreso-
lution, no matter how frequently Bush insisted that the American posi-
tion was nonnegotiable. 25
 At the same time, Bush administration offi cials were growing more 
confi dent, with Bush in particular coming to believe that the United 
States could “knock Saddam Hussein out early.” 26 A critical development 
was the discovery that, contrary to initial beliefs, the ground on the 
Saudi-Iraqi border west of Kuwait was fi rm enough to support tanks and 
large transport vehicles, thus permitting a ground war plan based on 
maneuver and envelopment rather than one based on a costly frontal as-
sault on prepared defenses in Kuwait. As a result, whereas in October 
military and political leaders were reporting that “if war comes, its 
human, economic, and political costs are likely to be high” and that 
“there is little prospect of winning a neat ‘victory’ in such a confl ict,” by 
January Bush was operating on the basis of military estimates that put 
the likely toll below two thousand casualties. 27 Meanwhile, Bush was 
increasingly convinced that the Iraqi government’s hold on power was 
tenuous, at one point in his diary comparing Saddam Hussein to Nicolae 
Ceauşescu, the Romanian communist dictator whose decades-long rule 
disintegrated in 1989 in the face of a general uprising. 28 Overall, then, 
American decision makers believed that war might provide signifi cant 
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benefi ts beyond the liberation of Kuwait. In this context, as the crisis de-
veloped American demands for unconditional withdrawal rose to in-
clude other demands such as reparation payments to Kuwait and the 
weakening or elimination of Iraqi WMD programs. 29
 Beliefs and Bargaining Positions Once Fighting Began 
 Ultimately, large shifts in bargaining positions only occurred once the 
war began, and especially as the Iraqis came to realize that their expecta-
tions, and hence their strategies, were fl awed. Before the war started, 
Saddam repeatedly averred that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait only 
as part of a general Middle East peace agreement, and that absent that 
effectively impossible condition Kuwait was now an inviolable part of 
Iraq. 30 He held to that position even as the deadline for withdrawal ap-
proached, apparently believing that American irresolution would mani-
fest itself either in a decision not to attack or, after initial clashes, in a 
reluctance to pay the costs necessary to evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait. 
Once the bombing began, he continued with the same basic strategy of 
trying to split the coalition by linking its activities to Israel—now by 
launching missile attacks on Israel designed to provoke an Israeli 
response—while promising to impose unacceptable casualties on coali-
tion forces should an invasion take place. 
 Diplomacy did not stop once the bombing began, although it took on 
a new character. Particularly illuminating were repeated Soviet peace ef-
forts in the period immediately prior to and during the war, which in-
duced the two sides to reveal their bargaining positions. 31 These peace 
efforts foundered initially on Saddam Hussein’s refusal to withdraw 
from Kuwait on anything approaching the terms contained in prior Se-
curity Council resolutions. Even when after almost a month of bombing 
the Iraqis indicated a willingness to accept Security Council Resolution 
660, which called for unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, their acceptance 
was subject to extensive qualifi cations that guaranteed American rejec-
tion. This position changed with the approach of the ground war, how-
ever. In the days prior to the February 24 start to the ground assault, the 
Iraqi government made an increasing range of concessions, ultimately 
agreeing to a Soviet cease-fi re proposal in which the Iraqis would with-
draw unconditionally, removing all forces from the country within three 
weeks. 32 By this point, however, the success of the air war and the failure 
of Iraqi attempts to split the coalition increased confi dence in the Bush 
administration, which now concluded that the Iraqi army was caught in 
a trap. In response, Bush raised American war aims to include not only 
the liberation and restoration of Kuwait but the substantial weakening of 
the Iraqi army. In line with this goal, he stated that peace was on offer 
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only if the Iraqis would agree to complete withdrawal within one week, 
which would have required the abandonment of almost all of the army’s 
heavy equipment. As a result, substantial Iraqi concessions—to terms 
that would have guaranteed peace prior to the start of fi ghting—were no 
longer suffi cient to purchase a cease-fi re. At the same time, however, the 
vast disparities between the two sides’ demands prior to fi ghting had 
narrowed substantially. 
 Peace ultimately came only after the four days of ground war brought 
about the weakening of the Iraqi army that the Americans sought. The 
fl anking of the Iraqi army in Kuwait precipitated that force’s headlong 
withdrawal into Iraq, during which the coalition air forces were able to 
annihilate any retreating heavy forces, although key Republican Guard 
units, which never had been deployed to the front lines, were able to es-
cape back toward Baghdad. At this point, Bush declared victory, an-
nouncing a unilateral cease-fi re that the Iraqis were only too happy to 
accept. In practice, the specifi c terms of that cease-fi re were worked out 
in a meeting between opposing generals at Safwan on March 3, after 
which the Iraqis begrudgingly acquiesced to additional Security Council 
Resolutions that codifi ed the political terms of Iraq’s defeat, including 
the establishment of no-fl y zones over southern and northern Iraq in 
which the Iraqi air force was not permitted to operate and the creation of 
an intrusive monitoring regime to identify and eliminate Iraq’s chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons programs. 33
 A separate but important question is why, given the success of the 
ground war, the Bush administration ruled out an escalation of the war 
to ensure regime change in Baghdad, a possibility that was discussed 
both at the time and subsequently. The decision to stop the war with Sad-
dam still in power arose primarily from two concerns: that the coalition 
would collapse if the United States were to attempt to move beyond the 
mandate provided by the Security Council, and that an attempt to over-
throw Saddam would involve the American forces in an indecisive hunt 
through hostile regions of Iraq that would expose them to urban guer-
rilla warfare that would infl ict the high level of casualties that a more 
restrained military strategy had managed to avoid. 34 Thus, having at-
tained their primary political aim and having furthermore substantially 
weakened Iraq, the Bush administration saw no further goals that could 
be achieved at acceptable cost. 
 After six months of infl exibility, then, both sides’ bargaining positions 
shifted quite dramatically once the bombing started, and especially once 
the fi ghting intensifi ed with the move toward the ground war. These de-
velopments are entirely consistent with the predictions of the informa-
tional mechanism: while credible signaling was diffi cult prior to the 
outbreak of costly fi ghting, the course of events once fi ghting began 
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demonstrated that Iraqi expectations were profoundly mistaken and 
thus justifi ed a dramatic shift in political demands. This process occurred 
quickly: even before the ground war rendered a continued Iraqi occupa-
tion of Kuwait impossible, Saddam had indicated his willingness to con-
cede the central issue at stake in the war. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, in a war in which divergent expectations led both sides to 
anticipate a relatively quick victory, only a relatively brief period of fi ght-
ing was necessary for the two to identify a settlement that they preferred 
to continued war. Moreover, demands shifted more rapidly as the war 
intensifi ed, with the shift to the ground war rapidly bringing about near-
total Iraqi capitulation despite the survival of the elite Republican Guard 
units. Overall, then, we have a case in which divergent expectations 
about the likely course and outcome of confl ict led to a war, but once that 
war began both expectations and bargaining positions shifted rapidly in 
a manner that allowed for quick settlement. 
 The Secondary Signifi cance of Alternate Mechanisms 
 In contrast to the strong evidence of the relevance of the informational 
mechanism, the commitment and principal-agent mechanisms were of at 
best secondary signifi cance. One possible commitment problem argu-
ment would be that the incorporation of Kuwait would increase Sad-
dam’s capabilities to such an extent that he would be able to engage in 
further aggression at a later date. While Bush administration fi gures cer-
tainly worried that Iraq might engage in further aggression, in particular 
with a further strike against Saudi Arabia, they did not express concern 
that control over Kuwaiti oil would facilitate such aggression. Indeed, 
the most worrying scenario was an attack on Saudi Arabia immediately 
after the initial invasion (before coalition forces had appeared in the re-
gion), before Iraq would have had an opportunity to turn Kuwaiti oil 
into a strategic resource. Instead, intervention was undertaken primarily 
because of the economic cost of allowing the consolidation of oil produc-
tion under hostile governments and because of a sincere belief that per-
mitting aggression to succeed would undermine international stability. 
 A separate argument about shifting power concerns the American 
insistence that Iraq abandon its heavy armor in Kuwait as a condition 
for peace. This requirement clearly was designed to weaken Iraq, and 
Saddam’s reluctance to agree even after he had conceded the central 
political issue—Kuwait’s independence—indicated that it was pre-
cisely this anticipated shift that prevented a settlement prior to the 
ground war. In chapter 1, however, I noted a distinction between beliefs 
in long-term decline that are a feature of preventive wars and these 
sorts of intrawar military shifts, as with the anticipated weakening of 
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the German Wehrmacht after the encircling of the Sixth Army at Stalin-
grad. The anticipated destruction of an entrapped force certainly may 
hinder settlement, but it will not produce the dynamics that make pre-
ventive wars diffi cult to resolve over an extended period of time, 
largely because the anticipated shift is likely to happen quickly. Thus in 
this case it took only four additional days of fi ghting for the Iraqi army 
to suffer the losses that it would have incurred through acceptance of 
American terms, after which this problem ceased to exist as an obstacle 
to settlement. It is for this reason that I argue that these sorts of in-
trawar shifts generated by anticipated military defeat do not invoke the 
broader dynamics of preventive wars. 
 A principal-agent interpretation is even weaker. As an absolute auto-
crat, Saddam worried about the possibility that he might be violently 
overthrown, either by his own army or by a Shi’a uprising, likely with 
Iranian backing. Indeed, he took extensive precautions against such a 
possibility throughout his reign—the steps that he took to forestall over-
throw by the military, including executing prominent generals and limit-
ing the military’s training in urban warfare, rendered his regime almost 
totally coup-proof, while a repressive internal system prevented more 
general uprisings. 35 He thus had no reason to use a war to cement his 
hold on power; indeed, defeat in war was one of the few developments 
that might signifi cantly have threatened his hold on power, as the Shi’a 
and Kurdish uprisings after the defeat in Kuwait demonstrated. 
 Likewise, it is hard to sustain a diversionary argument about the coali-
tion response. While disagreement about whether the war was worth 
fi ghting existed, few denied that Iraqi control over Kuwait was contrary 
to the interests of the United States or the international community more 
generally, and critics of the war argued primarily that its costs would 
likely be unacceptably high, something that the Bush administration, 
with better information, was confi dent would not be the case. While 
Bush’s popularity did rise signifi cantly as a consequence of Desert Storm, 
there is no evidence that he chose to respond to Iraq because he believed 
that it would improve his hold on power, nor has there been any evi-
dence of substantial misrepresentation of the situation in the Middle East 
or the likely outcome of a war. 
 Summary 
 The Persian Gulf War thus follows the classic pattern of a confl ict 
driven by private information and divergent expectations. Saddam Hus-
sein underestimated the both the resolve and the ability of the interna-
tional community, and in particular the United States, to respond 
effectively to the Iraqi invasion. Conciliatory diplomacy prior to the 
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invasion and an apparent pattern of casualty aversion gave Saddam the 
impression that the United States would not be willing to use force to 
reverse the conquest of Kuwait, and even if they were he doubted that 
the Saudis would permit Western forces to operate from their country. 
While some of these expectations were disabused over the course of the 
crisis, until the ground war Saddam remained convinced that the Iraqi 
army would impose high enough casualties on coalition forces to force a 
political retreat. It thus took a war to convince Saddam that his expecta-
tions were incorrect. Once the war began, however, the errors in his ex-
pectations rapidly became apparent, at which point he revised both his 
expectations and his demands downward, facilitating a quick political 
settlement. 
 The Anglo-Iranian W ar 
 More than a century before the Persian Gulf War, soldiers from the 
West found themselves in the area of the Persian Gulf fi ghting to pre-
serve the autonomy of a small but important region. As with the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, the crisis created by the Iranian (Persian) takeover of 
the Afghan city of Herat culminated in a short war that restored the ini-
tial status quo. Given the minimal consequences of the war—the deaths 
of a few thousand soldiers, but no political change—the war has left little 
imprint on the historical record. 36 While information on this confl ict is 
limited, a clear picture nonetheless emerges of a war driven by overopti-
mism, in which the information gained through fi ghting facilitated a 
quick negotiated settlement, even in the face of great obstacles to 
negotiation. 37
 An Overview of a Little-Known Clash 
 The central stake in the war was the city of Herat, which, given the 
1824 division of Afghanistan by three rival princes into the principalities 
of Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar, had been effectively independent for 
several decades. This situation presented an opportunity for Iran to re-
establish control over Herat, which had belonged to Persia under the 
previous Safavid dynasty, and two separate shahs attempted to do so in 
1838 and again in 1852. These incursions, however, inserted the country 
more centrally into the Great Game, the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Cen-
tral Asia. 38 In that contest, the British attempted to ensure that local lead-
ers in Afghanistan, through which an invasion of India would have to 
come, remained friendly; they were in particular opposed to an increase 
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in Iranian control because of a belief that the Russians, who posed a 
signifi cant threat to Iran, exerted excessive infl uence in Tehran. Thus, in 
both 1838 and 1852 the British responded to Iranian moves with a vigor-
ous diplomatic effort that ultimately convinced the shah to withdraw 
his forces and agree to treaties repudiating any claim of sovereignty 
over Herat. 
 The issue returned to the fore in 1856, however, when an internal Af-
ghan dispute led the prince of Herat to request Iranian aid. With this re-
quest as a pretext, the Iranians then moved in and, despite facing 
signifi cant local opposition, established control over the city in October 
1856. With negotiations between British and Iranian representatives in 
Constantinople dragging on, the British government in London autho-
rized the governor-general in Bombay to declare war, which he duly did 
on November 1. 
 Subsequent military developments can be summarized quickly. 
Given the disasters that had accompanied previous incursions into Af-
ghanistan—including an extended expedition from which only one Brit-
ish soldier escaped death or capture—the British were reluctant to 
intervene directly in Afghanistan and instead opted to land troops along 
the Persian Gulf coast. After doing so in December 1856, they seized the 
important trading center of Bushehr and then moved inland, where they 
defeated a signifi cant Iranian force outside the town of Khushab in the 
largest battle of the war. Declining to pursue the defeated army inland, 
the British then moved up the Euphrates River, taking the city of Mo-
hammerah (now Khorramshahr). On April 4, a few days after the fall of 
Mohammerah, plans for a signifi cant incursion into the Iranian interior 
were interrupted by the arrival of news of a peace agreement signed in 
Paris a month earlier. 39
 Thus, less than four months passed from the British landing to the 
news of the peace agreement (and less than three from the start of fi ght-
ing to the political settlement); while the British had had the best of it, 
at the point that the war ended, little fi ghting had occurred. 40 Nothing 
that the British had done directly compelled the Iranian army to with-
draw from Herat. Why then did the shah agree to give up something 
that, as the repeated attempts over several decades to subvert Herat’s 
independence clearly demonstrated, was quite important to him? The 
evidence in this case clearly indicates that the shah and his advisers 
underestimated British resolve—there existed a number of plausible 
reasons for them to do so—and thus adopted a policy that ran a risk of 
war with Britain were the British actually resolved, as they turned out 
to be. Consistent with the predictions of the informational mechanism, 
settlement came quickly, with the war ending basically as soon as the 
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two sides could meet to negotiate and convey the peace agreement to 
the armies. 
 Private Information and Divergent Expectations 
 In contrast to the situation in many wars, the Iranians were not par-
ticularly optimistic about their military prospects in the event of a direct 
clash with the British. 41 They had reason, however, to doubt that such a 
clash would actually occur. While the British had established a clear in-
terest in the fate of Herat (and the region more generally) in the past, 
several developments had provided reason to doubt the continued 
strength of that commitment. 
 The most important development was the annexation during the 1840s 
of the Sikh regions and the Punjab, which together provided a more nat-
ural and easily defensible northwest border for India. 42 Given this devel-
opment, a reasonable observer might wonder whether the British would 
still fi ght for Herat, as the loss of Afghanistan to Russian control (no cer-
tain prospect) was now less threatening. Indeed, at the outset of a re-
newed Iranian attempt to annex Herat in 1851, Prime Minister Palmerston 
wrote to the ambassador in Tehran to say, 
 You will, therefore, still endeavour to dissuade the Persian Government 
from advancing on Herat, and you may truly say that such a move would 
not be viewed with indifference by HM’s Govt.; but you will be careful not 
to make any specifi c threat which HM’s Govt. might not be disposed after-
wards to carry into execution. 43
 While this communication obviously was not conveyed to the Iranians, 
it was a reasonable response to a changed strategic situation, which the 
Iranians undoubtedly had noticed. This particular incident ended with 
the shah pulling out of Herat, which the Iranians had successfully taken, 
in response to a forceful British remonstration. However, the British 
never actually mobilized troops, meaning that they did not actually 
demonstrate any willingness to spend blood and treasure to keep Herat 
independent. The shah might therefore still think that they would acqui-
esce in a seizure, especially if it was timed to coincide with British trou-
bles elsewhere. 
 At the same time that the new frontier decreased Britain’s incentive 
to fi ght for Herat, events in the disastrous First Afghan War—in which 
a British attempt to install a more amenable potentate in Kabul miscar-
ried badly, with a signifi cant British force utterly destroyed during an 
attempted retreat back to India—provided reason to expect the British 
to be reluctant to intervene directly in Afghan affairs. 44 Indeed, British 
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offi cials clearly were infl uenced by this precedent, with the governor-
general in India (Lord Canning) sending a message back to London 
during the Herat crisis specifi cally to advise against any strategy that 
involved incursions into Afghanistan. 45 The British certainly still had 
tools at their disposal, as the invasion of the Gulf coast demonstrated, 
but those tools provided a less direct way of securing the independence 
of Herat. 
 Moreover, if the more secure border and the diffi culty of intervening 
directly in Afghanistan provided a reason to think that when distracted 
the British might let the Iranians get away with seizing Herat, then the 
Crimean War appeared to provide the necessary distraction. While the 
British and their allies ultimately won the war, they did so only at high 
cost and in a less than completely decisive manner. Indeed, by some ac-
counts far more was known in Asia about the Russian victory over the 
Turks at Kars than was known of the Russian defeat at Sevastopol; the 
Iranians apparently started their expedition with the belief that the Brit-
ish would have no spare troops to use against them. 46 Under these cir-
cumstances, Iranian decision makers could reasonably believe that the 
British might decide against diverting strength from a major confl ict to 
prevent the seizure of a remote city whose strategic value had declined 
signifi cantly. The end of the war with Russia removed this obstacle to 
British action, but unfortunately by the time that the Iranians realized 
their error and sought to correct it, events had proceeded too far, and 
they were unable to carry the negotiations through before the British, 
thinking that the Iranians would not back down without a fi ght, had 
committed to war. 47
 Thus, in October 1857, after the capture of Herat, the shah’s primary 
adviser assured him that Britain would never resort to “coercive mea-
sures” and “would not move a soldier or a ship in connection with 
Herat.” 48 It is thus unsurprising that the shah “appeared incredulous” 
when told that the British might occupy Bushehr, and that both he 
and his primary adviser expressed surprise on receiving the British 
declaration of war. The arrival of war, however, and especially the dem-
onstration—through the occupation of Bushehr and the battle at 
Kushab—that the British were suffi ciently resolved to fi ght forced a 
major revision in Iranian expectations. Initial clashes demonstrated that 
Iran lacked the manpower, money, or morale necessary to repel Britain; 
of the defeat at Kushab Amanat observes that “nothing could have more 
forcefully enhanced the image of British invincibility in the eyes of the 
demoralized Persian government.” The revision in expectations is per-
haps clearest in the shah’s note to his representative in Istanbul: “Of 
course! Of course! Swiftly settle the matter in whatever manner you 
deem advisable. Do not allow it to come to severe hostility.” 
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 From this point, all that stood in the way of peace was the time that it 
took for communication to occur. Indeed, the governor-general in India, 
whom London had empowered to act, declared war ignorant of negotia-
tions in Constantinople in which differences between the parties had 
narrowed. 49 After a brief delay when the news of the declaration arrived, 
negotiations moved to Paris, where an agreement was signed on 
March 4. The fi nal agreement was quite close to the prewar British posi-
tion, most obviously in Iran’s agreement to withdraw from Herat, al-
though they abandoned some tangential demands. 50 The extent of 
updating is clear, however, in the cheerfulness with which the shah 
greeted the news of the fi nal terms, which although forcing him to back 
down on the central issues in the war at least permitted him to retain his 
throne. 51 The Iranians duly ratifi ed the treaty and withdrew their army 
from Herat in short order. 
 To summarize, the Iranians saw a favorable opportunity to try to ac-
complish a fait accompli because they believed that when pushed the 
British might not prove willing to intervene. In this case, British resolve 
was private information, and because it was private (and not readily con-
veyed in a credible manner) it was possible, and indeed reasonable, for 
the Iranians to underestimate it. By contrast, there was relatively little 
divergence in expectations about the likely victor once war began. Thus, 
on the central issue leading to war, updating of beliefs occurred quite 
quickly, and the Iranians rapidly scaled back their ambitions, withdraw-
ing from Herat (despite the fact that they had already captured the city 
and that the British lacked the means to force them out directly) based on 
the expectation that further fi ghting would only increase costs without 
improving the odds of political gains. These results thus are quite consis-
tent with theoretical expectations: private information in this case could 
be effectively revealed only once the British demonstrated their willing-
ness to fi ght, at which point the Iranians revised their expectations, low-
ered their political demands, and got out of the war, all in a relatively 
short period of time. 
 The Limits of Alternate Mechanisms 
 Neither of the other two primary mechanisms provides as convincing 
of an explanation for this case. A commitment problem explanation runs 
into the fundamental problem that no source that I have found records 
comments from anyone involved to the effect that war now would pre-
vent a worse confl ict at a later date. The British did wish to maintain the 
Afghan buffer against the possibility of Russian encroachment, but no 
one argued that the loss of Herat would put the Russians in a position to 
invade India or to demand concessions with respect to the subcontinent. 
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A more convincing interpretation of British policy is instead that they 
were interested in maintaining a clear reputation for protecting strategic 
interests in Central Asia—a view, given the centrality of private informa-
tion to reputation, that is more consistent with an informational interpre-
tation. Moreover, if one did believe that the war was motivated by a 
commitment problem, it would be hard to understand the course of 
events. Once the war began, the British did not directly relieve Herat, 
and the damage that they did to the Persians along the Gulf coast was 
hardly crippling. In other words, nothing in the military events on the 
battlefi eld would have resolved a signifi cant commitment problem had 
it been contributing to the war. 
 At the same time, the case does demonstrate that mere suspicion of an 
opponent’s intentions or reliability is hardly grounds for war without 
end. The Iranians had repeatedly violated agreements to respect the in-
dependence of Herat (most notably in 1838 and 1852) when they believed 
that they might be able to get away with doing so. Indeed, contemporary 
British sources consistently depict the Iranians as duplicitous and un-
trustworthy. 52 In response to this duplicity, however, the British did not 
launch a crusade to remake the Iranian polity; rather they acknowledged 
that they would need to make clear their willingness to intervene to the 
Iranians to deter further interventions. From this perspective, it is clear 
that simple mistrust associated with international anarchy is not suffi -
cient to produce a major war. 
 Principal-agent dynamics likewise provide an unconvincing explana-
tion for the war, although developments within the confl ict provide 
some support for ancillary principal-agent hypotheses. In both Britain—
at this point a partial democracy—and completely autocratic Iran, lead-
ers had little to gain personally from fi ghting. In Iran, the Qajar Dynasty 
had developed an institutionally autocratic political system that gained 
legitimacy and internal cohesion from a system of effective negotiation 
and consensus. 53 Thus, despite (or because of) the existence of signifi cant 
external threats, the shah did not have to worry greatly about his hold on 
power, at least so long as foreign powers like Britain did not attempt to 
unseat him. In Britain, Prime Minister Palmerston had gained broad es-
teem through his handling of the initially badly mismanaged Crimean 
War, and thus stood to gain little from further foreign adventures. 54
 That said, there is some indication that in fighting the war 
Palmerston—who could be described as an early advocate of liberal in-
ternationalism—was pursuing a policy that a substantial fraction of the 
British public did not endorse. News of the war reportedly was greeted 
in England “with a mixture of disgust and derision, and with anti-war 
demonstrations in Bradford and Newcastle”; the  Morning Star referred to 
the war as a “Don Quixote campaign.” 55 Moreover, the government was 
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also under fi re for its conduct in the Second Opium War (aka, the Arrow 
War), which began concomitantly. Given this situation, Palmerston used, 
and most likely abused, some of the prerogatives of the prime minister. 
Parliament went out of session in July 1856, while the dispute in Persia 
was only just getting started, and only returned in February, by which 
time the war was well underway and there was little the opposition 
could do. Indeed, the government adopted the time-honored strategy of 
arguing that debate on an ongoing war would be contrary of the interests 
of the nation, arguing that it would be pointless to hold an open debate 
on the war without the relevant papers being available, but then refusing 
to release those papers because of the ongoing negotiations with Iran. 56
As a result, the opposition was limited in its criticisms to what could be 
gleaned from letters that soldiers sent home, which arrived long after the 
events they described had occurred. Nonetheless, the signifi cant criti-
cism that the government received was an indication of the limits to 
Palmerston’s ability to engage in international adventures, especially 
when one considers that his government collapsed roughly contempora-
neously over its handling of the Arrow War with China. 57
 Summary 
 As with the Persian Gulf War, the course of the Anglo-Iranian War is 
best explained by the informational mechanism. Although it was clear 
that the British would win in a military confl ict, the Iranian government 
had reason to think that they might not be suffi ciently resolved to fi ght 
one, given the stronger defense of India provided by the acquisition of 
the Sikh regions and the Punjab, British disinclination to involve itself 
directly in Afghanistan after the First Afghan War, and the apparent dis-
traction provided by the Crimean War. In practice, however, this calcula-
tion proved to be incorrect: the Crimean distraction was gone by the time 
that the crisis over Herat had reached its peak, while the British found a 
military strategy that did not force them to fi ght in Afghanistan. Every 
indication is that the Iranians were prepared to back down as soon as it 
became apparent that the British were willing to fi ght—had faster com-
munication between the adversaries been possible, it is unlikely that the 
war would have lasted more than a month, had it occurred at all. By 
contrast, the commitment problem mechanism appears to have been 
completely absent, while the principal-agent mechanism played at best a 
subsidiary role. 
 The Persian Gulf and Anglo-Iranian wars are not typical of the wars that 
scholars and policymakers tend to focus on, but they are typical of the 
wars that actually occur: both were short and not particularly deadly, at 
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least by the standards of interstate wars, and both ended well before the 
loser’s fi nal military defeat, despite the potential for further escalation 
and a longer and deadlier war. In the Persian Gulf War, the coalition 
elected not to take advantage of initial victories to march on Baghdad; in 
the Anglo-Iranian War the politicians brought an end to the war just be-
fore the British force moved away from the coastline to launch a major 
incursion into the interior. In both cases, the best explanation for both the 
onset of the war and its short duration is provided by the informational 
mechanism. Leaders who initially miscalculated about their opponents’ 
capabilities and resolve revised their expectations in response to the 
fi ghting and reduced their political demands accordingly, facilitating 
settlement. These fi ndings thus accord with the prediction that informa-
tional wars, although prevalent, tend to be limited. 
 Equally important, the absence of signifi cant commitment concerns in 
either case is consistent with the prediction that commitment problem 
wars will typically be more destructive. In neither case did leaders refer 
to concerns about shifting power in the way we observed in previous 
chapters, nor were there good reasons for them to worry about such con-
cerns. This observation allays any potential concerns that commitment 
problem concerns are simply omnipresent in wars, in which case they 
would have provided a less convincing explanation for war destructive-
ness. Instead, it appears that these concerns are present only in the most 
severe of wars. 
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 The Limits on Leaders 
 The Falklands War and the Franco-Turkish War 
 Chapter 6 analyzed one kind of limited war, confl icts driven by the 
informational mechanism. This chapter examines a different kind, 
namely wars driven by principal-agent problems—in other words, mis-
behaving leaders—in domestic politics. In these wars, leaders adopt 
policies that are designed to serve their own interests rather than those of 
their constituents. I argue that these wars, like informational confl icts, 
are internally limited: the war will continue only so long as the leader is 
able to avoid censure, most likely by limiting the information available to 
opponents. As it becomes apparent that the leader is overstating the 
probability of victory and understating the costs of the war, opposition 
will grow and ultimately impinge on the leader’s ability to continue the 
war. I further argued that in diversionary wars this process will typically 
occur quickly, because the very act of using the war to divert attention 
from other issues means that the leader will have diffi culty lying effec-
tively about how well it is going. By contrast, if the leader is simply pur-
suing a pet policy aim that the public does not share, she may be able to 
extend the war for a signifi cant amount of time, but only if the costs re-
main relatively low. These wars thus may be long, but they will not be 
unusually deadly. 
 The case studies in this chapter are both ones in which domestic poli-
tics played a signifi cant role in the onset, conduct, and termination of 
war. The better-known confl ict is the 1982 Falklands War between Britain 
and Argentina, in which the Argentine military junta gambled that an 
invasion of the disputed Falkland/Malvinas Islands would improve 
their hold on power in the face of signifi cant internal unrest. The lesser-
known case is the 1919–21 Franco-Turkish War, in which the colonial fac-
tion in France hijacked foreign policy to pursue policy aims that did not 
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serve broader French interests. The former case is a classic diversionary 
war, although a closer examination reveals the signifi cance of other 
mechanisms. The latter fi ts the description of a “policy” war, in which 
downplaying coverage of events on the ground permits leaders to resist 
settlement so long as fi ghting is not particularly intense. In each case, the 
leaders ultimately found their freedom of action increasingly restricted 
by domestic opposition as the extent of their misrepresentations became 
clear; war ended in each case not because the leaders favored war termi-
nation but because they were left with no other choice. 
 The Falklands War 
 The Anglo-Argentine clash over the Falkland Islands in 1982 has been 
described as “the archetypal case of diversionary war.” 1 According to 
this view, a military junta in Argentina that was steadily losing its hold 
on power distracted the public by launching an unexpected military ad-
venture. This strategy succeeded in rallying the public behind the junta, 
at least until a British task force arrived and evicted the Argentines from 
their new conquests. Given this standard interpretation, this war pro-
vides a natural case for testing hypotheses about the principal-agent 
mechanism. 
 While it would be incorrect to ignore domestic politics, a closer look 
demonstrates that a purely domestic political explanation for the war 
would be woefully incomplete. The Argentines were willing to invade in 
large part because they underestimated British resolve and capability; 
thus, divergent expectations about the consequences of the use of force 
played a signifi cant role in bringing about the confl ict. Moreover, al-
though temporarily successful, the diversionary strategy quickly back-
fi red when the war went poorly for the Argentines. This case is thus 
consistent with the prediction that diversionary wars will typically be 
short. 
 History of the Confl ict 
 The islands in question—known as the Falklands to the British and the 
Malvinas to the Argentines—lie several hundred miles off the coast of 
Argentina. Although of limited strategic signifi cance—the famous Ar-
gentine novelist Jorge Luis Borges described the war as “a fi ght between 
two bald men over a comb”—the islands nonetheless have been the sub-
ject of disputes between several powers over the last few hundred years, 
including consistent Argentine claims over the entire period since the 
British established sole control in 1833. 2 Over time, the symbolic 
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signifi cance of the islands increased, with the Argentines arguing that 
their transfer was necessary for the completion of decolonization, 
while the British argued that the principle of self-determination implied 
that the islanders—who wished to remain British—should be permitted 
to choose their own fate. British governments were to a signifi cant de-
gree entrapped, reluctant to anger the Argentines and entirely unwilling 
to pay the exorbitant costs that would be associated with funding an ef-
fective standing deterrent on the islands, but also unwilling to force the 
islanders, who had the support of a signifi cant lobby in London, to ac-
quiesce to a deal with which they were not comfortable. 3 They thus ad-
opted a policy of equivocating on Argentine demands for a fi nal 
resolution of the dispute, never directly rejecting Argentine claims but at 
the same time never allowing negotiations to progress toward a resolu-
tion. This strategy, however, grew more diffi cult over time, and when the 
Argentines began to push more aggressively for a fi nal deal in the fi rst 
few months of 1982 the British were forced to effectively reject Argentine 
demands. 
 An internal shuffl e in the Argentine junta in December 1981 had pro-
duced a new, hard-line leadership that was predisposed to seek a fi nal 
resolution to the Falklands issue by the end of 1982. The Argentines thus 
attempted to accelerate the negotiations while also planning for a possi-
ble invasion, scheduled if necessary to take place in the second half of the 
year. 4 In the event, however, the British refusal to make concessions on 
sovereignty combined with a sudden and unexpected crisis related to 
South Georgia—a polar island over which the two countries also con-
tested sovereignty—led the Argentines to fear that the British were on 
the verge of reinforcing the islands, which if done would render an inva-
sion impractical. As a result, the junta decided on March 26 to proceed 
with the military option. The invasion force departed on March 28; by 
the time that the British ascertained Argentine intentions on March 31 it 
was too late to do anything, and on April 2 the invasion succeeded with 
a minimum of fi ghting. 
 The conquest provoked strong reactions in both countries, with Ar-
gentines rallying to the junta while the British quickly assembled and 
dispatched a task force to retake the islands. 5 During the roughly three 
weeks that it took for the task force to reach the South Atlantic, the Ar-
gentines, working through a number of mediators, most prominently 
American secretary of state Alexander Haig, forwarded a variety of 
proposals for a negotiated settlement that would leave Argentina with 
fi nal sovereignty over the islands while offering the British a variety of 
face-saving concessions. The British, however, resolutely demanded 
Argentine withdrawal as a precondition for negotiations, and thus no 
settlement was reached prior to the arrival of the task force. 
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 Much of the war took place, unsurprisingly, at sea, where each side 
suffered losses, the biggest (and most controversial) of which was the 
sinking of the Argentine  General Belgrano . After retaking South Georgia 
on April 25, the British landed troops at a secluded bay on East Falkland 
on May 21. These units then moved across the island, facing at times 
heavy resistance, to put themselves in a position by June 14 to compel the 
surrender of the forces in the island capital of Stanley. By this point, pub-
lic opinion in Argentina had turned against the junta, which, after ac-
knowledging its defeat, was rapidly turned out of power. 
 The Interaction of Domestic Politics and Divergent Expectations 
 How then can we explain the critical decisions in this case? Historical 
attention has focused primarily on the junta, as it both took the initial 
decision to invade the islands and failed to back down in the subsequent 
crisis period. That said, the British decision to retake the islands was not 
necessarily predictable prior to the event, and thus is also worth examin-
ing. The central questions for this case then are why, after decades of 
persistent negotiation, the Argentines took the gamble of invading the 
islands at this particular point, why the British decided to assume the 
risks and costs of a military response, why the two sides were unable to 
reach a negotiated settlement to the dispute prior to the British recon-
quest of the islands, and (an almost unrecognized question in the litera-
ture) why the war ended at that point. 
 Ultimately, both diversionary motives in Argentine domestic politics 
and divergent expectations about the likely consequence of a resort to 
arms are necessary to answer these questions. The domestic-political im-
peratives confronting the junta provided a reason for urgency, and thus 
ultimately prodded them to take risks that they would not have been 
willing to take had their hold on power been more secure. At the same 
time, the junta was willing to take these risks only because they underes-
timated how large they actually were, in line with the informational 
mechanism. Without overoptimism about the probability of a British 
military response and the likely outcome of a fi nal military clash, the 
junta would not have been willing to invade in the fi rst place. 
 Domestic Political Motivations 
 The military coup in 1976 that brought the junta to power was a re-
sponse to widespread social unrest and poor economic performance. 6 It 
was thus welcomed by much of the country, especially among the more 
conservative parts of society that tended to share the political and social 
preferences of the generals. The new junta promised a neoliberal 
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economic policy and a return to order, including the repression of leftists, 
that together would restore Argentina to wealth and stability. In practice, 
however, things did not work out as well as advertised. The repression 
deemed necessary to restore stability turned out to be remarkably wide-
spread, with as many as thirty thousand Argentines “disappearing” in 
the dirty war in the fi rst few years of military rule. Meanwhile, the eco-
nomic reforms failed to generate the promised stability and growth, with 
continued high infl ation coupled with increased unemployment and 
stagnant wages. Facing international criticism for human rights abuses 
and losing the support of parts of society that were frustrated by eco-
nomic failures, the junta had to start to worry about fi ssures within the 
military that became more prominent over the course of 1981. 7
 As a result, pressure on the junta started to grow. In May 1981, General 
Videla, who had headed the military regime since the coup, completed 
his term in offi ce; his successor in turn found himself unable to deal with 
the country’s problems effectively and was ousted in December, precipi-
tating a transition to hardliners under Leopoldo Galtieri. Starting with 
protests by the mothers of some of the “disappeared,” Argentine civil 
society began to reassert itself, with leading political parties working to-
gether under the  Multipartidaria , established in January 1982, to press the 
junta to restore civilian control of the government, while the trade unions 
began to demonstrate an increased willingness to protest over poor eco-
nomic conditions. 8 In this context, the junta had to start to think more 
seriously about the possibility of transition. Indeed, several sources re-
port that army General Galtieri aimed to use his time in offi ce to put 
himself in a position to win an election after an eventual transition. 9
 Whether the goal was to stave off transition or to be in a position to 
fare well once transition arrived, the junta needed policy successes to 
enhance its legitimacy. Given the excesses of the dirty war and the eco-
nomic diffi culties, few obvious gains were available in domestic politics, 
and thus the natural solution was to look to the international realm. Here 
a contemporaneous territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Chan-
nel was headed for an unsatisfactory ending, with the junta anticipating 
that papal mediation would not yield a favorable conclusion. The Falk-
lands dispute was little more promising, as the British—torn between the 
desire not to anger Argentina and a disinclination to force the Falkland 
islanders to join Argentina against their will—had effectively given the 
islanders a veto over any possible deal, but at the same time there were 
some indications that the British might not stand fi rm if pushed. Thus 
the new government decided to make acquiring sovereignty over the is-
lands its primary goal for 1982, in the expectation that success in this 
venture would go a long way toward reestablishing the junta’s reputa-
tion for effective leadership. 10
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 In making this decision, the junta was not committing to a war with 
Britain, but it was demonstrating a willingness to consider an invasion if 
minimal demands were not met. On January 5, the junta formally or-
dered the military to develop plans for a bloodless invasion of the is-
lands, while at the same time demanding that Britain agree to a new 
negotiating framework that would culminate in a transfer of sovereignty 
by the end of the year. 11 This diplomatic approach ran the risk of anger-
ing the British and of permanently alienating the islanders and hence 
hindering a deal, but the junta adjudged that risk to be worth taking. 
Indeed, when the initial talks did not yield the desired results, the junta 
broke one of the understood rules of past negotiations by publicizing the 
nature of the discussions, including the demand for sovereignty, thereby 
ensuring a diplomatic crisis (if still, from the British perspective, an emi-
nently manageable one). At the same time, public comments hinted at 
the possible use of force. These diplomatic moves had the effect of height-
ening attention on the islands in Argentina, where newspaper editorials 
signaled to the public that it should be prepared for action of some sort 
on the issue. 12
 The risks that the junta was willing to run in the fi rst few months of 
1982 contrast sharply to the strategy that it had adopted in earlier nego-
tiations, when it was willing to accept Britain’s argument that quiet, low-
pressure diplomacy that focused on minor issues while leaving more 
divisive issues like sovereignty for later had the best chance of eventu-
ally convincing the islanders to accept a transfer to Argentina. 13 In so 
doing, they recognized that they might alienate the islanders and thus 
make a transfer more diffi cult, but they gambled that if pushed the Brit-
ish would not be willing to suffer a diplomatic breakdown over a few 
thousand people whose continued support was a constant drain on state 
revenues. When that strategy failed, the decision to invade likewise was 
predicated on an acknowledged gamble that the British would be un-
willing or unable to take back the islands. These gambles had been avail-
able earlier, but because of the risks associated with them successive 
Argentine governments had not seen them as worthwhile. Facing do-
mestic political pressures, the junta thus was willing to take risks that 
previous governments had eschewed. 
 That said, there are limits to the principal-agent story. The most impor-
tant one, discussed below, concerns the role of divergent expectations. It 
is also worth noting, however, that there are problems with the most ex-
treme diversionary interpretation of the junta’s behavior that emerged in 
the immediate aftermath of the war. Specifi cally, several commentators 
immediately after the war attributed the decision to invade to a desire to 
distract attention from large union protests over the state of the economy 
that began on March 30. 14 In reality, however, the order to invade was 
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given on March 26, and the invasion force had left the harbor on March 
28. Moreover, as was noted above, the invasion was the culmination of a 
broader strategy dating back several months, and thus could not have 
been tailored to immediate domestic concerns. 15 From this perspective, 
this case is consistent with the view that there are limits to degree of cyni-
cal diversion that elites can engage in. 
 Divergent Expectations and the Underestimation of Risk 
 More important, available evidence indicates that, even with its in-
creased tolerance for risk arising out of a desire to enhance its domestic 
position, the junta was willing to authorize an invasion only because it 
believed that international opinion would be on Argentina’s side, that 
the British would not fi ght back, and that any attempt against expecta-
tions to retake the islands would fail. These beliefs, although ultimately 
incorrect, were not without foundation, and it is thus worth investigat-
ing their origins and consequences in greater detail. 16
 Confi dence that the international community would be amenable to 
the Argentine action arose from several sources. By framing the dispute 
in terms of decolonization, the Argentines had managed to get wide-
spread support in the UN General Assembly, which had issued a number 
of favorable resolutions. 17 Meanwhile, the junta, which had impeccable 
anticommunist credentials, had established close relations with the Rea-
gan administration in the United States, which led them to expect the 
United States to adopt a neutral position in the dispute. 18 While aware 
that the use of force might pose an issue, the Argentines hoped that a 
surprise invasion would allow them to take the islands bloodlessly; in-
deed, both the Falklands and South Georgia were occupied without Brit-
ish casualties, although the Argentine forces suffered some losses. In the 
event, however, the United States tilted ever more toward Britain over 
the course of the confl ict, while the support that Argentina gained in the 
postcolonial world turned out to be of limited practical value. 
 The expectation that the British would not fi ght also had fairly solid 
foundations. Maintaining a true deterrent force on the islands, some 
eight thousand miles from Britain, would have been exorbitantly expen-
sive and would have detracted from the far more important task of ful-
fi lling Britain’s responsibilities within NATO. As a result, the British had 
installed a platoon of marines—fewer than fi fty men—backed up by the 
 Endurance , an ice patrol ship of such limited capacity as to be “a military 
irrelevance.” 19 This force was always intended as a trip wire (much like 
the NATO military presence in West Berlin), incapable of defending itself 
but generating a credible commitment to fi ght in the event of an inva-
sion. 20 However, the British commitment to this force was never 
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particularly strong, as evidenced by repeated debates over whether to 
keep paying for the  Endurance , which culminated in the decision in June 
1981 to withdraw the ship from service in 1982. 21 In this context, a blood-
less Argentine takeover could easily be construed as providing the Brit-
ish with the opportunity to make a graceful exit from the scene. 
 Indeed, in previous negotiations, the British had encouraged the idea 
that they might want to make such an exit, telling their Argentine inter-
locutors that they would be perfectly happy to cede sovereignty if the 
islanders were willing to go along with the transfer. 22 The British raised 
no strategic or economic arguments for keeping the islands, and the Tory 
government had just two years previously been willing to negotiate 
about sovereignty behind the backs of the islanders, despite the risk that 
publicity would lead to attacks by the vocal and infl uential Falklands 
lobby. 23 The British refrained from making clear deterrent threats, both 
because they expected that invasion would only follow an extended co-
ercive campaign and because they worried that any such threats might 
provoke the behavior that they were intended to prevent. 24 Moreover, 
several recent precedents gave the Argentines hope. The Thatcher gov-
ernment had been willing to negotiate away sovereignty over Rhodesia 
just the year before, while the Indian invasion of Goa in 1961 provided 
what the junta saw as a direct precedent: a military invasion of a colonial 
remnant that, while condemned in some quarters, ultimately was al-
lowed to stand. 25
 Statements and actions at the time clearly demonstrated confi dence 
that the British would not respond militarily. The invasion was carried 
out despite a signifi cant lack of readiness for war, and the junta had no 
military plans for anything beyond the initial incursion. 26 The expecta-
tion was that the occupation forces would only be needed for a few 
months; indeed, the military began transferring soldiers back to the 
mainland almost immediately once conquest had been assured. 27 In an 
interview in the fi nal days of the war, Galtieri observed that “though an 
English reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a prob-
ability. Personally, I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable.” 28
Similarly, during the mediation of Alexander Haig, Foreign Minister 
Nicanor Costa Mendez commented that he was “truly surprised that the 
British will go to war for such a small problem as these few rocky 
islands.” 29
 Moreover, the junta doubted Britain’s ability to retake the islands even 
if an attempt were made. The Argentine military was geared toward the 
capabilities needed to control the South Atlantic, in contrast to British 
preparations for land war in Europe, and Britain would not be able to 
generate any sort of quantitative superiority in forces over the Argen-
tines. 30 Initial clashes, in which the Argentines (erroneously) believed 
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that they had imposed high costs on the British while thwarting an at-
tempted landing, further encouraged the view that Britain could not re-
take the islands. 31 This view was not uniquely Argentine: given the 
tremendous distances involved and the lack of friendly bases from which 
to operate, many even among Britain’s allies believed that the attempt 
was unlikely to succeed. Indeed, a number of scholars have argued sub-
sequently that had the junta made more effective use of its available 
forces—instead of holding back its best units in interagency battles—it 
quite possibly could have won, and certainly would have imposed far 
greater losses on British forces. 32 Confi dence in victory dovetailed with 
the view that the British would not fi ght, as even if the British valued the 
islands more than expected, it made no sense to attempt to retake them if 
that mission was doomed. Taken together, these were not unreasonable 
beliefs; the Soviets, for example, apparently also believed that Britain 
would not fi ght and could not retake the islands if it tried. 33 Of course, 
“so long as Argentina was unconvinced that Britain would actually fi ght 
or that, if it did, it would succeed there was no need to renounce its fun-
damental objective.” 34
 The view from London, unsurprisingly, was different. Thatcher had 
little knowledge of military affairs, and thus relied on her advisers, such 
as Defense Minister John Nott, for guidance, although as a matter of 
principle she was inclined not to let the invasion stand. The military in 
turn quickly concluded that, although retaking the islands would not be 
easy—Admiral Fieldhouse at one point described it “the most diffi cult 
thing we have attempted since the Second World War”—it could be done 
at acceptable cost, at least so long as Britain moved quickly. 35 The navy’s 
ability to dispatch a task force within a matter of days was a basis for 
confi dence, with Nott literally overnight going from doubting that the 
islands could be retaken or that Britain could mount any sort of viable 
military response to believing “that a task force was a viable proposal 
and had a good chance of success.” 36 Moreover, many in the Cabinet be-
lieved that a demonstration of British resolve in the form of the task force 
would convince the Argentines to back down, although this belief evap-
orated as successive attempts at mediation failed. 37
 Evaluating a Commitment Problem Story 
 Before moving on to discuss the way in which the confl ict evolved 
over time, it will be useful briefl y to evaluate the plausibility of a com-
mitment problem interpretation of the war. Setting aside domestic politi-
cal concerns, the junta had no reason to believe that time was not on its 
side. Militarily, the situation in the South Atlantic was likely to grow only 
more favorable to the Argentines over time: the British Ministry of 
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Defense had been trying for years to retire the  Endurance , the only armed 
vessel in the region; the government also wished to withdraw the survey 
mission that constituted the only human presence on South Georgia. 
While both decisions were ultimately withdrawn prior to the invasion, it 
was clear that the solutions adopted were at best temporary fi xes. Mean-
while, the British had decided not to withdraw the marines who were 
scheduled to be relieved in March, instead reinforcing them with their 
intended replacements. 38 In this context, the long-term trend seemed to 
be toward the invasion becoming even easier over time. 
 That said, as with the Persian Gulf War, there is some evidence that 
local concerns about shifting power may have infl uenced Argentine pol-
icy on the margins. The decision to invade if the British refused to negoti-
ate seriously was made several months before the invasion, but at that 
point the junta did not intend to launch an invasion until later in 1982. 
The response in the British Parliament to the unexpected and unintended 
South Georgia crisis, most notably in its debate on March 23, raised fears 
that the British would reinforce the islands in the near future, thereby 
rendering it impossible to carry out the junta’s strategy of a bloodless 
takeover. 39 The junta thus decided on March 26 to launch the invasion as 
soon as possible. This decision was militarily signifi cant, in that it forced 
the junta to act with incompletely developed military plans and, more 
importantly, provided the British with a window to respond prior to the 
arrival of the stormy Southern Hemisphere winter. Shifting power con-
cerns thus accelerated the war. By the time these concerns unfolded, 
however, the junta was already committed to invading, meaning that 
these concerns do not explain the decision to invade or, equally impor-
tant, the manner in which the invasion was carried out. It is thus unsur-
prising that they did not play a signifi cant role in the adversaries’ 
subsequent conduct. 
 Views as the Confl ict Unfolded 
 Intensive diplomacy followed the Argentine invasion, highlighted by 
mediation efforts by Haig, Peruvian president Belaúnde, and UN secre-
tary general Pérez de Cuéllar. The historical record contains a remark-
able amount of detail about the course of these negotiations, but the 
relevant developments can be summed up relatively quickly. 40 The Ar-
gentines had always recognized that negotiations would necessarily fol-
low the invasion, and they were prepared to make a variety of what they 
saw as face-saving concessions to Britain to assure their success. That 
said, they resolutely insisted that any settlement reliably guarantee that 
Argentina ultimately receive sovereignty over the islands, although the 
formal transfer might occur as the outcome of some sort of negotiated 
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transition process. The British, by contrast, never wavered in rejecting 
any approach that would reward Argentine aggression with sovereignty. 
It was this fundamental difference over the future disposition of the is-
lands that prevented a negotiated agreement in the period prior to the 
insertion of the landing force. 
 During this period, it became possible for each side to at least in part 
revise its expectations about the consequences of the use of military 
force. Most obviously, the sending of the task force indicated that Britain 
was more willing to fi ght than the Argentines had believed, and the Ar-
gentines accordingly concluded that a war was indeed possible, although 
they continued to believe that there was a chance that Britain could be 
bought off at an acceptable price prior to actual clashes. Moreover, the 
response of other international actors provided an indication of how 
they likely would behave in the event of further escalation; in particular, 
the Argentines concluded that the Americans were providing signifi cant 
assistance to Britain, indeed beyond what was actually given. 41 Overall, 
then, the junta grew increasingly desperate to avoid full-scale war as the 
crisis unfolded, although at the same time the military was confi dent that 
Britain would be unable to take the islands back. 42
 By this point, however, the junta had no real freedom to maneuver. 
The initial invasion had proven remarkably popular, with protests 
against the government transforming overnight into celebrations. Al-
though quick to acknowledge that they would need to make some sort of 
concessions as a salve to British honor, the junta left no doubt that Argen-
tina would retain sovereignty over the islands. Indeed, the escalating 
economic and diplomatic costs of the crisis meant that the junta was en-
tirely dependent on success in the dispute for legitimacy, with the impli-
cation that rejecting concessions and continuing to fi ght was a “desperate 
gamble” that nonetheless was the only option that “held out any pros-
pect of success.” 43 Thus even relatively unambiguous evidence that Ar-
gentina would not manage to hold the islands did not bring about 
substantial concessions. Once the landing force was established, the best 
available option, if an increasingly unlikely one, was to stabilize the situ-
ation enough to ensure “a tolerable negotiating position.” 44 Even at this 
point, however, the junta would not concede on the sovereignty issue, 
although they were less diplomatically exposed given that the British 
refused to contemplate any concessions once they were on the verge of 
retaking the islands by force. 
 After the local surrender on June 14, the Argentines lacked the capacity 
to insert a new invasion force on the islands. That said, an end to the war 
was not foreordained. In an interview just days before the surrender, Gal-
tieri referenced the British evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940, which as he 
noted did not constitute a fi nal defeat, and promised that not even the 
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loss of the islands “would be the end of this confl ict and our defeat.” 45
The British had long worried that the Argentines might isolate the islands 
in a costly and painful diplomatic war of attrition; there is no reason why 
they could not have pursued a similar strategy of isolation and embargo 
after their initial gambit failed. Indeed, the British ambassador in the 
United States was reporting signifi cant concern in Washington that retak-
ing the islands would not necessarily bring about Argentine capitulation, 
and that the Argentines could carry out attacks indefi nitely from the air, 
making the long-term cost of maintaining the islands unacceptable. 46 Had 
they done so, the British would have faced the uncomfortable prospect of 
an extended and costly campaign in the South Atlantic over a resource of 
tangential signifi cance, with no real options for escalation that would not 
have brought about widespread international condemnation. 47
 Indeed, there is every indication that the junta contemplated exactly 
such a strategy. For several days the Argentines refused to recognize a 
British cease-fi re declaration, while Galtieri called the population to the 
Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires to build support for a continued struggle 
of unspecifi ed form. In practice, however, the continuation of the war was 
no longer an option. The disappearance of dissent had, in one scholar’s 
words, “rested on only one point of support: the conviction that the war 
could be won,” and with the surrender that support vanished. 48 The at-
tempt to rally the public was met by chants of “the boys were killed; the 
chiefs sold them out,” and the junta had to resort to violent repression of 
its own rally to restore order. 49 The junta had also lost legitimacy within its 
core constituency of the armed forces, where interservice recriminations 
quickly replaced the fi ght against the British. 50 With the loss of its ability to 
continue to prosecute the war, the junta had to concede defeat, accepting 
an end to the war and permitting a transfer within the military govern-
ment to offi cers who had been uninvolved in the war. 51 Having invested 
their entire legitimacy in the acquisition of the islands, Galtieri and the 
junta had no incentive to end the war even after the garrison’s surrender, 
but the public (and members of the military not in the junta), presented 
with incontrovertible evidence of incompetence and misrepresentation, 
refused to endorse such a move. These fi nal events—little noticed in the 
diversionary literature—highlight the importance of constraints on the 
leadership’s ability to continue to prosecute an ongoing war. 
 Summary 
 Overall, then, the decision to resort to force over the Falklands was 
motivated by both domestic politics and divergent expectations. The 
junta took a substantial risk in ordering the invasion, permanently 
alienating the islanders and ultimately provoking Britain into a military 
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response for which the Argentines were unprepared. This willingness 
to take risks stemmed from an unambiguous domestic political incen-
tive to pursue a policy success that would offset economic weakness, 
domestic repression, and diplomatic defeat in a separate high-profi le 
territorial dispute with Chile. Yet the junta was willing to take this risk 
only because it underestimated its size. International opinion was far 
more hostile to the invasion than expected, with the United States pro-
viding Britain with extensive and unanticipated assistance. More im-
portant, the British turned out to be both more resolved and more 
capable than expected, willing to pay the costs associated with sending 
a task force to the South Atlantic to retake the islands in the face of re-
sistance. Having successfully diverted opinion, the junta was unable to 
back down once it became clear that the British were willing to fi ght, 
and as a result no negotiated solution to the confl ict was possible until 
after the Argentines had been forcibly evicted from the islands. That 
said, evidence of failure rapidly turned Argentine opinion against 
the junta, which found itself with no option but to end the war and 
surrender power. 
 This case thus highlights the limits of diversionary war, both as a strat-
egy for embattled leaders and as an explanation for unusually extended 
confl icts. 52 The junta was able to use the Falklands issue for diversion, if 
only for a short period, only because it had recourse to a long-standing 
dispute on which most Argentines believed that their country had been 
eminently reasonable and had received nothing to show for their coop-
eration, and because their belief that the invasion was likely to succeed 
was quite plausible. Turning to the question of war duration, the failure 
of the junta’s gamble rapidly became apparent, and as it did so its free-
dom to maneuver likewise vanished. The consequence was a war, but a 
war that never would have lasted more than a few battles, and that ended 
as soon as the Argentine public came to realize the defi ciencies of their 
leaders’ strategy. Indeed, it appears that the junta was prepared to con-
tinue the war after the fall of the islands, but by this point they were un-
able to do so. This is exactly the process anticipated in hypothesis 4a, 
which predicts that diversionary wars will typically be short. 
 The Franco-Turkish War 
 The 1919–21 Franco-Turkish War provides an example of what I refer 
to as a policy war. In this case, a French political faction that favored co-
lonial expansion, salivating at the opportunities created by the partition 
of the Ottoman Empire, dragged the country into a war that the general 
public and the central government neither wanted nor knew much 
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about. This interpretation helps to answer a number of questions about 
an otherwise puzzling confl ict: why did France spend two years fi ghting 
a war against a country that it generally viewed favorably (and that had 
every incentive to fi nd outside allies, given the range of foes stacked up 
against it), when the territory at stake was of little value and the political 
costs of the war were quite high? Not only can the principal-agent mech-
anism explain the decision to adopt a policy that did not serve broader 
French interests, it can also explain the decision of the colonial faction to 
stifl e discussion of the war in France, which ultimately resulted in an 
extended, but not particularly costly, war. 
 History of the War 
 While the end of World War I on the Western Front was fairly orderly, 
postwar politics on the Eastern Front were extremely chaotic, with a host 
of new states jockeying for position in the power vacuum created by the 
collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman em-
pires. In the years after the war, Eastern Europe and the lands of the for-
mer Ottoman Empire experienced confl ict from the Baltic to the Holy 
Land. Even given the tendency to overlook this complex of wars, how-
ever, the Franco-Turkish War constitutes a particular lacuna in existing 
scholarship, overshadowed by the French actions in Syria and especially 
by the Greco-Turkish War. 53 That said, the Franco-Turkish War was an 
essential part of the broader Turkish independence struggle, while for 
the French it constituted an embarrassing defeat whose costs exacer-
bated the country’s economic diffi culties and contributed to the fi nancial 
crises of the mid-1920s. 
 The war concerned possession of Cilicia (roughly corresponding to 
modern-day Çukurova), a region in southern Anatolia that lies to the 
north of Syria. 54 Inter-Allied negotiation during World War I about the 
postwar disposition of the Ottoman Empire resulted in an agreement to 
allow France to claim mandates over Syria (including Lebanon) and Cili-
cia, while the British acquired Mesopotamia, the Italians acquired a re-
gion in southern Anatolia west of Cilicia, the Greeks took Smyrna 
(modern Izmir) in western Anatolia, and the Armenians were allotted an 
independent national state in the East. The basic nature of the secret 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, which in May 1916 formalized the British and 
French claims on Ottoman Territory, can be seen in fi gure 7.1 below: the 
blue zone of direct French control included coastal Syria and much of 
southeastern Anatolia, although in practice the British began impinging 
on the French zones almost from the outset (for example, quickly gaining 
unilateral control over Palestine) and the French never established an ef-
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Figure 7.1 Plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, including the zones 
claimed by France
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 French policy throughout this period involved repeated retreats to 
second-best options. What the French really wanted in Anatolia was a 
return to their pre–World War status quo, in which they had exercised a 
preeminent political and economic infl uence in the Ottoman Empire. 56 In 
this goal, the French were undercut by their allies, however, fi rst with the 
March 1915 Russian demand for Constantinople, to which the British as-
sented, and later with expanding British territorial interests in the Mid-
dle East. 57 The French thus retreated to trying to secure at least a generally 
accepted claim to some portion of Ottoman territory, centering on Syria, 
yet even the British concessions in the Sykes-Picot Agreement were un-
dermined as the British, who had far more soldiers in the Middle East, 
gradually encroached on French claims while encouraging undesired 
Greek activism in western Anatolia. 58 
 Meanwhile, the political situation in Turkey was changing quickly, as 
the supine Ottoman Porte—the traditional government of the Ottoman 
Empire—lost legitimacy to a nationalist resistance headed by Mustafa 
Kemal (later venerated as the Atatürk, or father of Turks) and located in 
the Anatolian interior. 59 As the extent of Allied demands on Turkey be-
came clear, the Porte’s strategy of relying on British magnanimity to re-
tain power became increasingly unpopular, while increased organization 
and early military successes encouraged the view that the Turks could 
successfully oppose their enemies. 
 The emergence of Kemal’s force coincided with the initial guerrilla re-
sistance against the French, who had assumed control over Cilicia in No-
vember 1919 and almost immediately encountered low-level but 
persistent military opposition. 60 A successful uprising at Maraş in early 
1920 spurred further opposition throughout the region, forcing the 
French to consolidate their overstretched forces in a few strategic locales. 
Unable to defeat the resistance, the French tried to reach a negotiated 
agreement with Kemal, but their refusal to contemplate withdrawal from 
Cilicia and their support for the Porte ultimately prevented any durable 
agreement. 61 In the face of continued guerrilla resistance, the French 
were able to achieve some local military victories, but never came close 
to pacifying the contested region. Ultimately, with the impossibility of 
overcoming the resistance (at least at acceptable cost) clear, and with 
growing threats to the more highly valued possessions in Syria, the 
French negotiated a humiliating withdrawal in the Ankara Agreement of 
October 1921, whose terms were later carried over into the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne. 
 The war thus ended with the French withdrawing from Cilicia in hu-
miliation, having abandoned almost all their claims to the region. Their 
troubles in Cilicia were an embarrassment internationally and had un-
dermined efforts to achieve political goals elsewhere. 62 Their withdrawal 
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was also a disaster for the native Christian population, largely Arme-
nians, who, having already suffered mass killings during World War I, 
generally fl ed rather than await retribution for their involvement in 
French occupation. 63 For the Turks, the victory was a signifi cant step on 
the way to establishing a truly independent Turkey, free of the constraints 
that had hindered the Ottoman Empire, although full achievement of the 
Turkish national state came only with victory over the Greeks and the 
Treaty of Lausanne. 
 Domestic P olitics 
 Ultimately, a convincing explanation for the Franco-Turkish War must 
examine the role of the French colonial party in pursuing goals that, for 
all their talk of French prestige, were not in the interest of the country as 
a whole. 64 French colonialists had long been concerned with expanding 
the French Empire, despite the absence of clear national interests beyond 
simple prestige that would be served by doing so. In particular, oft-cited 
economic benefi ts had little basis in reality, and business leaders were 
correspondingly uninterested in acquiring new colonies. Moreover, colo-
nial aspirations served as a distraction from France’s central security 
concern, which was Germany. In the Cilician case, the aspirations of the 
colonial party created confl ict with Britain at precisely the time when the 
French needed a close relationship with the British for protection against 
Germany. The colonialists recognized that confl ict over Cilicia would be 
unpopular and thus took steps to misrepresent their actions, the ease of 
their task, and the level of resistance that they faced. This strategy gener-
ated systematic misperceptions in Paris, which in turn ironically tied the 
hands of the colonial faction when it fi nally decided that the time had 
come to abandon Cilicia. It was these actions that ultimately produced 
both an unnecessary (and unnecessarily extended) war and a substantial 
humiliation for France. 
 The French Colonial Party and the Interests of France 
 The French colonial party was relatively small in numbers but exer-
cised a signifi cant infl uence over French foreign policy in the decades 
prior to World War I. Adherents to the party were spread across some 
fi fty overlapping societies, with a total membership that certainly num-
bered under ten thousand and most likely numbered under fi ve thou-
sand. 65 Starting around 1890, however, they took advantage of their 
strength among civil servants and the chronic instability of French gov-
ernments under the Third Republic to exert a consistent infl uence on 
French foreign policy in favor of colonial expansion. 66 Their infl uence 
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further increased during World War I, when the urgency of the war on 
the Western Front distracted their opponents from more distant issues 
and made “the abdication by the cabinet of its responsibility for colonial 
war aims even more complete than it might otherwise have been.” 67
Thus, for example, François Georges-Picot, who represented the French 
in the negotiations with the British that led to the Sykes-Picot Agree-
ment, drafted his own instructions for the negotiations, which highly 
optimistically called for France to receive the entire Mediterranean coast 
from Egypt to Cilicia, extending inward to Mosul and the Tigris; Prime 
Minister Briand accepted them without amendment. 68
 In pursuing the acquisition of colonies, the colonial party was consis-
tently hampered by the diffi culty it had identifying and articulating posi-
tive benefi ts that would ensue from an expansion of the empire. The 
British had already secured the most valuable colonies, most notably 
India, while the zones that the French acquired were frequently of no real 
economic value. Indeed, for many of the French colonialists, value for 
French finance and industry was hardly relevant: the motivation 
was French prestige. 69 Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that 
French business fi gures were frequently less excited about colonial ac-
quisitions than members of the colonial party wished for them to be. 
Thus, for example, during World War I colonialists in government 
formed a commission with the sole intent of recommending colonial ex-
pansion and called in leading business fi gures in the expectation that 
they would provide support for such an enterprise. They were thus 
sorely disappointed when business leaders expressed almost no interest 
in overseas acquisitions and instead called for increased tariff protec-
tion. 70 It is thus hard to argue that France’s colonial acquisitions served a 
useful economic purpose. 71
 More important, colonial aspirations if anything detracted from French 
security. Unlike Britain, which benefi ted from the defense provided by 
the English Channel, the French were a continental power that had to 
worry about threats from both Germany and Italy. The Germans in par-
ticular were a serious concern: they had imposed a humiliating defeat on 
France in the Franco-Prussian War and came close to doing so again in 
1914 in a war that the French won narrowly and only with the help of a 
number of signifi cant allies. At a general level, then, pursuing imperial 
dreams in the Levant was a distraction from the far more important task 
of fi nding a way to keep Germany down and to begin the process of do-
mestic recovery from the war. 72 Moreover, the French were keenly aware 
that security against Germany in the long run would require assistance 
from allies. Communism in Russia, isolationism in the United States, and 
general weakness among the remaining Western powers left Britain the 
most attractive option in this regard and thus provided good reason to 
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avoid antagonizing the British. 73 For the colonial party, however, the de-
feat of Germany left Britain as the only other signifi cant imperial power 
and thus as the natural opponent, even while the two sides were for-
mally allied during World War I. 74 The inevitable consequence was to 
risk alienating the very country on which the French relied for security 
over overseas interests of minimal strategic signifi cance. Indeed, colonial 
disagreements contributed notably to the deterioration in Franco-British 
relations in the years after the war. 75
 Given the costs of acquiring and administering new colonies, the ab-
sence of clear economic benefi ts, and the geopolitical dangers of estrange-
ment from Britain, it is unsurprising that the colonial faction lacked 
popular support. Indeed, the colonialists were quite aware of this un-
popularity, as when a leading colonialist noted that “French public opin-
ion will for a long time preserve its desire to repress all efforts at colonial 
competition. . . . This attitude is unfortunate but incontestable.” 76
 Colonial Policy in Cilicia: Hiding the War 
 Given the unpopularity of their preferred policy, the colonial party re-
sponded by pursuing their desired ends while going to great lengths to 
avoid attracting the attention of Paris. They thus maintained expansive 
territorial demands in Cilicia while simultaneously doing everything 
they could not to call on resources (particularly soldiers) from metropoli-
tan France. Instead, they responded to the insuffi ciency of French forces 
in the Levant by drawing on Muslim colonial troops (despite fears that 
they might prove unreliable in fi ght against Muslim Turks) and, more 
problematically, by co-opting local Armenians to serve as legionnaires, 
despite their new soldiers’ manifest defi ciencies and proclivity for at-
tacking Turkish civilians. 77 The upshot of these strategies was to leave 
French forces perpetually undermanned and staffed with unreliable 
troops, whose repeated attacks on the local population ultimately helped 
to ensure the failure of French efforts to control and pacify the region. 
 The colonialists further protected themselves from constraints im-
posed by Paris by using their levers of control to ensure that as little in-
formation as possible concerning Cilicia, and especially concerning the 
diffi culties that French forces encountered there, reached the eyes and 
ears of parliamentarians and the public in Paris. The colonialists had a 
signifi cant informational advantage to begin with—the French public 
tended to confuse Cilicia with Silesia (which lies in present-day Poland), 
for example—and thus needed only to prevent unambiguously discred-
iting information from appearing while muddying the waters in public 
discussions. 78 To the end of the war, colonialists in the Quai d’Orsay—the 
French foreign ministry—imposed a general news blackout that, despite 
 The Limits on Leaders 
[197]
early Parliamentary complaints that the government was hiding the 
truth from the people, prevented the opposition from mounting effective 
criticism. 79 The effectiveness of the news blackout—the socialist press ul-
timately was limited to reprinting reports from British and German 
newspapers outside the control of the colonialists—meant that critics 
had to resort to arguments about the illegitimacy of colonialism, to which 
the colonialists could respond with equally principled arguments about 
protecting the local Christian population. 80 The evidence for more pow-
erful critiques about the failure of pacifi cation attempts and the likeli-
hood of backlash against the local Christians, which would more clearly 
have undercut the colonialists’ case, was simply unavailable. 
 Public Opposition, Aborted Withdrawal, and Painful Defeat 
 At the same time that hiding the war allowed the colonial party to 
pursue goals that most Frenchmen would not have supported, it also did 
much to ensure their ultimate failure. The reluctance to ask for resources 
from the metropole meant that General Gouraud, the French commander 
in Syria and Cilicia, would be perpetually short on men and unable to 
pacify the region directly; reliance on the Armenians, while addressing 
the manpower shortage, ultimately worsened the problem by alienating 
the local population. Meanwhile, even those limited funds that govern-
ment was providing for action in the Levant came under threat as parlia-
mentarians became increasingly aware that the government was hiding 
something. 81 By March 1921, Prime Minister Briand had to deal with a 
parliament that was “slashing his military budget by hundreds of mil-
lions of francs every day.” 82 These developments are illustrative of the 
constraints that domestic opposition can place on policymakers intent on 
adopting policies that do not serve the national interest. In practice, these 
domestic constraints, combined with complications in Cilicia and Syria 
discussed below, tied the hands of the colonial party suffi ciently to con-
vince them the attempt to control Cilicia was now a lost cause. 
 As a result, General Gouraud and the colonialists prepared a change 
of strategy. The colonialists had always valued Syria more highly than 
Cilicia, and the emergence of a signifi cant threat from Arab nationalists 
under Emir Faisal committed to incorporating Syria into a broader Arab 
state posed a serious threat that ultimately induced the French to forci-
bly seize Damascus in July 1920. 83 Even after the victory over Faisal, 
who decamped to become king of Iraq, the French faced continuing un-
rest in Syria, which culminated in a signifi cant revolt between 1925 and 
1927. 84 Given this situation, the French thus had a strong incentive to 
reach an understanding with the Kemalists that would permit the rede-
ployment of troops from Cilicia to Syria. Kemal was aware of French 
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diffi culties, however, and consistently rejected proposed deals that 
would formally recognize Turkish sovereignty over Cilicia while leav-
ing the French with effective control. By September 1920, therefore, the 
colonialists reluctantly concluded that Cilicia was not worth the effort 
required to hold it. 85
 At this point, however, the colonialists found themselves entrapped 
by their own chicanery. Precisely because of their efforts to suppress 
negative information about events in the Levant, policymakers in Paris 
were uninformed about the extent of diffi culties there. As a result, 
Prime Minister Georges Leygues, who admitted to an Armenian diplo-
mat that he knew almost nothing about events on the ground in Cilicia, 
reversed the withdrawal policies and ordered a signifi cant escalation 
of the war. 86 This move torpedoed any chance at a settlement in the 
immediate future but did nothing to improve the French position in 
Cilicia, as the troops devoted to the escalation in Cilicia were needed 
back in Syria in short order to restore a deteriorating situation there. 
It was thus only when Gouraud, who obviously was fully aware of 
the problems in the region, in consultations in Paris demanded full 
withdrawal from Cilicia that the French returned to seriously (and in-
creasingly importunately) seeking a negotiated settlement. 87 This de-
velopment, while not anticipated in the theoretical discussion of 
domestic politics and war, nonetheless is consistent with the observa-
tion that to be effective in diverting policy, agents must keep their 
actions relatively quiet. 
 To summarize, a small but well-placed faction in French politics was 
able to divert policy to pursue its preferred aim of colonial expansion, 
despite the high costs and limited benefi ts of such a policy for France 
more generally. By limiting discussion of the war, the colonialists en-
sured that they could continue to stake a claim to Cilicia even in the face 
of sustained guerrilla resistance. The strategies that they used to main-
tain that policy ultimately undercut their ability to win the war, however, 
and the combination of increasing checks domestically and growing 
threats in the Levant ultimately forced them to back down. That said, a 
reasonable case can be made that this strategy would have worked 
better at a different time. The First World War meant that the French pub-
lic was unusually attuned to foreign policy and, given war weariness, 
more reluctant to pay signifi cant costs for minor policy aims. 88 In other 
settings, the colonialists might have been able to entrap Paris by fi rst 
staking a claim and then convincing the government to provide the re-
sources to protect a claim that it would not originally have advanced. In 
such a situation, the war might have been substantially longer than it 
actually was. 89
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 The Limits of Alternate Mechanisms 
 In contrast to the clear domestic political story, neither commitment 
problems nor overoptimism seem to have played a signifi cant role in this 
war. While the reestablishment of control over Anatolia certainly 
strengthened Turkey relative to its neighbors (including the French in 
Syria), the French were not worried about this development, largely be-
cause they expected to be able to restore their historically good relations 
with the Turks once the war was over. As for optimism, while overopti-
mistic prognostications were present, they are better understood as part 
of a duplicitous campaign to justify the French claim to Cilicia than as 
genuine beliefs about the likely outcome of a war. 
 Consider fi rst potential concerns related to the restoration of Turkish 
power. For several reasons, the French did not feel threatened by this ac-
cretion in capabilities. Given continued disputes with the Greeks, British, 
and Armenians, in the immediate term Kemal and the Turks had every 
reason not to intervene in Syria, the one place where they could poten-
tially have threatened French interests. Indeed, during the war Kemal 
had generally been cool to suggestions of military cooperation from 
Arabs in Syria, given the danger that such cooperation would complicate 
attempts to end the war in Cilicia and hence delay the restoration of the 
generally friendly relations that Turkey had had with France in the past. 90
Thus the French appear not to have worried that surrendering Cilicia 
would simply have allowed the Turks to bring the war to Syria. 
 In the longer term, of course, a Turkey that successfully fought off its 
opponents (still not guaranteed at the time of the Ankara Agreement) 
might have been able to threaten France’s hold over Syria. That said, 
there were several reasons why the French were not worried about such 
gains. 91 The French had had close relations with the Ottoman Empire 
prior to World War I and, as was noted above, would have preferred a 
situation in which they retained a signifi cant degree of infl uence over a 
unifi ed Turkey to its complete partition. A not insignifi cant benefi t was 
that the Turks might be induced to repay the Ottoman Empire’s debts. 92
Moreover, given the historical rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia, a united Turkey was a logical partner in the attempt to prevent 
the spread of communism, a particular concern of French governments 
during this period. 93 Most important, the signifi cant animosity felt by 
Arabs in the Middle East toward the Turks—a consequence of hundreds 
of years of repressive rule—meant that the obstacles to reestablishing the 
Ottoman Empire were in practice insurmountable, a point that Kemal 
appears to have been fully aware of. It is thus unsurprising that debates 
about withdrawal from Cilicia focused on the fate of the Christian 
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population in Anatolia and on possible reputational costs in France’s 
Muslim colonies; indeed, French parliamentarians concluded that that 
an agreement with Turkey would provide better security for Syria than 
occupation of Cilicia possibly could. 94
 An argument grounded in overoptimism about the ease of pacifying 
Cilicia is similarly unconvincing. This is not to say that overoptimistic 
prognostications were not present: colonialists predicted both that 
France’s civilizing mission and experience with prior Muslim colonies 
would lead the population to accept them and also (contradictorily) that 
the local population in Cilicia consisted primarily of Christian Arme-
nians who would constitute logical allies. 95 On closer analysis, however, 
these predictions appear to have been less than entirely sincere. Thus, for 
example, the colonial party heavily lobbied local Muslims and Christian 
Arabs to submit petitions for a French protectorate that they then used as 
evidence of spontaneous local support; similarly, the overestimation of 
the size of the Armenian population relative to the Turks was accom-
plished in part through the deliberate deception of omitting from the 
count of Turks anyone who was not ethnically Turkish, who did not ad-
here to Sunni Islam, or who spoke Arabic, despite the fact that the vast 
majority of those so omitted could be counted on to side with the Turks 
in the event of a confl ict. 96 To the extent that the French government in 
Paris was overoptimistic, it was as a consequence of these sorts of 
misrepresentations. 
 Moreover, in many respects the French were unusually accurate in 
their assessments. They were the fi rst of the World War I allies to recog-
nize the importance of Kemal’s movement, negotiating with him even 
before fi ghting broke out. 97 As a result, the obsequiousness of the Porte 
provided little basis for comfort. Likewise, it was almost immediately 
apparent that the Armenians—who fi rst opposed the French presence 
altogether out of a desire to construct a Greater Armenia and then repeat-
edly attacked Turkish civilians in retribution for past attacks or, later, to 
undermine negotiations with Kemal—would constitute diffi cult and 
counterproductive allies. 98 Given the quick diffi culties that the French 
encountered and their unwillingness to contemplate the sort of escala-
tion that would have been necessary to address these problems, it is hard 
to argue that the war lasted for as long as it did because of sustained 
French overoptimism. 
 Summary 
 In summary, to understand what happened in the Franco-Turkish War, 
we need to examine developments within French domestic politics. In 
the face of a well-organized colonial movement, the French government 
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lost control over imperial policymaking, not only overseas but in Paris 
itself. 99 As the primary group that cared about imperial policy, the colo-
nial faction in France secured the relevant policymaking posts and then 
proceeded to pursue policies that few in France would have chosen. The 
expansion into the Levant, including Cilicia—despite the almost com-
plete absence of interest among the business and fi nance fi gures who 
were supposed to benefi t, the strong public demand for demobilization, 
and the likelihood that this policy would damage relations with key al-
lies and thus undermine French security in Europe—thus involved the 
colonialists making political demands on Turkey that the French public 
was not willing to back up. Under these circumstances, when fi ghting 
ensued, the French forces in the Levant were incapable of asserting con-
trol over the situation. The colonialists nonetheless remained committed 
to trying to salvage some sort of position in Cilicia, with the result that 
their begrudging concessions were never enough to match what the Ke-
malists knew they could get by just extending the war until discontent in 
Paris forced a unilateral withdrawal. The threat to Syria, combined with 
the constraints increasingly imposed from Paris, prompted Gouraud to 
begin a unilateral withdrawal from Cilicia, but here the colonialists were 
undermined by their own strategy, as a new prime minister, unaware of 
the extent of the diffi culties in Cilicia precisely because of the strategy 
adopted by the colonialists, overruled the decision to withdraw, thus 
substantially extending the war before a fi nal French withdrawal in 1921. 
 Overall, then, this war almost certainly would not have happened had 
the colonial party been kept on a tighter leash, and it certainly would 
have ended sooner. These fi ndings are consistent with the argument that 
in “policy” wars—nondiversionary principal-agent confl icts—leaders 
will attempt to limit the availability of information, and that to the extent 
that they are successful in doing so the war may be relatively long. In-
deed, had the colonialists not chosen a particularly inauspicious time for 
their overseas adventure, it is likely that the center would not have im-
posed constraints as quickly and hence that the war might have dragged 
on substantially longer. 
 Neither the Falklands War nor the Franco-Turkish War can be ex-
plained without recourse to domestic politics. In the former case, a gov-
ernment with a shaky hold on power saw a military clash as an 
opportunity to restore its position, and thus took a gamble that it other-
wise would not have undertaken. In the latter, a small set of policymak-
ers with interests at odds with those of the broader public whom they 
theoretically represented fought a war to advance claims that their con-
stituents would not have backed. In each case, these decisions brought 
about the deaths of soldiers in the pursuit of objectives that can hardly be 
seen as advancing their interests and that in any event were not achieved. 
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The only silver lining to this story is that in each case fewer soldiers died 
than the responsible policymakers might have been willing to sacrifi ce. 
In the Falklands War, an initially successful gamble backfi red as the Brit-
ish proved both more willing and better able to respond militarily than 
the Argentine junta predicted; by the end, reaction on the streets and 
within the armed forces meant that any attempt to extend the war be-
yond the fall of Stanley—a military possibility, if not a political one—was 
doomed to failure. In the Franco-Turkish War, the knowledge that they 
would not have the backing of Paris forced the colonial party into a strat-
egy that limited the direct costs of the war and militated against substan-
tial escalation, albeit at the cost of lowering the probability of victory. 
Both wars were thus internally limited: the Falklands confl ict ended be-
fore the Argentine leadership would have chosen to end it, while the war 
in Cilicia was less deadly than it likely would have been had the colonial 
party had free rein to spend France’s resources as it wished. At the same 
time, commitment problems played no role in either of these wars, con-
sistent with the argument that they tend to produce wars more destruc-
tive than either of these. 
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 Conclusion 
 Recapitulations, Implications, and Prognostications 
 Most interstate wars are limited, in either duration or intensity. In a 
small number, however, intense fi ghting continues for years without 
the two sides resolving their differences. Indeed, in rare cases one side 
in a war categorically refuses to negotiate with its opponent, despite 
the extraordinary costs of a war to the death. The long, intense con-
fl icts, which I have referred to as “unlimited wars,” may be rare, but 
they are responsible for most of the suffering caused by war in the past 
two centuries. Existing scholarly explanations for these wars have not 
been entirely satisfying, however. Political scientists and historians 
have generally been more interested in why wars start than why they 
end and frequently focus exclusively on the most destructive and po-
litically consequential confl icts. These studies have contributed many 
valuable insights, but they have also left an important gap—the fi eld 
simply did not have a convincing answer to the question of what sepa-
rates the many more limited confl icts from the few that are particularly 
destructive. Why, in short, do the two sides in a war sometimes come 
to a quick resolution of their dispute, while in others they refuse to 
resolve their political disagreements even in the face of extended 
and painful fi ghting? This book, I hope, helps to fi ll this gap in our 
knowledge. 
 In this conclusion, I fi rst recapitulate the arguments and fi ndings in 
this book. The next section highlights their implications for two related 
topics—civil war and strategies of confl ict management—that are not 
discussed elsewhere in the book. The fi nal section discusses the implica-
tions of my fi ndings for questions about the future of war and of interna-
tional politics more generally. 
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 Recapitulations: Little Wars, Long Wars, 
Large Wars, and Wars to the Death 
 In this book, I argue that the size of wars is a function of the causal 
mechanisms that drive them. When countries fi ght because their leaders 
disagree about what is likely to happen once the shooting begins, events 
in the war cause expectations to converge—more quickly when fi ghting 
is more intense—until a mutually agreeable settlement appears. When 
leaders pursue private goals at the expense of the national interest (the 
principal-agent mechanism), they face domestic constraints that force 
them either to settle quickly or to ensure that fi ghting is not too intense, 
so that they can distract public attention from the war. Only commitment 
problem wars are thus not logically limited. In situational commitment 
problems, a declining power begins a preventive war to prevent the an-
ticipated consequences of decline; doing so, however, entails high war 
aims that the declining power will be reluctant to relinquish even in the 
face of battlefi eld diffi culties. Moreover, in some cases, the target of a 
preventive attack concludes that its adversary is dispositionally aggres-
sive and undeterred by the costs of fi ghting, and hence that peace can 
only be guaranteed by fundamental change in the adversary’s political 
system. Given these beliefs, negotiation is futile; the only acceptable 
form of war termination is the opponent’s unconditional surrender. The 
remainder of this section recapitulates the logic of these claims and the 
evidence adduced to support them. 
 Informational W ars 
 Under the informational mechanism, war participants fi ght because 
they disagree about what is likely to happen should they resort to war. 
Indeed, as Blainey noted, they generally disagree quite substantially, ex-
pecting not only to win but to do so quickly and at low cost. Once fi ght-
ing begins, optimistic expectations will be challenged by events on the 
battlefi eld. If both sides expect to win the opening battle, at least one will 
be surprised when it is fought. That surprise in turn provides reason to 
revisit one’s expectations, allowing for an increased probability that the 
war will end badly. Once this possibility is acknowledged, political set-
tlements that previously seemed unattractive will become more palat-
able. As the participants lower their demands, a settlement that both 
prefer to continued fi ghting will eventually appear; at this point, the par-
ticipants should identify the settlement and end the war. Indeed, because 
both sides expect to win quickly, the amount of surprise in the war will 
be large, with the result that updating of beliefs (and hence settlement) 
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will occur in a matter of months rather than years, especially when fi ght-
ing is relatively intense. 
 Both quantitative and qualitative evidence provide support for these 
claims. In statistical analysis, high war intensity, which should proxy for 
the speed at which information is revealed, is associated with shorter wars 
and with quicker settlement, although demonstrating this effect required 
separating out the commitment problem wars, which can be both long 
and intense. Two case studies provide further support. In the nineteenth-
century Anglo-Iranian War, an initial disagreement about British resolve 
was cleared up by the onset of fi ghting, allowing for a quick political set-
tlement. More recently, the Persian Gulf War of 1991 occurred because 
Saddam Hussein underestimated both American willingness to fi ght for 
Kuwait and the opposing coalition’s ability to evict Iraqi forces from oc-
cupied Kuwait at acceptable cost; once the course of fi ghting demonstrated 
the coalition’s resolve and capability, Saddam backtracked dramatically in 
his political demands, thus permitting a settlement. 
 By contrast, arguments based on divergent expectations provide an 
unconvincing explanation for larger wars like World War II. Hitler and 
his generals recognized that Germany’s initial expansion was quite risky 
and had the potential to plunge the country into an unaffordable long 
war, but they undertook it anyway; even more glaringly, they refused to 
contemplate negotiation with the Soviet Union even as military defeat 
and occupation became ever more glaringly inevitable. Similarly, despite 
the undeniable military disaster of the collapse of France and the expec-
tation of an imminent German invasion of the British Isles, British lead-
ers refused altogether to negotiate with Germany, even when German 
demands proved to be relatively moderate. While the belief that the Ger-
man economy was vulnerable provided some (poorly grounded) basis 
for confi dence, the informational mechanism simply cannot explain why 
a country that had seen its strategy for victory completely undone and 
that faced the imminent threat of total defeat would have been unwilling 
to even consider negotiation. 
 Taken together, these fi ndings indicate strongly that wars driven pri-
marily by the informational mechanism tend to be limited. As most wars 
are limited, this fi nding is quite consistent with the view that differing 
expectations about how the war will go account for most uses of force. 
That said, this mechanism cannot account for the most destructive wars. 
 Principal-Agent W ars 
 Domestic-political explanations for war are unifi ed under what I refer 
to as the principal-agent mechanism. Under this mechanism, leaders use 
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war to pursue goals, be they a stronger hold on power or policy goals in 
foreign or domestic politics, that the public would not support, at least at 
the costs that the war entails. They must worry, however, about the con-
straints—whether they be institutional checks on policy, the army’s re-
fusal to fi ght, or the possibility of removal from power—that society can 
place on a ruler who is seen as following undesirable policies. As a result, 
highly visible diversionary strategies, as with the Falklands War, will be 
successful at best for a short period of time before the public catches on 
that the leaders are running unnecessary risks or refusing reasonable 
settlement offers and withdraws support. If the leader is able to keep the 
war less visible, however, most obviously by ensuring that the fi ghting is 
not particularly intense, then she will have greater freedom of action and 
likely will be able to extend a war for longer if necessary. In either case, 
however, the constraints placed on leaders mean that these wars will not 
be both long and intense. 
 Again, both qualitative and quantitative work provides evidence in 
support of these propositions. As with the informational mechanism, the 
path to peace depends on the revelation of information through war, in 
this case to the public. The relationship between war intensity and the 
speed of settlement in the noncommitment problem wars thus is also 
consistent with theoretical expectations for the principal-agent mecha-
nism. Moreover, consistent with the argument that constraints on leaders 
limit their ability to impose policy unilaterally, I fi nd that leaders of dem-
ocratic states—who face greater institutional constraints on their ac-
tions—tend to settle more quickly, although the relevant relationships 
are less statistically robust than some project. Contrary to some prior 
work, I also found no evidence to suggest that partially democratic war 
losers present particular obstacles to settlement. 
 Case studies of the Falklands War and the Franco-Turkish War are 
similarly consistent with these arguments. In the Falklands War, a mili-
tary junta that faced threats to its hold on power was willing to run risks 
that it would not otherwise has countenanced, if only because it under-
estimated the size of those risks. By invading the Falklands, the junta 
brought about a war with Britain in which it could not make concessions 
on the central issue—fi nal sovereignty over the islands—without losing 
power, and thus it was willing to continue the war even after the Argen-
tine garrison was forced to capitulate. Military failures, however, turned 
the public against the leadership and left it unable to continue the war 
or even to maintain its hold on power. The post–World War I Franco-
Turkish War by contrast was undertaken not to divert the public from 
domestic troubles but because foreign policy had come under the control 
of a faction that wished to expand France’s colonial empire, even in the 
face of general opposition to such a policy and at the cost of a signifi cant 
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deterioration in France’s security in Europe. In line with theoretical ex-
pectations, the colonial faction stifl ed coverage of the war in Paris while 
taking steps to limit demands on the central government and thereby 
increase their freedom of action. This approach allowed for an extended 
war, although in the end funding cuts imposed by a hostile legislature 
combined with threats to their position in Syria to force the colonialists to 
abandon their claim to Cilicia, the territory in dispute with Turkey. Once 
again, therefore, domestic constraints on undesired leadership behavior 
brought about war termination, although because the colonial faction 
was able to keep its actions quiet this war lasted substantially longer. 
Overall, then, both theory and evidence indicate that principal-agent 
problems in domestic politics can account both for relatively short wars 
and for longer confl icts, but that they cannot account for wars that are 
both long and intense. 
 Commitment Problems: Preventive Wars 
and Unconditional Surrender 
 Only commitment problems, in their two different guises, remain to 
account for the most destructive unlimited wars. When faced with a sit-
uational commitment problem, declining powers fi ght preventive wars 
because they fear that if current trends continue they will be forced into 
unpalatable concessions or a war on worse terms. War can only address 
this problem if it forestalls the decline, however, and typically the vic-
tory necessary to prevent the decline from occurring will be quite large. 
As a result, in wars driven by this mechanism, the initiator typically has 
unusually large war aims and is unwilling to settle on intermediate 
terms, a combination that frequently leads to unusually risky military 
and diplomatic strategies. If the initial attack miscarries, which, given 
the risky strategies often chosen, it frequently will, the result can be a 
quite extended military confl ict, in which even signifi cant suffering may 
not be suffi cient to convince the declining power to settle. I argue that 
these wars will be rare, precisely because these wars tend to be risky and 
costly, but that when they happen they are likely to be unusually 
destructive. 
 This argument has a number of testable implications for the conduct 
and termination of war. Statistical tests reveal that larger shifts in relative 
prewar capabilities, which proxy for anticipated future shifts, are associ-
ated with more destructive wars, an in particular with increased diffi -
culty reaching a political settlement. By contrast, when leaders have 
reason to fear decline, they are more likely to resort to relatively risky 
strategies, with the result that these wars are unusually likely to end 
through the conquest of one side by the other, sometimes quite quickly. 
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 Qualitative evidence also provides signifi cant support. The nine-
teenth-century Paraguayan War, which almost totally destroyed Para-
guay while imposing incredible costs on its opponents as well, started 
because Paraguayan president Francisco Solano López feared that a rap-
prochement between Argentina and Brazil and an effectively joint inter-
vention in Uruguay would put his neighbors in a position to partition his 
country. Facing this increasing threat, he decided that an aggressive war 
to break up the incipient alliance and restore the government of Uruguay 
was preferable to the risks associated with accepting continued relative 
decline. He thus launched an aggressive and risky war that, although 
understandable given the diffi cult situation he faced, ultimately miscar-
ried badly. Adolf Hitler in Germany similarly believed his nation to be 
headed for a serious decline that, if not addressed, might well lead to the 
extinction of the German race, although in this case his beliefs were 
grounded more in his ideology than in the structural situation of Ger-
many. Moreover, by the late 1930s, he had concluded that the combina-
tion of German rearmament and Stalin’s purge of the military had 
opened up a narrow window of opportunity for Germany to make the 
substantial territorial gains necessary to address the broader decline 
identifi ed by his ideology. He thus launched an incredibly aggressive 
and risky war with the ultimate goal of annexing much of European Rus-
sia; as long as the war continued he resisted any form of settlement with 
the Soviet Union. Shorter case studies of the Crimean War, the Pacifi c 
War in World War II, and the Iran-Iraq War provide further support. In 
the Crimean War, the British believed the Russians to be on the verge of 
acquiring control over Constantinople and the Black Sea Straits and re-
sponded by fi ghting for war aims designed to drive the Russians back to 
a point at which such gains were impossible. The Japanese believed that 
only signifi cant expansion could maintain their status as a great power; 
the urgency with which they sought that expansion increased dramati-
cally as they perceived a window of opportunity created by World War II 
in Europe and as an American oil embargo threatened to throttle their 
military forces. Finally, Saddam Hussein saw the disruption created by 
the Iranian Revolution as a golden opportunity to revise the results of 
past disagreements in Iraq’s favor and potentially eliminate the threat 
that an ideologically hostile regime posed to his hold on power. 
 Wars to the Death 
 Even in preventive wars, the declining power remains at least theo-
retically open to negotiation, if not on terms that the rising power would 
be at all likely to accept. Thus, once his attack had clearly miscarried, 
Paraguay’s López demonstrated at least a potential willingness to talk, 
Conclusion
[209]
while Hitler was willing to negotiate with Britain and seems to have 
expected that some form of rump Russia would survive beyond the 
Urals. In both these wars, however, as well as in the Pacifi c component 
of World War II and the Iran-Iraq War, some participants categorically 
refused to negotiate with the existing regime on the opposing side, in-
stead preferring to fi ght a war to the death. This behavior, which I refer 
to as a sincere demand for unconditional surrender, guarantees a par-
ticularly long and bloody war; the preference for such a war over any 
possible settlement is puzzling from a theoretical perspective. Existing 
work, however, has not provided a good explanation for it, nor can any 
of the three mechanisms discussed here provide a fully convincing 
account. 
 I argue that sincere demands for unconditional surrender arise out of 
a two-part process. First, a declining power launches an aggressive pre-
ventive war designed to forestall that decline; then the target of the 
preventive war attributes the attack not to the fear of decline but to the 
innately aggressive disposition of the opposing ruler or of the oppos-
ing society more generally. This inference, however, implies the exis-
tence of what could be called a dispositional commitment problem: an 
innately aggressive opponent will view any peace deal as simply pro-
viding an opportunity to choose the optimal time and place for the next 
attack. Having attributed the war to the enemy’s aggressive character, 
the target of the war thus logically concludes that a viable peace will 
require the fundamental remaking of the opposing political system, 
something that can only be achieved following a total victory. The re-
sult is a war to the death. I further argue that this process is more likely 
when the rising power that is targeted in the attack lacks the intentions 
attributed to it by the power that fears decline. This discussion identi-
fi es a range of testable hypotheses that can be tested in case study 
analysis. 
 The case studies examined here correspond closely to this argument. 
Thus, in the Paraguayan War, López feared that Brazil intended to work 
with Argentina to partition Paraguay. This fear was reasonable, but Bra-
zilian actions after the war, when they had every opportunity to extin-
guish Paraguayan independence, demonstrate that they were misplaced; 
the subsequent Brazilian refusal to negotiate—justifi ed on the basis of 
López’s iniquity—thus conforms to the argument that innocent targets 
will be more likely to demand unconditional surrender. Moreover, the 
Argentines, who gave every indication of wishing to annex Paraguay, 
did not join in Brazil’s refusal to negotiate, consistent with the argument 
that targets who are in fact hostile will understand the motivation be-
hind the attack and thus be open to talks. Similarly, in World War II, 
none of the Allies shared Hitler’s theory of world politics, and thus they 
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did not intend to do what he feared, nor did they understand the moti-
vations behind his actions. As a result, they attributed his actions to an 
innate desire for war and concluded that no settlement with Hitler or, for 
most Allied leaders, with any potential German representative would 
bring a sustained peace. Moreover, my argument is able to account for 
more microlevel features of this confl ict—such as the willingness to relax 
the terms of unconditional surrender for Germany’s allies, the way 
in which Allied leaders’ views of Hitler changed over time, and the 
particular emphasis that American leaders placed on unconditional 
surrender—that are also consistent with my argument. Similarly, the 
Japanese attack in World War II was grounded in fears that the United 
States intended to render Japan a third-rate power, quite possibly 
through war in the next few years, that were inconsistent with American 
intentions. The Iranian refusal to negotiate in the Iran-Iraq War also can 
be read in this light, although defi nitive evidence in this case is unavail-
able. By contrast, the case study of the Crimean War, in which Britain’s 
preventive actions did not induce Russia to refuse to negotiate, is also 
consistent with the argument about innocence, as the Russians clearly 
wished to acquire Constantinople, the development that the British were 
fi ghting to prevent. 
 Taken together, then, this process provides the logic for unconditional 
surrender: an aggressive action, taken out of perceived necessity, is seen 
as evidence of an aggressive disposition that must be expunged. This, in 
other words, is how people end up in a war to the death. 
 Implications: Internal Confl ict and External Intervention 
 The primary goal of this book has been to develop a better understand-
ing of the determinants of particularly long and bloody wars. To render 
the analysis more tractable, I focused on interstate wars, setting civil 
wars aside. A reasonable question is to what extent the fi ndings from this 
work can be translated to intrastate confl icts. Because civil wars differ 
structurally from interstate wars in certain signifi cant respects, direct 
translation of results is not possible. Nonetheless, there are several rele-
vant implications of this study for our understanding of civil wars; this 
section thus highlights those implications. Similarly, by focusing primar-
ily on the decisions of the leaders of the warring parties, I set aside the 
question of how outsiders might facilitate or encourage war termination. 
That said, because effective strategies will directly address the underly-
ing causes of war, a better understanding of why wars continue or end 
provides a useful basis for generating policy prescriptions. The second 
part of this section thus highlights several implications for policy that 
follow from the fi ndings here. 
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 What Lessons for Civil Wars? 
 This book focuses on interstate wars, which include most of the par-
ticularly deadly wars throughout history. From a theoretical perspective, 
interstate wars are easier to understand because participants are gener-
ally more easily separable—the participants typically are not competing 
over a population whose preferences lie somewhere between those of the 
principal actors—and the spoiler problem associated with splintering ac-
tors poses much less of an obstacle to settlement. 1 For both these reasons, 
interstate wars are closer to the assumptions of the standard bargaining 
model and thus provide a more attractive initial testing ground. That 
said, given the frequency of civil wars, both today and likely in the fu-
ture, it is appropriate to assess the implications of the fi ndings here for 
our understanding of internal confl ict. 
 The central fi nding here, that preventive wars arising from shifting 
power make for the worst wars, dovetails with an emerging consensus in 
the civil wars literature. 2 Absent secession, a comparatively rare out-
come, a prerequisite for a functioning state following civil wars is the 
demobilization and integration of the armed forces on each side. As Wal-
ter notes, however, to the extent that one side cheats in the demobiliza-
tion phase or manages to secure control over the unifi ed forces after 
demobilization, the other side will fi nd itself in an extremely dangerous 
position and will certainly not be able to enforce the political agreement 
on which the two sides settled the war. 3 Given the prevalence of this 
problem in civil wars, it is thus unsurprising that they frequently prove 
far more intractable than interstate wars and thus that civil wars last sub-
stantially longer than interstate wars on average. That said, while these 
wars tend to be long, the limited capabilities of weak states and espe-
cially of many rebel groups mean that fi ghting is frequently less intense 
than in the interstate context. 
 Other differences between civil and interstate wars are starker. A now 
large literature highlights the role of natural resources in generating in-
tractable civil confl icts. 4 In many ways, natural resource wars are compa-
rable to principal-agent confl icts, in that the wealth that accrues from 
controlling an exploitable resource tends to accumulate in the hands of a 
small number of leaders. An important question in these confl icts is how 
these leaders are able to convince the people whom they claim to repre-
sent to follow them. To the extent that outsiders are able to convince rebel 
soldiers that the leaders for whom they are fi ghting, who often grow rich 
without allowing the benefi ts of wealth to trickle down beyond the high-
est echelons of their movement, are the only ones who would really suf-
fer from the imposition of peace, these leaders likely will fi nd it far more 
diffi cult to reject settlement on terms the government proposes. 
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 Where civil wars seem to differ most clearly from interstate wars is in 
the diffi culty of clearly identifying the relevant actors. As was noted 
above, spoiler processes can lead wars to continue even when political 
leaders of all relevant factions have concluded that a proposed settle-
ment is preferable to continued fi ghting. Perhaps more problematically, 
in failed states, such as Somalia since 1991, it may be the case that it is 
impossible to identify an appropriate set of actors with whom one can 
conduct negotiations. The diffi culty that the United States faced in iden-
tifying a strategy to end the Iraq insurgency arose in part because it faced 
opposition from a wide range of domestic factions, many as antagonistic 
toward each other as they are toward the Americans. This situation is not 
one that can be captured easily using any of the mechanisms analyzed 
here, meaning that it is not possible to derive clear lessons from this 
study for these types of cases. 
 Ending Wars Once They Have Started 
 Postmortems on violent confl ict frequently bemoan the failure of the 
international community to act prior to the outbreak of violence, when it 
is presumed that the costs of intervention would have been low and the 
positive effects in securing peace would have been great. 5 In an ideal 
world, policymakers would be able to identify potential violent confl icts 
before they begin and intervene to prevent their occurrence. Yet achiev-
ing this goal will likely remain elusive: there are strong theoretical rea-
sons why identifying future wars out of the larger set of potential confl icts 
is diffi cult, and there is no indication that the international community 
would be willing to commit suffi cient resources to make proactive mea-
sures in all countries in which confl ict might occur possible. 6 In this con-
text, then, it makes sense to discuss strategies for ending wars after they 
have begun. 
 One of the central implications of the bargaining model of war, and 
one of the key fi ndings of this study, is that wars are characterized by 
equifi nality: there are multiple individually suffi cient causes of confl ict. 
If we grant the argument that the problems that led to war must be re-
solved before we can return to peace, then any discussion of strategies 
for ending wars must acknowledge that appropriate policies may vary 
based on the underlying causes. An intervention strategy designed to 
address preventive motivations for war will not be effective if the under-
lying problem is simply that both sides think that they are likely to win 
on the battlefi eld. We must also be cognizant of the ways in which differ-
ent problems interact, as with the observation that in diversionary wars 
the informational mechanism is also frequently active. 
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 Existing work on strategies for ending ongoing wars has only just 
begun this process, however. Most theoretical studies of mediation, for 
example, focus on only one mechanism, and few scholars explicitly ad-
dress multiple mechanisms or mechanisms in combination. Kydd’s 
work, which constitutes an important exception to this generalization, 
highlights the ways in which prescriptions may change as the underly-
ing problem leading to confl ict changes. 7 When the problem is private 
information, Kydd fi nds that only biased mediators can credibly convey 
information (as pessimistic statements from the perspective of the side 
that the mediator favors can convince that side to make concessions). In 
contrast, he fi nds that an unbiased mediator will generally be more effec-
tive when the participants wonder whether it is wise to trust the other 
side, an endemic concern in the context of preventive motivations for 
war. These observations thus demonstrate the importance of emphasiz-
ing the contingent nature of policy prescriptions and—a step that the 
fi eld has shown little interest in undertaking—of developing tools to 
help policymakers identify the underlying causes of confl ict so that they 
can better identify which strategies will likely prove more effective. 
 This book has been primarily concerned with evaluating the relative 
effectiveness of different mechanisms in explaining wars of varying de-
structiveness, and thus comments on policy prescriptions will necessar-
ily be preliminary. That said, several signifi cant implications emerge 
from the fi ndings here. In general, ending informational wars requires 
convincing participants of their overoptimism and thus inducing them 
to update their beliefs. Doing so may be diffi cult, but especially better-
informed mediators, such as representatives of the great powers, may be 
able to credibly convey information that will convince participants to 
modify their expectations and hence their demands. Ending wars in 
which principal-agent dynamics are at play will require alerting the citi-
zens of their leader’s shenanigans and providing other assistance so that 
they can impose greater constraints on that leader’s ability to continue 
the war. Ending preventive wars will generally be most diffi cult, and will 
require more active intervention, for example through the formation of 
defensive alliances that will provide that declining power with some 
guarantee that it will not suffer excessively from its decline. The unfortu-
nate implication here is that outsiders will probably have the greatest 
leverage over those confl icts that are most likely to end quickly without 
outside intervention, while they will have the least control over precisely 
those wars that they will most want to infl uence. 
 To turn to more specifi c observations, several nonobvious implications 
for ending wars can be derived from this framework. Thus, for example, 
highly public bargaining may be counterproductive when the primary 
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concern is private information (as the two sides may have incentives to 
adopt extreme positions to signal resolve) but effi cacious when leaders 
on one side are extending wars unnecessarily (as knowledge of the other 
side’s bargaining stance may help the constituents of leaders who are 
pursuing a diversionary strategy to recognize this tactic and respond ap-
propriately). Similarly, biased military intervention will frequently be 
extremely effective in bringing an end to informational confl icts (indeed, 
often the source of disagreement is precisely whether an outsider will 
intervene), but it may do little to bring about war termination when 
fi ghting is driven by other mechanisms. One general implication of this 
book is thus that work on strategies of confl ict management will benefi t 
from careful consideration of the underlying mechanism producing 
violence. 
 Prognostications and Terminations 
 With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
apparent end of ideological confl ict and a consequent convergence in 
worldwide preferences provided a basis for forecasts of the substantial 
reduction or even end of the violent confl ict that has dogged humanity 
throughout its history: pessimists were fi ghting a rearguard action based 
on predictions that many saw as fanciful at the time and that have as yet 
failed to materialize. 8 Violent confl ict in the Balkans and genocide in 
Rwanda provided initial correctives to these expectations; September 11 
and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that 
ideological confl ict persists and that interstate wars are still possible. 
Even so, however, many people still believe that major wars, or interstate 
wars more generally, are rapidly becoming obsolete. 9 It is certainly true 
that the Western and Central Europeans, long the protagonists of many 
of the biggest interstate wars, have devised a political system in the Eu-
ropean Union in which resort to violence seems unthinkable. Elsewhere 
in the world, however, violence remains more than just thinkable, while 
the likely retreat of US hegemony in the next few decades may make the 
world a more unpredictable place. 
 Indeed, the apparently inexorable rise of China has raised concerns 
about a possible war with the United States in the future. China’s rise 
generates understandable concerns among Americans about the conces-
sions that the United States will need to make in the future in light of 
Chinese power. 10 Indeed, concern about the implications of China’s rise 
has led its neighbors to seek to ensure continued American involvement 
in Asia, while some in the United States have called for a more confron-
tational approach based on mistrust of long-run Chinese intentions. 11
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 That said, there are several good reasons to doubt that China’s rise will 
lead to great power war. Indeed, precisely because such a war would be 
enormous, the potential participants have a very good reason to avoid it; 
it is likely only to the extent that the declining power—in this case the 
United States—can identify a reasonable plan for preventing the decline 
from occurring. While the United States is and will for the foreseeable 
future remain the dominant military power in the world, there are sig-
nifi cant limits on its ability to impose its will directly on China. China’s 
economic growth, while driven by the coasts, is broad-based and is 
driven by factors—most notably an extremely large population—that 
could not be changed by anything short of a war to break up the state of 
China, an undertaking that no serious academic or policymaker has con-
templated. To put it simply, it is entirely unclear how, having started 
such a war, the United States might plausibly expect to be able to end it: 
at a minimum, it would need to break off several of the large and eco-
nomically prosperous coastal cities like Shanghai, but having done so it 
would have no plausible policies for what to do with them. In such a 
context, even someone who is genuinely concerned by the signifi cant 
military buildup that China has undertaken will lack a convincing argu-
ment for why war would serve American interests. 
 The most likely source of confl ict between China and the United States 
would be a dispute over Taiwan. Theory here indicates that the Chinese, 
as the rising power, should see little need to demand immediate conces-
sions on this issue, as they can wait until later, when they can negotiate 
from a position of greater strength. Indeed, Chinese policy on Taiwan 
appears to be following this prediction quite closely: the military buildup 
around the Taiwan Straits appears to be intended primarily to deter the 
Taiwanese from making any overt move toward independence. More-
over, while Taiwan is symbolically and economically signifi cant, its 
broader strategic signifi cance is limited: in contrast to British fears about 
Russian control over Constantinople freeing the Russians to move into 
the Mediterranean, there is little more that China could do after acquir-
ing Taiwan that it could not do beforehand. War could nonetheless still 
occur if, for example, the Chinese leadership underestimates American 
resolve, or possibly if threats to their rule induced the Chinese leadership 
to launch a diversionary invasion. 12 Given the size of the combatants, 
such a war would no doubt be destructive, but it would not be the unlim-
ited confl ict that has been the greatest concern of commentators. It is 
more likely that China and the United States will manage the transition 
without war, with the United States making some tacit concessions along 
the way. 
 While the implications of this study’s fi ndings for the US-China rela-
tionship thus are a source for optimism, some of the more general results 
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provide reason for caution. Great power war in the nuclear era is admit-
tedly unlikely. Indeed, given the reduction over time in the number of 
great powers, there simply are fewer dyads in which such a confl ict 
could occur. That said, one point emphasized in this book is that one 
does not need great powers to have big wars. The Paraguayan War and 
the Iran-Iraq confl ict provide evidence that medium powers are perfectly 
capable of infl icting horrendous costs on each other. Moreover, while 
these wars too are rare, there is no trend to indicate that they are decreas-
ing substantially over time: after all, the Iran-Iraq War was hardly in the 
distant past. 
 And if nuclear-armed states are unlikely to fi ght each other, the pro-
cess of acquiring nuclear weapons can be profoundly destabilizing. 
While nuclear threats are frequently incredible, given that any attack will 
provoke an equally destructive response, a nuclear-armed state nonethe-
less protects itself against bullying by existing nuclear powers and opens 
up a range of options for conventional mischief making. 13 Thus the shift 
in relative capabilities associated with the acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons provides a potent rationale for preventive war, the more so because 
destroying a nuclear weapons program—which will be reliant on a lim-
ited number of nuclear plants and testing centers—may seem easier than 
preventing other sources of shifts in relative capabilities. From this per-
spective, the American attack on Iraq may be only the fi rst of several 
such preventive wars. Moreover, as nuclear proliferators learn from past 
targeted attacks on reactors in Iraq (in 1981) and Syria (in 2007) to dis-
perse and harden potential targets, opponents will discover that truly 
eliminating a nuclear program will require deep penetration by ground 
forces, as the international coalition did in Iraq in 2003. This motivation 
for preventive war is unlikely to disappear soon. 
 Separately, the dramatic changes in the international system with the 
end of the Cold War may have both good and bad implications for the 
nature of war in the future. On the one hand, the end to superpower 
competition eliminated the imminent threat that any confl ict might esca-
late into a catastrophic great power war, and also decreased the likeli-
hood that peripheral confl icts will serve as proxy wars in which external 
assistance sustained each side’s military capacity and hence extended 
the potential amount of bloodletting. On the other hand, it is unclear that 
superpower competition necessarily made for worse wars. Precisely be-
cause of the possibility that a local war might escalate to include one or 
both of the superpowers, with the specter of nuclear use that such a pos-
sibility raised, leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union had 
a strong incentive to keep third-world confl icts limited. Indeed, fre-
quently the worst confl icts arise when no one is able or willing to address 
the fears of declining powers. In the Paraguayan War, outside powers 
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simply did not care enough about events in the interior of the South 
American continent to intervene with any enthusiasm. In the Iran-Iraq 
War, an essential element of the confl ict was the mistrust with which the 
Revolutionary regime in Tehran viewed the rest of the world, which 
complicated any outsiders’ attempts to bring about peace. In World War II, 
the powers were completely sorted into the two camps by the end of 
1941, leaving no outsiders who could intervene to allay the concerns of 
the participants. From this perspective, then, the reduced interest of the 
great powers in events in the developing world may in fact remove a 
check on big wars, possibly making such confl icts more likely. 
 To say that such wars are as likely to occur as they were in the past is 
not, of course, to say that they are imminent. The most deadly wars re-
main for very good reasons thankfully rare; it is thus entirely possible 
that we could see several decades pass without a particularly large inter-
state war. Because declining powers can, and frequently do, respond to 
their decline by simply accepting a loss of infl uence, predicting the oc-
currence of preventive wars is extremely diffi cult: we may be able to 
identify situations, as with the US-China relationship, in which relative 
decline makes such confl icts a possibility, but it is much harder to pick 
out from among the dyads in which confl ict is likely those in which war 
will actually occur. When it does, however, as it almost certainly will, a 
better understanding of its dynamics may help policymakers to fi nd the 
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the Warsaw Pact) to be credible. The initiator of the preventive war will be reluctant 
to send such signals, as doing so will likely entail abandoning the initial goal of the 
war and hence giving the opponent the long-term advantage; the target of the 
preventive war will be disinclined to send such signals both because doing so will 
hamper efforts to enforce unconditional surrender and because a truly disposition-
ally aggressive opponent would simply swallow the concessions and continue the 
 attack. 
 54. Sincere demands for unconditional surrender are conceptually distinct from, if 
sometimes related to, the more common phenomenon of foreign-imposed regime 
change. Most cases of foreign-imposed regime change involve great powers inter-
vening in the domestic politics of minor-power neighbors, with limited or even no 
fi ghting in most cases. Given these differences, it would be theoretically inappropri-
ate to test predictions about unconditional surrender on cases of foreign-imposed 
regime change. 
 55. Blainey (1988), Fearon (1995), Van Evera (1998), Johnson (2004). 
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56. See for example Smith (1998a), Gartzke (1999), Filson and Werner (2002), 
Slantchev (2003b), Powell (1999, 2004), and Smith and Stam (2004). 
57. Fearon (1995) points out that divergent expectations alone are insuffi cient for 
war; it also has to be the case that actors are unable to share the bases for their dif-
fering expectations credibly. Given confl icting preferences, however, actors have an 
incentive to claim to be strong or resolved even when they are not, because success-
ful bluffs will lead to a better political settlement. This incentive undermines credi-
ble signaling, however, because weak or irresolute actors will claim to be more 
formidable than they actually are, leaving observers uncertain whether claims to be 
willing to fi ght are sincere or bluffs. 
 58. Fey and Ramsay (2007), building on Aumann’s (1976) observation that rational 
actors cannot agree to disagree, have argued that arguments about mutual optimism 
provide a theoretically incoherent explanation for war. Slantchev and Tarar (2011) 
however convincingly argue that this result hinges on strong assumptions about 
exogenous settlement terms and especially the ability of either party in a dispute to 
impose peace on the other. 
 59. This observation thus explains why a popular “puzzle”—why a weaker power 
would ever go to war against a stronger one—is in fact less puzzling than it at fi rst 
seems. Typically, scholars who advance this puzzle assume that the weaker power 
is starting a war that it should know that it cannot win; as this discussion demon-
strates, however, it is quite possible that, even if it cannot win militarily, the weaker 
power might win politically, which is after all what matters. 
 60. Bensahel et al. (2008), Woods et al. (2006, 30). 
 61. May (2000, ch. 18). 
 62. Oren (2002, e.g. 151, 172). 
 63. Jarausch (1969). 
 64. Hjeholt (1965, 1966), Bucholz (2001). 
 65. Mack (1975), Mueller (1980). 
 66. al Marashi (2003), Wrede-Braden (2007). 
 67. There is some debate in the literature about whether private information is a 
necessary condition for divergent expectations; from a practical perspective, one 
could easily imagine that leaders might reach divergent expectation even on the 
basis of the same information, whether because of psychological biases or simply 
because of the sheer complexity of international politics. Kirshner (2000), Johnson 
(2004). Ultimately, however, this distinction is not one that is of great signifi cance for 
this project. From a practical perspective, distinguishing between divergent inter-
pretations of common information and divergent expectations based on private in-
formation is impossible, as in every case some information is available to both sides 
and some is private, while determining the precise bases on which leaders form their 
expectations is notoriously diffi cult. For my purposes, the more important question 
is less where divergent expectations come from than what happens once they pro-
duce a war. 
 68. Blainey (1988, 56). For formal demonstrations of this process, see Wagner (2000), 
Filson and Werner (2002), Slantchev (2003b), and Powell (2004). Note that saying 
that beliefs converge is not the same as saying either that the two sides reach com-
plete agreement or that both sides know who would ultimately triumph militarily. 
All that is necessary is that the participants roughly agree on the  relative probability 
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that each side will win; they can then construct a settlement that gives each side 
something at least as good as its certainty equivalent to the lottery associated with 
continued fi ghting. 
69. Wittman (1979). 
70. For the details of this war, which is also referred to as the Second Austro- 
Sardinian War, see King (1967) and Blumberg (1990). It is worth noting that this case 
is a war with major powers on both sides in which fi ghting ended in short order; the 
short duration is likely the reason why many scholars (incorrectly) omit it from the 
list of major power wars in the past two centuries. 
 71. Coox (1985, 578, 921). 
 72. Reiter (2009, esp. 122) concludes that this case—the most limited war that he 
examines—is particularly well captured by informational dynamics. See also Van 
Dyke (1997) and Edwards (2006). 
 73. Powell (2004), Smith and Stam (2004). See also Iklé (1991) for the argument that 
from a rational perspective wars driven by divergent expectations should not last 
long. 
 74. Blainey (1988, 41). 
 75. For a representative example of explanations for World War I grounded in over-
optimism, see Johnson (2004, ch. 3). 
 76. Gartzke (1999). 
 77. Reed (2003), Slantchev (2004). 
 78. Davies (1972). 
 79. For an early version of this argument, see Kant ([1795] 1957). 
 80. Simmel (1898), Coser (1956), Levy (1989). 
 81. Lenin (1920, esp. chs. 5–7). 
 82. Berghahn (1976), Snyder (1991). 
 83. Trask (1981, 56). 
 84. Anderson (1981, 111). 
 85. For a review of the economics literature on principal-agent problems, see Eisen-
hardt (1989). There are, of course, signifi cant differences between employer-
employee relations and leader-public relations—for one, in the latter the principal 
(the public) is far more disaggregated, raising potential collective action problems—
but the basic dilemmas that a principal-agent dynamic raises are still relevant. 
 86. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). 
 87. Goemans (2000). 
 88. Ibid. 
 89. Similar arguments that partial democracies are particularly prone to engaging in 
undesirable actions in the security arena include Snyder (1991) and Mansfi eld and 
Snyder (2005). 
90. Decalo (1989, 111–113), Kasozi et al. (1994, 124–127). This possibility also can 
prevent rejectionists from extending a war when settlement is on the table, as for 
example happened when the Kiel mutiny at the end of World War I torpedoed at-
tempts by hardliners in the German navy to launch a fresh offensive with the goal of 
undermining settlement talks. Iklé (1991, 70). 
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91. For the French mutinies, see Pedroncini (1967) and Rolland (2005). 
92. Stanley (2009), Stanley and Sawyer (2009), Croco (2011). 
93. Hasegawa (2005, 213–214). 
94. Khadduri and Ghareeb (1997, chs. 11–12). 
95. There exist two standard logics of diversionary war. One posits that leaders can 
use war to exploit in-group/out-group effects, rallying a divided society against an 
external threat, at least so long as internal divisions are not too severe. Simmel (1898, 
1955), Coser (1956). An alternate view sees war as a noisy signal of leadership com-
petence: good leaders who have been unlucky in domestic politics or incompetent 
leaders who hope to get lucky in foreign policy may have an incentive to start a 
confl ict so as to improve public perceptions of them and thus increase the probabil-
ity that they are able to remain in offi ce. Richards et al. (1993), Smith (1998b), Tarar 
(2006). 
 96. For typical examples of studies that found a relationship between domestic po-
litical conditions and the use of force, see Ostrom and Job (1986), Nincic (1990), 
James and Oneal (1991), Gaubatz (1991), and Wang (1996). 
 97. Gaubatz (1991). 
98. Chiozza and Goemans (2003). Relatedly, Moore and Lanoue (2003) note that the 
diversionary hypothesis seems in tension with the observation that domestic eco-
nomic diffi culties are a far more robust predictor of the use of force than presidential 
approval ratings, given that the president should only need to divert attention from 
the economy if its troubles are affecting his popularity. 
99. For evidence of signifi cant popularity gains in external crises in the United States 
and elsewhere, see Mueller (1970, 1973), Sprecher and DeRouen (2002), and Lai and 
Reiter (2005). For the fi nding that the gains from the average crisis are small, see Lian 
and Oneal (1993), James and Rioux (1998), and Baker and Oneal (2001). For the 
fi nding that the big gains occur in precisely those crises that are least open to ma-
nipulation, see Chapman and Reiter (2004) and Lai and Reiter (2005). Colaresi (2007) 
similarly emphasizes the role of constraints on rally effects. 
100. Iklé (1991). 
101. For more discussion of this case, see chapters 4 and 5. 
102. Mueller (1994, 128–129). 
103. See Schlafl ey (1999) for an example of such speculation, and Hendrickson (2002) 
for a skeptical view. 
 104. Indeed, even given the general consensus in World War II, Roosevelt still expe-
rienced signifi cant criticism. Prior to the war, Roosevelt’s policies of assistance to 
Britain and the Soviet Union were controversial, and even after enemy attack had 
rallied the public to the war, congressional Republicans closely monitored govern-
ment competence in its prosecution while at times arguing that Roosevelt and Sec-
retary of State Cordell Hull were responsible for the surprise at Pearl Harbor. Darilek 
(1976, esp. ch. 2), Casey (2001). 
 105. The agent’s private information is an essential component of the most compel-
ling models of diversionary war and gambling for resurrection. As such, it features 
in all formal models; de Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) provide a particularly clear 
discussion of its importance. Note that just because leaders have access to better 
information does not mean that they will necessarily make good use of it. Jervis 
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(1976, 2006). That said, what the leader does with information available to her is less 
important than what claims she can make on the basis of its existence. 
106. Mamdani (1983, 105–107), Decalo (1989, 111–113), Kasozi et al. (1994, 124–127), 
Mambo and Schofi eld (2007). 
107. Ellsberg (1971), Berman (1982), Bator (2008). 
108. Schuessler (2009). 
109. This process could be seen, for example, in the spread of control over India. See 
Lawson (1993, e.g. ch. 4). 
110. That said, even well prior to the development of modern communication tech-
nology a signifi cant amount of information about ongoing wars was frequently 
available, if at a greater delay. Thus, for example, English peasants appear to have 
been surprisingly well informed about developments in France during the Hundred 
Years War despite the presence of many obstacles to communication that do not ex-
ist today. Updates about events in France were passed back through the churches, 
where priests reported them in sermons; regular citizens seem to have followed 
developments closely. Seward (1978, e.g. 82). 
 111. See for example Genova and Greenberg (1979) and Krosnick (1990). 
 112. Gartner (2008). Likewise, there is evidence that draft-eligible Americans during 
Vietnam were more likely to favor an immediate withdrawal when their probability 
of being drafted increased. Bergan (2009). 
 113. Gartner (1997). 
 114. This perspective is consistent with the selectorate theory of international poli-
tics, which emphasizes the importance of the size of the group of people who infl u-
ence the selection of the leader. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Leaders with small 
selectorates—generally autocrats—face fewer constraints in exploiting members of 
the general public who do not infl uence leadership selection. 
 115. For the argument that democracies tend to be more selective in initiating wars, 
see Reiter and Stam (2002) and Slantchev (2004). 
2 . Research Strategy and Statistical Tests
1. Indeed, focusing on well-known cases may be particularly perverse if there are 
systematic differences related to the mechanisms in question that lead some cases 
to be well known while others are not. Thus, for example, I argue that in policy 
wars—nondiversionary principal-agent confl icts—leaders will seek to limit the 
availability of information about the war. This strategy, if effective, may mean that 
subsequent historians have diffi culty determining everything that happened in the 
war, as indeed appears to have happened in the Franco-Turkish confl ict discussed 
in chapter 7. 
 2. More specifi cally, the cases in the statistical dataset were divided according to 
length—delineated by a relatively natural break between wars shorter than and lon-
ger than one year—and intensity, where confl icts were coded as more intense if they 
were above the seventy-fi fth percentile either in absolute war intensity (deaths per 
unit time) or in war intensity adjusted by population (deaths per capita per unit 
time). One case was then selected randomly from within each category. This ap-
proach admittedly does involve selection on the dependent variable; if possible, it 
would have been preferable to select randomly from among the list of wars driven 
by each of the different mechanisms. Compiling such a list, however, would have 
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required extensive research on every case in the dataset prior to case selection, an 
infeasible proposition. As the relevant case studies demonstrate, the wars selected do 
provide signifi cant variation in the independent variable, as we would have hoped. 
3. For detailed discussions of the criteria for identifying wars, see Singer and Small 
(1972) and Sarkees and Wayman (2010). 
4. Other studies that disaggregate multilateral wars in this way include Bennett and 
Stam (1996), Goemans (2000), and Reiter and Stam (2002). 
5. Ayache (1981, 143–144), Balfour (2002, ch. 1). 
6. This information is available on an IQSS Dataverse, at http://dvn.iq.harvard.
edu/dvn/dv/weisiger. 
7. Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). 
8. Clodfelter (2007). The most common data source for battle death data is the Cor-
relates of War dataset, which focuses on the slightly broader category of battle-
related fatalities. See Sarkees and Wayman (2010, 49–52). This approach, however, 
results in some anomalies, such as the Ottoman Empire suffering twenty thousand 
war deaths in the Second Balkan War despite fi ghting no battles (two thousand 
soldiers did die of disease), or US deaths in the Mexican-American and Spanish-
American Wars being higher than those of their opponents, contrary to all historical 
accounts, because deaths from illness are only available on the American side. In 
practice, however, the statistical results presented below are substantively identical 
when substituting the COW death fi gures. 
 9. Determining the dates of war onset and termination can be trickier in civil wars, 
where fi ghting is more likely to escalate gradually as rebels establish themselves or 
to gradually taper off into a stalemate. 
 10. Fazal et al. (2006). 
 11. For example, in the nineteenth-century Pacifi c War, Bolivia withdrew militarily 
from the confl ict in 1880 (leaving Peru to oppose Chile unaided) but only signed a 
peace agreement in 1884, several months after the Peruvians had capitulated; COW 
codes the Bolivian-Chilean confl ict, and hence the war, as continuing even after the 
Peruvian capitulation. 
 12. For a discussion of these costs in the context of the Iraq War, see Stiglitz and 
Bilmes (2008). 
 13. Capella (2012). I am deeply indebted to Rosella Capella for sharing this data 
with me. 
 14. Maddison (2003). Calculating war cost is a highly imprecise science. Given an 
initial report of total expenditures, I converted any value in US dollars or British 
pounds into 2012 dollars using standard conversion rates. For expenditure totals in 
other currencies (e.g., francs or rubles), I fi rst converted the total into same-year dol-
lars either using known historical exchange rates or, where exchange rate data were 
unavailable, by using the precious metal content of currency to calculate an effective 
exchange rate. Thus, for example, I converted Chinese expenditures in the First Sino-
Soviet War, which were reported in Chinese taels, into dollars by determining that 
the tael contained roughly thirty-fi ve grams of silver, which at that time had a value 
of fi fty-nine cents. 
 15. This approach differs from the strategy in the power transition literature of iden-
tifying points at which one country passes another, or alternately points at which 
countries are relatively equal in power. From a theoretical perspective, the power 
transition approach is unattractive because it downplays the central dynamic identi-
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fi ed by theory, which is fear of signifi cant future decline. Indeed, bargaining model 
theory indicates that there is no theoretically coherent reason to believe that power 
shifts should be more dangerous at points of relative equality than at other points 
along the dimension (see Powell [1999]). Thus, for example, the Bush administration 
clearly feared an incipient rise in Iraqi capabilities prior to the 2003 war. Although a 
nuclear-armed Iraq would still have been far weaker than the United States, an in-
crease in Iraqi capabilities would have limited American freedom of action in the 
Middle East and would have permitted Saddam Hussein to pursue new policies 
antithetical to American interests. 
 16. William Watts, “Americans Look at Asia,” A Henry Luce Foundation Project, 
New York, 1999, 39; Ishihara (1991); Friedman and LeBard (1991). 
 17. This approach admittedly will not capture anticipated shifts related to qualita-
tive technological advances, such as (most obviously) the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. The 2003 Iraq War provides the only case in which fears related to a pur-
ported nuclear weapons program produced war, however, meaning that this defi -
ciency should not greatly bias statistical results. 
 18. Singer et al. (1972). The international relations fi eld has never developed a fully 
satisfactory measure for power, nor, for that matter, is it likely to be able to do so; see 
Baldwin (1989) for a discussion of the central problems. Basic material capabilities, 
captured by variables like population, economic production, and military capacity, 
end up forming the basis for any measure of power that spans a wide range of coun-
tries and time, with the National Military Capabilities dataset the overwhelming 
choice. This dataset is certainly open to criticism, among other things because it 
treats an inherently relational concept in a fundamentally nonrelational way, be-
cause it fails to include important determinants of state capacity such as geography, 
and because it focuses purely on measurable capabilities, thus ignoring “soft power” 
and other nonmaterial forms of infl uence (see Nye [2004]). However, attempts to 
improve on existing measures, as for example in Organski and Kugler (1980), gener-
ally produce operationalizations that differ only marginally from the existing ap-
proach. To ensure comparability with the rest of the discipline, therefore, I use the 
standard dataset. 
 19. This approach unfortunately does produce a number of cases for which I have 
missing data, because at least one participant did not exist fi ve or ten years prior to 
the war. For those cases in which data were available for at least fi ve years prior to 
the war, I fi lled in missing data for ten-year shifts by extrapolating backward for 
cases in which the country existed but did not meet COW’s requirements for system 
membership and by using data from the year of independence for cases in which the 
country genuinely did not exist ten years prior to the war. Alternate approaches to 
handling missing data in these cases, including substituting the size of the shift over 
the fi ve years prior to war or simply excluding the observations, had no substantive 
effect on the results. 
 20. The intensity of fi ghting is, of course, only one possible indicator of the speed 
with which participants learn new information, but it is also by far the most theo-
retically and empirically appropriate. Thus, for example, one might argue that infor-
mation should be revealed by allies failing to come to a country’s aid. This scenario 
is quite possible; it is also possible, however, that the ally’s decision to intervene 
might be equally surprising for the opponent. Moreover, in many cases, as with the 
Russian decision to aid Serbia or the Italian decision not to assist Germany and 
Austria-Hungary in World War I, the ally’s decision is no surprise to either side in 
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the confl ict. There is thus no clear scenario in which allied behavior is likely to be 
unusually informative. Another possibility concerns the speed of communication—
in the modern era, bad news from Afghanistan reaches the United States almost in-
stantaneously, whereas for much of the nineteenth century communication between 
Central Asia and the West might have taken months. In practice, however, this situ-
ation simply meant that leaders in earlier times were forced to delegate greater 
authority to local representatives. Thus, in the Anglo-Iranian War discussed in chap -
ter 6, the British delegated the decision to declare war to the government in India, 
while the Iranians appointed a representative with signifi cant leeway to negotiate in 
Constantinople and Paris. Communication diffi culties nonetheless lengthened the 
war marginally, if only because it took a month for news of the peace agreement to 
reach the battlefi eld, but not by enough for the difference to be statistically detect-
able, especially given the relatively small sample of interstate wars. 
 21. Marshall et al. (2010). 
 22. WIT distinguishes between military and political losers, as in some cases the 
military victor may fare less well politically. To give an example, in the Austro-
Italian component of the Seven Weeks War, Austria clearly defeated Italy on the 
battlefi eld, but the Austrians ended up having to cede Venetia to the Italians as part 
of the price of peace with Prussia. Most of the cases of variation between military 
and political victors arise either in draws or in circumstances in which postwar di-
plomacy (like the Congress of Berlin after the 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War) reallo-
cated benefi ts; as the latter developments occur after the fi ghting ends, it is prefer-
able to use the military outcome here. 
23. Specifi cally, the only noticeable variations in governance on the losing side occur 
in World War II (partially democratic Japan contrasted with Nazi Germany and fas-
cist Italy), the Palestine War (monarchical Jordan contrasted with partially demo-
cratic Egypt and Syria), and Vietnam (democratic United States contrasted with 
relatively undemocratic South Vietnam). Alternate approaches to handling these 
cases do not affect empirical results. 
24. Reiter and Stam (2002), Slantchev (2004), Filson and Werner (2004). 
25. This threshold is conventional and does not greatly infl uence results. A variable 
that simply uses the Polity score of the initiator is similarly associated with shorter 
wars, but is typically statistically insignifi cant. 
 26. Slantchev (2004). For the rare cases in which my dataset includes a war that was 
not in his, I use terrain codings from a confl ict in a geographically similar area, so 
that, for example, the Austro-Italian component of the Seven Weeks War is given the 
same terrain coding as the Austro-Sardinian War of 1848. 
 27. Stinnett et al. (2002). Substituting the basic contiguity score, which includes in-
termediate categories for countries separated by limited stretches of water, has no 
effect on the results. 
 28. Cunningham (2006). 
 29. Bennett and Stam (1996), Slantchev (2004). 
 30. I also experimented with using capabilities data from all participants—i.e., in-
cluding the (generally quite weak) minor participants in multilateral wars—and 
with discounting capabilities over distance in the manner introduced by Bueno de 
Mesquita (1981, 105). Neither alteration had any effect on results. 
 31. Levy (1983). 
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32. On cultural difference and war, see Huntington (1993, 1996), although Russett et al. 
(2000), Henderson and Tucker (2001), Chiozza (2002), and Tusicisny (2004) offer em-
pirical critiques. For ideological difference, see Haas (2005, esp. 17, 30) and Owen (2010). 
33. Henderson and Tucker (2001). Huntington is not always entirely clear into which 
civilization he would classify given countries. That said, most uncertainties either 
concern countries that have not fought wars or do not affect the coding (e.g. whether 
Israel is coded as a member of the Western civilization or comprises its own civiliza-
tion is irrelevant, given that it only fi ghts wars against countries in the Islamic civi-
lization). An alternate coding that identifi es a civilizational confl ict in multilateral 
wars when at least one dyad crosses civilizational lines differs only in the coding for 
the Second Balkan War (based on the Ottoman Empire’s involvement); results using 
a modifi ed variable are thus essentially identical to those presented below. 
 34. Liberal nationalist ideas often directly threatened members of the old order in the 
nineteenth century, even when the proponents of liberal positions were not particu-
larly democratic. Thus, for example, Italian nationalism (closely allied at the 
time with liberal forces), which was ultimately co-opted by (monarchical) Sardinia-
Piedmont, posed a signifi cant threat to (monarchical) Austria. Similarly, Bartolomé 
Mitre’s liberal leanings alienated him from Francisco Solano López in the Para-
guayan War, even though neither side showed any great commitment to democracy 
(see Leuchars [2002, 17]). (Mitre was admittedly an elected offi cial during the war, 
but he demonstrated his low commitment to democratic norms by launching two 
rebellions once out of power.) The division between liberals and conservatives was 
pertinent in Europe and throughout Latin America, although the exact meaning of 
the terms differed somewhat across continents. 
 35. Once again, changing these variables to code a clash if any dyad within a multi-
lateral war crosses ideological lines results in very few changes and thus does not 
affect the statistical or substantive signifi cance of the key variables. 
 36. Bennett and Stam (1996). See however Biddle (2004) for a critique of this concep-
tualization of military strategy. 
 37. See for example Smith (1998a), Wagner (2000), Filson and Werner (2002), Smith 
and Stam (2004), Powell (2004), and Powell (2006). For a qualitative perspective that 
highlights the same two forms of war termination, see Iklé (1991, 37). 
 38. A few prior studies of interstate wars have distinguished among types of war 
termination but along markedly different lines. See Wright (1970) and Pillar (1983). 
More recent work that has differentiated among types of war termination in a statis-
tical context has focused on victory or defeat (from the perspective of a democratic 
participant or of the initiator). Bennett and Stam (1998), Slantchev (2004), DeRouen 
and Sobek (2004). Scholars studying civil wars have generally shown a greater inter-
est in the ways in which wars end, although here too some differences with the 
simple conquest/settlement dichotomy that follows from theory exist. See for ex-
ample Licklider (1995), Mason and Fett (1996), and Walter (1997, 2002). 
 39. The possibility of guerrilla resistance after conventional conquest at times com-
plicates this distinction. For a discussion of this issue, see Weisiger (2012). 
 40. The online appendices contain the verbatim coding rules, the coding decisions, 
and explanations for decisions in all potentially questionable cases. 
 41. For a summary of duration analysis, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004). 
 42. I use the semiparametric Cox specifi cation instead of more parametric specifi ca-
tions like the popular Weibull because it imposes fewer assumptions about the 
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shape of the baseline hazard rate (roughly the probability that a war would end on 
any given day, which may vary substantially over the course of the war). The Cox 
specifi cation does assume that the effect of variables on the hazard rate is propor-
tional over time (so that if a variable reduces the baseline probability of settlement 
by half a month into the war, it will have the same effect several years into the war). 
Tests of the proportional hazard assumption consistently produce no evidence of 
violations, either for the model as a whole or for specifi c variables. I also conduct 
robustness checks with a log-normal specifi cation—which both the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion and comparison of log-likelihoods indicate is the appropriate para-
metric specifi cation—with results that are consistently substantively unchanged. 
 43. Fine and Gray (1999). 
 44. There are thousands of ways in which one might combine the different control 
variables. It is thus unsurprising that some combinations result in the power shift 
variable losing signifi cance, although even then it typically is close to signifi cance. I 
have been unable to fi nd a specifi cation for any dependent variable in which the sign 
is reversed. 
 45. I do not include a similar graph for government spending, again for reasons of 
space. Results are analogous, however: working from model 6 and holding other 
variables at their median, predicted total spending as a share of GDP is over four 
times higher when the capability shift variable is at its ninetieth percentile than 
when it is at its tenth percentile. 
 46. Goemans (2000). 
 47. An alternate approach would be to code a major power war as occurring when-
ever a major power is involved, rather than only when there is a major power on 
each side. Measured in this way, major power confl icts are no longer than nonmajor 
power confl icts, although they do continue to be markedly deadlier. Other variables 
in the relevant regressions are unchanged. 
 48. I present results only for cultural difference, given overlap with ideological dif-
ference. Either variant of the ideological difference variable is, however, consistently 
statistically insignifi cant. 
 49. Fine and Gray (1999). 
 50. To save space, I present only models that include all explanatory and control 
variables. Results are consistent in sparser models, however—for example, results 
for all variables are consistent in every regression if the war intensity variable is 
dropped from the regression. 
 51. The fi ndings for duration until settlement are particularly robust here—whereas 
in the pooled analysis (as in table 2.2), the shifting power variable is frequently in-
signifi cant in the absence of statistical controls, in the competing risks specifi cation 
the variable is always a signifi cant predictor of duration until settlement and is 
typically a signifi cant predictor (in the opposite direction) of duration until con-
quest. 
 52. As before, introducing a quadratic term reveals no evidence that losing partial 
democracies are particularly averse to settlement. 
 53. An alternate testing strategy would be to bifurcate the sample into relatively 
short and relatively long wars and run the analysis separately on each, with the ex-
pectation that increased war intensity would be associated with quicker settlement 
in short wars but with slower settlement in long wars. Conducting these tests, which 
are reproduced in the online appendix, produces precisely the predicted results; as 
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this approach raises concerns about selection on the dependent variable, however, I 
focus on the full-sample tests here. 
54. See for example Frieser (2005) for a discussion of the riskiness of Germany’s use 
of blitzkrieg—a maneuver strategy—in World War II. 
55. Reiter and Meek (1999). Their study looked not at wars but at the peacetime plans 
of a set of countries in particular years, with specifi c country-years chosen at ran-
dom. 
 56. To facilitate interpretation, reported results are for total production divided by 
1,000,000. This proxy is conventional given that reliable GDP data for a wide range 
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Peñalba (1982) provides the best English-language summary of this perspective; 
Bethell (1996) briefl y but thoroughly debunks it. See also McLynn (1979) and Abente 
(1987). The most recent historical literature, especially Whigham (2002) and Leuchars 
[235]
Notes to Pages 86–93
(2002), has, without downplaying López’s signifi cant failings, explored in greater 
detail the challenges that he faced, which ultimately provide the basis for a signifi -
cant reinterpretation of the history of the war. 
 2. Signifi cant debate has surrounded the number of Paraguayans who died in the 
war, as the general limits of population records of the time and the destruction and 
dislocation associated with the war make precise estimates impossible. For an early 
estimate that deaths were around two-thirds of the total population, see Box (1929, 
179). More recently, two studies have reexamined the issue, with one concluding 
that initial estimates were far too high while the other concluded that they were 
roughly accurate. See Reber (1988) and Whigham and Potthast (1999), as well as 
critiques of the two efforts by Whigham and Potthast (1990), Reber (2002), and Klein-
penning (2002). The war severity data used in the statistical analysis here focuses on 
battle deaths and thus omits the huge numbers of Paraguayans who died of starva-
tion or disease (and who are harder to count), but even so the war is eclipsed in per 
capita deadliness only by the World Wars. 
 3. Box (1929, ch. 7), Stewart and Peterson (1942, 178–183), Saeger (2007, esp. 10–12). 
 4. The declaration came in 1813; Brazil was the fi rst country to recognize Paraguayan 
independence, which it did (largely to gain Paraguayan support against Argentina’s 
Juan Manuel de Rosas) in 1844. Leuchars (2002, 2, 23). 
 5. For the possibility of that these regions would gain independence, see for example 
Box (1929, 276), Whigham (1991, 53–56), and Rector (2009, ch. 5). 
 6. Given that the focus of this study is on political decision making, the summary of 
the military side of the war will be quite brief. For more details on the military cam-
paigns, see Leuchars (2002). 
 7. The most detailed account of Paraguayan capabilities prior to the war is Whigham 
(2002, ch. 7). 
 8. For an overview of work on the Paraguayan state’s role in the economy, see Pas-
tore (1994). 
 9. Whigham (2002, 217). 
 10. Leuchars (2002, 56). 
 11. The overthrow was the culmination of the La Plata War of 1851; see Lynch (1981) 
and Whigham (2002, 119–121). 
 12. Quoted in Leuchars (2002, 39). See also Saeger (2007, 82, 93) for evidence of close 
relations between López and Urquiza. 
 13. Whigham (2002, 220). 
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recommendations to its author “to attend to the state of his huts and settle the squab-
bles of his half-naked squaws at home.” Quoted in Whigham (2002, 158). 
 35. The terms of the Treaty of Triple Alliance obviously could not infl uence López’s 
decision for war, as the treaty had not yet been signed when López decided on war, 
and its territorial clauses remained secret until the British published them in early 
1866. Whigham (2002, 279–280). That said, the nature of the territorial terms provide 
[237]
Notes to Pages 97–102
good reason to consider the war indeed to have been “a war over the partition of 
Paraguay,” precisely in line with López’s fears. Leuchars (2002, 46). 
36. Quoted in Leuchars (2002, 28–29). 
37. Thompson (1869, 25). 
38. In the 1839–52 Uruguayan civil war, the Blancos, acting with Argentine support, 
overran rural Uruguay but were unable to take Montevideo. They besieged the city 
starting in 1843 but were unable to prevent supply from the sea; outside assistance 
thus permitted the Colorados to hold on until the anti-Rosas coalition under Urquiza 
invaded in 1852 and forced the Blancos to surrender. 
 39. See for example Leuchars (2002, 146). 
40. Details on the exact content of the discussions are unfortunately unavailable. For 
a summary of the available evidence, see Cunninghame Graham (1933, 199) and 
Leuchars (2002, 145–147). 
41. See for example Washburn (1871, vol. 2, 203–205). 
42. That said, the need to strike into Uruguay, explained by the preventive motiva-
tion, was the reason that he was willing to contemplate the risk of attacking Argen-
tina in the fi rst place. 
 43. For examples, see Leuchars (2002, 145–147). The differing views on whether to 
negotiate with López was a signifi cant source of friction between the allies; Emperor 
Pedro at one point complained that Mitre “drags his feet and aims to drag me into a 
peace which our honor does not let us accept.” Quoted in Bernstein (1973, 103). The 
Uruguayan force was too small to be of signifi cance in this case; its leadership does, 
however, seem to have been open to talks. 
 44. Leuchars (2002, 147). 
 45. Washburn (1871, vol. 2, 185–186, 195–198, 203–205), Peterson (1932, 16–17), Cun-
ninghame Graham (1933, 133), Phelps (1975, 164–165). 
 46. Bernstein (1973, 106–107). 
 47. On rebellion in Argentina, see de la Fuente (2004). On the connection between the 
war and eventual domestic change in Brazil, see Bernstein (1973) and Needell (2006). 
 48. Quoted in Box (1929, 23). Urquiza, whose interests were more aligned with Para-
guay’s than they were with those of Buenos Aires, did formally recognize Paraguay 
as independent after taking power in 1851, but the  porteños did not consider them-
selves bound by this act. 
 49. Quoted in Whigham (2002, 278). 
50. Warren (1978). 
51. For the negotiation and terms of the treaty, see Whigham (2002, 276–281). 
52. See Warren (1978, 116) for the terms of the Brazilian-Paraguayan treaty. In addi-
tion to granting the Brazilians the extent of their prewar territorial claims (but no 
more), the treaty also called for Paraguay to pay a tremendous indemnity, but the 
Brazilians also made it clear that they would not require payment so long as the 
Paraguayans cooperated in limiting Argentine gains, something that Paraguay’s 
leaders were more than happy to do. 
53. Peterson (1932, 10–11). 
54. Leuchars (2002, 46). For other examples of Brazilian intransigence (beyond the 
repeated refusals to negotiate highlighted above), see Kolinski (1965, 125), Phelps 
(1975, 167), and Barman (1999, 230). 
[238]
Notes to Pages 103–110
55. McLynn (1979, 21–22). 
56. Whigham (2002, 121). 
57. Saeger (2007, 81). 
58. Warren (1978). 
59. Whigham (2004, 179, 195). 
60. Kraay (2004), Bernstein (1973, 107). 
61. Barman (1999, 356–361). From a domestic political perspective, it is also worth 
noting that the war was backed by both liberals and conservatives in Brazil. Bern-
stein (1973, 91–92). 
4 .  World War II 
1. Charmley (1993, esp. 647–649). 
2. Hildebrand (1970), Hillgruber (1981). 
3. Taylor (1961), Broszat (1966, esp. chs. 3–4), Mommsen (1991, esp. chs. 7–8). 
4. For an essay that helped clarify the terms of the functionalist-intentionalist debate, 
see Mason (1981). Browning (1992) provides a relatively recent infl uential function-
alist perspective, while Goldhagen (1996) advances an extreme (and historically un-
convincing) intentionalist perspective. 
 5. Thus, for example, Broszat (1966, esp. 51) argues that Nazi ideology was funda-
mentally incoherent (and hence that it cannot be seen as the basis for the Holocaust), 
but he acknowledges that race politics and the acquisition of Lebensraum—the key 
elements of ideology for my argument—were present early and basically unchanged 
throughout Hitler’s political career. 
 6. This stance is similar to that of Rich (1973), although I highlight different evidence. 
 7. His optimism with respect to Britain was repeatedly in evidence in  Mein Kampf 
and in his unpublished second book, although by the late 1930s evidence of unex-
pected hostility reduced his confi dence. Hitler (1925, e.g. 664–665), Hitler (1928, esp. 
ch. XIV). On confi dence on the eve of war, see Taylor (1952, 266–267) and Blainey 
(1988, 48–49); Powell (2006, 195–199) provides a contrasting view. Note also that 
Hitler’s optimism prior to the invasion of France was not shared by his generals. 
May (2000, ch. 18). 
 8. On preinvasion German confi dence, see Cecil (1975, ch. 8). On the purge of the 
Red Army and related weaknesses, see Gorodetsky (1999, 115) and Reese (1989). For 
examples of similar expectations of a quick Soviet collapse in Britain and the United 
States, see Dallek (1979, 278) and Gilbert (2000, 831). 
 9. Hitler (1925, 653), Hitler (1928, 100);  Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, 
vol. 1, doc. 19 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1949), 34. 
 10. Quoted in Kershaw (1998, 588). 
 11. See for example Rich (1973, vol. 1, 208–210). 
 12. See Gorodetsky (1999, e.g. ch. 10) for a discussion of Soviet conciliation of the 
Germans during the period prior to Barbarossa. 
 13. For an example of the relatively early recognition among the generals that defeat 
was coming, see Bullock (1953, 716–717). 
[239]
Notes to Pages 110–113
14. Cecil (1975, 23). Infi ghting and the selective use of information within the Nazi 
hierarchy also limited Hitler’s effective policy freedom to a degree that was not 
recognized at the time. Kershaw (1985, ch. 4), Shore (2003). 
15. Press (2004, 151). 
16. May (2000, 106). 
17. Quoted in Rothfels (1961, 82). 
18. Quoted in Kershaw (1987, 145). 
19. Lüdtke (1992). 
20. Kershaw (1987, 143–147). 
21. Copeland (2000, ch. 5). 
22. Quoted in Copeland (2000, 131). 
23. Bullock (1953, 735–740). 
24. Many studies that try to present Hitler as a calculating actor responding to de-
velopments in the international system, as this one does, as a fi rst step bracket Hit-
ler’s racial ideology, arguing that anti-Semitism and the focus on the German race 
and German racial purity were important primarily in internal politics. See for ex-
ample Taylor (1961) and Copeland (2000). This approach typically follows from a 
desire to separate a rationalist explanation for German foreign policy from Nazi 
domestic policies—especially the Holocaust—that were particularly horrifi c. As the 
discussion below indicates, however, I believe this approach to be fundamentally 
mistaken: without understanding Hitler’s beliefs about the world, as grounded in 
his ideology, it is impossible to understand why he made the foreign policy choices 
that he did or what his ultimate aims were. 
 25. The discussion in this section relies primarily on Hitler’s  Mein Kampf , written in 
1924 during his prison stay following a failed coup, and his unpublished second 
book, completed in draft form by 1928 but never published. For a summary of Hit-
ler’s ideology that is quite compatible with the one presented here, see Rich (1973, 
vol. 1, 3–10, 81–82). 
 26. See Smith (1986) for a discussion of the long-running competition between two 
ideological justifi cations for German imperialism, which he calls  Weltpolitik and Leb-
ensraum, in which Hitler, although drawing on the economic logic of Weltpolitik, 
gave policy priority to the goals associated with Lebensraum. 
 27. Hitler (1925, 131). 
 28. Ibid., 131, 138. See also 642–643 for the fi rst principle that “foreign policy must 
safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating 
a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation’s population and growth on the 
one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the other hand” (emphasis re-
moved). 
 29. Ibid., 133–135. 
 30. Ibid., 139, 644. 
 31. Ibid., 646. 
 32. Hitler consistently rejected calls for a return to the borders of 1914. See, for ex-
ample, Ibid., 651–652, and Hitler (1928, chs. 8–9). 
 33. Hitler (1925, 661; emphasis removed). 
 34. Ibid., 140, 143; Hitler (1928, 76–77). 
[240]
Notes to Pages 113–115
35. Hitler (1925, 654). An interesting question is why Hitler did not see territory 
gained through conquests in Western Europe as suffi cient to guarantee Germany’s 
security. The answer is partly racial—he saw the French and especially the Dutch 
and Scandinavians as racially superior to the Slavs, and hence intended to some 
degree to co-opt them rather than displacing or killing them—and partly strategic, 
in that even the incorporation of the whole of the western conquests would still 
leave Germany overshadowed in the long run by Soviet Russia. 
 36. Hitler (1925, 141), Hitler (1928, 70, 191). 
 37. Hitler (1925, 654), Hitler (1928, 148–152). See also Kershaw (2000, 285). 
 38. For the argument that Germans outside the Reich were being lost to the race, see 
for example Hitler (1928, 99–100). 
 39. Hitler (1925, 140). 
 40. Ibid., 138. See also 654. 
 41. Hitler (1928, 89–90). 
 42. Quoted in Kershaw (1998, 442). 
 43.  Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. 1, doc. 19, 30. 
 44. Quoted in Kershaw (2000, 88). 
 45. Thus, for example, most of his advisors believed that the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland could have been accomplished through negotiation in another year or 
two, but he was unwilling to wait. Kershaw (1998, 582, 584). Similarly, in the Munich 
Crisis, he responded to British willingness to accept the transfer of the Sudetenland 
by raising his demands, although in this case he ultimately backed down after being 
convinced that further time for rearmament would favor Germany. Overy (1999), 
Copeland (2000, 133). 
 46. For similar arguments about Hitler’s beliefs in a deteriorating military situation, 
see Copeland (2000, ch. 5) and Powell (2006). 
 47.  Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. 1, doc. 19, 34. 
 48. Ibid., series C, vol. 5, doc. 490, p. 854. 
 49. Roberts (2006, 16). 
 50. Copeland (2000, 123–145) makes a convincing case that the generals shared Hit-
ler’s fears of decline and were quite prepared for a preventive war, although they 
differed at points on questions of timing. 
 51. Hitler predicted inevitable French opposition to German expansion in  Mein 
Kampf , although he was more sanguine about a possible alliance with Britain. Hit-
ler (1925, 665), Rich (1973, vol. 1, 4–5). By the late 1930s, however, British behavior 
and reports from his representatives in London had left him with few grounds for 
expecting British cooperation. See for example then-ambassador and future for-
eign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop’s January 1938 assessment of British inten-
tions toward Germany.  Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. 1, doc. 93, 
162–168. 
 52. For the British view, see Ripsman and Levy (2008). 
 53. For Hitler, see Chief of Council for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality,  Nazi Con-
spiracy and Aggression , vol. 7 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 
1946), 801, 812. For Allied views, see Smart (2003, esp. 8–10). The expectation that an 
arms race would lead to debilitating infl ation in Germany provided a further reason 
for haste. Klein (1959, 78–79). 
[241]
Notes to Pages 115–118
54. Roberts (2006, 15–16), Keegan (1990, 129). 
55. Kershaw (2000, 44, 285–286). For a contemporary lecture by the German ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union that emphasizes the signifi cant, if temporary, impact of the 
purges on Soviet capabilities, see  Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, 
vol. 1, doc. 610. 
56. For Hitler’s focus on the importance of avoiding fi ghting on two fronts, see for 
example Hitler (1928, 78–79, 185, 187). 
 57.  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , vol. 3, 575. In June 1940, a German intelligence 
report noted that the Russians were disturbed by the prospect of a quick German 
victory in the West, but that “active participation of Russia in the war is entirely out 
of the question because of military weakness and inner-political instability.” Ibid., 
vol. 6, 984. 
58. Quoted in Gorodetsky (1999, 323). 
59. Quoted in Clark (1965, 24) and Warlimont (1964, 112). 
60. Quoted in Rich (1973, vol. 1, 240). 
61.  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , vol. 6, 1000. 
 62. For the belief that Britain was holding out in the hope of eventual Russian as-
sistance, see Halder (1988, 227). For an example of the interpretation of Barbarossa 
as primarily driven by the desire to convince the British to negotiate, see Iklé (1991, 
53). For the invasion being Hitler’s greatest mistake, see Schulman (1948, ch. 10) and 
Kahn (1978, ch. 24). 
 63. May (2000, ch. 18, esp. 267–268). 
64. Kershaw (2000, 43). 
65. Another source of puzzlement has been his cavalier attitude toward the United 
States, most notably his declaration of war following Pearl Harbor. This point is 
ancillary to the primary concerns here, but it is worth noting that by December 1941 
the United States was already at war with Germany in everything but name—the 
navy, for example, had been operating for several months under a standing order to 
shoot any German vessel encountered in the Atlantic on sight. In this context, Hitler 
could quite reasonably have seen a declaration of war as simply an acknowledgment 
of reality, as well as an opportunity to improve the sometimes strained relations with 
Japan and hence possibly bring about an eventual Japanese attack on Russia in the 
Far East. For an argument along these lines, see Rich (1973, vol. 1, ch. 20). 
66. Domarus (1997, vol. 3, 1845–1846). Remarkably, after the victory in the west, 
Hitler’s demands of Britain in some ways  dropped , as he no longer explicitly insisted 
on the retrocession of the colonies (although of course he demanded recognition of 
the new situation with respect to France). 
 67. Woodward (1971, ch. 25). 
 68. Quoted in Frieser (2005, 310–311). 
 69. Allen (2005). See  FRUS 1944, vol. I, 484–579, for discussions of German peace 
feelers in the closing stages of the war, when a wide range of individuals and groups 
sought to arrange some sort of deal, generally involving the overthrow of Hitler and 
peace in return for some sort of political concessions from the Allies. Also worth 
noting is the quixotic personal mission of Rudolf Hess, one of the highest-ranking 
Nazis, who, offi cially without authorization, fl ew personally to Britain in May 1941 
in a unilateral attempt to negotiate a peace deal, an act that resulted only in his arrest 
and incarceration. 
[242]
Notes to Pages 118–121
70. Reiter (2009, 115–119). For a recent argument criticizing views that Stalin autho-
rized moves toward peace, see Roberts (2006, 165–166). 
71. Mastny (1972), Koch (1975). Separately, as part of pushing for peace with the 
Western powers, Himmler responded to British and American truculence by threat-
ening to reach a separate peace with the Soviets, with the consequence that Germany 
would fall to communism.  Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter  FRUS ), 
1944, vol. I, 491. This threat was seen, almost certainly correctly, as baseless bluster. 
 72. Rich (1973, vol. 2, ch. 8 and 11 and 394–398). 
 73. Ibid., 330–331. 
 74. For comments on the wasted deaths of World War I or on the costs of shedding 
blood for inappropriate goals, see for example Hitler (1925, 651–652) and Hitler 
(1928, 85–86). 
 75. Thus in the closing months of the war Hitler repeatedly returned to the miracu-
lous Prussian escape in the Seven Years’ War, when the death of Empress Elizabeth 
precipitated Russia’s withdrawal from the war; the death of President Roosevelt 
fostered a brief period of hope in the last month of the war. Kershaw (2000, 791–792). 
 76. See for example Schweller (1994). 
 77. Other views of Hitler’s war aims are possible. Thus, for example, many Ameri-
can policymakers concluded that Hitler’s political aims changed over time, increas-
ing in response to the pusillanimity of his opponents. Jervis (1976, 223). The argu-
ment against unlimited aims advanced here also addresses the logical claims of such 
an alternate view. 
 78. Whether there were territorial limits to how far Hitler planned to go is a separate 
question, of course, from whether the Allies  believed such limits to exist. I discuss 
Allied beliefs in the context of unconditional surrender later in this chapter. 
 79. For reviews of the relevant debate, see Michaelis (1972) and Kershaw (1985, 
ch. 6). Most globalists argue that Hitler had an intentional plan to conquer the world, 
typically through a three-step process of peaceful expansion, a European war, and 
then a war of world conquest. The most prominent exponents of this view in English 
are Hildebrand (1970), Hauner (1978), Hillgruber (1981), and Weinberg (2005, ch. 1). 
A smaller group agrees that Germany would have continued to expand indefi nitely 
but argues that that expansion by domestic political imperatives rather than an in-
nate desire for expansion. See for example Broszat (1970). For the continentalist posi-
tion that Hitler’s aims were limited to the acquisition of Lebensraum in Eastern 
Europe, see for example Trevor-Roper (1960) and Rich (1973, vol. 2, ch. 12). 
 80. Rauschning (1940). Rauschning broke with the Nazis in 1934 and wrote the book 
with the intention of convincing Germans to withdraw their support for Hitler’s 
regime; it subsequently attracted signifi cant attention during the war in Britain and 
the United States. 
 81. Kershaw (1998, xiv), for example, comments that the book is “now regarded to 
have so little authenticity that it is best to disregard it altogether.” 
 82. Moltmann (1961, 201). I would argue that a “world power” in Hitler’s terms is a 
nation with territory suffi cient to protect itself and to support its population; by 
those terms, multiple world powers existed, but Germany was not one of them. 
 83. Koch (1968, 126). 
 84. Weinberg (1995, ch. 15), Goda (1998). 
 85. Moltmann (1961, 224). 
[243]
Notes to Pages 121–125
86. See for example Weinberg (1995, ch. 15). 
87. It should, however, be noted that Hitler is less uniformly dismissive of the United 
States in  Mein Kampf than is typically believed, at one point for example contrasting 
its “immense inner strength” with “the weakness of most European colonial pow-
ers.” Hitler (1925, 139). 
 88. For the relevant discussion, see Hitler (1928, ch. 9). Purported allusions to a fu-
ture war depend on Hitler’s claim that only a state that follows his recommenda-
tions “will be able to stand up to North America” (116); this comment was a rhe-
torical aside that in no way implies a planned invasion of the Americas. 
 89. Weinberg (1964). 
 90. Compton (1967, 247–248). Compton more generally attributes Hitler’s disinterest 
in the United States to a combination of ideology, which saw Americans as racially 
mixed and hence degenerate, and geopolitics, in which countries outside the Euro-
pean continent were seen as largely irrelevant. 
 91. See for example Hitler’s speech in Domarus (1997, vol. 3, 1845–1846). 
 92. Jackson (2003, 11). 
 93. Smart (2003, ch. 3). 
 94. Quoted in Jackson (2003, 1). 
 95. Quoted in Reynolds (1990, 329). 
 96. Bell (1974, 48–52). 
 97. Reynolds (2001, 234). See Bialer (1980) for a general survey of prewar British fears 
about the effects of air power. 
 98. Gilbert (1994, 157), Domarus (1997, vol. 3, 2062–2063). 
 99. For popular and scholarly accounts of the War Cabinet discussions, see Knight 
(1977), Reynolds (1985), Costello (1991), Carlton (1991, 1993), Lawlor (1994), Lukacs 
(1999), and Reiter (2009, 95–108). 
 100. Gilbert (1994, e.g. 158). A range of interpretations of these events exist, including 
for example the claim that Halifax sought to capitulate while Churchill aimed to 
continue the war or the argument that both Churchill and Halifax were in principal 
open to negotiations, albeit not on the terms that Hitler was willing to offer. See 
Costello (1991) and Carlton (1993), respectively. 
 101.  FRUS, Conferences at Washington, 1941–2, and Casablanca, 1943 , 727. 
 102. This point is muddied in the historical record by Roosevelt’s odd and untrue 
claim that he advanced the demand as an off-the-cuff comment in a press confer-
ence, an interpretation belied both by extensive evidence of prior discussions of the 
demand and by the conviction with which he subsequently defended the policy. See 
Sherwood (1950, 696) and Dallek (1979, 373–376) for useful discussions of Roos-
evelt’s behavior in this incident. 
 103. For details on the advisory committee’s discussions, see Notter (1949, Part 2) 
and  FRUS: Conferences at Washington, 1941–2, and Casablanca, 1943 , 506n 2. 
 104. Notter (1949, 85). 
 105. Ibid., 101, 127. 
106. Quoted in Sherwood (1948, 418). 
107. Gilbert (2000, 361), quoted in Dallek (1979, 256). 
108. Allen (2005), Hindley (1996). 
[244]
Notes to Pages 125–129
109. Kecskemeti (1958, ch. 5). 
110. Reynolds (1985). 
111. Gilbert (1994, 247). 
112. Ibid., 337–338, 341. See also 119, 155, 163, and 255 for pessimistic or negative 
comments by British leaders about the Americans during the critical period. See also 
Woodward (1962, 78–79). 
113. Smart (2003, ch. 3). 
114. Gilbert (1994, 157–158). 
115. Ibid., 313. 
116. With the French collapse, Churchill acknowledged that the blockade was 
“largely ruined,” but he continued to hold out hope that bombardment might 
weaken the German economy, for example objecting later in the summer to Herbert 
Hoover’s plans to provide food aid to the occupied populations on the grounds that 
“the front lines run through the factories.” Quoted in Gilbert (1994, 441) and Doe-
necke (2000, 95). 
 117. Roberts (1991, 177), Neillands (2001, 57–58). 
 118. Overy (2001, 71). 
 119. On the severity of the U-boat threat, see Churchill (1950, esp. ch. 7). For discus-
sions of the expectations of a German invasion and its likely consequences, see Hin-
sley (1979, vol. 1, ch. 5) and Bell (1974, 50). 
 120. Quoted in Costello (1991, 213). 
 121. Gilbert (1994, 93, 338). 
 122. Roberts (1991, 224). 
 123. On motivated bias, see Jervis (1976, esp. ch. 10). 
 124. Charmley (1993, 560). 
 125. Butler (1957, xviii). 
 126. The Special Operations Executive (SOE), tasked by Churchill to work covertly 
to “set Europe ablaze,” provides a similar example of motivated bias: at its creation, 
British leaders apparently hoped that it might provoke a general uprising that 
would provide the coup de grâce originally expected from the French army, but in 
the event it immediately entered into factional battles within the British bureaucracy 
and ultimately served as at best an auxiliary to the war effort. In the summary of one 
historian, the SOE emerged “as a desperate attempt to plug the gaping hole in Brit-
ish strategy caused by the collapse of France, and wildly unrealistic hopes were 
pinned upon it at the very highest levels—as they also were on other ‘indirect’ meth-
ods of defeating the Germans such as economic warfare and strategic bombing”; one 
of the organization’s leaders described it after the fact as “no more than a hopeful 
improvisation devised in a really desperate situation.” Stafford (1980, 2); quoted in 
Stafford (2006, 49). For a fuller history of the SOE, see Foot (1966) and Stafford (1980). 
 127. James (1970), Charmley (1993, 434). 
 128. Roberts (1991, ch. 21), Lawlor (1994, 33). 
 129. Trachtenberg (2005), Schuessler (2009). 
[245]
Notes to Pages 129–133
130. Bell (1990, 16), Gilbert (1994, 22, 243, 246). 
131. Casey (2001, 74–75). 
132.  Department of State Bulletin , vol. XI, no. 265, 83. 
 133. Charmley (1989, 210–212), Self (2006, 437–438). Similarly, the broader cabinet 
met Churchill’s announcement that “whatever happens at Dunkirk, we shall fi ght 
on” with general acclaim. Gilbert (1994, 182–184), Charmley (1993, 405–406). 
 134. Burridge (1985, 129, 132, 145),  FRUS , 1940, vol. I, 81. 
 135. Bell (1974, ch. 6). 
 136. Langer and Gleason (1953, 757–758, 939). 
 137. Darilek (1976, 18, 24). 
 138. Ibid., ch. 2. 
 139. Foster (1983, 20). 
 140. Berinsky (2009, 47–48). 
 141. See Powell (2006) and in particular Reiter (2009, ch. 6). 
 142. Roberts (1991, 178). 
 143. See for example Chase (1955) and Armstrong (1961). 
 144. Roosevelt (1946, 117), Carroll (1948, 334), Pozdeeva (1994, 356–357). 
 145. Chase (1995, 262). 
 146. The exception to this claim is the argument that Roosevelt somehow “gave 
away” Eastern Europe to the Soviets. Baldwin (1950, 14), Wittmer (1953). In practice, 
however, unless the Western Allies were prepared either to invade France far earlier 
than June 1944—which they ultimately decided they were militarily incapable of 
doing—or make a deal with Germany to fi ght the Soviets—which no serious com-
mentator in the West advocated, even in retrospect—Eastern Europe simply was not 
Roosevelt’s to lose. Reynolds (2006, 66–67). 
 147. For examples of contemporary criticism, see Hull (1948, 113), Chase (1955, 113), 
Balfour (1970, 719), and Villa (1976). 
 148. Sherwood (1950, 695). In practice, evidence that the demand strengthened Ger-
man resistance is scanty, especially in comparison with the clear effect of the aerial 
bombardment of German cities. Chase (1955, 267). 
 149. Hull (1948, 1570). 
 150. Reiter (2009) similarly argues that the refusal to negotiate followed from a mis-
trust of Hitler’s character, but he lacks a strong theoretical explanation for the origin 
of that mistrust. 
 151. English translations of the book were quite limited prior to World War II, with 
the fi rst full translation appearing only in 1939, and the book’s poor organization 
tended to put off those who attempted to read it in German. As a result, relatively 
little was known about it, which aided Hitler’s attempts in international diplomacy 
to downplay his earlier statements. See Ensor (1939) for a fascinating contemporary 
discussion of the book, and Barnes and Barnes (1980) for a history of the delay in the 
book’s translation. 
 152. Indeed, in 1939 Stalin had reason to hope that whichever country lost the war 
would turn communist, as Russia had done in World War I. A purported secret 
speech to the Politburo defends the pact with Hitler in precisely these terms 
[246]
Notes to Pages 134–138
(Pleshakov 2005, 43–44); Sluch (2004) however makes a fairly convincing (if not de-
fi nitive) case that this speech never occurred, although he acknowledges that the 
main arguments attributed to Stalin were likely close to what the dictator believed. 
153. This point should not be taken as implying that there were no policy differences 
among these men—clearly such differences existed. The central point is simply that 
their interpretations of German behavior shifted in similar ways and in response to 
similar observations over time, and that this shift took all of them from the view that 
one could negotiate with Germany to the view that negotiation was impossible. 
154. Gilbert and Gott (1963, 340). 
155. Quoted in Roberts (1991, 185). 
156. Ibid., 214. His openness to the approach to Mussolini in the May War Cabinet 
meetings can also be attributed to greater optimism that France might be induced to 
continue to fi ght, a hope that he held onto longer than others. Lawlor (1994, 57). 
Halifax also apparently did not see a signifi cant threat to British morale from the 
knowledge that negotiations were occurring; here most historians have sided with 
Churchill in arguing that negotiation would have undermined the popular will to 
continue resistance, whatever the terms that Germany demanded. 
157. Gilbert (1994, 799). 
158. Quoted in Self (2006, 431). 
159. Dilks (1978). 
160. Quoted in Self (2006, 437–438). 
161. Quoted in Gilbert (1977, 452). 
162. Quoted in James (1970, 225). 
163. Ibid., 228–229. 
164. Ibid., 318. 
165. Quoted in Gilbert (1977, 1001). 
166. Quoted in Kimball (1997, 44). 
167. Gilbert (1993, 194). 
168. Farnham (1997, 62). 
169. Dallek (1979, 144, 149). 
170. Kimball (1997, 44). 
171. Dallek (1979, 175). 
172. Sherwood (1950, 667). 
173. Notter (1949, 127). 
174.  FRUS 1944, vol. I, 584–585, 587–588. 
175. Ibid., 588–589, 592. 
176. Armstrong (1961, 42). 
177. Kecskemeti (1958, ch. 4). 
178. For a discussion of the varied diagnoses of the German problem among Allied 
leaders, see Armstrong (1961, 21–22, 28). 
179. Casey (2001, esp. ch. 5). 
180.  FRUS 1944, vol. I, 501–502. 
181. Armstrong (1961, 19–20). 
[247]
Notes to Pages 139–145
182.  FRUS: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 , 51 1–513. 
 183. Gilbert (2000, 322). 
 184. Ibid., 1513. See also 332, 1428, 1487, and 1659. Churchill ultimately acquiesced 
to the views of his allies; even had he prevailed, it is unlikely that any German gov-
ernment would have agreed to his requirement that Prussia be permanently alien-
ated from Germany until the military situation approached that of the fi nal months 
of the war. 
5 .  Additional Commitment Problem Cases 
1. This summary of the onset of the war is extremely abbreviated. For useful discus-
sions of the prewar negotiations with contrasting views on the reasonableness of 
various sides’ demands, see Rich (1985) and Goldfrank (1994). 
2. On the Russian policy of restraint, see Kerner (1937). The Russians recognized that 
they held predominant infl uence at the Porte and that in the event of Ottoman col-
lapse the likely result would be a partition that would saddle them with great power 
rivals on their southern fl ank. 
 3. Seaton (1977, 38). 
 4. Puryear (1935). 
 5. This point was generally accepted, although there were important differences of 
opinion as to when the collapse would occur. For examples, see Curtiss (1979, 
65–66). 
 6. Rich (1985, 38). 
 7. Argyll (1906, 448). Similarly, Foreign Minister Clarendon, in an address to the 
House of Lords shortly after the British declaration of war, averred that “there is not 
a man in Russia that does not believe that Constantinople will ultimately belong to 
Russia. It will be our duty as far as possible to see that that expectation shall be dis-
appointed. Because were it to succeed … it is not too much to anticipate that more 
than one power would have to undergo the fate of Poland.”  Annual Register (Lon-
don: 1854, 57). 
 8. In this context, it is worth remembering that Russia was the sole major continental 
power to have been untouched by the revolutions of 1848. In particular, the demon-
stration of Austrian reliance on Russia—the Austrians had been able to put down 
Hungarian uprisings only with the assistance of several hundred thousand soldiers 
from Russia—raised fears that Russia might be in a position to unilaterally revise the 
status quo with respect to Turkey. See for example Taylor (1964, 91–93), who argues 
that Russia assisted Austria in Hungary precisely to gain a free hand with respect to 
Constantinople. 
 9. For British war aims, see Rich (1985, esp. 107–110). Palmerston, who was prime 
minister for the second half of the war, and Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambas-
sador to the Porte, had particularly ambitious aims that entailed signifi cant territo-
rial losses by Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea region. 
 10. Without the preventive motivation, it is highly unlikely that the war would have 
happened. That said, divergent expectations also played a signifi cant role in bring-
ing about the confl ict. Most notably, Nicholas consistently underestimated the prob-
ability that the British would be willing to cooperate with the French in opposing 
Russian actions in Constantinople; had he known that the British would be willing 
[248]
Notes to Pages 145–149
to fi ght (and that the Austrians and Prussians would not back him), he likely would 
not have adopted a policy as aggressive as he did. See for example Lincoln (1978, 
333–341). 
11. Some might object to this argument on the grounds that it would have been un-
reasonable for the Russians to believe that they could achieve the kind of military 
success necessary to impose unconditional surrender. While it is no doubt possible 
that this situation played a role in Russian thinking, it is worth remembering that at 
the time that American policymakers formulated the unconditional surrender policy 
in World War II the Americans and their British allies were completed excluded from 
the Continent as a result of unprecedented German victories; without the benefi t of 
hindsight, a policy aiming at the total defeat of Germany was simply audacious at 
the time. 
 12. The lack of clarity in Russian war aims arose both because documentation on 
Russian decision making is limited relative to the availability of information about 
the other powers (partly because of the concentration of power in the hands of a few 
men and partly because of the vagaries of subsequent history) and because the Rus-
sians generally were on the defensive and thus simply sought to induce the Allies to 
limit their demands. 
 13. Rich (1985, 110). 
 14. For discussions of wartime negotiations, see for example Rich (1985, ch. 9) and 
Wetzel (1985, chs. 6–7). 
 15. Curtiss (1979, 60–61). 
 16. Schroeder (1972, 41–42). 
 17. Pulcini (2003, 89). 
 18. Neumann (1996). 
 19. Experience with international politics of course left the Russians with few doubts 
about the likelihood that other powers would acquiesce to their acquisition of Con-
stantinople, and both the tsar and Nesselrode thus repeatedly disavowed interest in 
direct acquisition. At the same time, however, Russian plans for the event of Turkish 
collapse consistently involved Russia temporarily taking control of the Bosporus; as 
the British experience in Egypt a decade and a half later was to show, of course, 
“purely temporary” control could become quite protracted. 
 20. Rich (1985, 14). 
 21. Curtiss (1979, 62). 
 22. For examples of studies that present the Japanese decision for war as ultimately 
self-defeating and irrational, see Snyder (1991, ch. 4) and Kupchan (1994, ch. 5). 
 23. Ike (1967, e.g., 247–249). 
 24. The decision that the war could end only through unconditional surrender came 
quite early in the war, although it was made public only in January 1943. For more 
information, see chapter 4. 
 25. Sagan (1988) provides the best extant account of the preventive motivations be-
hind the Japanese attack, including substantially more detail than can be presented 
here. 
 26. Quoted in Yagame (2006, 97). 
 27. Quoted in Sagan (1988, 337). See also Marder (1981, vol. 1, 175). 
[249]
Notes to Pages 149–154
28. Miwa (1975, 116). 
29. Sagan (1988, 326), Snyder (1991, 125–126). 
30. For the centrality of resource problems in Japanese strategic planning, see Barn-
hart (1987). 
 31. Ike (1967, 238), Marder (1981, vol. 1, 166–167). 
32. Marder (1981, vol. 1, 176), Sagan (1988, 342). 
33. Ike (1967, 196–200). 
34. Ibid., 152. 
35. Ibid., 247–249. 
36. For a discussion of unconditional surrender that focuses in particular on Japan, 
see Hellegers (2002). 
37. Quoted in Armstrong (1961, 16–17, 19). 
38. Sagan (1988, 323). 
39. Hellegers (2002, 10). 
40. Informational accounts have a particularly diffi cult time explaining this confl ict: 
by 1944 at the latest it was apparent to all that Japan was doomed, and yet fi ghting 
continued, with quite possibly over half of all deaths in the war occurring after this 
point. Dower (1993, 293–294). 
 41. Hasegawa (2005). 
 42. Hellegers (2002, 149–155). 
 43. Even the acceptance of the fi gurehead role for the emperor was controversial 
with large segments of the US public. See for example Kecskemeti (1958, 163–167). 
 44. Gieling (1999, ch. 6) usefully reviews relevant sermons by high-ranking fi gures 
that discussed the decision for peace, including calculated rhetorical shifts in the 
way that the war was presented to the public. 
 45. On the context of the 1975 agreement, see Hiro (1989, 15–16). 
 46.  New York Times , “Khomeini Dismisses Truce Offer, Vowing a Fight to the End,” 
October 1, 1980, A1. 
 47. See for example King (1987, 10), Karsh (1987/88, ch. 1), Chubin and Tripp (1988, 
28–29), Hiro (1989, 37), and Ghareeb (1990, 35). For an exception that explains the 
Iraqi invasion (and all other political decisions by either side) in terms of domestic 
politics, see Pelletiere (1992). The strongest domestic political argument is that Sad-
dam fought the war to protect his own position, rather than to protect Iraq as a 
whole. While his government was unpopular with many in Iraq, it is also true that 
a wide constituency, most obviously among the Sunnis but also in other ethnic 
groups, would have been opposed to his replacement by a theocratic government 
along the lines of the one in Iran. 
 48. For examples, see Pelletiere (1992, 32). 
 49. Hiro (1989, 26–27). 
50. Robins (1989 46–47). 
51. Hiro (1989, 36). 
52. Chubin and Tripp (1988, 33). 
53. Hiro (1989, 36–37). 
[250]
Notes to Pages 155–162
54. Seifzadeh (1997, 94). 
55. Robins (1989, 47), Hiro (1989, 38). It is worth noting that domestic funding for the 
war in Iran and Iraq came primarily from oil revenues, although the Iraqis also ben-
efi ted from large foreign loans. 
56. Hiro (1989, 46). 
57. For examples, see Chubin (1989) and Pelletiere (1992). 
58. Chubin and Tripp (1988, 40). 
59. Iraq of course encouraged rebellion among the minority populations, with the 
result, for example, that Iranian Kurds were cooperating with Iraq at the same time 
that Iraqi Kurds were assisting Iran. Among the core population that supported the 
revolution, however, the regime did not face substantial resistance to its war aims. 
 60. For examples, see Chubin and Tripp (1988, 38, 49) and Gieling (1999, ch. 6). 
 61. Chubin and Tripp (1988, 52). 
 62. Hiro (1989, 243). 
 63. Quoted in Hiro (1989, 32). 
 64. Pelletiere (1992, 29) describes the desire to export the revolution violently as the 
preference of a “radical fringe” that did not control policy after the revolution. Khad-
duri (1988, 67) notes that Khomeini espoused a peaceful interpretation of jihad prior 
to the revolution, although he believes that Khomeini switched to a more violent 
interpretation once in power. 
 65. This case is admittedly unusual, in that it is almost certainly true that the revolu-
tionary leadership was particularly predisposed to explain behavior in dispositional 
terms, given its theologically based tendency to divide the world into regions of 
believers and unbelievers, where the latter were inherently corrupt. This sort of pre-
disposition could easily make the dispositional inference more likely. 
 66. Chubin (1989). 
 67.  New York Times , “An Old Letter Casts Doubts on Iran’s Goal for Uranium,” Octo-
ber 5, 2006, A14. 
6 .  Short Wars of Optimism 
1. On the disputes over loan forgiveness and Kuwaiti overproduction, see Baram 
(1993) and Khadduri and Ghareeb (1997, chs. 6–7). 
2. For a history of this claim, including a signifi cant crisis in 1961 that was resolved 
only through British intervention, see Finnie (1992). 
 3. Thus, for example, even with 100,000 Iraqi soldiers massed on the border, the 
Kuwaiti representative at the fi nal meeting between the two sides—at Jidda two 
days before the invasion—was instructed to hold fi rm in the face of pressure. Khad-
duri and Ghareeb (1997, 115–117). 
 4. Kostiner (1993, 112–114), Yetiv (2004, 22). 
 5. Some have argued that Saddam may also have gained confi dence from the expec-
tation, grounded in Cold War history, that American opposition would ensure that 
Iraq would receive Soviet support. Gorbachev (1996, 552), Hassan (1999, 4, 39). Al-
though plausible, there is little evidence that expectations of Soviet support played 
[251]
Notes to Pages 162–164
a signifi cant role in Iraqi thinking; rapid and categorical Soviet denunciations of 
Iraqi policy in any event provided no basis for optimism as the crisis unfolded. 
6. For general discussions of casualty aversion and its implications for the foreign 
policy of the United States or of democracies more generally, see Smith (2005) and 
Wrede-Braden (2007). 
7.  New York Times , “Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy,” 
September 23, 1990, 19. The Iraqi army had demonstrated the ability to infl ict sig-
nifi cant casualties in the war with Iran, at times killing well over ten thousand Ira-
nians in a single battle. Clodfelter (2007, 627–629). 
 8. Matar (1981, 95). 
 9. Quoted in Long (2004, 14). See also comments to this effect by David Newton, who 
as US ambassador to Iraq in the mid-1980s had Saddam emphasize this point to him 
on several occasions. Woodward (1991, 258). Analysis of polling data after the war 
indicates that the expectation that signifi cant casualties would lead to a substantial 
drop in popular support for the war was “basically sound,” although the Iraqis 
failed to impose the level of casualties necessary to bring about this drop in support. 
Mueller (1994, 121, 124–129). 
 10. Simpson (1991, pp 273, 281–282). American policymakers cited this concern as a 
reason for ending the ground war when they did, although at least one subsequent 
study found that public opinion demonstrated little concern for Iraqi civilian or 
military casualties. Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 485), Mueller (1994, 122–123). 
 11. On constructive engagement, see Rubin (1993) and Karabell (1995). 
 12. That said, when she observed that “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab con-
fl icts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait,” she relied on a stance that was 
designed to deal with a situation in which Iraq requested American support in the 
border dispute. Viorst (1991, 66). The comment was thus more encouraging to Iraq 
than it had been meant to be, but it was not dramatically out of line with US policy, 
and it was a reasonable response given that Glaspie had not been given time before 
the meeting to check in with Washington. Indeed, in contemporary domestic discus-
sions, State Department representatives observed that the United States had “no 
special defense or security commitments to Kuwait,” and Glaspie was never in-
structed to make unambiguous deterrent threats. Quoted in Stein (1992, 152). 
 13. As Jervis (1993, 177) notes, simultaneously deterring and reassuring a potential 
opponent in international politics is an extremely diffi cult task, and conceivably an 
impossible one in this case. 
 14. Schwarzkopf (1992, 385), Knights (2005, 20–25). 
 15. Bin et al. (1998, 75–78). 
 16. Viorst (1991, 67). 
 17. For the desire for an “Arab” solution to the crisis, see for example Khadduri and 
Ghareeb (1997, 161–167). The expectation that the Saudis might buy off Saddam 
clearly was not groundless, given their history of using money to resolve confl ict; 
indeed, the Americans worried that the Saudis might decide to resort to fi nancial 
diplomacy and undermine the strong line that the Bush administration preferred. 
Yetiv (2004, 34). 
 18. Woodward (1991, 268), Long (2004, 39–43). The Iraqi claim not to have intended 
to invade Saudi Arabia gains credence from the observation that they did not attack 
during the period immediately after the invasion or during the fi rst few weeks of the 
[252]
Notes to Pages 164–170
American deployment to Saudi Arabia, during which time the force protecting the 
main Saudi oilfi elds would have posed little greater obstacle to an Iraqi advance 
than the Kuwaiti army had. 
 19. See for example Simpson (1991, 276). Saddam also sought to tie opposition to the 
Iraqi invasion to Israel, in the hope that doing so would fracture the coalition. 
 20.  New York Times , “War and Peace: A Sampling from the Debate on Capital Hill,” 
January 11, 1991, A8. See also  New York Times , “Bush May Recall Congress to Con-
sider Force in Gulf,” November 29, 1990, A1, and  New York Times , “Legislators Take 
Sides for Combat or for Reliance on the Sanctions,” January 11, 1991, A1. 
 21.  New York Times , “Debate This Week: Approval Appears Likely After Heavy Argu-
ing, Say Hill Leaders,” January 9, 1991, A6. 
 22. Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 445–446). 
 23. For examples of attempts to fi nd ways to credibly signal resolve, see Bush and 
Scowcroft (1998, 421–423, 426). 
 24. Viorst (1991, 68). 
 25. Simpson (1991, 249–251), Woodward (1991, 335–336). 
 26. Quoted in Yetiv (2004, 165). 
 27.  New York Times , “Amid Preparations, No One Can Say When a War Might Break 
Out or End,” October 21, 1990, 12; and Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 425). For examples 
of higher public estimates at the time, see  New York Times , “Fighting the Iraqis: Four 
Scenarios, All Disputed,” November 19, 1990, A1, and N ew York Times , “War and 
Peace: A Sampling from the Debate on Capital Hill,” January 11, 1991, A8. A contem-
porary statistical estimate predicted that total deaths on both sides from the war 
would exceed 100,000 and might reach 1,000,000. Cioffi -Revilla (1991). 
 28. Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 428). 
 29. Khadduri and Ghareeb (1997, 132). 
 30. Given the intractability of the Israel-Palestine confl ict and of Syrian involvement 
in Lebanon, these demands were seen in the region and elsewhere as a rhetorical 
ploy to cover an intent to remain in Kuwait indefi nitely. Yetiv (2004, 40). 
 31. Gorbachev (1996, 551–565) describes Soviet peace efforts in detail. 
 32. For the text of this proposal, see  New York Times , “Moscow’s Statement: Transcript 
of Comments on Soviet Peace Proposal,” February 23, 1991, 5. 
 33. For details on the cease-fi re terms, see Schwarzkopf (1992, 479–490). For Iraqi 
acceptance of the, in their words, “unfair and vindictive measures” contained in the 
relevant Security Council Resolutions (in particular Resolution 687), see  New York 
Times , “Excerpts From Letter to U.N.: Iraqis ‘Accept This Resolution,’ ” April 8, 
1991, A6. 
 34. Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 489), Yetiv (2004, 219). 
35. Quinlivan (1999). Oakes (2006) argues that a leader in Saddam’s position is more 
likely to use repression to retain power than diversion. 
36. I am aware of four book-length studies of this war: English (1971), the best English-
language source on the confl ict; Hunt and Townsend (1858) and Outram (1860), 
which are most useful for military questions; and Bushev (1959), which provides an 
alternative (Russian) perspective, albeit based on similar sources as those used by 
English. Akhmedzhanov (1971) provides a useful history of the Herat question, albeit 
suffused with a signifi cant anti-British bias. A number of works also discuss various 
[253]
Notes to Pages 170–175
aspects of the confl ict as one part of a broader analysis. Most work unsurprisingly 
focuses on the British perspective, with little information on decision making inside 
the Iranian court; in this regard, Amanat (1997, esp. ch. 7) is particularly useful for its 
insight into the Iranian court. See also Walpole (1912, vol. VI, 266–273). 
 37. It took more than a month for communications to pass between European capi-
tals and Asian cities like Tehran and Bombay in which signifi cant decisions concern-
ing the war were made. On the diffi culty of communication, see for example Hunt 
and Townsend (1858, esp. ch. 4). 
 38. For the signifi cance of Iran and Herat within the Great Game, see Akhmedzha-
nov (1971, 17–21). 
 39. Outram (1860, 237–238), Barker (1915, 32). 
 40. A total of roughly 1,500 to 2,000 people died in the war (the vast majority of them 
Iranian soldiers), a very low total for a war between two relatively large countries. 
 41. One anecdote provides evidence of the extent to which the Iranians recognized 
the inevitability of military defeat in the event of war with Britain. At the start of the 
war, the Iranian prime minister ensured that one of his political enemies would be 
named as the commander-in-chief for the Iranian forces, thus positioning him to 
take the blame for the anticipated subsequent military disaster. That man, similarly 
recognizing the futility of fi ghting, took so long to reach the front that the war was 
already lost by the time that he arrived. English (1971, 119–120). 
 42. Bushev (1959, 40). 
 43. Quoted in English (1971, 28–29). 
 44. Waller (1990). 
 45. See Barker (1915, 2) and English (1971, 63). Instead of invading, the British formed 
an alliance with the prince of Kabul Dost Mohammed Khan (the man who ulti-
mately reunifi ed Afghanistan in 1863), although the alliance ended up being more 
of a defensive nature and was in any event not sealed until late January, leaving little 
time for any real action in the war. Kaye (1864, vol. 1, 427–448). 
 46. Hunt and Townsend (1858, 180), Walpole (1912, 270–271). Amanat (1997, 278, 
286) reports Iranian disappointment when the news of the end of the Crimean War 
arrived, at a point when the Iranians had already committed to the seizure of Herat. 
 47. It is worth noting that the possibility for Russian intervention—an additional 
potential source of divergent expectations—seems to have played no role in the 
move to war, despite fears in some British quarters that the war with Iran might 
herald a new clash with Russia. Bushev (1959, 86). The Russians were not eager for 
another fi ght with Britain so recently after the Crimean War, and there is no indica-
tion that the leaderships on either side ever considered such an eventuality at all 
likely. 
 48. The evidence in this paragraph is taken from Amanat (1997, 293–302). 
 49. English (1971, 138). 
 50. For the full text of the treaty, see Rawlinson (1875, vol. 4, 370–373). 
 51. Amanat (1997, 304). 
 52. See for example English (1971, 43). 
 53. Bakhash (1978), Martin (2005). 
 54. Ashley (1879, vol. 2, 346), Chamberlain (1987, 97–99). 
 55. English (1971, 139), quoted in Bushev (1959, 130). 
[254]
Notes to Pages 176–184
56. Ibid., 140–141. 
57. Holt (1964, 202–204). It is possible that a similar outcome would have arisen over 
the war with Iran, but in practice the Chinese dispute, in which Britain was attempt-
ing to force the sale of an addictive narcotic to address its trade defi cit, provided a 
far more attractive basis for opposition criticism. Hurd (1967). 
7 .  The Limits on Leaders 
1. Oakes (2006, 432). For a similar interpretation, see Levy and Vakili (1992). 
2.  Time Magazine , February 14, 1983, 65. On the history of the islands, see Hoffmann 
and Hoffmann (1984) and Freedman (2005, vol. 1, chs. 1–3). For a summary of what 
limited strategic signifi cance the islands have, see Sloan (2005). 
 3. On the Falklands lobby, which had managed as early as 1967 to get a public pledge 
that no deal would be struck against the islanders’ wishes, see Dillon (1989, ch. 3) 
and Charlton (1989, ch. 4). 
 4. Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 153–154). 
 5. For evidence of the strong positive reaction in Argentina, see Femenia (1996, esp. 
96–98). 
 6. For the performance of the junta in the years prior to 1982, see Rock (1985, 366–
367), Pion-Berlin (1985), and Vacs (1987). 
 7. Pion-Berlin (1985), Arquilla and Rasmussen (2001). 
 8. Vacs (1987, 24–29). 
 9. Levy and Vakili (1992, 130), Lewis (2001, 146–147). 
 10. Gamba (1987, 111–112), Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 153). 
 11. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 105), Gamba (1987, 115), Freedman 
(2005, vol. 1, ch. 15). 
 12. Lebow (1985, 108), Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 159). It was clear that this behavior 
was intended to strengthen support for the government. See  Latin American Weekly 
Report , “Argentina: Islands Used as Vote-Catchers,” March 12, 1982, available online 
at http://www.latinnews.com/arcarticle.asp?articleid=78765. 
13. See for example Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 71, 107–109). 
14. See for example Hastings and Jenkins (1983, 59–60). 
15. For succinct rebuttals to the argument that the junta acted in response to eco-
nomic unrest, see Gamba (1987, 132) and Arquilla and Rasmussen (2001, 748). 
16. For works that emphasize the role of divergent expectations, see for example 
Lebow (1985), Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991), and Fravel (2010). 
17. Toase (2005, 147–151). 
18. Gamba (1987, 137–140), Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 190–191). 
19. Thatcher (1993, 177). 
20. Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 57). On trip-wire forces more generally, see Schelling 
(1966, 47). Even after the invasion, British decision makers continued to insist that 
a larger standing commitment prior to the war simply was not an option. Nott 
(2005, 58). 
[255]
Notes to Pages 185–188
21. The British also planned to withdraw the survey team that provided the only 
British presence on South Georgia, although as with the  Endurance this decision was 
forestalled at the last minute. 
 22. See for example Freedman (2005, vol. 1, e.g. 116–118). 
 23. Ibid., vol. 1, ch. 11. 
 24. Franks (1992, 26–27, 32). 
 25. Gustafson (1988, 62–63), Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 78), Freedman 
(2005, vol. 1, 153). 
 26. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 82–83, 107). 
 27. Gamba (1987, 145–146). 
 28.  The Times of London , “Galtieri: No Regrets, No Going Back,” June 12, 1982, 4. 
 29. Quoted in Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 200). 
 30. Arquilla and Rasmussen (2001, 754–758). 
 31. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 257, 273, 277). 
 32. See for example Hughes and Larson (1985) and Arquilla and Rasmussen (2001). 
 33. Thatcher (1993, 173–174). 
 34. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 241). 
 35. Hastings and Jenkins (1983, 123–124), Freedman (2005, vol. 2, 69–82). 
 36. Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 206, 211). 
 37. Nott (2005, 59). 
 38. Freedman (2005, vol. 1, 143–147, 168–169, 199–200). There were also concerns that 
there might be a British submarine in the area. 
 39. Ibid., vol. 1, 187. 
 40. For the full history, see Haig (1984, ch. 13) and Freedman (2005, vol. 2, sections 2 
and 4). The talks included a lot of detailed bargaining over subsidiary issues, in large 
part because the mediators sought to build a consensus by starting with issues—
such as the composition of an interim authority—on which agreement might be 
reached before tackling the more diffi cult questions of sovereignty, while each side 
was reluctant to directly reject any mediator proposals to avoid being blamed for the 
failure of negotiations. On the central sovereignty question, however, neither side 
ever made a substantial concession. 
 41. The British were permitted to make use of an American base on (British-owned) 
Ascension Island, and the United States and other countries (notably France) pro-
vided intelligence on Argentine capabilities. That said, the Argentine Navy ulti-
mately effectively withdrew from the war in part because naval leaders believed 
that the United States was providing Britain with extensive satellite intelligence, 
well beyond the very limited amount that was actually provided. Freedman and 
Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 270), Freedman (2005, vol. 2, 71, 236). 
 42. Freedman (2005, vol. 2, e.g. 173–174). 
43. Lebow (1985, 109),  Latin American Weekly Report , “The Forces that Galtieri Un-
leashed,” April 30, 1982, available online at http://www.latinnews.com/arcarticle.
asp?articleid=79445. See also Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1991, 313). 
 44. Quoted in Freedman (2005, vol. 2, 544). 
[256]
Notes to Pages 189–193
45.  The Times of London , “Galtieri: No Regrets, No Going Back,” June 12, 1982, 4. 
46. Freedman (2005, vol. 2, 511–512). 
47. Attacks on the Argentine mainland would have been politically counterproduc-
tive. Thatcher (1993, 221). 
48. Vacs (1987, 29). 
49.  The Times of London , “Military Defeat Hammers Last Nail into Galtieri’s Political 
Coffi n,” June 18, 1982, available online at http://www.latinnews.com/arcarticle.
asp?articleid=80018. 
 50. Arquilla and Rasmussen (2001). 
 51. Gamba (1987, 181). 
 52. For a similar argument about the limits of diversionary war, see Fravel (2010). 
 53. Historiography on this confl ict is quite limited, and accounts of specifi c incidents 
are frequently contradictory. Indeed, Zeidner (2005, 3), in an admittedly opinionated 
work on the war, asserts that “much, if not most, of what [prior scholars] have said 
about it is wrong.” The best-covered aspect is the great power diplomacy of the pe-
riod, in which the relationship between France and Britain is particularly important. 
There is also a reasonable literature on the emergence of the Kemalist movement to 
replace the Ottoman Porte and on the partially coterminous Greco-Turkish War. 
Coverage of events on the ground in Cilicia and of direct negotiation between the 
two sides is particularly limited. Of the four sources that treat the war in detail, 
Saakian (1986) and Tachjian (2004) are most interested in the fate of the Armenian 
population and are consequently somewhat less useful for the questions here. Na-
kache (1999) is the most detailed source, but her work relies almost exclusively on 
French-language sources. Zeidner (2005) is thus the only signifi cant work to look in 
detail at the political and military developments of the war using both French and 
Turkish sources. There are, of course, also works in Turkish, which my language 
skills do not permit me to use; even here, however, there apparently is little in the 
way of serious scholarly work. Zeidner (2005, 3–4). 
 54. Technically, the French possessions in territory claimed by Turkey included some 
land east of the Amanus Mountains that typically is not considered part of Cilicia. 
While the greater diffi culty of projecting power further from the coast meant that 
there were signifi cant differences between the two regions with respect to the mili-
tary course of the war, in political negotiations the distinction was rarely signifi cant. 
Nakache (1999, part II). References to Cilicia here thus should be read as including 
the eastern territory. 
 55. The map was produced by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs and is available on a free content license at http://en.wikipe
dia.org/wiki/Image:Sykes-Picot-1916.gif. 
 56. Toynbee (1922, 88–89). Thus, for example, the French estimated that they held 
some 75 percent of the entire Ottoman public debt, while independent estimates put 
the fi gure at more than 60 percent; they were thus hopeful that the empire might 
survive, if in a diminished form. Busch (1976, 200), Saakian (1986, 41). For a detailed 
discussion of French investments in Syria and Cilicia in particular, see Nakache 
(1999, 51–55, 75–84). 
 57. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1974, 82), Cumming (1938). For useful discussions 
of Allied negotiations over the postwar disposition of the Ottoman Empire, see 
Howard (1931), Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1974), and Tanenbaum (1978). 
[257]
Notes to Pages 193–197
58. Zeidner (2005, 153–156). 
59. Sonyel (1975). 
60. Zeidner (2005, 78–80, 139, 177–178). 
61. A truce reached on May 30, 1920, was never fully implemented and ultimately 
collapsed after only a few weeks. Zeidner (2005, 238). 
62. Zeidner (2005, 186). 
63. Tachjian (2004, 168). 
64. The importance of the colonial party is a consistent theme in literature on French 
policy in Cilicia. In addition to the works cited below by Andrew and Kanya-Forst
ner, who directly address the colonial party, see for example Saakian (1986, 48–49), 
Nakache (1999, 89–95), Tachjian (2004, 21–26), and Zeidner (2005, 22–31). 
65. Andrew (1976, 145). 
66. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1981), Abrams and Miller (1976, 686). 
67. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1974, 96), Zeidner (2005, 22–29). 
68. Andrew and Kanya Forstner (1974, 85). 
69. Andrew and Kanya Forstner (1976, 991–993), Zeidner (2005, 258). Andrew and 
Kanya-Forstner do note that members of the colonial party were not above using 
expeditions to further both French prestige and their own business interests simul-
taneously. The business side was typically secondary, however, and in any event it 
is hard to argue that France as a whole benefi ted from policies designed to serve the 
specifi c economic interests of policymakers. 
 70. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1976, 986). The one exception was with French silk 
producers, as French sericulture had been effectively destroyed by disease. Silk pro-
duction played only a minor role in the French economy, however. 
 71. As a side note, this disjuncture poses a signifi cant problem for Marxist interpreta-
tions of French imperialism such as that of Saakian (1986). For a relevant discussion, 
see the debate between Abrams and Miller (1976) and Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 
(1976), in which the latter are far more convincing. See also Andrew and Kanya-
Forstner (1981, 17). 
 72. See Nakache (1999, 725) for a parliamentary speech by Édouard Daladier, a fu-
ture prime minister, that frames the war in Cilicia in precisely these terms. 
 73. The French do seem to have held out some hope for a security guarantee from 
the United States, but the return to isolationism in Washington, especially following 
President Wilson’s stroke in October 1919, killed that prospect. To the extent that a 
guarantee ever was a possibility, however, French colonial designs, confl icting as 
they did with the spirit of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, were again a signifi cant irritant. 
Zeidner (2005, 55). 
 74. Cumming (1938, 13–20), Tanenbaum (1978, 6–8). 
 75. Cumming (1938), McCrum (1978). 
 76. Quoted in Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1976, 984), my translation. 
 77. Zeidner (2005, 139), Nakache (1999, 627–640). 
 78. Nakache (1999, 383). 
 79. Ibid., 717, 721. 
[258]
Notes to Pages 197–211
80. Zeidner (2005, 262). See Nakache (1999, 707–709) for a discussion of coverage of 
Cilicia in the press, including a list of specifi c articles, many of which had fi rst been 
published in British newspapers. 
81. Complaints increased over the course of 1920, and by the end of the year parlia-
ment was refusing to renew funding for more than an additional two months. Na-
kache (1999, 726). 
82. Zeidner (2005, 273). 
83. Tachjian (2004, 109, 136). 
84. Khoury (1987, esp. part III). 
85. Zeidner (2005, 255). 
86. Aharonian (1964, 68–69), Zeidner (2005, 256). 
87. Zeidner (2005, 272). 
88. Khoury (1987, 46). 
89. Some readers may wonder whether Turkish domestic politics similarly infl u-
enced the duration and severity of the war, given the strong split between the Porte 
and the Kemalists. In practice, however, the Porte’s decision not to resist was out of 
line with the preferences of the public that it claimed to represent, but in a direction 
that favored peace rather than war; by contrast, the Kemalist stance seems to have 
matched the preferences of the Turkish public fairly closely. Zürcher (1984, 116). 
 90. Sonyel (1975, 23–24). 
 91. Indeed, the only direct reference that I found to such concerns is Toynbee (1922, 
85), who complained specifi cally about lack of French concern about the possibility 
that Turkey might seek to undermine the French position in Syria. 
92. The signifi cance of Ottoman debts can be seen in the intensity of Anglo-French 
debates over whether reparations should have priority over prewar debts. Mont-
gomery (1972, 779). 
 93. Zeidner (2005, 267). 
 94. Nakache (1999, 738), Zeidner (2005, 256). 
 95. Burrows (1986), Zeidner (2005, 123–126), Saakian (1986, 44–45). 
 96. Zeidner (2005, 125–126). 
 97. Saakian (1986, 41), Tachjian (2004, 115–116). The early French recognition con-
trasted especially strongly with the British failure to recognize the growing irrele-
vance of the old Ottoman government, whom they repeatedly blamed for violence 
carried out by Kemalist forces over whom that government had no control. Zeidner 
(2005, 185). 
 98. Aharonian (1962, 5–6), Zeidner (2005, 238, 246). 
 99. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1981, 5). 
 Conclusion 
1. On spoiler problems, see Stedman (1997). 
2. See especially Fearon (2004). 
3. Walter (1997, 2002). 
[259]
Notes to Pages 211–216
4. See for example Collier et al. (2004) and Ross (2004). 
5. For a representative example that also highlights the reluctance of the interna-
tional community, and the United States in particular, to intervene even once confl ict 
begins, see Power (2002). 
 6. On the logical impossibility of perfectly predicting war  ex ante , see Gartzke (1999). 
 7. Kydd (2003, 2006). 
8. Mearsheimer (1990), Fukuyama (1992). 
 9. Mueller (1989, 2004). 
 10. This discussion assumes, of course, that China’s development continues along its 
current course. Japan’s experience of tremendous growth in the 1980s followed by a 
decade of stagnation provides a salutary reminder that current trends are not guar-
anteed to continue, and concerns about an overheated economy and about internal 
unrest associated with increasing economic inequality and unrepresentative gov-
ernment provide potential bases for concern. That said, China’s large population 
and other advantages provide reason to believe that, even should its growth be de-
railed for any of these reasons, the country will ultimately rise to rival the United 
States as a world power. 
 11. See for example Friedberg (2011). 
 12. It is worth noting, however, that in recent history, internal unrest in China has 
been associated with  increased fl exibility in external disputes. Fravel (2005). 





 Abente, Diego. 1987. “The War of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models.” 
 Latin American History Review 22(2): 47–69. 
 Abrams, L., and D. J. Miller. 1976. “Who Were the French Colonialists? A Reassess-
ment of the Parti Colonial, 1890–1914.”  Historical Journal 19(3): 685–725. 
 Aharonian, Avetis. 1962. “From Sardarapat to Sevres and Lausanne (Part 1).”  Arme-
nian Review 15 (3–59): 3–13. 
 ——. 1964. “From Sardarapat to Sevres and Lausanne (Part 6).”  Armenian Review 17 
(1–65): 64–73. 
 Akhmedzhanov, G. A. 1971.  Geratskii Vopros v XIX Veke . Tashkent: Fan. 
 Allen, Martin. 2005.  Himmler’s Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich 
Himmler . London: Robson Books. 
 Amanat, Abbas. 1997.  Pivot of the Universe: Nasr al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian 
Monarchy, 1831–1896 . Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 Anderson, Thomas P. 1981 . The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 
1969 . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
 Andrew, C. M. 1976. “The French Colonialist Movement during the Third Republic: 
The Unoffi cial Mind of Imperialism.”  Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th 
Ser., 26: 143–166. 
 Andrew, C. M., and A. S. Kanya-Forstner. 1974. “The French Colonial Party and 
French Colonial War Aims, 1914–1918.”  Historical Journal 17(1): 79–106. 
 ——. 1976. “French Business and the French Colonialists.”  Historical Journal 19(4): 
981–1000. 
 ——. 1981.  The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914–1924 . Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
 Annual Register, or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 1854 . 1855. London: F & 
J Rivington. 
 Argyll, George Douglas, Eighth Duke of. 1906.  Autobiography and Memoirs . London: 
John Murray. 
 Armstrong, Anne. 1961.  Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy 
upon World War II . New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 Arquilla, John, and María Moyano Rasmussen. 2001. “The Origins of the South At-
lantic War.”  Journal of Latin American Studies 33(4): 739–775. 
 Ashley, Evelyn. 1879.  The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palm-
erston . London: R. Bentley. 
 Aumann, Robert J. 1976. “Agreeing to Disagree.”  Annals of Statistics 4(6): 1236–1239. 
Bibliography
[262]
 Ayache, Germain. 1981.  Les Origines de la Guerre du Rif . Paris: Publications de la Sor-
bonne. 
 Baker, William D., and John R. Oneal. 2001. “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? The 
Nature and Origins of the “Rally ‘Round the Flag” Effect.”  Journal of Confl ict Reso-
lution 45(5): 661–687. 
 Bakhash, Shaul. 1978.  Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy, and Reform under the Qajars, 1858–
1896 . London: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Centre, St. Antonys College. 
 Baldwin, David A. 1989.  Paradoxes of Power . New York: Basil Blackwell. 
 Baldwin, Hanson W. 1950.  Great Mistakes of the War . New York: Harper & 
Brothers. 
 Balfour, Michael. 1970. “Another Look at Unconditional Surrender.”  International 
Affairs 46(4): 719–736. 
 Balfour, Sebastian. 2002.  Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War . 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Baram, Amatzia. 1993. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Bagh-
dad.” In  Iraq’s Road to War , edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, 5–36. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Barker, George Digby. 1915.  Letters from Persia and India, 1857–1859: A Subaltern’s 
Experiences in War . London: G. Bell and Sons. 
 Barman, Roderick J. 1999.  Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825–91 . 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Barnes, James J., and Patience P. Barnes. 1980.  Hitler’s ‘ Mein Kampf ’  in Britain and 
America: A Publishing History, 1930–1939 . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Barnhart, Michael A. 1987.  Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Secu-
rity, 1919–1941 . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 Bator, Francis M. 2008. “No Good Choices: LBJ and the Vietnam/Great Society Con-
nection.”  Diplomatic History 32(3): 309–340. 
 Bell, P.M.H. 1974.  A Certain Eventuality: Britain and the Fall of France . London: Saxon 
House. 
 ——. 1990.  John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the Soviet 
Union, 1941–1945 . London: Edward Arnold. 
 Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam III. 1996. “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 
1816–1985.”  American Political Science Review 90(2): 239–257. 
 ——. 1998. “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 42(3): 344–366. 
 Bensahel, Nora, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, 
Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell. 2008.  After Saddam: Prewar Planning and 
the Occupation of Iraq . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
 Bergan, Daniel E. 2009. “The Draft Lottery and Attitudes towards the Vietnam War.” 
 Political Opinion Quarterly 73(2): 379–384. 
 Berghahn, Volker. 1976. “Naval Armaments and Social Crisis: Germany before 
1914.” In  War, Economy, and the Military Mind , edited by Geoffrey Best and Andrew 
Wheatcroft, 61–88. London: Croom Helm. 
 Berinsky, Adam J. 2009.  In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from 
World War II to Iraq . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 Berman, Larry. 1982.  Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam . 
New York: W. W. Norton. 
 Bernstein, Harry. 1973.  Dom Pedro II . New York: Twayne. 




 Bialer, Uri. 1980.  The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 
1932–1939. London: Royal Historical Society. 
 Biddle, Stephen D. 2004.  Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Bat-
tle . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Bin, Alberto, Richard Hill, and Archer Jones. 1998.  Desert Storm: A Forgotten War . 
Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988.  The Causes of War . New York: Free Press. 
 Blumberg, Arnold. 1990.  A Carefully Planned Accident: The Italian War of 1859 . Selins-
grove, PA: Susquehanna University Press. 
 Box, Pelham Horton. 1929.  The Origins of the Paraguayan War . Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press. 
 Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, and Bradford S. Jones. 2004.  Event History Modeling: A 
Guide for Social Scientists . New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 Broszat, Martin. 1966.  German National Socialism, 1919–1945 . Santa Barbara: CLIO Press. 
 ——. 1970. “Soziale Motivation und Führer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus.”  Vi-
erteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 18(4): 392–409. 
 Browning, Christopher. 1992.  Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland . New York: HarperCollins. 
 Bucholz, Arden. 2001.  Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871 . New York: Palgrave. 
 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981.  The War Trap . New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. 
Morrow. 2003.  The Logic of Political Survival . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Bulloch, John, and Harvey Morris. 1989.  The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Conse-
quences . London: Methuen. 
 Bullock, Alan. 1953.  Hitler: A Study in Tyranny . New York: Harper & Row. 
 Burridge, Trevor. 1985.  Clement Attlee: A Political Biography. London: Jonathan Cape. 
 Burrows, Mathew. 1986. “ ‘Mission Civilisatrice’: French Cultural Policy in the Mid-
dle East, 1860–1914.”  Historical Journal 29(1): 109–135. 
 Busch, Briton Cooper. 1976.  Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918–
1923 . Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. 1998.  A World Transformed . New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
 Bushev, P. P. 1959.  Gerat i Anglo-Iranskaia Voina, 1856–1857 gg . Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Vostochnoi Literatury. 
 Butler, J.R.M. 1957.  Grand Strategy, Volume II: September 1939 – June 1941 . London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Offi ce. 
 Cappella, Rosella. 2012.  The Political Economy of War Finance. Ph.D. diss., University 
of Pennsylvania. 
 Carlton, David. 1993. “Churchill in 1940: Myth and Reality.”  World Affairs 156(2): 
97–103. 
 Carroll, Wallace. 1948.  Persuade or Perish . Boston: Houghton Miffl in. 
 Casey, Steven. 2001.  Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, 
and the War against Nazi Germany . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Caven, Brian. 1980.  The Punic Wars . New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Cecil, Robert. 1975.  Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 . London: Davis-Poynter. 
 Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2003. “Modeling the Size of Wars: From Billiard Balls to Sand-
piles.”  American Political Science Review 97(1): 135–150. 
 Chamberlain, Muriel E. 1987.  Lord Palmerston . Washington, DC: Catholic University 
of America Press. 
 Chapman, Terrence L., and Dan Reiter. 2004. “The United Nations Security Council 
and the Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 48(6): 886–909. 
Bibliography
[264]
 Charlton, Michael. 1989.  The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute . Ox-
ford: Basil Blackwell. 
 Charmley, John. 1989.  Chamberlain and the Lost Peace . London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
 ——. 1993.  Churchill: The End of Glory . London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
 Chase, John L. 1955. “Unconditional Surrender Reconsidered.”  Political Science Quar-
terly 70(2): 258–279. 
 Chief of Council for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. 1946.  Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce. 
 Chiozza, Giacomo. 2002. “Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns 
of International Confl ict Involvement, 1946–97.”  Journal of Peace Research 39(6): 
711–734. 
 Chiozza, Giacomo, and Hein E. Goemans. 2003. “Peace through Insecurity: Tenure 
and International Confl ict.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 47(4): 443–467. 
 Chubin, Shahram. 1989. “Iran and the War: From Stalemate to Ceasefi re.” In  The Gulf 
War: Regional and International Dimensions , edited by Hanns W. Maull and Otto 
Pick, 5–16. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Chubin, Shahram, and Charles Tripp. 1988.  Iran and Iraq at War . Boulder, CO: West-
view Press. 
 Churchill, Winston S. 1950.  The Second World War: The Grand Alliance . Boston: Hough-
ton Miffl in. 
 Cioffi -Revilla, Claudio. 1991. “On the Likely Magnitude, Extent, and Duration of an 
Iraq-US War.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 35(3): 387–411. 
 Clark, Alan. 1965.  Barbarossa: The Russian-German Confl ict, 1941–1945 . New York: W. 
Morrow. 
 Clausewitz, Carl von. [1832] 1976.  On War . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Clodfelter, Micheal. 2007.  Warfare and Armed Confl icts: A Statistical Reference to Casu-
alty and Other Figures, 1500–2000 . Jefferson, NC: McFarland. 
 Coe, Andrew J. 2011. “Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War.” Un-
published article, Harvard University. 
 Colaresi, Michael. 2007. “The Benefi t of the Doubt: Testing an Informational Theory 
of the Rally Effect.”  International Organization 61(1): 99–144. 
 Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffl er, and Måns Söderbom. 2004. “On the Duration of Civil 
War.”  Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 253–273. 
 Compton, James V. 1967.  The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler, the United States, and the 
Origins of World War II . Boston: Houghton Miffl in. 
 Coox, Alvin D. 1977.  The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for 
Chankufeng/Khasan, 1938 . Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 ——. 1985.  Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 . Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Copeland, Dale C. 2000.  The Origins of Major War . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 Coser, Lewis A. 1956.  The Functions of Social Confl ict . Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
 Costello, John. 1991.  Ten Days that Saved the West . London: Bantam Press. 
 Croco, Sarah E. 2011. “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, 
and Domestic Punishment.”  American Political Science Review 105(3): 457–477. 
 Cumming, Henry H. 1938.  Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East: The Decline 
of French Infl uence . London: Oxford University Press. 
 Cunningham, David E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.”  American Jour-
nal of Political Science 50(4): 875–892. 
 Cunninghame Graham, R. B. 1933.  Portrait of a Dictator: Francisco Solano Lopez (Para-
guay, 1865–1870) . London: Heinemann. 




 Dallek, Robert. 1979.  Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 . 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Darilek, Richard E. 1976.  A Loyal Opposition in Time of War: The Republican Party and 
the Politics of Foreign Policy from Pearl Harbor to Yalta . Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press. 
 Davies, Norman. 1972.  White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20 . New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Decalo, Samuel. 1989.  Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships . Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
 de Figueiredo, Rui J. P., and Barry Weingast. 1999. “The Rationality of Fear: Political 
Opportunism and Ethnic Confl ict.” In  Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention , ed-
ited by Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, 261–302. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 de la Fuente, Ariel. 2004. “Federalism and Opposition to the Paraguayan War in the 
Argentine Interior: La Rioja, 1865–67.” In  I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the 
Paraguayan War, 1864–1870 , edited by Hendrik Kraay and Thomas Whigham, 
140–153. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
 DeRouen, Karl R., Jr., and David Sobek. 2004. “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration 
and Outcome.”  Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 303–320. 
 de Soysa, Indra, John R. Oneal, and Yong-Hee Park. 1997. “Testing Power-Transition 
Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities.”  Journal of Confl ict 
Resolution 41(4): 509–528. 
 Dilks, David. 1978. “The Twilight War and the Fall of France: Chamberlain and 
Churchill in 1940.”  Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Fifth Series, 28: 61–86. 
 Dillon, G. M. 1989 . The Falklands, Politics and War . New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Doenecke, Justus D. 2000.  Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 
1939–1941 . New York: Rowman & Littlefi eld. 
 Domarus, Max. 1997.  Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932–1945 . London: I. B. 
 Tauris. 
 Dower, John W. 1993.  War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacifi c War . New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
 Edwards, Robert. 2006.  White Death: Russia’s War on Finland, 1939–40 . London: Wei-
denfeld & Nicolson. 
 Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989. “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.”  Acad-
emy of Management Review 14(1): 57–74. 
 Ellsberg, Daniel. 1971. “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine.”  Public 
Policy 19: 217–273. 
 English, Barbara. 1971.  John Company’s Last War . London: Collins. 
 Ensor, R.C.K. 1939. “ ‘Mein Kampf’ and Europe.”  International Affairs (Royal Institute 
of International Affairs 1931–1939) 18(4): 478–496. 
 Farnham, Barbara Rearden. 1997.  Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political 
Decision-Making . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Fazal, Tanisha M. 2007.  State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, 
and Annexation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Fazal, Tanisha M., V. Page Fortna, Jessica Stanton, and Alex Weisiger. 2006. “The War 
Initiation and Termination (WIT) Data Set.” Paper presented at the American Po-
litical Science Association Annual Meeting. 
 Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.”  International Organization
49(3): 379–414. 
 ——. 1996. “Bargaining over Objects that Infl uence Future Bargaining Power.” Un-
published manuscript, Stanford University. 
Bibliography
[266]
 ——. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?”  Journal 
of Peace Research 41(3): 275–301. 
 Femenia, Nora A. 1996.  National Identity in Times of Crises: The Scripts of the Falklands-
Malvinas War. Commack, NY: Nova Science. 
 Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2007. “Mutual Optimism and War.”  American 
Journal of Political Science 51(4): 738–754. 
 Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002. “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: 
Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.”  American Journal of Po-
litical Science 46(4): 819–838. 
 ——. 2004. “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, 
Duration, and Outcomes.”  American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 296–313. 
 Fine, Jason P., and Robert J. Gray. 1999. “A Proportional Hazards Model for the Sub-
distribution of a Competing Risk.”  Journal of the American Statistical Association 
94(446): 496–509. 
 Finnie, David H. 1992.  Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq . 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Foot, M.R.D. 1966.  SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Opera-
tions Executive in France, 1940–1944 . London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Offi ce. 
 Fornos Peñalba, José Alfredo. 1982. “Draft Dodgers, War Resisters, and Turbulent 
Gauchos: The War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay.”  Americas 38(4): 463–
479. 
 Foster, H. Schuyler. 1983.  Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940–
1975 . Washington, DC: Foxhall Press. 
 Franks, Oliver. 1992.  The Franks Report: Falkland Islands Review . London: Pimlico. 
 Fravel, M. Taylor. 2005. “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explain-
ing China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes.”  International Security 30(2): 
46–83. 
 ——. 2010. “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Confl ict.” 
 Security Studies 19(2): 307–341. 
 Freedman, Lawrence. 2005.  The Offi cial History of the Falklands Campaign . London: 
Routledge. 
 Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. 1991.  Signals of War: The 
Falklands Confl ict of 1982 . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Friedberg, Aaron L. 2011.  A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for 
Mastery in Asia . New York: W. W. Norton. 
 Friedman, George, and Meredith LeBard. 1991.  The Coming War with Japan . New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Frieser, Karl-Heinz. 2005.  The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West . An-
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 
 Frost, Robert I. 2000.  The Northern Wars: War, State, and Society in Northeastern Europe, 
1558–1721 . Harlow, England: Longman. 
 Fukuyama, Frances. 1992.  The End of History and the Last Man . New York: Free 
Press. 
 Gamba, Virginia. 1987.  The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis 
Prevention . Boston: Allen & Unwin. 
 Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 1997.  Strategic Assessment in War . New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press. 
 ——. 2008. “Ties to the Dead: Connections to Iraq War and 9/11 Casualties and Dis-
approval of the President.”  American Sociological Review 73(4): 690–695. 




 Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1991. “Electoral Cycles and War.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution
35(2): 212–244. 
 Genova, B.K.L., and Bradley S. Greenberg. 1979. “Interests in News and the Knowl-
edge Gap.”  Public Opinion Quarterly 43(1): 79–91. 
 Ghareeb, Edmund. 1990. “The Roots of Crisis: Iraq and Iran.” In  The Persian Gulf 
War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy , edited by Christopher C. Joyner, 
21–38. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 Gieling, Saskia. 1999.  Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran . London: I. B. Tauris. 
 Gilbert, Martin. 1977.  Winston S. Churchill, Volume. V: The Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939 . 
Boston: Houghton Miffl in. 
 ——. 1993.  The Churchill War Papers, Volume I: At the Admiralty, September 1939–May 
1940 . London: Heinemann. 
 ——. 1994.  The Churchill War Papers, Volume II: Never Surrender, May 1940–December 
1940 . London: Heinemann. 
 ——. 2000.  The Churchill War Papers, Volume III: The Ever-Widening War, 1941 . New 
York: W. W. Norton. 
 Gilbert, Martin, and Richard Gott. 1963.  The Appeasers . London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 
 Gilpin, Robert. 1981.  War and Change in World Politics . New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
 Goda, Norman J. W. 1998.  Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path 
toward America . College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 
 Goddard, Stacie. 2006. “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of 
Legitimacy.”  International Organization 60(1): 35–68. 
 Goemans, Hein E. 2000.  War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the 
First World War . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Goldfrank, David M. 1994.  The Origins of the Crimean War . London: Longman. 
 Goldhagen, Daniel. 1996.  Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Ho-
locaust . New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1996.  Memoirs . New York: Doubleday. 
 Gorodetsky, Gabriel. 1999.  Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia . 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 Gustafson, Lowell S. 1988.  The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands . 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Györkei, Jenõ, and Miklós Horváth. 1999.  Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 
1956 . Budapest: Central European University Press. 
 Haas, Mark L. 2005.  The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 . Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
 Haig, Alexander M. Jr. 1984.  Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy . New York: 
Macmillan. 
 Halder, Franz. 1988.  The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942 . Novato, CA: Presidio. 
 Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. 2005.  Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of 
 Japan . Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 Hassan, Hamdi A. 1999.  The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness 
in the Analysis of War and Confl ict . London: Pluto Press. 
 Hassner, Ron. 2004. “To Halve and to Hold: Confl icts over Sacred Space and the 
Problem of Indivisibility.”  Security Studies 12(4): 2–33. 
 Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. 1983.  The Battle for the Falklands . New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
 Hauner, Milan. 1978. “Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?”  Journal of Contemporary 
History 13(1): 15–32. 
Bibliography
[268]
 Hellegers, Dale M. 2002.  We, the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the 
Japanese Constitution . Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Henderson, Errol A., and Richard Tucker. 2001. “Clear and Present Strangers: The 
Clash of Civilizations and International Confl ict.”  International Studies Quarterly 
45(2): 317–338. 
 Hendrickson, Ryan C. 2002. “Clinton’s Military Strikes in 1998: Diversionary Uses of 
Force?”  Armed Forces and Society 28(2): 309–332. 
 Hildebrand, Klaus. 1970.  The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich . Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 Hillgruber, Andreas. 1981.  Germany and the Two World Wars . Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press. 
 Hindley, Meredith. 1996. “Negotiating the Boundary of Unconditional Surrender: 
The War Refugee Board in Sweden and Nazi Proposals to Ransom Jews, 1944–
1945.”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies 10(1): 52–77. 
 Hinsley, F. H. 1979.  British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Infl uence on Strategy 
and Operations . London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce. 
 Hiro, Dilip. 1989.  The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Confl ict . London: Grafton 
Books. 
 Hitler, Adolf. [1925] 1999.  Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: 
Houghton Miffl in. 
 ——. [1928] 2003.  Second Book . New York: Enigma. 
 Hjeholt, Holger. 1965. “British Mediation in the Danish-German Confl ict, 1848–1850: 
Part One, From the March Revolution to the November Government.”  Historisk-
fi losofi sk Meddelelser 41(1): 5–235. 
 ——. 1966. “British Mediation in the Danish-German Confl ict, 1848–1850: Part Two, 
From the November Cabinet until the Peace with Prussia and the London Protocol 
(the 2nd of July and the 2nd of August, 1850).”  Historisk-fi losofi sk Meddelelser 42(1): 
5–251. 
 Hoffmann, Fritz L., and Ogla Mingo Hoffmann. 1984.  Sovereignty in Dispute: The 
Falklands/Malvinas, 1493–1982 . Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 Holt, Edgar. 1964.  The Opium Wars in China . London: Putnam. 
 Horvath, William J. 1968. “A Statistical Model for the Duration of Wars and Strikes.” 
 Behavioral Science 13: 18–28. 
 Houweling, Henk, and Jan G. Siccama. 1988. “Power Transitions as a Cause of War.” 
 Journal of Confl ict Resolution 32(1): 87–102. 
 Howard, Harry N. 1931.  The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923 . Nor-
man: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 Hughes, Wayne Jr., and Jeffrey A. Larson. 1985.  The Falklands Wargame . Bethesda, 
MD: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency. 
 Hull, Cordell. 1948.  The Memoirs of Cordell Hull . New York: Macmillan. 
 Humphreys, R. A. 1957. “The Emancipation of Latin America.” In  The New Cam-
bridge Modern History, Volume IX: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval , edited by 
J. O. Lindsay, 612–638. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Hunt, G. H., and George Townsend. 1858.  Outram and Havelock’s Persian Campaign, 
To Which Is Prefi xed a Summary of Persian History, an Account of Various Differences 
between England and Persia, and an Inquiry into the Origins of the Late War . London: 
G. Routledge. 
 Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?”  Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22–
49. 
 ——. 1996.  The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order . New York: Si-
mon and Schuster. 
Bibliography
[269]
 Hurd, Douglas. 1967.  The Arrow War: An Anglo-Chinese Confusion, 1856–1860 . Lon-
don: Collins. 
 Ike, Nobutaka. 1967.  Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences . 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Iklé, Fred Charles. 1991.  Every War Must End . New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 Ishihara, Shintaro. 1991.  The Japan that Can Say No . New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 Jackson, Julian. 2003.  The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. 2009. “The Reasons for Wars: An Up-
dated Survey.” In  The Handbook on the Political Economy of War , edited by Christo-
pher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers, 34–57. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 James, Patrick, and John R. Oneal. 1991. “The Infl uence of Domestic and Interna-
tional Politics on the President’s Use of Force.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 35(2): 
307–332. 
 James, Patrick, and Jean Sébastien Rioux. 1998. “International Crises and Linkage 
Politics: The Experiences of the United States, 1953–1994.”  Political Research Quar-
terly 51(3): 781–812. 
 James, Robert Rhodes. 1970.  Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900–1939 . London: Wei-
denfeld and Nicolson. 
 Jarausch, Konrad H. 1969. “The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann- 
Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914.”  Central European History 2(1): 48–76. 
 Jervis, Robert. 1976.  Perception and Misperception in International Politics . Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 ——. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”  World Politics 30(2): 168–214. 
 ——. 1993. “Images and the Gulf War.” In  The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: 
Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Confl ict , edited by Stanley A. Renshon, 173–179. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 ——. 2006. “The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform.” 
 The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics 4(1): 1–9. 
 Johnson, Dominic D. P. 2004.  Overconfi dence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive 
Illusions . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Kahn, David. 1978.  Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II . New 
York: Collier Books. 
 Kant, Immanuel. [1795] 1957.  Perpetual Peace . New York: Liberal Arts Press. 
 Karabell, Zachary. 1995. “Backfi re: US Policy towards Iraq, 1988–2 August 1990.” 
 Middle East Journal 49(1): 28–47. 
 Karsh, Efraim. 1987 – 88. “Military Power and Foreign Policy Goals: The Iran-Iraq 
War Revisited.”  International Affairs 64(1): 83–95. 
 Kasozi, A.B.K., Nakanyike Musisi, and James Mukooza Sejjengo. 1994.  The Social 
Origins of Violence in Uganda: 1964–1985 . Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press. 
 Katra, William H. 1996.  The Argentine Generation of 1837: Echeverría, Alberdi, Sarmiento, 
Mitre . Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 
 Kaye, John William. 1864.  A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857–1858 . London: 
W. H. Allen. 
 Kecskemeti, Paul. 1958.  Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat . Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
 Keegan, John. 1990.  The Second World War . New York: Penguin Books. 




 Kerner, Robert J. 1937. “Russia’s New Policy in the Near East after the Peace of Adri-
anople; Including the Test of the Protocol of 16 September 1829.”  Cambridge His-
torical Journal 5(3): 280–290. 
 Kershaw, Ian. 1985.  The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation . 
London: Edward Arnold. 
 ——. 1987.  The ‘ Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich . Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 ——. 1998.  Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris . London: Allen Lane. 
 ——. 2000.  Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis . New York: W. W. Norton. 
 Khadduri, Majid. 1988.  The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Con-
fl ict . New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Khadduri, Majid, and Edmund Ghareeb. 1997.  War in the Gulf, 1990–91: The Iraq-
Kuwait Confl ict and Its Implications . New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Khoury, Philip S. 1987.  Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 
1920–1945 . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow. 1992. “When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?” 
 American Journal of Political Science 36(4): 896–922. 
 Kimball, Warren F. 1997.  Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War . 
New York: William Morrow. 
 King, Bolton. 1967.  A History of Italian Unity. Volume 2. New York: Russell & Russell. 
 King, Ralph. 1987.  The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications . Adelphi Papers 119. 
London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
 Kirshner, Jonathan. 2000. “Rationalist Explanations for War?”  Security Studies 10(1): 
143–150. 
 Klein, Burton H. 1959.  Germany’s Economic Preparations for War . Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 Kleinpenning, Jan M. G. 2002. “Strong Reservations about ‘New Insights into the 
Demographics of the Paraguayan War.’ ”  Latin American Research Review 37(3): 
137–142. 
 Knight, Jonathan. 1977. “Churchill and the Approach to Mussolini and Hitler in May 
1940: A Note.”  British Journal of International Studies 3(1): 92–96. 
 Knights, Michael Andres. 2005.  Cradle of Confl ict: Iraq and the Birth of Modern U.S. 
Military Power . Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 
 Koch, H. W. 1968. “Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War: Second Thoughts 
on the Origins of Some of the Documents.”  Historical Journal 11(1): 125–143. 
 ——. 1975. “The Specter of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German ‘Peace Feel-
ers,’ 1942–44.”  Journal of Contemporary History 10(3): 531–549. 
 Kolinski, Charles J. 1965.  Independence or Death! The Story of the Paraguayan War . 
Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 
 Kostiner, Joseph. 1993. “Kuwait: Confusing Friend and Foe.” In  Iraq’s Road to War , 
edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, 105–116. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Kraay, Hendrik. 2004. “Patriotic Mobilization in Brazil: The Zuavos and Other Black 
Companies.” In  I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–
1870 , edited by Hendrik Kraay and Thomas Whigham. Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press, pp. 61–80. 
 Krosnick, Jon A. 1990. “Government Policy and Citizen Passion: A Study of Issue 
Publics in Contemporary America.”  Political Behavior 12(1): 59–92. 
 Kugler, Jacek, and Douglas Lemke. 1996.  Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions 
of the War Ledger . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 




 Kydd, Andrew H. 2003. “Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation.” 
 American Journal of Political Science 47(4): 597–611. 
 ——. 2005.  Trust and Mistrust in International Relations . Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 
 ——. 2006. “When Can Mediators Build Trust?”  American Political Science Review 
100(3): 449–462. 
 Lacina, Bethany, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2005. “Monitoring Trends in Global 
Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths.”  European Journal of Population 21(2–3): 
145–166. 
 Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. 2005. “Rally ‘Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and 
the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948–2001.”  International Studies Quar-
terly 49(2): 255–272. 
 Langer, William L., and S. Everett Gleason. 1953.  The Undeclared War, 1940–1941 . 
New York: Harper & Brothers. 
 Lawlor, Sheila. 1994.  Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 . London: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Lawson, Philip. 1993.  The East India Company: A History . London: Longman. 
 Lebow, Richard Ned. 1985. “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the 
Falkland War.” In  Psychology and Deterrence , edited by Robert Jervis, Richard Ned 
Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, 89–124. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 Lee, Chong-Sik. 1983.  Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and 
Soviet Interest, 1922–1945 . Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 Leffl er, Melvyn P. 1992.  A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Admin-
istration, and the Cold War . Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Lemke, Douglas. 2002.  Regions of War and Peace . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Lenin, V. I. 1920.  Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism . Moscow: Foreign Lan-
guages Publishing House. 
 Leuchars, Chris. 2002.  To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance . 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 Leventoglu, Bahar, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2007. “The Armed Peace: A Punctu-
ated Equilibrium Model of War.”  American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 755–
771. 
 Levy, Jack S. 1983.  War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 . Lexington: Uni-
versity Press of Kentucky. 
 ——. 1985. “Theories of General War.”  World Politics 37(3): 344–374. 
 ——. 1987. “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.”  World Politics 
40(1): 82–107. 
 ——. 1989. “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique.” In  Handbook of War Stud-
ies , edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, 259–288. Boston: Unwin Hyman. 
 Levy, Jack S., and Lily I. Vakili. 1992. “Diversionary Action by Authoritarian 
Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case.” In  The Internationaliza-
tion of Communal Strife , edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, 118–146. London: 
Routledge. 
 Lewis, Daniel K. 2001.  The History of Argentina . Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 Lian, Bradley, and John R. Oneal. 1993. “Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and 
Public Opinion.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 37(2): 277–300. 
 Licklider, Roy. 1995. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 
1945–1993.”  American Political Science Review 89(3): 681–690. 
 Lieber, Kier A. 2007. “The New History of World War I and What It Means for Inter-
national Relations Theory.”  International Security 32(2): 155–191. 
Bibliography
[272]
 Lincoln, W. Bruce. 1978.  Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russians . Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press. 
 Lloyd, Alan. 1977.  Destroy Carthage! The Death Throes of an Ancient Culture . London: 
Souvenir Press. 
 Long, Jerry M. 2004.  Saddam’s War of Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait . Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 Lüdtke, Alf. 1992. “The Appeal of Exterminating ‘Others’: German Workers and the 
Limits of Resistance.”  Journal of Modern History 64 (Supplement: Resistance against 
the Third Reich): S46–S67. 
 Lukacs, John. 1999.  Five Days in London, May 1940 . New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 Lynch, John. 1981.  Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel De Rosas, 1829–1852 . Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
 Mack, Andrew. 1975. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmet-
ric Confl ict.”  World Politics 27(2): 175–200. 
 MacLean, David. 1995.  War, Diplomacy, and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics 
of La Plata, 1836–1853 . London: British Academic Press. 
 Maddison, Angus. 2003.  The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
 Mambo, Andrew, and Julian Schofi eld. 2007. “Military Diversion in the 1978 Uganda-
Tanzania War.”  Journal of Political and Military Sociology 35(2): 299–321. 
 Mamdani, Mahmood. 1983.  Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda . Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press. 
 Mansfi eld, Edward D., and Jack L. Snyder. 2005.  Electing to Fight: Why Emerging De-
mocracies Go to War . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Marashi, Ibrahim al-. 2003. “The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strat-
egy of Saddam Hussein.”  Middle East Review of International Affairs 7(2): 1–10. 
 Marder, Arthur J. 1981.  Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial 
Japanese Navy . Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2010. “Polity IV Project 
Dataset Users’ Manual: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–
2010.” Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. 
 Martin, Vanessa. 2005.  The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest, and the State in Nineteenth-
Century Persia . London: I. B. Tauris. 
 Mason, T. David, and Patrick J. Fett. 1996. “How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice 
Approach.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 40(4): 546–568. 
 Mason, Timothy. 1981. “Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the 
Interpretation of National Socialism.” In  The “ Führer State, ”  Myth and Reality: Stud-
ies on the Structure and Politics of the Third Reich , edited by Gerhard Hirschfeld and 
Lothar Kettenacker, 3–20. Stuttgart: Klett-Cota. 
 Mastny, Vojtech. 1972. “Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World 
War II.”  American Historical Review 77(2): 1365–1388. 
 Matar, Fuad. 1981.  Saddam Hussein: The Man, the Cause, and the Future . London: Third 
World Centre for Research and Publishing. 
 May, Ernest B. 2000.  Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France . New York: Hill and Wang. 
 McCrum, Robert. 1978. “French Rhineland Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, 
1919.”  Historical Journal 21(3): 623–648. 
 McLynn, F. J. 1979. “The Causes of the War of the Triple Alliance: An Interpretation.” 
Inter-American Economic Affairs 33(2): 21–43. 
 Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War.”  International Security 15(4): 5–56. 
Bibliography
[273]
 Michaelis, Meir. 1972. “World Power Status or World Dominion? A Survey of the 
Literature on Hitler’s ‘Plan of World Dominion’ (1937–1970).”  Historical Journal 
15(2): 331–360. 
 Miwa, Kimitada. 1975. “Japanese Images of War with the United States.” In  Mutual 
Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations , edited by Akira Iriye, 115–137. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. 
 Molnár, Miklós. 1971.  Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution . London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
 Moltmann, Günter. 1961. “Weltherrschaftsideen Hitlers.” In  Europa und Übersee: Fest-
schrift für Egmont Zechlin , edited by Otto Brunner and Dietrich Gerhard, 197–240. 
Hamburg: Verlag Hans Bredow-Institut. 
 Mommsen, Hans. 1991.  From Weimar to Auschwitz . Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 Montgomery, A. E. 1972. “The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920.” 
 Historical Journal 15(4): 775–787. 
 Moore, Will H., and David J. Lanoue. 2003. “Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign 
Policy: A Study of Cold War Confl ict Behavior.”  Journal of Politics 65(2): 376–
396. 
 Morrison, Donald G., and David C. Schmittlein. 1980. “Jobs, Strikes, and Wars: Prob-
ability Models for Duration.”  Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 25: 
224–251. 
 Mueller, John E. 1970. “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson.”  American 
Political Science Review 64(1): 18–34. 
 ——. 1973.  War, Presidents, and Public Opinion . New York: Wiley. 
 ——. Mueller, John. 1980. “The Search for the Breaking Point in Vietnam: The Statis-
tics of a Deadly Quarrel.”  International Studies Quarterly 24(4): 497–519. 
 ——. 1989.  Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War . New York: Basic 
Books. 
 ——. 1994.  Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 ——. 2004.  The Remnants of War . Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 Nakache, Karen. 1999.  La France et le Levant de 1918 à 1923: La Sort de la Cilicie et de ses 
Confi ns Militaires. Ph.D. diss., Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis. 
 Needell, Jeffrey D. 2006.  The Party of Order: The Conservatives, the State, and Slavery in 
the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871 . Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 Neillands, Robin. 2001.  The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive, 
1939–1945 . London: John Murray. 
 Neumann, Iver B. 1996.  Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and Interna-
tional Relations . London: Routledge. 
 Nincic, Miroslav. 1990. “U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection.”  World 
Politics 42(3): 370–396. 
 Nott, John. 2005. “A View from the Centre.” In  The Falklands Confl ict Twenty Years On: 
Lessons for the Future, edited by Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, and Mark Grove, 
57–63. London: Frank Cass. 
 Notter, Harley A. 1949.  Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 . Washington, 
DC: United States Department of State. 
 Nye, Joseph S. 2004.  Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics . New York: 
Public Affairs. 
 Oakes, Amy. 2006. “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Is-
lands.”  Security Studies 15(3): 431–463. 
 O’Neill, Barry. 2001. “Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory.”  International 
Studies Quarterly 45(4): 617–640. 
Bibliography
[274]
 Oren, Michael B. 2002.  Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle 
East . New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Organski, A.F.K. 1968.  World Politics . New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980.  The War Ledger . Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 Ostrom, Charles W. Jr., and Brian L. Job. 1986. “The President and the Political Use 
of Force.”  American Political Science Review 80(2): 541–566. 
 Outram, James. 1860.  Lieut.-General Sir James Outram’s Persian Campaign in 1857 . Lon-
don: Smith, Elder. 
 Overy, Richard. 1999. “Germany and the Munich Crisis: A Mutilated Victory?” In 
 The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II , edited by Igor Lukes and Erik 
Goldstein, 191–215. London: Frank Cass. 
 ——. 2001.  The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality . New York: W. W. Norton. 
 Owen IV, John M. 2010.  The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, 
States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010 . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Pastore, Mario. 1994. “State-Led Industrialization: The Evidence on Paraguay, 1852–
1870.”  Journal of Latin American Studies 26(2): 295–324. 
 Pedroncini, Guy. 1967.  Les Mutineries de 1917 . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
 Pelletiere, Stephen C. 1992.  The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum . New York: Praeger. 
 Peterson, Harold F. 1932. “Efforts of the United States to Mediate in the Paraguayan 
War.”  Hispanic American Historical Review 12(1): 2–17. 
 Phelps, Gilbert. 1975.  Tragedy of Paraguay . London: Charles Knight. 
 Pillar, Paul. 1983.  Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process . Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 Pion-Berlin, David. 1985. “The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina, 1976–1983.”  Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27(2): 55–76. 
 Plá, Josefi na. 1976.  The British in Paraguay, 1850–1870 . Richmond, UK: Richmond 
Publishing. 
 Pleshakov, Constantine. 2005.  Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II 
on the Eastern Front . Boston: Houghton Miffl in. 
 Powell, Robert. 1999.  In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Rela-
tions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 ——. 2002. “Bargaining Theory and International Confl ict.”  Annual Review of Politi-
cal Science 5: 1–30. 
 ——. 2004. “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting.”  American Journal of Political 
Science 48(2): 344–361. 
 ——. 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem.”  International Organization 60(1): 169–
203. 
 Power, Samantha. 2002.  A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide . New 
York: Basic Books. 
 Pozdeeva, Lydia V. 1994. “The Soviet Union: Territorial Diplomacy.” In  Allies at War: 
The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939–1945 , edited by David Reynolds, 
Warren F. Kimball, and A. O. Chubarian, 355–385. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
 Press, Daryl G. 2004–5. “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the ‘Ap-
peasement’ Crises of the 1930s.”  International Security 29(3): 136–169. 
 Pulcini, Theodore. 2003. “Russian Orthodoxy and Western Christianity: Confronta-
tion and Accommodation.” In  Russia and Western Civilization: Cultural and Histori-
cal Encounters , edited by Russell Bova, 78–112. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 Puryear, Vernon John. 1935.  International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East: A 




 Quinlivan, James T. 1999. “Coup-Proofi ng: Its Practice and Consequences in the 
Middle East.”  International Security 24(2): 131–165. 
 Rauschning, Hermann. 1940.  The Voice of Destruction . New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. 
 Rawlinson, Henry Creswick. 1875.  England and Russia in the East: A Series of Papers on 
the Political and Geographic Condition of Central Asia . London: J. Murray. 
 Reber, Vera Blinn. 1988. “The Demographics of Paraguay: A Reinterpretation of the 
Great War, 1864–70.”  Hispanic American Historical Review 68(2): 289–319. 
 ——. 2002. “Comment on ‘The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone.’ ”  Latin American 
Research Review 37(3): 129–136. 
 Reed, William. 2003. “Information, Power, and War.”  American Political Science 
Review 97(4): 633–641. 
 Reese, Roger. 1989. “A Note on a Consequence of the Expansion of the Red Army on 
the Eve of World War II.”  Soviet Studies 41(1): 135–140. 
 Reiter, Dan. 1995. “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost 
Never Happen.”  International Security 20(2): 5–34. 
 ——. 2003. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.”  Perspectives on Politics 1(1): 
27–43. 
 ——. 2009.  How Wars End . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Reiter, Dan, and Curtis Meek. 1999. “Determinants of Military Strategy, 1904–1999: 
A Quantitative Empirical Test.”  International Studies Quarterly 43: 363–387. 
 Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002.  Democracies at War . Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 Reynolds, David. 1985. “Churchill and the British ‘Decision’ to Fight on in 1940: 
Right Policy, Wrong Reasons.” In  Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World 
War , edited by Richard Langhorne, 147–167. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni ver -
sity Press. 
 ——. 1990. “1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century?”  International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1944–) 66(2): 325–350. 
 ——. 2001. “Churchill’s Writing of History: Appeasement, Autobiography, and ‘The 
Gathering Storm.’ ”  Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6th Ser., 11: 221–247. 
 ——. 2006.  From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International His-
tory of the 1940s . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Rich, Norman. 1973–74.  Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of 
Expansion . New York: W. W. Norton. 
 ——. 1985.  Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale . New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry 
D. Young. 1993. “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A 
Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 37(3): 504–535. 
 Richardson, Lewis F. 1960.  Statistics of Deadly Quarrels . Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press. 
 Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. 2008. “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? 
The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s.”  International Security 33(2): 
148–181. 
 Ritter, Gerhard. 1958.  The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth . London: O. Wolff. 
 Roberts, Andrew. 1991.  “The Holy Fox”: A Biography of Lord Halifax . London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 Roberts, Geoffrey. 2006.  Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 . New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 Robins, Philip. 1989. “Iraq in the Gulf War: Objectives, Strategies and Problems.” In 
 The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions , edited by Hanns W. Maull and 
Otto Pick, 45–59. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 Rock, David. 1985.  Argentina, 1516–1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands 
War . Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bibliography
[276]
 Rock, Stephen R. 1989.  Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical 
Perspective . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 Rolland, Denis. 2005.  La Grève Des Tranchées: Les Mutineries de 1917 . Paris: Imago. 
 Roosevelt, Elliott. 1946.  As He Saw It . New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 
 Ross, Michael L. 2004. “How Do Natural Resources Infl uence Civil War? Evidence 
from Thirteen Cases.”  International Organization 58(1): 35–67. 
 Rothfels, Hans. 1961.  The German Opposition to Hitler: An Assessment . London: O. 
Wolff. 
 Rubin, Barry. 1993. “The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement to War.” In 
 Iraq’s Road to War , edited by Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, 255–272. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press. 
 Runciman, Steven. 1951.  A History of the Crusades, Volume I: The First Crusade and 
the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox. 2000. “Clash of Civilizations, 
or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence.”  Journal of Peace Re -
search  37(5): 583–608. 
 Saakian, R. G. 1986.  Franko-Turetskie Otnosheniia i Kilikiia v 1918–1923 gg . Erevan: 
Izdatel’stvo AN Armianskoi SSR. 
 Saeger, James Schofi eld. 2007.  Francisco Solano López and the Ruination of Paraguay: 
Honor and Egocentrism . New York: Rowman & Littlefi eld. 
 Sagan, Scott D. 1988. “The Origins of the Pacifi c War.” In  The Origin and Prevention of 
Major Wars , edited by Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, 323–352. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Wayman. 2010.  Resort to War: 1816–2007 . 
Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 Sarmiento, Domingo F. [1845] 1998.  Facundo: Or, Civilization and Barbarism . New 
York: Penguin Books. 
 Scheina, Robert L. 2003.  Latin America’s Wars: The Age of the Caudillo, 1791–1899 . 
Washington, DC: Brassey’s. 
 Schelling, Thomas C. 1966.  Arms and Infl uence . New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 Schlafl ey, Phyllis. 1999. “Clinton’s Post-Impeachment Push for Power: How Clinton 
Is Using Kosovo.”  Phyllis Schlafl y Report 32(8): 1. 
 Schroeder, Paul W. 1972.  Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction 
of the European Concert. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 ——. 1994.  The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 . New York: Clarendon 
Press. 
 Schuessler, John M. 2009. “The Deception Dividend? FDR’s Undeclared War.” 
 International Security 34(4): 133–165. 
 Schulman, Milton. 1948.  Defeat in the West . New York: E. P. Dutton. 
 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman and Peter Petre. 1992. Ge neral H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The 
Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take a Hero . New York: Bantam Books. 
 Schweller, Randall L. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profi t: Bringing the Revisionist State 
Back In.”  International Security 19(1): 72–107. 
 ——. 1998.  Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy for World Conquest . New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 ——. 2006.  Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power . Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 




 Seifzadeh, Hossein S. 1997. “Revolution, Ideology, and the War.” In  Iranian Perspec-
tives on the Iran-Iraq War , edited by Farhang Rajaee, 90–97. Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida. 
 Self, Robert. 2006.  Neville Chamberlain: A Biography . Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
 Seward, Desmond. 1978.  The Hundred Years War: The English in France, 1337–1453 . 
New York: Atheneum. 
 Sherwood, Robert E. 1948.  The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate 
History . London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. 
 ——. 1950.  Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History . New York: Harper. 
 Shore, Zachary. 2003.  What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign 
Policy . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Simmel, Georg. 1898. “The Persistence of Social Groups.”  American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 3(5): 662–698. 
 ——. 1955.  Confl ict . Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
 Simpson, John. 1991.  From the House of War: John Simpson in the Gulf . London: 
Hutchinson. 
 Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. “Capability Distribution, 
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In  Peace, War, and Numbers , 
edited by Bruce Russett, 19–48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 Singer, J. David, and Melvin P. Small. 1972.  The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical 
Handbook . New York: John Wiley. 
 Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003a. “The Power to Hurt: Costly Confl ict with Completely 
Informed States.”  American Political Science Review 97(1): 123–135. 
 ——. 2003b. “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.”  American Po-
litical Science Review 97(4): 621–632. 
 ——. 2004. “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Confl ict and the Terms 
of Peace.”  American Journal of Political Science 48(4): 813–829. 
 Slantchev, Branislav L., and Ahmer Tarar. 2011. “Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist 
Cause of War.”  American Journal of Political Science 55(1): 135–148. 
 Sloan, Geoffrey. 2005. “The Geopolitics of the Falklands Confl ict.” In  The Falklands 
Confl ict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future , edited by Stephen Badsey, Rob 
Havers, and Mark Grove, 23–29. London: Frank Cass. 
 Sluch, Sergei Zinov’evich. 2004. “Rech’ Stalina, Kotoroi Ne Bylo.”  Otechestvennaia 
Istoriia (1): 113–139. 
 Smart, Nick. 2003.  British Strategy and Politics during the Phony War: Before the Balloon 
Went up . Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 Smith, Alastair. 1998a. “Fighting Battles, Winning Wars.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 
42(3): 301–320. 
 ——. 1998b. “International Crises and Domestic Politics.”  American Political Science 
Review 92(3): 623–638. 
 Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. “Bargaining and the Nature of War.”  Journal 
of Confl ict Resolution 48(6): 783–813. 
 Smith, Hugh. 2005. “What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theo-
ries of Casualty Aversion.”  Armed Forces and Society 31(4): 487–512. 
 Smith, Woodruff D. 1986.  The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism . New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 
 Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing. 1977.  Confl ict among Nations: Bargaining, Deci-
sion Making, and System Structure in International Crisis . Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
 Snyder, Jack L. 1991.  Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition . 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Bibliography
[278]
 Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan. 1975.  Turkish Diplomacy, 1918–1923: Mustafa Kemal and the 
Turkish Nationalist Movement . London: Sage. 
 Sprecher, Christopher, and Karl DeRouen Jr. 2002. “Israeli Military Actions and Inter-
nalization-Externalization Processes.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 46(2): 244–259. 
 Springhall, John. 2001.  Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas 
Empires. New York: Palgrave. 
 Stafford, David. 1980.  Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945: A Survey of the Spe-
cial Operations Executive, with Documents . London: Macmillan. 
 ——. 2006. “Churchill and SOE.” In  Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of 
War , edited by Mark Seaman, 47–60. London: Routledge. 
 Stanley, Elizabeth A. 2009.  Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination 
and the Korean War . Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 Stanley, Elizabeth A., and John P. Sawyer. 2009. “The Equifi nality of War Termina-
tion: Multiple Paths to Ending War.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 53(5): 651–676. 
 Stedman, Stephen John. 1997. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.”  International 
Security 22(2): 5–53. 
 Stein, Janice Gross. 1992. “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–1991: A 
Failed or Impossible Task?”  International Security 17(2): 147–179. 
 Stewart, Watt, and Harold F. Peterson. 1942.  Builders of Latin America . New York: 
Harper & Brothers. 
 Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Linda J. Bilmes. 2008.  The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True 
Cost of the Iraq Confl ict . New York: W. W. Norton. 
 Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Goch-
man. 2002. “The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.”  Con-
fl ict Management and Peace Science 19(2): 58– 66. 
 Tachjian, Vahé. 2004.  La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie: Aux Confi ns de la 
Turquie, de la Syrie et de l’Irak (1919–1933) . Paris: Éditions Karthala. 
 Tanenbaum, Jan Karl. 1978. “France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920.”  Transac-
tions of the American Philosophical Society 68(7): 1–50. 
 Tarar, Ahmer. 2006. “Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War.” 
 International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 169–188. 
 Taylor, A. J. P. 1961.  The Origins of the Second World War . New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 ——. 1964.  The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918 . New York: Penguin. 
 Taylor, Telford. 1952.  Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich . New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
 Thatcher, Margaret. 1993.  The Downing Street Years . New York: HarperCollins. 
 Thompson, George. 1869.  The War in Paraguay, with a Historical Sketch of the Country 
and Its People and Notes upon the Military Engineering of the War . London: Long-
mans, Green. 
 Thucydides. [ca. 400 BCE] 1954.  The Peloponnesian War . New York: Penguin Classics. 
 Toase, Francis. 2005. “The United Nations Security Resolution 502.” In T he Falklands 
Confl ict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future , edited by Stephen Badsey, Rob 
Havers, and Mark Grove, 147–169. London: Frank Cass. 
 Toft, Monica Duffy. 2006. “Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Ex-
planations for War.”  Security Studies 15(1): 34–69. 
 Toynbee, Arnold J. 1922.  The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the 
Contact of Civilizations . London: Constable. 
 Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991.  History and Strategy . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 ——. 2005. “The Bush Strategy in Historical Perspective.” In  Nuclear Transformation: 
The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine , edited by James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen, 9–22. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bibliography
[279]
 Trask, David F. 1981.  The War with Spain in 1898 . New York: Macmillan. 
 Trevor-Roper, Hugh Redwald. 1960. “Hitlers Kriegsziele.”  Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitge-
schichte 8(2): 121–133. 
 Tusicisny, Andrej. 2004. “Civilizational Confl icts: More Frequent, Longer, Bloodier?” 
 Journal of Peace Research 41(4): 485–498. 
 Vacs, Aldo C. 1987. “Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization in Argentina.” In 
 Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America , edited by James M. 
Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, 15–42. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 Van Dyke, Carl. 1997.  The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939–40 . London: Frank Cass. 
 Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.”  International 
Security 22(4): 5–43. 
 Villa, Brian L. 1976. “The U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and the Potsdam 
Proclamation.”  Journal of American History 63(1): 66–92. 
 Viorst, Milton. 1991. “Report from Baghdad.”  New Yorker 24: 55–73. 
 von Clausewitz, Carl. 1976.  On War . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Vuchinich, Samuel, and Jay Teachman. 1993. “The Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, 
and Family Arguments.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 37: 544–568. 
 Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. “Bargaining and War.”  American Journal of Political Science 
44(3): 469–484. 
 Waller, John H. 1990.  Beyond the Khyber Pass: The Road to British Disaster in the First 
Afghan War . New York: Random House. 
 Walpole, Spencer. 1912.  A History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 
1815 . London: Longmans, Green. 
 Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.”  International 
Organization 51(3): 335–364. 
 ——. 2002.  Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars . Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979.  Theory of International Politics . New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 Wang, Kevin H. 1996. “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational 
Choice and Domestic Politics.”  Journal of Confl ict Resolution 40(1): 68–97. 
 Warlimont, Walter. 1964.  Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–45 . New York: Praeger. 
 Warren, Harris Gaylord. 1978.  Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar Decade, 
1869–1878 . Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at 
 Austin. 
 Washburn, Charles A. 1871.  The History of Paraguay, with Notes of Personal Observa-
tions, and Reminiscences of Diplomacy under Diffi culties . Boston: Lee and Shepard. 
 Wawro, Geoffrey. 1996.  The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy 
in 1866 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Wei, Henry. 1956.  China and Soviet Russia . Princeton: D. Van Nostrand. 
 Weinberg, Gerhard L. 1964. “Hitler’s Image of the United States.”  American Historical 
Review 69(4): 1006–1021. 
 ——. 1995. Ge rmany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World 
History . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 ——. 2005.  Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Weisiger, Alex. 2012. “Victory without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termi-
nation.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Pennsylvania. 
 Weiss, Herbert K. 1963. “Stochastic Models for the Duration and Magnitude of a 
‘Deadly Quarrel’.”  Operations Research 11(1): 101–121. 




 Whigham, Thomas. 1991.  The Politics of River Trade: Tradition and Development in the 
Upper Plata, 1780–1870 . Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
 ——. 2002.  The Paraguayan War, Volume 1. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
 ——. 2004. “The Paraguayan War: A Catalyst for Nationalism in South America.” In 
 I Die with My Country: Perspectives on the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870 , edited by 
Hendrik Kraay and Thomas Whigham, 179–198. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press. 
 Whigham, Thomas L., and Barbara Potthast. 1990. “Some Strong Reservations: A 
Critique of Vera Blinn Reber’s ‘The Demographics of Paraguay: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Great War, 1864–70.’ ”  Hispanic American Historical Review 70(4): 667–
675. 
 ——. 1999. “The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New Insights into the Demographics of 
the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870.”  Latin American Research Review 34(1): 174–186. 
 Williams, John Hoyt. 1979.  The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800–1870 . 
Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin. 
 Wittman, Donald. 1979. “How a War Ends: A Rational Choice Approach.”  Journal of 
Confl ict Resolution 23(4): 743–763. 
 Wittmer, Felix. 1953.  The Yalta Betrayal: Data on the Decline and Fall of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers. 
 Woods, Kevin M., Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James 
G. Lacey. 2006.  The Iraqi Perspective Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 
Saddam’s Senior Leadership . Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 
Joint Center for Operational Analysis. 
 Woodward, Bob. 1991.  The Commanders . New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 ——. 2004.  Plan of Attack . New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 Woodward, Sir Llewellyn. 1962.  British Foreign Policy in the Second World War . Lon-
don: Her Majesty’s Stationary Offi ce. 
 ——. 1971.  British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume II . London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Offi ce. 
 Wrede-Braden, Antonia Catharina. 2007.  Reputation for Retreat: Casualty-Aversion and 
the Declining Credibility of Democracies ’ Threats . Ph.D. diss., Harvard Uni versity. 
 Wright, Quincy. 1970. “How Hostilities Have Ended: Peace Treaties and Alterna-
tives.”  Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 392: 51–61. 
 Yagame, Kazuo. 2006.  Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan, 1937–1941: A 
Critical Appraisal of the Three-Time Prime Minister . Jefferson, NC: McFarland. 
 Yetiv, Steve A. 2004.  Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making & the Persian Gulf 
War . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 Zeidner, Robert F. 2005.  The Tricolor over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 
1918–1922 . Ankara: Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History. 
 Zürcher, Erik Jan. 1984.  The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and 
Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926 . Leiden: E. J. Brill. 
 Index 
Note : Page numbers followed by  f , m , and  t refer to fi gures, maps, and tables 
respectively. Pages numbers followed by n or nn indicate notes. 
 Barrios, Justo Rufi no, 236 n 24 
 Beck, Ludwig, 111 
 Belaúnde, Fernando, 187 
 Bennett, D. Scott, 6, 65–66 
 Blainey, Geoffrey, 14, 28, 34, 37, 39, 
204 
 Blanco regime, in Uruguay, 88, 92, 94, 98, 
237 n 38 
 Bolivian-Chilean c onfl ict, 229 n 11 
 Borges, Jorge Luis, 179 
 Brazil 
 intervention in Uruguay, 87, 90, 94, 
96–99 
 military strength, 92 
 traditional rivalry with Argentina, 88, 
90–91, 95–96 
 see also Paraguayan War 
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 20, 222 n 28 
 Britain. See Anglo-Iranian War; Crimean 
War; Falklands War; World War II in 
Europe 
 Broszat, Martin, 108, 235 n 35 
 Bulgaria, 118, 138 
 Bush, George H.W. and administration 
of, Persian Gulf War and, 
160–70 
 Capability shifts, quantitative analysis 
and, 61, 63, 70–72, 75–76, 79, 84 
 Cappella, Rosella, 60 
 Cederman, Lars-Erik, 6 
 Chamberlain, Neville, 126–27, 128, 129, 
130, 134, 135 
 Chile, 182, 190, 236 n 24 
 Afghanistan, and First Afghan War, 172. 
 See also Anglo-Iranian W ar 
 Alliance strategy, riskiness of, 18 
 Amin, Idi, 50 
 Anglo-Iranian War, 170–76 
 history of, 170–72, 253 n 40 
 informational mechanism and 
underestimation of British resolve, 
36, 172–74, 205 
 limits of preventive war mechanism, 
174–75, 177 
 research strategy and, 56 
 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, 8, 35, 41 
 Argentina 
 military strength, 92 
 traditional rivalry with Brazil, 88, 90–91, 
95–96 
 see also Falklands War; Paraguayan War 
 Argyll, Duke of, 144–45 
 Austria 
 Crimean War, 142, 144, 146, 247 n 8 
 Nazi expansion and, 107 
 Paraguay and, 101 
 Aziz, Tariq, 154, 165 
 Baker, James, 165 
 Bargaining model of war 
 alternative mechanisms, 14–15 
 decline and, 16 
 defi nition and assumptions, 13–14 
 preventive war mechanism and, 17 
 theoretical advancements and, 7 






 Japan and World War II, 147, 148, 150 
 probability of confl ict with U.S., 214–15, 
217, 259 n 10 
 as rising power, 17–18, 24 
 Chiozza, Giacomo, 46–47 
 Churchill, Winston S., 33, 107, 110 
 unconditional surrender and, 106, 123, 
124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 134, 135–36, 
137, 139, 244 n 116, 247 n 184 
 unpopularity and initial political 
weakness of, 129 
 Cilicia. See Franco-Turkish War 
 Civil war s 
 implications for, 210–12 
 internationalized, 58–59 
 Clausewitz, Carl von, 6, 13 
 Clodfelter, Micheal, 60 
 Coe, Andrew J., 220–21 n 11 
 Cold War, security dilemma and, 32, 
224 n 52 
 Colombia, 236 n 24 
 Commitment pr oblem 
 defi ned, 3–4, 11–12 
 quantitative analysis and, 56, 57–58, 63, 
66, 68–72, 71 f , 75–76, 77–80, 78  f , 
84–85 
 war duration and intensity, 22 f 
 see also Preventive war mechanism; 
Unconditional surrender 
mechanism 
 Confl ict management, implications for, 
212–14 
 Conquest and settlement 
 defi nitions, 24 
 operationalization and measurement, 
66–68, 67 t 
 quantitative analysis and, 74–80, 77 t , 
78 f , 79  f 
 Constructive engagement, in Persian Gulf 
War, 163 
 Continentalists, on German war aims, 120, 
242 n 79 
 Copeland, D ale, 1 11, 219 n 8, 239 n 24, 
240 n 50 
 Correlates of War (COW) dataset, used in 
statistical analysis, 58, 60, 64, 65, 71, 
229 n 8, 229  n 11 
 Cox spe cifi cations, in quantitative 
analysis, 68, 232 n 42 
 Crimean War, 141–47 
 Anglo-Russian rivalry, 141–43 
 British preventive motivations, 20, 31, 
247 n 10 
 expansive war aims, 142, 143–45, 
247 n 9 
 fi nal settlement and, 142–43 
 as possible distraction in Anglo-Iranian 
War, 173, 176, 253 n 46 
 quantitative analysis and, 62 
 research strategy and, 56 
 Russian willingness to negotiate, 141, 
142, 145–47 
 strategic si gnifi cance of Constantinople, 
24, 141–43, 208, 210, 247 n 7, 248 n 12 
 Cyclic theories of international politics, 16 
 Czechoslovakia, 107 
 Deaths, in war.  See War destructiveness 
 Decline, fear of as cause of war, 3–4.  See 
also Commitment problems 
 Democracy 
 hypothesis about, 52–53 
 quantitative analysis and, 63–64, 72, 73 f , 
73 t , 74, 76, 77  t , 78, 81  t , 82–83, 84 
 Destructiveness. See War destructiveness 
 Deterrent, cost of maintaining as 
explanation for war, 15, 220 n 11 
 Dispositional commitment problem.  See 
Unconditional surrender mechanism 
 Divergent expectations.  See I nformational 
mechanism 
 Diversionary war.  See Falklands War; 
Principal-agent mechanism 
 Domestic politics and war.  See P rincipal-
agent mechanism 
 Duration models.  See Event history 
models 
 Economic cost of war.  See W ar 
destructiveness 
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 47, 132 
 El Salvador, 44 
 Elizalde, Rufi no de, 102 
 Equifi nality, as characteristic of wars, 2–3, 
6, 54, 76, 78, 212 
 Event history models 
 Cox proportional hazard model, 
68 
 test of proportional hazard assumption, 
232 n 42 
 see also Quantitative analysis; Statistical 
analysis 
 Evil dictators.  See Un conditional 
surrender mechanism 
 Fahd, king of Saudi Arabia, 164 
 Falklands War, 178–90, 201–2 
Index
[283]
 diversionary motive for Argentine 
junta, 50, 179, 181, 190 
 government weakness, 181–83 
 invasion as gamble, 183, 189–90 
 unsuccessful attempt to prolong war, 
188–89 
 history of dispute, 179–81 
 importance of informational mecha-
nism, 183–86 
 limits of preventive war mechanism, 
186–87 
 quantitative analysis and, 67–68 
 research strategy and, 56 
 unconditional surrender mechanism, 29 
 Fieldhouse, John, 186 
 Fine, Jason P., 75 
 Finland, 137–38 
 First Afghan War, 172 
 First-strike advantage, 25 
 Flores, Venancio, 88, 90, 96, 97 
 France 
 Allied unconditional surrender strategy 
and, 122–23 
 British pessimism after fall of, 126–28, 
244 n 16 
see also Crimean War; Franco-Turkish 
War; World War II, in Europe 
 Francia, José Gaspar de, 95 
 Franco-Austrian War, 6, 38, 226 n 70 
 Franco-Turkish War, 56, 178–79, 190–202, 
206–7 
 history of, 191, 192 f , 193–94, 256 nn 53, 54 
 limits of information mechanism, 200 
 limits of preventive war mechanism, 
199–200 
 principle-agent mechanism, 190, 
200–202 
 colonial faction in French politics, 
194–96, 257 n 69 
 domestic constraints eventually force 
withdrawal, 197–98 
 suppression of information about 
war, 196–97, 198, 207 
 Galtieri, Leopoldo, 182, 185, 188–89 
 George-Picot, François, 195 
 Germany. See World War I; World War II, 
in Europe 
 Glaspie, April, 162–63 , 251 n 12 
 Globalists, German war aims and, 120, 
242 n 79 
 Godfrey of Bouillon, 222 n 25 
 Goebbels, Joseph, 110 
 Goemans, Hein F., 45, 47, 72 
 Gorchakov, Alexander, 146 
 Göring, Hermann, 117–18 
 Gouraud, Henri, 197, 198, 201 
 Gray, Robert J., 75 
 Guatemala, 236 n 24 
 Haig, Alexander, 180, 185, 187 
 Halifax, Lord, 123, 127, 129, 130, 131, 
134–35, 243 n 100, 246 n 156 
 Hernández, Fidel Sánchez, 44 
 Hess, Rudo lf, 241 n 69 
 Hildebrand, Klaus, 108 
 Hillgruber, Andreas, 108 
 Himmler, Heinrich, 118, 125, 242 n 71 
 Hirohito, emperor, 46, 152 
 Hitler, Adolf, 18, 33, 48 
 advocacy for preventive war, 
113–14 
 ideology, 9, 105, 108, 112–14, 133, 139, 
208, 239 n 24, 243 n 90 
 informational mechanism and, 108–10 
 invasion of Soviet Union not mistake, 
108–19 
Mein Kampf , 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 
133, 238 n 7, 239 n 25, 240 n 51, 
243 n 87, 245 n 151 
 principle-agent mechanism and, 110–11 
 racial beliefs, 108, 113, 119–20, 133, 
239 n 24, 240 n 35, 243 n 90 
 reasons for continuing to fi ght after 
Stalingrad, 107, 110, 129, 131 
 second, unpublished book, 112, 120, 
121, 2 37 n 7, 239 n 25 
 unconditional surrender mechanism 
and, 27, 209–10, 222 n 38 
 Hull, Cordell, 130, 132 
 Hungary, 29 , 138, 222 n 25, 247 n 47 
 Huntington, Samuel P., 65, 232 n 33 
 Hussein, Sa ddam 
 Iran-Iraq War and, 153–58, 160, 208, 
249 n 47 
 Persian Gulf War and, 160–70, 205 
 U.S. invasion of Iraq and, 18, 35–36 
 India, 170, 172, 173, 185, 195, 228 n 109 
 Informational me chanism 
 confl ict management implications, 
204–5, 212–13 
 defi ned, 4–5, 7 
 divergent expectations, 34–36, 53, 
225 nn 57, 67 
 external actors and, 35–36, 37 




Informational mechanism, divergent 
expectations (continued)
 potential rationality of war given, 34–35 
 sources of, 35, 37 
 as explanation for limited wars, 11, 12, 
36–42 
 revision of beliefs once war begins, 
40–41 
 war duration and intensity, 41–42, 41 f 
 hypotheses, 39–40 
 implausibility of explanations for 
unlimited wars, 39 
 internal constraints and, 31 
 quantitative analysis and, 58, 72, 75, 76, 
78, 78 f , 8 4 
 see also specifi c case studies 
 International anarchy, as insuffi cient 
explanation for unconditional 
surrender, 27 
 Internationalized civil wars, 58–59 
 Interstate c onfl icts 
 defi ned for statistical analysis, 58 
 frequency and destructiveness of, 2 f 
 Intrastate c onfl icts.  See Civil wars, 
implications for 
 Iranian Revolution, 24, 153, 154, 208, 
250 nn 59, 65 
 Iran-Iraq War, 6, 152–58, 160, 208, 216, 217, 
249 n 47 
 history of, 153–54 
 limits of principle-agent mechanism, 
155–56, 249 n 47 
 preventive war mechanism and Iraq, 
154–55, 156, 157, 158 
 quantitative analysis and, 62 
 research strategy and, 56 
 unconditional surrender mechanism, 
28, 30, 152, 153, 210, 223 n 46 
 Iraq. See Iran-Iraq War; Iraq War; Persian 
Gulf War 
 Iraq W ar 
 civil war and, 222 n 30 
 informational mechanism, 35, 36 
 insurgency and, 212 
 nuclear weapons fears, 230 n 17 
 principal agent mechanism, 48 
 U.S. i nvasion 
 preventive war mechanism, 16–17, 
21, 22,  220–21 n 11 
 unconditional surrender mechanism, 29 
 Ironside, Edmund, 122 
 Israel 
 Persian Gulf War, 166 
 Six Day War, 8, 35, 41 
 Issue indivisibilities, as explanation for 
war, 14–15, 220 n 6 
 Italy, 38, 124 
 opportunity to negotiate in World War II, 
132, 137 
 Japan. See Nomonhan Border War; World 
War II, in the Pacifi c 
 Jodl, Alfred, 1 16 
 Johnson, Lyndon, 51 
 Jordán, Ricardo López, 96 
 Kant, Immanuel, 14 
 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 193, 197–98, 
199, 200 
 Kennedy, Edward, 165 
 Khan, Dost Mohammed, 253 n 45 
 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 153, 155, 157, 
158 
 Kleist, Peter, 118 
 Konoe, Fumimaro, 149 
 Korean W ar 
 principle-agent mechanism, 46, 47 
 quantitative analysis and, 66–67 
 Kosovo W ar 
 informational mechanism and, 37 
 principle-agent mechanism, 48 
 Kuwait. See Persian Gulf War 
 Kydd, Andrew H., 213 
 Lebensraum, 105, 108, 112–14, 117, 119, 
122, 238 n 5, 239 n 26 
 Leygues, Georges, 198 
 Limited wars, 8, 11, 33–34 
 informational mechanism and, 
34–42 
 principal agent mechanism and, 42–53 
 López, Carlos Antonio, 92, 95 
 López, Francisco Solano, 101–3, 232 n 34, 
234 n 1 
 belief in Paraguayan decline, 23, 94–100, 
236 nn 19, 23, 24 
 death of, 90 
 sanity questioned, 86, 87, 91–92, 93–94, 
235 n 17 
 war aims of, 96–99 
 willingness to negotiate, 21, 91, 98, 100, 
208 
 Maddison, Angus, 60 
 Malvinas Islands.  See Falklands War 
 Marshall, George C., 124 
 Mediation, 213 
 Meek, Curtis, 82 
Index
[285]
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 112, 116, 119, 120, 121, 
122, 133, 238 n 7, 2 39 n 25, 240 n 51, 
243 n 87, 245 n 151 
 Mendez, Nicanor Costa, 185 
 Military st rategy 
 measuring risky strategies, 65–70 
 statistical determinants of, 80–83 
 Milosovic, Slobodan, 37 
 Misbehaving leaders.  See P rincipal-agent 
mechanism 
 Mitre, Bartolomé, 90, 92–93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 
103 
 rise to power destabilized Platine 
politics, 86, 88, 232 n 34 
 willingness to negotiate, 100, 101–2, 104, 
243 n 43 
 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 115, 121 
 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 107, 127 
 Mommsen, Hans, 108 
 Motivated bias, British unconditional 
surrender position and, 128, 244 n 126 
 Mubarek, Hosni, 162 
 Mutual overoptimism.  See I nformational 
mechanism 
 Nagano, Osami, 149 
 National Military Capabilities dataset, 62, 
63, 65, 82, 230 n 18 
 Natural resources, civil wars and, 211 
 Nesselrode, Karl, 144, 146, 248 n 19 
 Nicholas I, tsar of Russia, 143, 144, 145, 
146, 147, 247 n 10, 248 n 19 
 Nomonhan border war, 38 
 Nott, John, 186 
 Nuclear we apons 
 implications for future confl icts, 13, 216 
 Iraq War and, 230 n 17 
 Ottoman Empi re 
 decline of, and Crimean War, 141–47 
 post-World War I plans for, 191, 192 f , 
193–94 
 see also Franco-Turkish War 
 Overoptimism. See I nformational 
mechanism 
 Pacifi c War (South America), 229 n 11 
 Pacifi c War (World War II).  See World War 
II, in the Pacifi c 
 Palmerston, Lord, 172, 175 
 Paraguayan War, 18, 23, 86–104, 216–17, 
234 n 1 
 destructiveness of, 6, 30, 86, 235 n 2 
 history of, 88, 89 m , 90–91 
 informational mechanism, 91–94, 99, 
237 n 43 
 Argentine disunion, 92–93, 96, 101 
 limits of as explanation for eventual 
destructiveness, 94 
 Paraguayan military strength, 92 
 limitations of principle-agent mecha-
nism, 102–3, 237 n 52 
 preventive war mechanism, 98, 99, 
208–9 
 Argentine refusal to recognize 
Paraguayan independence, 86, 
95–96 
 Paraguayan expectations of decline, 
23, 94–100, 236 nn 19, 23, 24 
 Paraguayan war aims, 96–99 
 quantitative analysis and, 62, 232 n 34 
 research strategy and, 56 
 security dilemma and, 32 
 unconditional surrender mechanism 
 Argentine openness to negotiation, 
100, 237 n 43 
 Brazilian refusal to negotiate, 28, 88, 
91, 100 
 dispositional explanations for 
Paraguayan expansion, 87–88, 
101–3 
 Pedro II, emperor of Brazil, 87, 100, 104, 
237 n 43 
 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 187 
 Persian Gulf War, 159–70 
 history of, 159–61 
 informational mechanism and, 35–36, 
160, 176–77, 205 
 Iraqi army’s performance, 162, 
163–64 
 Iraqi expectations of U.S. casualty 
aversion, 161, 162–63, 250 n 5, 
251 nn 9, 10 
 Kuwait refusal to make concessions, 
162, 250 n 3 
 negotiation during war, 25, 166 
 reasons for quick war termination, 
160–61, 166–68 
 reasons for U.S. optimism, 164–66 
 Saudi willingness to provide bases, 
161–62, 164, 165, 168, 170, 
251 nn 17, 18 
 limits of commitment problem 
mechanism, 46, 47–48, 168–69, 
177 
 limits of principle-agent mechanism, 
169 
 research strategy and, 56 
Index
[286]
 Philippines, U.S. seizure of, 25 
 Policy wars (nondiversionary principal 
agent confl icts), 7, 43, 201 
 quantitative analysis and, 228 n 1 
see also Franco-Turkish War; Principal-
agent mechanism 
 Positive utility, as explanation for war, 15 
 Powell, Robert, 39, 220 nn 6, 11 
 Power transition theory of war, 16 
 Preventive war mechanism, 11–12, 16–25, 
204, 207–10 
 confl ict management implications, 213 
 defi ned, 4, 7 
 as explanation for unlimited war, 16–25 
 duration and intensity, 49 f , 52–53 
 fi ghting to conquest, 24 
 high war aims, 21, 22–23 
 possibility of short but decisive wars, 
20–22, 24 
 risky military strategy, 23–24 
 as explanation for war, 16–25 
 diplomacy as potential alternative to 
war, 18–19, 222 n 25 
 incentives to engage in war, 24–25 
 reasons for failure of rising power to 
allay opponent’s fears, 18–19 
 reasons to fear decline, 3–4, 16–18, 
61–68, 229 n 15, 230 nn 17–20 
 hypotheses, 2 2–24 
 measuring anticipated decline, 61–63 
 quantitative analysis and, 70–72, 75–83, 
207–8 
 unconditional surrender and, 25–26, 
30–32 
 see also specifi c case studies 
 Principal-agent mechanism, 3, 11, 12, 53, 
204, 205–7 
 confl ict management implications, 213 
 defi ned, 7 
 diversionary wars, 43, 46–50, 49 f , 178, 
205, 227 nn 95, 98, 105 
 as explanation for limited war, 12, 
42–49 
 constraints on leaders, 42–43, 45–49, 
52, 53 
 hypotheses, 49–50, 52–53 
 internal constraints and, 31, 223 n 49 
 policy wars, 43, 49–52, 49 f 
 quantitative analysis, 46–47, 58, 72, 78, 
84 
 unifi es argument about domestic 
politics and war, 43–44 
 war duration and intensity, 49–50, 49 f 
 see also specifi c case studies 
 Private information.  See I nformational 
mechanism 
 Quantitative analysis, 57–85 
 central fi ndings, 57–58 
 data and measurement, 58–68, 229 n 15, 
230 nn 17–20 
 statistical tests, 68–83 
 disaggregating types of war 
termination, 74–80, 77 t , 78  f , 79  f 
 general predictions, 69–74, 69 t , 71  f , 
73 f , 73  t 
 tests of ancillary hypothesis, 80–83, 
81 t 
 Rauschning, Hermann, 120, 242 n 80 
 Realist focus on systemic wars, 6, 219 n 8 
 Regime change, unconditional surrender 
and, 29 
 Reiter, Dan, 27, 82, 222 n 28, 234 n 56, 
245 n 150 
 Research strategy, 54–57, 228 nn 1, 2.  See 
also Quantitative analysis 
 Reynolds, David, 126 
 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 115 
 Rich, Norman, 147 
 Risk-acceptance, as explanation for war, 
15 
 Romania, 138 
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 30 
 death o f, 242 n 75 
 domestic constraints on, 5, 227 n 104 
 unconditional surrender and, 28, 29, 
124, 125, 126, 127, 129–30, 131–32, 
136–37, 137, 138, 151, 243 n 102 
 Rosas, Juan Mauel de, 93, 101, 103 
 Russia. See Crimean War; Soviet Union; 
World War II, in Europe 
 Russo-Finnish War, 109, 115 
 Russo-Hungarian c onfl ict, 29 
 Russo-Japanese War, 6, 113 
 Russo-Polish War, 41 
 Russo-Turkish War, 143 
 Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf War and, 
161–62, 164, 165, 168, 170, 251 nn 17, 18 
 Schleswig-Holstein Wars, 41 
 Schlieffen Plan, 23–24 
 Second Opium War (Arrow War), 176, 
254 n 57 
 Security dilemma, unconditional 
surrender mechanism, 32–33, 224 n 53 
 Settlement. See Conquest and settlement 
 Seymour, Lord, 144 
Index
[287]
 Shifting power.  See Preventive war 
mechanism 
 Sincere demand for unconditional 
surrender, 8, 16, 26, 27–33, 209, 
224 n 54 
 Sino-Indian c onfl ict, quantitative analysis 
and, 66–67 
 Situational commitment problem.  See 
Preventive war mechanism 
 Slantchev, Branislav, 65 
 Smith, Alastair, 39  
 Somalia, 212 
 “Sons of the soil” wars, 222 n 35 
 Soviet Un ion 
 German war aims and alliance and 
invasion of, 107, 109–10, 113–19 
 Japan and World War II, 151 
 Persian Gulf War, 166 
 Spanish-American War, 25, 44 
 Spoiler problem, civil wars and, 211, 212 
 Stalin, Jo sef, 221 n 19 
 Germany and World War II, 110, 115, 
116, 138–39, 24 5 n 152 
 Japan and World War II, 151 
 purported peace feelers, 118–19 
 Stam, Allan C. III, 6, 39, 65–66 
 Stark, Harold R., 124 
 Statistical analysis, case studies and 
research strategy, 54–57 
 Survival models.  See Event history models 
 Sweden, 220 n 11 
 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 191, 192 m , 193, 
195 
 Taiwan, 215 
 Taylor, A.J.P., 108, 239 n 24 
 Thatcher, Margaret, 185, 186 
 Third Punic War, 223 n 44 
 Thucydides, 14, 16 
 Triple Alliance, Treaty of, 102, 236 n 35 
 Triple Alliance, War of the.  See P ara-
guayan War 
 Uganda-Tanzania War, 46, 50, 67 
 Unconditional surrender mechanism 
 dispositional commitment problem, 4, 
7, 12, 26, 27–30, 53 
 hypotheses, 29, 31–33 
 insuffi ciency of international anarchy as 
alternative explanation, 27 
 preventive war’s connection to, 25–26 
 initiator’s incorrect beliefs, 26, 31–32 
 undertaken by target of preventive 
war, 26, 30–31 
 as puzzle for bargaining model, 27 
 research strategy and, 55 
 security dilemma and, 32–33, 224 n 53 
 see also specifi c case studies 
 United St ates 
 Falklands War and, 185, 187, 188, 
255 n 41 
 Franco-Turkish War and, 257 n 73 
 implications for confl ict with China, 
214–15, 217, 259 n 10 
 Paraguayan War and, 91 
 see also Persian Gulf War; World War II, 
in Europe; World War II, in the 
Pacifi c 
 Unlimited wars, 8, 11, 16, 203 
 implausibility of informational 
explanations for, 39 
 implausibility of principal-agent 
explanations for, 49 
 preventive war mechanism and, 16–25 
 unconditional surrender mechanism 
and, 25–33 
 Urquiza, Justo José de, 87, 92–93, 94, 
96, 103, 235 n 14, 237 n 48 
 Uruguay 
 Brazilian intervention in, 87, 90, 94, 
96–99 
 strategic s ignifi cance of, prior to 
Paraguayan War, 88, 89 m 
 Vance, Cyrus, 165 
 Velayati, Ali Akbar, 156 
 Videla, Jorge Rafael, 182 
 Vietnam W ar 
 informational mechanism, 34–35, 36, 
225 n 59 
 principle-agent mechanism, 47, 51, 
228 n 112 
 Walter, Barbara, 211 
 War destructiveness, 7–8 
 economic costs of, defi nition and 
measurement, 60–61, 83, 229 n 14 
 war intensity, defi nition and measure-
ment, 60, 83 
 war severity, defi nition and measure-
ment, 59–60, 83 
 War duration, 22 f , 41–42, 49–50, 49  f , 52–53 
 War Initiation and Termination (WIT) 
project, 60, 64, 65, 231 n 22 
 War of the Triple Alliance.  See P araguayan 
War 
 War severity.  See War destructiveness 
 Welles, Sumner, 136 
Index
[288]
 Weltpolitik, 239  n 26 
 World War I 
 Hitler’s ideology and, 19, 119 
 informational mechanism, 35, 37, 39, 
40–41 
 preventive war mechanism, 17, 19, 21, 
23 
 principle-agent mechanism, 46 
 World War II, in Europe, 105–40, 217 
 informational mechanism and, 37 
 Japan and, 149 
 limits of informational explanations, 
108–10, 205 
 British pessimism after fall of France, 
126–28, 244 n 16 
 German expansion not about 
overoptimism, 108–9 
 unable to explain unconditional 
surrender, 110–11, 125–29 
 limits of principle-agent mechanism 
explanations, 108–9, 129–30 
 preventive war mechanism, 25, 105–6, 
139, 208–9, 221 n 19 
 German rearmament and, 114–19, 
240 nn 45, 50 
 limits to German expansion, 119–22 
 Nazi ideology, 112–14, 238 n 5, 
239 nn 24, 26, 28, 240 n 35 
 shifting power motivations, 117–19, 
241 nn 66, 69 
 unable to explain unconditional 
surrender, 130–32 
 principle-agent mechanism, 46, 47, 48, 
227 n 104 
 quantitative analysis and, 62, 67 
 unconditional surrender mechanism, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 106–7, 122–39, 209–10, 
223 n 46, 248 n 24 
 alternatives to Hitler and, 138–39 
 British refusal to negotiate after fall of 
France, 106, 122–23, 131 
 dispositional commitment problem, 
133–37, 140 
 early commitment to, in United 
States, 124–25 
 German peace feelers, 117–19, 125, 
138 
 Germany’s European allies and, 134, 
137–38, 210 
 purported Soviet peace probes, 
118–19 
 refusal to negotiate not driven by 
alliance politics, 132, 245 n 146 
 U.S. and preventive motivations, 17 
 World War II, in the Pacifi c, 67, 68, 
147–52 
 Japanese expansionism and war aims 
prior to, 148–49, 150, 152 
 Japanese pessimism about war, 149–50, 
152 
 preventive war mechanism, 147, 150, 
151, 152, 208 
 research strategy and, 56 
 unconditional surrender mechanism, 
30, 124, 125, 130, 137–38, 148–49, 
151–52, 210, 222 nn 38, 39, 223 n 45 
 Yamamoto, Isoroku, 149 
